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°5267

D Not Scanned

Winer, Michael S.

CorpOratB Author

United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)

ROUOrt/ArtlClB TitlO Rsbuttal Comments of Respondent Environmental
Protection Agency in re: Emergency Suspension
Orders for 2,4,5-T and Silvex, April 4, 1979

Journal/Book Title
Year
Month/Day
Color
Number of Images

A ril 4

P

D

°

Descripton Notes

Tuesday, March 05, 2002

Page 5267 of 5363

�UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY

In re: Emergency suspension Orders
for 2,4,5-T and Silvex

)
)
)

FIFRA Docket Nos,
409, 410

REBUTTAL COMMENTS OF RESPONDENT
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY

Michael S. Winer
Dorothy E. Patton
Patricia A. Roberts
Ellen Siegler
Kevin M. Lee
Timothy D. Backstrom
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY
401 M Street, S.W.
Washington, D.C. 20460
April 4, 1979

�I he:.eby c e r t i f y chat copies of tine foregoing "Rebuttal Comments
of Respondent Environmental Protection Agency" were hand-delivered or
availed first; class postage p r e p a i d , on April 4, 1979, 10 the following

G. K. F r i t h , President
Tobacco Scales C h e m i c a l Coraoany ,
P.O. Box 12045
Lexington, Kentucky 40580

T i mo t h y A t k e s o n
31 e o t o e i J o h n s o n
Chevron Chemical Company
1250 Connecticut A v e n u e , N.W.
Washington, D.C. 2003S

"£. v e!. e t c Meal m a n
? 81 G o r d o n C o r p
300 3 o u ch 3rd
Kansas C i t y , K3 55113

Shrikant V. K u l k a r n i , Ph.D.
Manager, Pesticide Labeling
Vertac Technical Center
P.O. Box 941
West Memphis, AR 72301

tiouston G-_*rvais, President
Louisiana Pesticide Applicators Assoc
Baton Rouce, LA 70303

Ro be r t L . A c ke r 1 y
Sellers, Conner &amp; Cunso
Counsel f o r L e b a n o n C h e rr, i c -:: .1 C o r p
1525 K Street, H.W.
Washington, O.C. 20005

dward ','&lt; , W a r r e n , et

al

Counsel foi Oov Chemical Company
1775 f. S t r e e t , [•].&gt;/.

L a r r y R . Hodges
O:

A m b l e r , P e n n s y l v a n i a 13002

Gene R. Cur r ie
Technical Services Manager
M f A Oil C o a p a n y
3 o A -t 2 j - •{ e s t o t n A v e n u e
3 h ~ n a n d o a n , IA 51 o 01

Graham Purcell, Esquire
Douo, Purcell, Muntzing &amp;
Hansen , Char ter ed
1775 Pennsylvania Ave . , &gt; T . / v .
Washington, D.C. 20005
Counsel for R i v e r d a l e
Chemical Company, Frank
Miller i Sons, Tobacco
States Chemical Company,
P3I Gordon Corp. , Pueblo
Chemical i Supply Company
a n d ?1a 11 e Ch e m i c a 1 C o m o a n v
Roger A. Shores, President
B a r t e i s and Shores Cheir.ica!
1400 St. Louis Avenue
K a n s a s City, MO 6 4101

John E. Soltes, General Man
I'fSGRO, D i v i s i o n of Old Fort

.o

�A n c h o n v ? . 3r own
Piflsourv, Madison

G e n e:: a 1 C o u n 3 .e ].
u n i v e r s a l C o o p e r a t i v e s , Inc.

Minneaoolis, MM 5:
Sonide Chemical Company
2 ', t u r 2
Yorkville , ;?'/' 13495

F r a n k 3 . 3 c e w a r G , 7 i c e e r e s z. o e n r_
Tne Chas . H. Lilly Company
7237 N". E . X il 1 ingsvor ch
? o r c 1 a n -s , OR 97213
Jon 0 . L o f L , ? r e s i a ent
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Bound B r o o k , :JJ 03305

R o n a 1 d A . M e i e r , M a n a-g e r
Lawn F e r t i l i s e r D i v i s i o n '
T h e A n d e rs o ns
P.O. 3 o x 119
Maumee, OH 43537
MelYin R. Wilcox, III
Roberts, H a r b o u r , S m i t h , H a r r
French S Ritcer
Counsel for T.O. 3ell/dba/?or
Unlimited
404 Morch Green S t r e e t
Longview, TK 75601

0 . A. Wo1c o c c, Manage r
Planning i Technical Services
F a r m e r s Union G e n e r a l Exchange, Inc.

John J . Sal ardo
Corporate Counsel
2727 W a l k e r , M.W.
Grand Rapids, MI 49504

Gene R . Cur r ie
Technical Services M a n a g e r
Imp «:.• ial Inc .
Box 423 We 3*. oth Avenue
Shenandoah, IA 51501

John R. Diem, Vice Presidenc
u the
Inc.
P.O. Box 213

R i c h a r d deC. H n d s , Esq.
C i e a r y , Go^ilieb, 3'een ^ Ha;Tiilcon
Counsel for U35 Acr i-Che:r icai D i v i s i o n
of United Spates S^eel C o r p o r a t i o n
1250 Connie t ic'-i r_ A v e n u e , II . W .

H L o r a n t.
for Slack Leaf
Lor an. and Lor a n c , ?C
P.O. Box 353
Hianland Park , IL 50035

H - r i c a g e Housi P r o d u c t s C o r p o r a t i o n
1025 Northern Boulevard
Roslyn, MY 11575

J o n n R . '&lt;-t i r i p
Roc'&lt;land C h e m i c a
P.O. 3 o x 30 9
West Caldwell, -IJ 07005

�TABLE OF CONTENTS
PAGE
INTRODUCTION-----------------------------------------------1
REGULATORY HIS TOR Y ----------------------------------------- 4
BURDEN OF PROOF IN SUSPENSION PROCEEDINGS ------------------ 6
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY REBUTTAL
PCS ITION--------------------------------------------------1 0

I. The Administrator's suspension order is based
in large part on animal toxicity data, which
corresponds to the effects observed on 'the
Alsea stud y — — —-------— ------------------— —— — --— — 1 o
A . Introduction--------— ----. — ------------------10
—
B.

Fetotoxic, teratogenic and carcinogenic
effects have occurred in test animals as
a result of exposure of 2,4,5-T, silvex
a nd /o r T CDD — ———.—. — .-.... — - — ... 1 2
.—-....
...
(1) Spontaneous abortions have occured
in non-human primates exposed to
2,4,5-T, silvex and/or TCDD------------------13

(2) Reproductive failure is common in
other mammalian species exposed to
2,4,5-T, silvex and/or TCDD — ---—----. — 7
— 1
(3) Exposure to TCDD or 2,4,5-T and/or
silvex contaminated with TCDD poses
a potential carcinogenic risk to
C.

Any exposure to TCDD must be regarded as
a potential reproductive hazard- ------(1) TCDD is fetotoxic at doses as low as
0.001 mg/kg/d ay------------------------------21
(2) No reproductive no-effect level has
been established for TCDD. Therefore,
any exposure must be regarded as
posing potentially significant risk----------23

�-11PAGE

II.

The Alsea Study indicates that there is a
relationship between the use of 2,4,5-T
for forest management in Alsea and spontaneous abortions among Alsea residents------------—28
A. The Alsea Study is* a simple and direct
analysis of the relation between the
forest use of 2,4,5-T and reproductive
failure in humans who live in the area
where the pesticide is used—— — - — — —•----- — 31
(1) The spontaneous abortion index was
based on hospitalized spontaneous
abortions, the most certain means of
obtaining a uniform data based for
the study and control areas — - — ------• — ----32
(2) The spontaneous abortion, birth and
spray data used for 1972-1977, were
aggregated to increase the reliability of the rates being estimated—-------35
(3) A statistically significant
increase in the overall hospitalized spontaneous abortion index
for the study area relative to the
control area indicates that such
abortions occur more often among
women who live in the area where
2,4,5-T is sprayed—----—-----— — -—.-.——- 37
.(4) The statement in the Alsea report
that "correlation does not mean
causation," re-states a basic principle of statistical analysis and
in no way negates the biological
significance of the observed relation between the use of 2,4,5-T and
miscarriages in the Alsea area—--------—40
(5) There was a statistically significant correlation between the amount
of 2,4,5-T used in the Alsea area
in March, April and May and the
increased incidence of abortions
in the study area in June ------------------- 41

�-111-

PAGE

(6) Dow's argument that there is a
June peak of miscarriages in Midland, Michigan actually supports
the conclusions of the Alsea Report,
and its attempts to discredit the
Alsea conclusions by pointing to
a June peak in Miami fails because
the Miami data is based on induced
abortions, not spontaneous abortions-—

42

(7) The results support the hypothesis
that the occurrence of spontaneous
abortions in Alsea is related to
the use of 2,4,5-T

45

E.

Valid conclusions concerning human exposure
to suspected chemical agents do not depend
on the availability of chemicals residue
data and are not limited by the lack of
such data
———-•
——.——————47

C.

In connection with the suspension orders.
Alsea I was utilized only to develop the
hypothesis, later confirmed through Alsea
II, that there was a relation between the
use of 2,4,5-T and the occurrence of an
excess incidence of miscarriages in Alsea

50

(1) The reviewers inability to find a
"causual" relationship between
2,4,5-T and miscarriages in Alsea I
is not surprising and has no bearing
on the results reported for Alsea II

—52

D.

The data on the spontaneous abortion
index for a neighboring urban area and
the spectral analysis -data which were
included in the Alsea Report were supplementary in character and were not part
of the data used to derive pertinent
findings concerning use of 2,4,5-T—————-— 54
(1) The data and analyses relating to'
the occurrence of spontaneous
abortions in the urban area have
no bearing on the differences in
the spontaneous abortion indices
in the control and study areas

55

�-IV-

PAGE

(2) The complex spectral analysis in the
Alsea Study was performed solely to
determine whether or not the June
peak in incidence of spontaneous
abortions in the Study area could
reasonably be attributed to innate
periodic variations in the data-------------57
(3) The alternative statistical treatments proposed by Dow do not contradict the basic findings of the

Alsea Study----------------------------------59
(a) The alleged "correlation"
between monthly spraying of
2,4,5-T in the Study Area and
the hospitalized spontaneous
abortion index in the Control
Area is irrelevant — -------------------60
(b) Even though the suggested use
of a Chi-square test to determine
whether or not the incidence
of hospitalized spontaneous
abortions in the Study Area was
greater than the incidence of
such abortions in the Control
Area is of questionable theoretical validity, such a test
nevertheless confirms the basic

findings of the Alsea Study ------------ 61
III.

The Suspended Uses of 2,4,5-T and Silvex
result in direct exposure to humans through
aerial drift and/or through chemical contamination of vegetation food and water which
humans use or consume — - — - — —---—--------.—.-.----53
Introduction

B.

The Use of 2,4,5-T and/or silvex leads to
direct human exposure to these chemicals
and to TCDD—---—.—.——— — -----—. ------ — 54
—
1. Use of these pesticides results in
direct exposure to bystanders — - — — — ------68

�-vPAGE

2.
•3.
C.

Use of these pesticides results in
direct exposure to applicators -------------- 70
Home uses of silvex result in direct
exposure to family members------------— — "—73

Use of these pesticides results in contamination of food and water and thereby
presents indirect exposure to humans- — - — —•----75
1.

Chemical residues of 2,4,5-T» silvex,
and/or TCDD are detected in environmental media and human and animal
*^"*"^""***** *^ **"w*"™****""^*m*l*"*'w'"™******^"****'—*^"~"""*^""1"^*""*"*^**" / j

2.

IV.

Contamination of food and water with
2,4,5-T results in indirect exposure
to h urn a n s — — — — — — •— — — —---— — 7 7

D . S umm a r y — — —. — — ~ ~ — -- — — — Q Q
—
The Suspension of the Contested Uses of
2,4,5-T And Silvex Will Not Result in Substantial Adverse Economic Impacts ------------------- -82
A . Introduction — -------------------- — ----•------«•— 82
B . Rights-of-Way—---— — — — ----—• — -— ——84
C.

Forestr y — —---— — —---—---—----------------8 7

D . pasture—————— — — — — —- — ———————89
E . Silvex — — — — —---—----- — — — — 9 2

�INTRODUCTION

On February 28, 1979, the Administrator issued emergency
orders suspending certain uses of the pesticides 2,4,5-T and
silvex.

The Administrator's decision documents totaled nearly

200 pages.and they were supported by an administrative record
approximately 40,000 pages long.

The Administrator's orders

provided for the filing of counterstatements of position by
2,4,5-T and silvex registrants.

On March 26, 1979, the Dow

Chemical company filed its comments on the Administrator's
emergency suspension orders; several other registrants filed
considerably shorter counterstatements.
The Administrator's orders also give respondent Environmental Protection Agency an opportunity to file a rebuttal.
EPA's rebuttal submission begins with discussions of the regulatory history and of the burden of proof.
the rebuttal is divided into four sections.

The main body of
Section I reaffirms

that the suspension orders were based on a vast body of toxicological, medical, and environmental evidence indicating that
the uses of 2,4,5-T and silvex pose a serious health threat to
*/
humans and not just on the Alsea Study.
Section I focuses
with particular attention on the lack of a reproductive, no-effect
level for TCDD and on the primate studies which indicate health
effects comparable to those experienced by the Alsea, Oregon,
women.
V~ Rgport~of Assessment of a_Field Investigation of _Six-Year
Spontaneous~Abortion Rates~Tn ThFee 0^egQn_Areas in_~relation
t°. ?°-^iIiIlIiiIl5l^§£5Z_l£a.2iiiIs™(hei:e^nafter "Alsea~~II" or

Alsea Study"!- This~repoFt was~prompted by letters from eight
Oregon women complaining of miscarriages shortly after 2,4,5-T
use. The Agency's preliminary assessment of the eight women's
experience is referred to as Alsea I.

�-2-

Section II concerns the validity and significance of the
Alsea Study.

Although circumstantial evidence of actual and

potential adverse human health effects has long existed, the
Alsea Study's demonstration of a statistically significant
correlation between human miscarriages and the use of 2,4,5-T
in the Alsea area provided special new information confirming
the predictions of the animal test data and demonstrating that
the isolated experiences of individual women occurred in larger
groups of women as well.

We show in Section II that Dow's

analysis of the Alsea Studies is based on unnecessary and unrealistic expectations regarding scientific methods and unsupported claims and erroneous interpretations of the data.
Section III deals with Dow's effort to meet its burden of
proof by attempting.to show that human exposure to 2,4,5-T is
negligible.

It should be noted that neither Dow nor other

registrants have provided data or other information which
refute the Agency's assumption that women who live and work
in areas where 2,4,5-T is used may be exposed to the pesticide.
Section III presents information developed since the February
28 decisions consisting principally of case histories showing
that use of 2,4,5-T may result in the distribution of this
chemical (and presumably TCDD) to sites of human habitation
and work.

The same considerations would, of course, be appli-

cable to silvex.
Section IV shows that the Administrator adequately assessed
the benefits of the suspended 2,4,5-T and silvex uses during
the two-year period for cancellation proceedings.

We show that

�-3-

Dow s criticisms of the Agency's analysis is highly speculative
and to a considerable degree is marred by misinterpretation
of the EPA analyses and by factual or analytical errors.

Dow

relies heavily on a report entitled "The Biologic and Economic
Assessment of 2,4,5-T," which was prepared by the USDA-EPAStates RPAR Assessment Team.

That report focused on impacts

which could result from a permanent cancellation, not a shortterm suspension.

In several instances, Dow has overlooked this

important limitation on the Report's pertinence to this case.
Moreover, on March 1, 1979, Assistant Secretary of Agriculture
Cutler announced cessation of the use of 2,4,5-T for forest
management and stated that "the Department fully supported EPA's
review of possible risks and benefits associated with the use
of 2,4,5-T."

The Administrator's findings of relatively minor

impacts of the suspended 2,4,5-T and silvex uses are sound.

�-4REGULATORY HISTORY

During the past 'decade scientific and public concern has
steadily mounted over the threat to human health posed by TCDD
(a form of dioxin) and by pesticides such as 2,4,5-T and silvex
which contain TGDD.

In 1969 the Mr.ak Commission, composed of

distinguished scientists, issued a report to the Secretary of
Health, Education and Welfare recommending that use of 2,4,5-T
should be "immediately restricted to prevent risk of human
*/
exposure."
In 1970 the United States Department of Agriculture (which at that time administered the Federal Insecticide,
Fungicide and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA)) suspended the registration of 2,4,5-T for aquatic and home uses.
As Dow points out, an advisory committee of the National
Academy of Sciences did find in a May 1971 report that insufficient evidence of hazard from very low concentrations of TCDD
**/
had been established.
But the committee went on to note
"existing deficiencies in information relative to possible
accumulation in the soil and possible magnification in the food
chain of the dioxin TCDD. . . . "
67.

Advisory Committee Report at

And the Committee was sufficiently concerned to recommend

that 2,4,5-T formulations used around the home and in recreational areas bear the warning "This compound may be dangerous
to pregnant women and animals and its use must be such .as to
reduce the possibility of exposure to an absolute minimum."
*/ Report of the Secretary's Commission on Pesticides and Their
Relationship to Environmental Health, U.S. Govt. Printing Office
(1969) at 657-58.
^*/ Report of the Advisory Committee on 2,4,5-T to the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency (1971) at 64.

�-5-

Advisory Committee Report at 67.

Moreover, it is important to

note that studies on animals showing adverse reproductive and
carcinogenic effects from TCDD when administered at extremely
low dose levels first became available subsequent to issuance
of the Advisory Committee Report.

For example, the studies

showing reproductive and carcinogenic effects at dose levels
as low as one_billiqneth of a gram (per kilogram of body weight
per day) are very recent.

These studies are discussed in some

detail later in this memorandum.
The Decisions and Emergency Orders are responsive to the
new data which has accumulated concerning the toxicity of TCDD
at low dose levels in animals and to the very recent Alsea data
which indicates a relationship between spraying of 2,4,5-T and
incidence of miscarriages.

The Administrator has explained why

the actions taken are appropriate and candidly set forth the
reasons why he has taken these actions now. See Decision and
*/
Emergency Order (2,4,5-T) at 48-52.
As will be explained
further below, the decisions that were made were fully in
accord with the Administrator's responsibilities and with all
applicable requirements of law.

*/ In Environmental:r Defense Pund_v_._ EPA (Aldrin/Dieldrin),
510 F.2d 1292",~lIF5 ri^~(D.C.""Clr7 T973), plaintiffs charged
that EPA's two prior refusals to suspend the registrations
of aldrin and dieldrin undermined its decision to take such
action subsequently. The court firmly rejected that argument,
noting that "what changed here was not EPA s policy but the
nature of the evidence." Id. The same is true here.

�-6-

THE BURDEN OF PROOF IN SUSPENSION PROCEEDINGS
The most fundamental principle of FIFRA is that proponents
of the use of a pesticide—manufactures and user groups—bear
the burden of proof that the benefits of the chemical outweigh
the risks which may result as a result of use of the pesticide.
Environmental Defense Fund v. EPA, 548 F2d. 998, 1004 (D.C.
Cir. 1976); Environmental Defense Fund v. EPA, §10 F2d. 1292,
1297 (D.C. Cir. 1975); Dow Chemical Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 477
F2d. 1317, 1324 (8th Cir. 1973); Stearns Electric Co. v. EPA,
461 F2d. 293, 303 (7th Cir. 1972).

The central consequence

of this principle and its sound foundation in public policy
cannot be grasped without appreciating that chemical regulation
is a discipline characterized fundamentally by uncertainty.
The statute requires the Agency to balance risks and benefits;
however, it.is hardly'ever possible to know, what'the risks and
benefits of a pesticide in fact are with the kind of precision
which responsible men normally desire to achieve on matters
so fundamental and important.
This is because the facts are almost always incomplete,
the scientific theories unproven, and both the facts and the
theories in hot dispute. A few examples are illustrative:

a

chemical may have been shown to produce liver effects in mice.
The chemical is one which is widely used, and as a consequence,
a wide varity of groups of people are exposed to the chemical.
Leaving aside the questions about the benefits of the chemical
(i.e., questions relating to the value of the chemical as a
tool to man), the regulation involves, at a minimum, issues
about the reliability of the study; whether the animal data is

�. a reliable predictor of human illness of man if exposed; what
groups of people may be exposed and in what ways and in what
amounts?

Great uncertainties will be encountered in the attempt

to answer each of these questions.

The response of an academi-

cian to those uncertainties is usually easy to predict—conduct
other study, to get more information.

While in some situations

that answer is an acceptable one, in most situations it is not,
for the public policy reasons which are fundamentally sound
and reasonable.

The reason that "wait and see" is not generally

an acceptable answer is precisely because the chemical will
continue to be used during any period of further inquiry; con• sequently, the possibility that uncertainties may be resolved
after further information gathering in favor of higher, rather
than lower, estimates of risk cannot responsibly be ignored.
This is not to'say that the regulator must regard risksthat are not known with certainty as infinite; the fundamental
point is that responsible regulatory policy will not permit
ignoring respectable hypothesis of risk which are consistent
with the incomplete information which exists and is relevant to
the problem.

Thus, the approach which must be taken to risk—

and the fundamental meaning of the burden of proof concept
under FIFRA—is that the Agency must resolve uncertainties on
the risk side of the regulatory equation reasonably in favor
of the higher estimates of risk which are consistent with the
available data.

Registrants and others meet their "burden of

proof" by proving that the Agency's assessment of the existing
information is flawed, or by performing additional studies to

�produce more information which will eliminate or narrow uncertainties, and thereby justify the Agency in acting on the
assumption that the chemical to is less risky than it earlier
estimated.
Risk considerations alone, as we have pointed out before,
do not produce decisions under FIFRA; instead, the Agency is
required to regulate "unreasonable" risks — which is defined
to mean those risks which are found to exceed the economic,
social and environmental benefits of use.

The burden of proof

concept discussed above with respect to risks requires a similar
analytical approach to benefits questions.

In the end, regula-

tory decisions turn on policy laden, legislative decisions on
I/
whether the risks exceed the benefits.
While there can be considerable disagreement among reasonable men as to how the component parts of a risk/benefit analysis
are put together for any given chemical, no one seriously can
dispute the fundamental soundness of the approach, or the wisdom
of a reasonable allocation of the risks of uncertainty to proponents of the use of a chemical.

In summary, this approach is

essentially grounded in the judgment that society at large can
soundly require people who wish to use a poisonous materal to
persuade a regulatory agency that its value as a tool is worth
the price which society may have to pay—including the price
in injury and illness which can reasonably be hypothesized,
if uncertainties in the information available are resolved in
V
Ethyl Corp. v. EPA., 541 F2d. 124 (D.C. Cir. 1976); Society
of Plastics Industry, Inc. v. OSHA 509, F2d. 1301 (2d Cir), cert.
denied 421 U.S. 992 (1975).

�favor of higher, rather than lower risks.

In the context of

this decision, this approach boils down to a simple question—
are these chemicals valuable enough as tools for man over the
two years to justify subjecting people to risks of reproductive
failure and cancer which reasonably can be hypothesized to exist,
based upon the existing scientific data?

The Agency, of course,

answers these questions in the negative.
The suspension provision is FIFRA's precautionary tool for
safeguarding public health before serious harm results.

It

permits prophylactic action, pending more definitive resolution
of the issues.

"The function of a suspension decision is to make

a preliminary assessment of evidence and probabilities, not an
ultimate resolution of difficult issues" Environmental Defense
Fund v. EPA, supra, §510 F2d. at 1298.

A lesser degree of cer-

tainty is required for suspending a pesticide, than for taking
it off the market permanently.
It is not necessary to find "conclusively" that
actual harm to man will occur if the use of
the pesticide in question is continued; rather
the findings required is that continued use
in the cancellation proceedings is "likely"
to result in any "unreasonable risk" to man
or the environment......[T]he propriety of
suspension turns upon an analysis in which the
risks are balanced against the benefits, rather
than from an analysis of risks or benefits
alone... [T]he mere fact that the evidence
on either of these issues (risks or benefits)
is not complete, or that more evidence may be
expected to be developed in the cancellation
proceedings, is not a reason to deny suspension.
In re Velsicol Chemical Corporation et. al. , Decision of the
Administrator on the Suspension of Heptachlor/Chlordane, 41 Fed.
Reg. 7552, 7574 (February 19, 1976).

�-10ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY REBUTTAL POSITION

I.

The Administrator's suspension order is based in large
part on animal toxicity data which corresponds to the
effects observed in the Alsea Study.
A. • Introduction
Dow contends that the Administrator's suspension analysis

is based almost entirely on the Alsea Study.

However/ the exami-

• nation of the suspension documents and Administrative Record
serves to rebut this contention.

These documents unequivocably

establish that the decision to suspend was based in part on
the studies on animal toxicity and exposure detailed in the
notices and listed in the Administrative Record.

Specifically,

the suspension notices 'open with statements that 2,4,5-T, silvex
and TCDD cause reproductive and oncogenic effects in test animals,
2,4,5-T Order at 1, Silvex Order at 1, and continue with the
Administrator's finding'that "the occurrence-of [fetotoxic,
teratogenic, and carcinogenic] effects in test animals indicates
that humans who are exposed to TCDD and/or 2,4,5-T and silvex
may experience comparable effects."
Order at

2,4,5-T Order at'

, Silvex

. Further, in the detailed statement of findings,

the Notice devotes more than twelve pages to a review of data
showing that silvex, 2,4,5-T and/or their common dioxin contaminant,
TCDD, produce terotogenic, fetotoxic and carcinogenic effects
in test animals.

2,4,5-T Order at 22-34, Silvex Order at 27-36.

Further, a discussion of the exposure potential of the uses of
2,4,5-T and silvex fills ten pages of the notice.

2,4,5-T Order

at 47-52, 56-61, Silvex Order at 47-52, 54(a)-61. By contrast,

�-lithe detailed discussion of the Alsea study occupies six pages.
2,4/5-T Order at 34-42, Silvex Order at 36-43. Thus, although
the Alsea study is clearly a crucial element in the decision
to suspend these pesticides, the suspension actions were not
based exclusively or even primarily on the Alsea study, as Dow
contends.

Rather, these actions were based on a combination

of three interlocking elements which together indicated that the
uses of the pesticide presented an imminent hazard to humans who
might be exposed to these pesticides if use continued during the
coming months.
The Alsea study added to the long-standing scientific data
and information on the toxic effects and exposure potential of
these pesticides, new data showing a correlation between the use
of 2,4,5-T in Alsea, Oregon and an excess of spontaneous abortions
in that area compared to a control population.

Because Dow has

chosen to regard the suspension actions as based mainly on the
Alsea II study and, notwithstanding the extensive and detailed
discussions of other issues in the suspension notices, have based
their challenge to these actions almost exclusively on the Alsea
study, the Agency responds with corresponding emphasis on the
Alsea study in Section II of this memorandum.
However, the observed correlation between 2,4,5-T use in
the Alsea area and the excess incidence of miscarriages in that
area was first investigated and later deemed to be important
precisely because the effects observed in the women residents

�-12-

of Alsea are analagous to the effects observed in test animals.
That is, when test animals are exposed to 2,4,5-T, silvex, and/or
TCDD, the animals exhibit several different forms of reproductive
failure such as fetal death, or animals with birth defects such
as cleft palate and abnormal kidneys.

2,4,5-T Order at 22; Silvex

Order at 27.
Moreover, these fetotoxic and teratogenic effects are
observed in test animals at very low dose levels and because
no-effect levels for these effects have not been conclusively
established,-it is not possible to predict a "safe" level for
humans.

Thus, the actions suspending 2,4,5-T and silvex were

based on animal toxicity data and information on exposure
potential, as well as on the Alsea study.
The discussion to follow reviews these data in two parts..
Subsection B summarizes the animal toxicity data, referring
particularly to the data which tend to be specifically predictive
of the adverse reproductive effects observed in the Alsea area
residents.

Section III reviews information on the potential

for biologically significant exposure to humans.
B.

Fetotoxic teratogenic and carcinogenic effects
have occurred in test animals as a result of
exposure to 2,4,5-T, silvex and/or TCDD.

The Agency's analysis of studies in experimental animals
had led to the firm conclusion that maternal exposure to 2,4,5-T,
silvex and/or TCDD leads to excess incidences of birth defects,
such as cleft palate and abnormal kidneys, stillborn animals and

�-13reduced survival among the offspring of these animals.

Exposure

to these substancies had also resulted in carcinogenic responses.
Because of the consistency and reproducibility of these adverse
effects, the Agency chose only to cite representative studies
in the suspension order documents.
are briefly reviewed below.

The results of these studies

Of special significance are the

primate studies, which indicate effects comparable to those seen
in the women of Alsea, Oregon.
(1) Spontaneous abortions have occurred in
non-human primates exposed to 2,4,5-T
and/or TCDD.
Reproductive studies in rhesus monkeys indicate that
V
maternal exposure to 2,4,5-T and/or TCDD results in an increased
incidence of early spontaneous abortions and reproductive
•difficulties.

Long-term exposure to' even minute'quantities of

' '.

TCDD resulted in a marked increase in the first third of the
gestational period even where there was no evidence of maternal
toxicity by clinical observation or biomedical testing.

Monkeys

exposed 50 ppt TCDD (2.5 ng/kg/day) before and during pregnancy
had a total fetal loss of 67% (50% by abortion and 17% as stillbirth)
and fertility rate of 75%, compared with 0% and 100% in the controls.
*7 fn~~TtsTcbimentIT Dow indicates the existence of an unspecified
monkey study using silvex. Comments at 28. The Agency is unaware
of such a study.
*V Total TCDD intake at time of breeding (7 months) was 0.35
ug/kg body weight. It is worth nothing that after 20 months of
dietary treatment (total intake - 0.9 ug/kg/ body weight), the
females were exhibiting signs of systemic toxicity, indicating
that a no NOEL had been established for subchronic toxicity.

�-14-

Atterapts to re-breed one of the aborters resulted in an additional
early abortion.

ARI R-9 and personal communications.

When

animals were treated with a higher dose, the fertility rate
dropped to 25%, with one of the two animals aborting in the
first third of gestation.

Irregularities in menstrual cycles,

anovulation, and reduction in the reproductive hormones, progesterone and estrogen, were among the toxic effects seen at the
higher dose.

The investigators concluded that the reproductive

abnormalities were most probably the result of hormone imbalance,
and were apparently the result of the TCDD treatment, rather
than general toxicity, because the hormonal alterations were
observed before the animals became obviously ill (Allen et al.,
1977; Barsotti et al., in press).
Early abortions have also been observed in monkeys where
exposure has only been for a short period of the pregnancy.

An

accumulated dose of 1 ug/kg (1000 ppt) of TCDD over a 3 week
period resulted in a 75% abortion rate, compared with 0% in the
controls.

All abortions in the treated animals were during the

first third of the gestational period and the only evidence of
maternal toxicity was slight chloracne in one animal,.observed
months later.

The viable offspring produced at this dose had

abnormal palate develoment, and thre of the four at a lower dose
had debatable abnormal development in the same orofacial region.
ARI R-39 and personal communications.

�-15-

Dow regrets that "the agency did not take into consideration
the value of primate data prior to the issuance of an emergency
cancellation [sic]," and contends that exposure to 2,4,5-T does not
result in teratogenic or feto.toxic effects in monkeys, citing two
additional studies to support its position.

Gehring Affidavit,

Appendix (b) (hereinafter "Analyses") at 5. The primate studies
using TCDD were discounted because of "significant toxic
manifestations" in the pregnant monkeys.

Id. at 7.

The Agency agrees with Dow's assertion that special emphasis
should be placed on the primate studies, because the rhesus
monkey is the animal of choice for evaluating the potential
V

for human reproductive effects. Analyses, Ref. #3; Wilson, 1973.
This preference is based upon fundamental similarities between
the reproductive systems of man and the monkey.

Physically, the

monkey uterus, placenta and fetal supportative structures are
comparable to those in man; implantation of the ovum and major
organogenesis follow similar time courses, occur ing in the first
third of the gestational period.

In addition, the monkey's

hormonal balance of estrogen and progesterone is almost identical
to the human system, both in the menstrual cycle and in pregnancy.
The ability of the placenta to take over from the ovaries and
continue the production of the hormones necessary to maintain
pregnancy is common to both.

In man, the placenta is able to

produce the necessary progesterone and estrogen after the third
month, and alteration in maternal levels of these hormones prior

�-16-

to that time could result in an abortion.

Progesterone drops

in man have been associated with abortions and the untimely onset
I/
of menstruation.
The studies cited by Dow were designed to focus primarily
on teratogenic effects.

In the first, pregnant monkeys were

administered 2,4,5-T, containing 0.05 ppm TCDD, "a"t dose levels
approximating human exposure."
abnormalities were observed.

No maternal toxicity or fetal
The authors concluded that 2,4,5-T

was not teratogenic at the levels tested.

However, a close

analysis of the study indicates that there may be other evidence
of fetotoxicity in the form of increased abortions.

In light of

the TCDD studies cited above, the apparent doubling of the
abortion rate observed in this study should be considered a
possible effect.

Sufficient experimental details regarding th'e

second "study" are not available in the cited reference to allow
**/
for an adequate assessment of the s t u d y . H o w e v e r , evidence of
abortion, lowered birth weight and incomplete ossification were
indicated.

In analyzing the TCDD studies, Dow chose to ignore

data included in the Record for this action (see above), which
demonstrate fetotoxic effects in monkeys at doses where no
maternal toxicity was observed prior to the abortion.
*7 A~common~coimnent seen among the response to the 2,4,5-T RPAR,
Is of women experiencing episodes of untimely vaginal bleeding
after reportedly being exposed to spray. See e.g., Responses
[30000/26] ##263, 356 and 2187.
*V For example, information regarding dioxin contamination of
the 2,4,5-T, method of dosing and methods of analysis were not
included.

�-17-

(2)

Reproductive failure is common in other
mammalian species exposed to 2,4,5-T,
silvex and/or TCDD.

Studies in rodents have clearly demonstrated that prenatal
exposure to 2/4,5-T, silvex and/or TCDD results in toxicity to
the offspring of treated animals.

Adverse effects from exposure

to TCDD have been observed at doses as low as 0.3 ug/kg in mice,
0.01 ug/kg in rats and 2.5 ng/kg in monkeys.

The most commonly

observed effects are increased fetal mortality and higher
incidences of birth defects, such as cleft palate, intestinal
bleeding, kidney and cardiovascular anomalies and reduced skeletal
ossification.

Reduced neonatal survival has also been observed.

In all species tested, there is evidence of increased fetal
wastage, in the form of resorptions, abortions and stillbirths.
2/4",5-T Order at 22? Silvex Order at 27.
Dow contends that "2,4,5-T and TCDD are weakly teratogenic
and embryolethal agents which are confined to rodents (primarily
mice)...."

In support of this contention, Dow claims that the

teratogenic effects have only been observed in the mouse which
is extremely susceptible to cleft palate, and that other anomalies,
such as kidney malformations, are really only retardations in
development rathr than true birth defects.

The observed fetal

lethality is summarily discounted as the result of maternal
toxicity, or of a completely different mechanism of action,
since rodent fetal death occurs at a different time in pregnancy
than the spontaneous abortions observed in Alsea.

�-18-

Many of Dow's arguments become moot with the realization
that for regulatory purposes the important concern is total
impact on quality of life, rather than discrete mechanisms of
action.

Therefore, whether a reproductive failure is the direct

result of fetal toxicity or is secondary to maternal toxicity is
not a critical determinant for regulation, since the end-result
is the same.

See Analyses at 3; Comments at 28.

This is also

true of the distinction made by Dow between studies showing
.in-jjtejro death and those showing reduced neonatal survival.
Analyses at 4.

The important factor is that a life is shortened.

Similar reasoning applies to the line drawn by Dow between
retardation and "true" teratogenesis.

Analyses at 1.

The life

of an infant born with retarded mental or physical development
is certainly disadvantaged and possibly subject to increased
risk during his "catch-up" period, even though the handicap may
ultimately be overcome.
Dow's contention that teratogenicity had only been observed
as cleft palate in susceptible strains of mice is unfounded.
Cleft palate has also been seen in rats, and palate abnormalities
in monkeys.

Other types of teratogenic effects which have been

observed due to 2,4,5-T, silvex and/or TCDD exposure are cardiovascular anomalies, intestinal disorders and kidney abnormalities,
(Some of these observations have been made in Dow sponsored
experiments.)

Use of a susceptible strain has the advantage of

making the experimental system more sensitive. Any baseline

�-19-

effects due to environmental factors should be nullified
through the use of adequate controls.
Finally, Dow's argument about time of response does not
take into consideration a very basic physiological factor.
Dow's Comments at 128-29. The susceptible stages of
pregnancy occur at different times in different species.

There-

fore, the same type of response to a given stimulus could be
expected to occur at different times.

For example, in mice and
i

rats, the susceptible period of organogenesis is in the middle
third of the gestational period, whereas in man it is early in
the first trimester. Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that
a toxin which elicits fetal death in the middle third of mouse
or rat gestation would be likely to have the same effect in the
first trimester of m'an or animals having comparabl'e developmental
schemes, such as the rhesus monkey.
(3) Exposure to TCDD or 2,4,5-T and/or silvex
contaminated with TCDD poses a potential
carcinogenic risk for man.
Long-term feeding studies have shown that TCDD at very low
levels is a carcinogenic agent in mice and rats.

TCDD has also

been found to be mutagenic in the Ames test without the metabolic
activation system. Conversely, there is no significant evidence
to indicate that either 2,4,5-T or silvex p_er se is carcinogenic
in test species.

However, these apparently negative conclusions

do not negate the cancer-causing potential of commercially
produced 2,4,5-t and silvex, because of their TCDD contamination.

�-20-

Although Dow "recognizes" that carcinogenic effects from
TCDD exposure have been shown in test animals, it contends that
human exposure to the TCDD in 2,4,5-T and silvex is so low as
to pose no substantial risk.
2,4,5-T or silvex

Dow argues that since studies using

y have given negative results,

the small amount

of TCDD they contain cannot be sufficient to pose a significant
problem to man.

Dow Comments at 31.

The Agency's Carcinogen Assessment group (CAG)'concluded
that TCDD was carcinogenic at exceedingly low doses; therefore
the low amount contained in 2,4,5-T (or silvex) is of concern.
The lack of statistically significant tumor incidences from the
2,4,5-T (or silvex) exposure may be attributed to the extremely
low levels of TCDD in the product relative to the levels at
which it produces observable •carcinogenic effects in rodent
bioassays using relatively small numbers of animals.

However,

since TCDD is a strong carcinogen, 2,4,5-T (or silvex) products
containing TCDD at any detectable levels can be considered
human carcinogenic hazards.

CAG, 1979.

Dow argues that a "reproducible carcinogenic effect has
been observed only with a higher toxic dose in excess of 1000
ppt (TCDD)."

Dow Comments at 30.

The CAG has reviewed a recent

study conducted by Dow Chemical Company and has concluded that
*7 Dow~mentTons~~f"Ive long-term studies in rats or mice using
silvex. The Agency is aware of only two of these studies
designed to test the oncogenic potential of silvex. However,
from the available information, it appears that silvex ge£ se
is not carcinogenic in test species.

�-21-

the combined incidence of hepatocellular carcinoma and hepatocellular hyperplastic nodules in rats is statistically significant
at both the 2200 and 220 ppt levels. Also, a recent communication
to CAG from the National Cancer Institute indicated that in their
as yet incomplete study, TCDD appears to be as carcinogenic and
potent as was observed in the Dow study.
Dow further alleges that "the negative animal data has [sic]
been confirmed by recent and extensive epidemiological studies
of humans exposed by phenoxy herbicides."

The Agency is unaware

of such studies."
Finally, Dow contends that it will show that the carcinogenic
risk to man from the TCDD in 2,4,5-T and silvex is "considerably
less than for . . . eating peanut butter."

Since the obvious

reference here is to the possibility of exposure to the extremely
potent carcinogen, aflatoxin, it seems appropriate to note that
recent calculations indicate that TCDD is even more potent as a
carcinogen than aflatoxin.
C.

Any exposure to TCDD must be regarded as a
potential reproductive hazard.
(1) TCDD is fetotoxic at doses as low
as 0.001 ug/kg/day.

Dow has also challenged the Agency's failure to adopt the
TCDD no-effect level of 0.03 ug/kg/day upon which the RPAR was
based as a no-effect level for teratogenic and fetotoxic effects.
This challenge ignores, with good reason in terms of Dow's
interests, new data, developed in Dow's own laboratories showing

�-22-

that TCDD has fetotoxic effects effects at doses as low as 0.001
ug/kg/day.
After the RPAR was issued in April of 1978, the Agency
received new data establishing that TCDD has adverse reproductive effects as doses lower than 0.03 ug/kg/day.

Specifically,

in the RPAR notice the Agency reported that the Dow Chemfcal
Company had submitted a letter summarizing preliminary results
from a new study on the effects of TCDD in rats over three
generations.

Record at R-l, p. 17131.

At that time, Dow did

not provide the underlying data, but stated'that fetotoxic
effects were observed at 0.01 ug/kg/day in some generations.
Because Dow described the report as preliminary, and because
little data was presented in the letter, the Agency used data
from the published literature showing that 0.03 ug/kg/day was
a no-effect level, rather than using information from plaintiff's
letter.
Subsequently, Dow has published an abstract of some of the
data and has submitted a data report to the Agency.

Record at

R-8. In these reports, Dow itself recognized 0.01 ug/kg/day as
an effect level.

Thus, although Dow's use of the 0.03 ug/kg

no-effect level used in the RPAR is understandable, this value
would be unsound both as a matter of science and of policy.
Moreover, the Agency's review of these data indicates that
adverse reproductive effects are observed at 0.001 ug/kg/day.
2,4,5-T Order at 26.

Silvex Order at 31.

�-23-

Thus, the 0.03 ug/kg/day used in the RPAR is not the applicable
no-effect level.
Because the Agency explained in the emergency orders that
"exposure to 0.001 ug/kg/day . . . resulted in statistically
significant increases in the percentage of pups dead at birth
or dying before the end of three weeks of life in some generations,"

Id., Dow's statement that the suspension decisions and

the RPAR conclusions were based on "virtually identical animal
research reports" is totally erroneous.
(2) No reproductive no-effect level has been
established for TCDD. Therefore, any
exposure must be regarded as posing
potentially significant risk.
The suspension decisions are based in part on a Dow study
&lt;

showing that TCDD produces adverse reproductive effects in test
animal'at doses as low as 0.001 ug/kg/day (.hereinafter''"Dow
study").

However/ Dow interprets this data as showing that no

effects were observed at 0.001 ug/kg, over three generations.
Record at R-8.
Action No.

Because the injunction in Dow v. Cosjtle, Civil

76-10087, arguably precludes EPA from disclo'sing

data from this study, EPA presented a summary, but not the actual
data, in the decisions and orders suspending these pesticides.
2,4,5-T Order at 26; Silvex Order at 30.

EPA regards this study

as critically important to the Agency's determination that an
imminent hazard exists, and regrets that the injunction prevents

�-24-

the disclosure of the data that substantiate and illuminate the
basis for the Agency's determination that there are fetotoxic
effects at 0.001 ug/kg. the lowest dose tested in any TCDD study.
Although the inconsistencies between EPA's and Dow's interpretations of the data can be evaluated only if the actual data can
be disclosed, the basis for EPA's position is detailed below.
The Dow study shows that adverse reproductive effects
occur in test animals exposed to doses of TCDD as low as O.'OOl
ug/kg/day.

However, Dow's summaries of the data state that there

are generally no adverse effects at this dose level, and create
the impression that 0.001 is a "no-effect" level.
Generally a no-effect level is viewed as a toxicological
endpoint, marking a level of exposure in animals which is "safe"
*/
because there are no observable adverse effects.
Toxicologists
generally assume that the animal no-effect level can serve as
a base for estimating exposure levels which would be "safe" for
humans.

The "safe" level for humans is set at some level lower

than the animal no-effect level to provide a "margin-of-safety"
that takes into account differences in senstivities between
animals and humans, and differences in sensitivities among
humans.

This "margin-of-safety" does not represent an infallible

*7fhe~dTscuisIon~of "no-effect levels" is irrelevant to the
estimation of potential cancer risk. See discussion at
,

�-25-

indicator of potential hazard to humans.

Error could be

introduced because man is more sensitive than the test species
by a greater factor than normally allowed, or by the incorrect
choice of a no-effect level.

The thalidomide tragedy is

probably the best known example of error in predicting human
safety from animal data.

There, although testing indicated

that exposure to the drug produced no abnormal effects in
animals, when humans used the drug it became clear that the
medically prescribed dose assumed to be safe when considered
in terms of the animal test data was, in fact, dangerously
toxic to the human fetus.
The lowest level at which TCDD has no-observable effects
in test animals is crucial to the Agency's determination of the
risk potential of 2,4,5-T and silvex.

TCDD is present in these

pesticides as a low-level contaminant and thus will be present
in the environment at low levels whenever and wherever these
pesticides are used.

If there truly is a no-effect level in

animals it is possible at least to begin to estimate a possible
"safe" level for humans and to assess the possible risk to humans
by relating this assumed "safe" level to the level of pesticide
that may be in the environment, if that level is known.

Conse-

quently, if there is no no-effect level, any use of 2,4,5-T and
silvex would result in potentially significant expsure to TCDD,

�-26-

because there is no minimum level upon which to estimate a
V
a margin-of-safety.
It is the Agency's position that no reproductive no-effect
level has been demonstrated for TCDD.

In a September

1977

preliminary report to the Agency, Dow described observations
in the animals exposed to 0.001 ug/kg/day only in terms that
implied that there was no adverse effects at this dose level.
Record at R-l.

Dow later published an abstract of this study

in which it added experimental details and new data, without
further elaboration.

Specifically, they said:

"At 0.001 ug/kg/day, no deleterious effect on
fertility was seen in any generation."
"Among litters of rats receiving 0.001 ug/kg/day
no-effect on litter size at birth or neonatal
growth was observed in any generation."
"In summary, the reproductive capacity of rats
ingesting of 0.01 and O.-l ug/kg/day, but not at
0.001 ug/kg/day, through' three successive
generations."
"Statistically significant increases and decreases
in survival were seen at 0.001 ug/kg/day."
Record at R-8.
VIt~ls~questlonable whether the traditional margin-of-safety
calculation used in establishing tolerances, which uses a factor
of 100, would be appropriate for TCDD. The factor of 100 under
this approach is derived by assuming that a factor of 10
adequately compensates for possible variation in. susceptibility
wJ.thJLn a species, and that a second factor of 10 adequately
compensates for differences between species (i.e., between the
animal test species and man)7fHere is some reason to doubt
whether a safety factor of 10 adequately compensates for the
variability in susceptibility of human beings. Even if this
were not the case, however, the wide variability in susceptibility of different aruma! species to TCDD raises great doubt as
to the justification fol using on_ly_ a factor of 10 to adjust
for possible variations in susceptibility between an animal
species and man.

�-27-

In contrast to Dow's descriptions of no effects at 0.001
ug/kg/day, EPA's review of this study indicates that the
following adverse reproductive effects were observed at 0.001
ug/kg/day:
statistically significant decreases in neonatal
survival in the first litter of the first
generation at 24 hours, 7 days, and 21 days.
a significant decrease in the gestation survival
index and the 7 and 14 day survival indices in
the second generation literature. Record at R-8,
Confidential.
These observations mean that there were statistically significant
increases in the number of stillborn pups and that a larger than
normal proportion of the animals that were born alive did not
survive the first two weeks of life.

Although EPA acknowledges

that adverse effects do not appear in all generations ingesting
0.001

ug/kg/day, it cannot accept the premise that the effects

which do appear should be ignored.

�--tell.

The Alsea Study indicates that there is a relationship
between the use of 2,4,5-T for forest management in
Alsea and spontaneous abortions among Alsea residents.
The Agency's review of the relation between the use of

2,4,5-T and the occurrence of spontaneous abortions in the Alsea
area includes three closely related but separate phases.

The

first phase, or Alsea I in Dow's terminology, was a case history
review of the occurrence of miscarriages among a group of eight
women who reported an unusually high proportion of miscarriages
in their group and that the miscarriages generally followed
by approximately two months the annual use of 2,4,5-T in their
area.

The women questioned whether there might be a relation

between the spraying of 2,4,5-T each spring and the occurrence
of eight of their miscarriages in June.

Alsea I constitutes

the Agency's investigation and conclusions relating to the
miscarriage experience of these eight women.

As the history

of this action clearly shows, no regulatory action was taken on
the basis of the Alsea I data.

Further, except for establishing

the initial hypothesis, the examination of these case reports
was not utilized to support the decision to suspend these
pesticides. Accordingly, the data relating to the eight women
have little bearing on the suspension action and Dow's challenges
to these data have little relevance.
In Alsea II, the Agency investigated the hypothesis which
arose from Alsea I and the experimental animal data by studying
a large cohort of births and miscarriages among Alsea residents.

�Alsea II constitutes the second stage in the Agency's investigation
of the relation between the uses of 2,4,5-T and the occurrence of
reproductive failure in the Alsea area and it is this study,
and only this study, which serves as a basis for the Agency's
action suspending 2,4,5-T and silvex.

2,4,5-T Order at 2;

Silvex Order at 2. As developed more fully in subsection A
below, Alsea II shows that a comparison of the hospitalized
spontaneous abortion indices in the Alsea area in relation to
a comparable index for women living in areas where 2,4,5-T is
not used shows an increased incidence of spontaneous abortions
in the Alsea area relative to the control area, that an
increase in spontaneous abortions in the study area occurs
approximately two months after the area was sprayed with
2,4,5-T and that there is a close correlation between the
amount of 2,4,5-T sprayed and the increase in the in the-incidence of abortions by months.
The third aspect of the study includes supplementary data
on spontaneous abortions in a neighboring urban area and
supplementary analyses of the core conclusions by other statistical methods.

Each of these supplementary methods was employed

to test the validity of the core data or to refine, complete and
supplement the basic analyses and conclusions.

These supple-

mentary aspects were included solely as routine checks on the
basic analysis or, as in the case of analyses of the urban
area, because the data were generated while gathering data on
the study area, and were not used in the explanation of the

�basis for the Administrator's action.

Accordingly, although

the complex supplementary analyses support and confirm the
correlation between the use of 2,4,5-T and the occurrence of
miscarriages in Alsea, the complexity of these analyses must not
be allowed to obscure and complicate the essential simplicity of
the study as a whole.
Dow contends that the Alsea study is faulty in design,
that it does not show an increase in the spontaneous abortion
index in the study area in June, and that invalid statistical
methods invalidate the study's conclusions.

Dow Comments at

16-20, 22-24.
In the discussion to follow, we will show that Dow's
challenges are based on mistaken, unsupportable, and sometimes
unreasonable assumptions which do not withstand simple scientific
and logical scrutiny.

The discussion is presented in four parts.

In subsection A we summarize the Alsea II findings, issues and
analyses upon which the decisions to suspend 2,4,5-T and silvex
were based.

In subsections B, C, and D, we discuss Alsea I

and other corrollary data and statistical analyses which relate
to the Alsea Study but which are clearly secondary aspects of
the suspension decisions.

�A.

The Alsea Study is a simple and direct analysis
of the relation between the forest use of
2,4,5-T and reproductive failure in humans who
live in the area where the pesticide is used.

The Agency's preliminary analysis of the data generated
through the Alsea study indicated that the spontaneous abortion
index (hospitalized miscarriages per 1,000 births) for the Alsea
Study area where 2,4,5-T was used was significantly greater than
the index for the control area where there was little or no
known use of 2,4,5-T.
A dramatic increase in the spontaneous abortion index for
the study area relative to the control area occurred in June and
July following, by approximately two or three months, a period
in March and April when 2,4,5-T was used to control vegetation
in the forested study area.
Statistical analyses of these data indicated that there was
a significant relationship between the amounts of 2,4,5-T used
in the study area and the subsequent increase in the spontaneous
abortion index in the study area.
Thus, the Agency's systematic survey of the occurrence of
spontaneous abortions in an area of 2,4,5-T use indicated that
• there was an unusua.lly high number of spontaneous abortions in
that area, compared to a representative control area and that
the incidence of spontaneous abortions may reasonably be related
to the use of 2,4,5-T in the area.

The protocol and results,

and Dow's challenges to the protocol and results are summarized
below.

�(1)

The spontaneous abortion index was based
on hospitalized spontaneous abortions,
the most certain means of obtaining a
uniform data base for the study and control
areas.

The validity of any epidemiologic investigation is dependent
upon the validity of- information on the event under study.

For

the Alsea study, data on the occurrence of spontaneous abortions
was critical.

However, the reporting of spontaneous

abortions,

particularly those occuring early in pregnancy is influenced by
many factors.

In the first instance, many women do not know

that they have had a spontaneous abortion, interpreting the
uterine bleeding simply as delayed menses.

In other cases, a

woman may seek medical attention for something that both she
and her physician interpret as a menstrual problem, not necessarily as a possible abortion. In still other cases, a physician
may identify, the problem as a spontaneous abortio'n arid treat
the patient in his office. Other patients are hospitalized.
The Alsea study is based on hospitalized spontaneous
abortions because these data are the most readily available
indicators of the occurrence of spontaneous abortions.

While

it is true that all spontaneous abortions are not hospitalized
or even noticed by a woman, it is reasonable to assume that
the factors influencing the occurrence, awareness and hospitalization of spontaneous abortions are comparable between the
control and study areas.

It is also reasonable to assume that

these factors are comparable throughout the year within an area.

�Dow contends that there would be more hospitalized
spontaneous abortion patients in the study area than in the
control area and that for this reason the number of hospitalized
miscarriages cannot be used as a reliable measure of the total
number of miscarriages in a population sample.

Dow Comments'

at 18. Dow bases this contention in part on the assumption
that practices regarding the hospitalization of spontaneous
abortion patients differ in the control and study areas.
Dow offers no data in support of this assertion that the
sample is biased, and miscalculates the data available in the
Alsea Report.

For example, Dow describes the Alsea Report as

stating that "most general practitioners hospitalize over threefourths of the spontaneous abortion cases that they treat as
compared with only 10% hospitalization of the cases treated by
obstetrical and gynecological specialists."

Dow Comments at

18-19. However, contrary to Dow's assertion that "most" general
practitioners hospitalize over 75% of their spontaneous abortion
patients, in fact only half of the general practitioners
referenced in Table 23 of the Alsea report had admission rates
in excess of 75%.
But more importantly, measurement of the impact of
hospitalization on the spontaneous abortion index for the study
area must be based on the number of patients who are sent to
hospitals, not on the number of physicians who send their
patients to hospitals.

That, is, the critical information is

�the proportion of patients who are treated by general practitioners and who also are hospitalized for spontaneous abortions.
Using the data in Table 23 it can be estimated that 57.5% of the
spontaneous abortion cases which are seen first by general
*j
practitioners are hospitalized, not 75% as Dow contends.
Furthermore, Dow appears to wrongly assume that none of
the study area women were treated by obstetrical specialists at
the Corvallis hospitals in the urban area.

In fact, 45 of the

188 study area women were treated at the Good Samaritan Hospital
— a Corvallis hospital.

Indeed, the primary reason for

including the hospital in the study was that it was expected
that study area women would be treated there.

Treatment by the

specialists at the hospital would not generally involve hospitalization.

The Agency does not dispute Dow's statement that

10% of the spontaneous abortion patients who see specialists
in obstetrics and gynecology are hospitalized.
To support the contention that there is bias in the reporting
of spontaneous abortions, Dow further states that there are eight
obstetrical/gynecology specialists in the urban area, one
specialist in the control area and none in the study area, and,
V
This can be estimated from the data in Table 23 by (1) multiplying the proportion of spontaneous abortion cases that are
hospitalized by the annual mean number of abortion cases treated
for each of the 13 GP's for which both kinds of information are
available, and then (2) summing both this product and'the annual
mean number of abortion cases treated to obtain 72.3 cases
treated annually and 41.6 hospitalized for the 13 GP's. This
is an estimate of 41.6/72.3 = 57.5 percent hospitalized among
abortion cases seen by GP's.

�that the specialist in the control area is responsible for onehalf of the obstetrical care in that area.

Dow comments at 19.

Accepting for the sake of argument Dow's estimate that half of
.the cases in the control area are treated by a specialist,
this result does not differ significantly from the Agency'.s
estimation that a roughly comparable percentage of the study
area women who had abortions were treated by an ob/gyn
specialist.

The reasons for the Agency's estimate will be

developed at the Hearing. Seen in this light, Dow's
unsupported claim becomes meaningless.
The Agency is aware of no data — and Dow provides none —
other than that developed in the Alsea Study which estimates
the spontaneous abortion rate for the Alsea area.

Absent such

data, Dow's change that the hospitalized spontaneous abortions
are an "unrepresentative data base,-" 'Dow Comments at 16, is
only unsupported speculation.
(2) The spontaneous abortion, birth and spray
data used for 1972-1977, were aggregated to
increase the reliability of the rates being
estimated.
The statistical analyses underlying the Alsea Study are
based in part on aggregated spontaneous abortion data and birth
data for the six-year period from 1972-1977.

Such aggregation

of data over time is a common statistical practice which is
used to increase the power of resolution when the event rate
is low.

This practice is especially necessary for data such as

�these where the expected number of miscarriages per month in
many of the areas investigated could range from 1 to 4.

In

this case, even a 20% increase in the rate could not be found
in monthy or perhaps even yearly data, but could be found when
the data are aggregated over a number of years.
Dow characterizes the Agency's use of the sums of all births
and all hospitalized spontaneous abortions over aggregated
periods as an "improper statistical technique" or "bunching"
which obscures annual variation.

Dow Comments at 22.

Dow's objections suggest familiarity with this basic
approach to vital statistics.

The data on abortions, births and

spraying over a period of years were summed in order to produce
the large numbers and more stable results that are essential
for the analyst to detect trends in the data and increase the
power of statistical tests so that effects that are only moderate
can nevertheless be detected.

Dow may prefer year-by-year

analysis because reducing the sample size can make it virtually
impossible to discover a real effect unless that effect is
truly overwhelming.
Moreover, combining data across years to produce total
rates by month, as here, rather than summing across months to
produce yearly rates as Dow proposes, Id., is appropriate because
the variation in spray pattern between different months is much
greater than the variation between different years.

Because

spraying is a seasonal event, there are seven months with no

�sp,raying in any year but there are no years in which spraying
did not occur.

If Dow's proposal were adopted, the apparent

yearly average for the months in which spraying occurred would
be reduced by the "zeros" for the months in which there was no
spraying. Thus, yearly averages would give lower than actual
monthly spray data for the months in which spraying occurred.
(3) A statistically significant increase in the
overall hospitalized spontaneous abortion
index for the study area relative to the
control area indicates that such abortions
occur more often among women who live in
the area where 2/4,5-T is sprayed.
The Alsea study was planned to develop data which would
allow the Agency to determine whether the miscarriages were
related to the use of 2,4,5-T in the area.

To test this

hypothesis, the Agency gathered data on hospitalized spontaneous
abortions occurring in the 1,600 square mile Alsea basin and
compared these data to comparable data from a control area where
2,4,5-T was not used.

This comparison showed that the overall

hospitalized spontaneous abortion index for the study area was
greater than that for the control area and that the difference
was statistically significant.

2,4,5-T Order at 35; Silvex

Order at 39.
When the data were analyzed to determine whether the
increase in study area spontaneous abortions was insignificant
because it was within the normal range of random fluctuation
or whether there was a real increase in the incidence of miscarriages among the women residents of the study area in relation
to the control area, the difference between the study area and

�-35control area was found to be statistically significant when
analyzed by several different tests.

Report at 46-71.

Dow's claim that "there is no statistically significant
difference between the overall hositalized spontaneous abortions
index" for the study and control areas, Dow Comments at 20,
totally disregards the evidence in the record.
First, when the mean values for the study and control area
are compared by Duncan's Multiple Range Test, the means are
significantly different from one another using a two-tailed
test (p

0.05).

Report at 46.

Because the original hypothesis

was that exposure to 2,4,5-T increases the isk of miscarriage
and because there is no reason to suspect that the pesticide
can prevent miscarriages, EPA judges a one-tailed test to be
appropriate.

Using this test, the result reaches twice the

.level of statistical significance'(p

.025).

Further, the number of abortions occurring in June in the
study area is significantly greater than the number that would
be expected either on the assumption that the number of
abortions were uniform across all months or that the abortion
"J
index was uniform for all months. Report at 52.
'_/

This conclusion is based on the following calculations:
number of abortions = 24
number expected on uniform number assumption
= 188 = 15.7
12
2
x = 4.39 p = 0.02 (one-tailed)

(CONTINUED)

�This result confirms the hypothesis by showing a statistically significant increase in the study area spontaneous
abortions relative to those occurring in the control area.

To

test the hypothesis, it was not necessary to show a significant
increase in June in the study are compared to the control area
since both an overall excess in the study area compared to
the control area and an increase in June in the study area above
the overall rate in the study area have been shown.

However,

in the interest of more fully inspecting the available data,
the investigators analyzed the data further and showed that
women in the control and urban areas do not experience an
increased incidence of miscarriages in June.

See tables and

figures in Report at pp. 42, 44, 45.
Moreover, another test contained in the Report confirms
this result.

This is the test showing a correlation between the

monthly pattern of spraying 2,4,5-T in months and the abortion
index in the study area two and three months following the
spraying.

This analysis shows a significant correlation (p

.01)

between the use of 2,4,5-T and the abortion indices two months
and three months after the spraying.
*__/

Report at pp. 63, 67.

(Footnote continued from previous page)
number expected on uniform index assumption
= 80.8 X 184 - 14.9
1,000

2
x - 5.56

p = .01 (one-tailed)

These would also be significant at .05 on the basis of a
two-tailed test.

�(4)

The statement in the Alsea report that
"correlation does not mean causation,"
re-states a basic principle of statistical
analysis and in no way negates the
biological significance of the observed
relation between the use of 2,4,5,-T and
miscarriages in the Alsea area.

Philosophers, legal scholars, and scientists have long
debated the concept of causality, but few expect conclusively
to establish cause and effect relationships.

For this reason,

thoughtful epidemiologists avoid the term "causal" and seek
evidence of association between increases in risk which are
temporally and geographically associated with potential exposure
to suspected etiologic agents.

In particular, descriptive

studies such as the Alsea study can and do provide suggestive
evidence of increases in risk, but they are not designed to
"prove" a "cause and effect" relationship.
Dow repeatedly states that the Alsea Report "expressly
concedes that this analysis is a correlational analysis, and
correlation does not necessarily mean causation."
at 15.

Dow Comments

Dow's characterization of this statement as a concession

implies that the Agency itself faults the study on this basis.
Again, however, this is simply an honest, scientific appraisal
of the meaning of the data, and it is fully consistent with
the Agency's conclusion that the data suggests a relationship
between the use of 2,4,5-T and miscarriages in the Alsea area.
Moreover, correlation between miscarriages and 2,4,5-T is
not an isolated observation, a product of statical "manipulation."

Dow Critique at 1.

Rather, the observed relationship

�-ribetween the use of 2,4,5-T and spontaneous abortion is alarmingly
consistent with a vast scientific literature which unequivocably demonstrates that when pregnant test animals are exposed
to 2,4,5-T, silvex and/or TCDD, dead and damaged offspring are
produced.

2,4,5-T Order at 22, Silvex Order at 27.

In view

of this extremely strong experimental data, the observed
correlation as biological as well as statistical significance.
Other more complex analyses reinforcing the fundamental
conclusions developed using these methods are discussed in
Subsection C.
(5)

There was a statistically significant
correlation between the amount of 2,4,5-T
used in the Alsea area in March, April
and May and the increased incidence of
abortions in the study area in June.

To test the level of interaction between the spray data
and the abortion d.ata, a -cross-correlation was .computed between
the abortion index for the study area and the monthly pattern
of spraying 2,4,5-T in pounds per month.
a statistically significant (p

This analysis showed

.01) correlation between

abortion indices for the study area and the spray pattern after
lags of two (r = .70) and three (r = .76) months.
Dow acknowledges that the

Report at 63.

seasonal variations in the

abortion index for each of the three areas are possibly common
biological phenomena, but cautions that factors other than
herbicide spraying account for the variations. Dow Comments
at 21.

�Because of a concern for factors other than herbicide
spraying, the authors of the Alsea Report viewed the cyclic
variation as "noise" in the data to be removed, much as seasonal
adjustments are made to economic indicators, before comparisons
are made.

For this reason, an analysis of the cyclic variation

was performed, and showed that cyclic trends accounted for
nearly all of the variation in the control area but did not
remove the seasonal June peak in the study area.

Further, the

time-course of variation was different in the study area than
the control area.

Thus, after accounting for cycle variation,

the seasonal variation in miscarriages is seen to be quite
separate from the remaining variation after removing its effects
from the study area data.

This residual variation was found to

.be associated in time with the level of 2,4,5-T sprayed.
(6)

Dow's argument that there is a June peak
of miscarriages- in Midland, Michigan actually
supports the conclusios of the Alsea Report,
and its attempts to discredit the Alsea
conclusions by pointing to a June peak in
Miami fails because the Miami data is based on
induced abortions, not spontaneous abortions.

The Alsea study demonstrates that there was a statistically
significant increase in the incidence of miscarriage among Alsea
area women in June and that this increase was correlated with
the use of 2,4,5-T in the area for forest management, approximately two months earlier.

�Dow contends that the June peak observed in Alsea is
comparable to June peaks observed in other urban areas, particularly Midland, Michigan, and Miami, Florida.
at 6, i( 15,

Gehring Affidavit

Dr. Gehring. argues that the finding of June peaks in

Miami and Midland "undermines, if not refutes altogether," the
Agency's assessment of the Alsea data.

Gehring affidavit at 6.

Dow's proposal that the Miami and Midland data refute the
Alsea data misuses the available information in one case and
fails to consider relevant information in the other.

First, and

quite simply, the Miami data in the Alsea Report, Report at
Appendix B, upon which Dow based its conclusion related to
therapeutic abortions, not spontaneous abortions.

Clearly on

increase in elective abortions cannot refute an assessment based
on spontaneous

abortions.

The argument based on the Midland data is similarly
unscientific.

Dow presents no data or analyses such as those

presented in the Alsea Report.

Rather, Dow attempts to make

its point using only a graph which appears to show a June peak
in Midland that is higher than in Alsea.

Critique attached to

Gehring Affidavit, (hereinafter "Dow Critique" or "Critique")
In 1978, Dow submitted three studies on TCDD's to EPA
under Section 8(e) of the Toxic Substances Control Act.

An EPA

status report, concluded that TCDD's "appear to be widespread
contaminants of the Tittabawassee and Saginaw Rivers (and

�-77--

possibly Saginaw Bay) downstream from Midland."

Kover, 1979.

Caged rainbow trout accumulated TCDD after 7 days when held in
Dow's tertiary waste treatment effluent and after 30 days in
flowing waters about six miles downstream of Dow's plant,
indicating downstream movement of TGDD from the plant.

The

status report went on to characterize Dow's plant discharge
as "the major (if not the only) source" of TCDD contamination
in the area and concluded that "the levels of TCDDs identified
in Midland soil and dust samples indicate that this area
represents a definite TCDD "hot spot."
Data prepared by the Michigan Department of Health showed
that the Midland County rate for all malformation was more than
twice the rate for the entire state for the period 1970-1974
and in each individual year after 1970. Infante, 1979.

In two

years, 1972 and 1973, this county's rate was the'highest in the
state.

Michigan contains at least two other counties where the

presence of a university mdeical center, located in Ann Arbor
and Detroit, would suggest the identification and recording of
anomalies at birth to be at least as thorough and accurate as
in Midland County.
The Michigan Department of Health also provided data on
specific types of malformations and calculated the number of
cases of malformation which v/ould be expected for Midland County

�I
/
'if the rate there were comparable to statewide rates.

Infante, 1979.

However, when the actual number of malforma-

tion cases was compared to the number expected assuming that
Midland was like the rest of the state, a clear excess of
urogenital abnormalities, cleft lip and palate, and heart
defects was found for babies born in Midland County.
Bailor, 1967.
Whether there is a relationship between the high rates of
congenital malformations in Midland County and Dow's monitoring
data showing the area to be a TCDD "hot spot" has not been
determined.

However, cleft lip and palate and urogenital

abnormalities are in clear excess in Midland County, as they
are among the defects frequently observed in litters of test
animals exposed to 2,4,5-T, silvex and/or TCDD during pregnancy,
2,4,5-T Orde.r at 22? Silvex Order at 27.
(7)

The-results support the hypothesis th-at
the occurrence of spontaneous abortions
in Alsea is related to the use of 2,4,5-T.

The study was planned and conducted to test the suggestion
of a relation between miscarriages and the use of 2,4,5-T in the
"__/ These data were presented within th context of a discussion
of possible reproductive hazards of vinyl chloride exposure.
The discussants were careful to avoid attributing an etiologic
connection in the absence of exposure data and in light of the
knowledge that a number of substances are manufactured or
processed at Dow's Midland plant. In 1977, a study published
by Dow scientists found little evidence of a teratogenic or
fetotoxic effect of vinyl chloride in either of three species:
mouse, rat or rabbit. John, 1976.

�Alsea area, and the study confirmed that miscarriages were
likely to occur there more often than in the control area
where 2,4,5-T was not used.
Dow's denunciation of the confirmed hypothesis as a
"preconceived conclusion," Gehring affidavit at 4, disregards
a fundamental principal of the scientific method.

To test a

hypothesis and to avoid charges of fishing the investigator
must know what question he is asking and plan the test
accordingly.

In the case of the Alsea II study, the eight

women had reported that they had experienced what seemed to
them to be an unusual number of miscarriages.

This obser-

vation was then applied to develop the hypothesis that there
should be different incidences between the Alsea area and
areas where 2,4,5-T was not used, and there should be an
increased incidence of miscarriages approximately two months
after the annual spring spraying season in the Alsea basin.
As developed above these elements of the hypothesis were
tested and confirmed in Alsea II.

�B.

Valid conclusions concerning human exposure
to suspected chemical agents do not depend
on the availability of chemical residue data
and are not limited by the lack of such data.

Detection and measurement of chemical residues of a
suspected etiologic a g e n t - i n human tissues and fluids are
not prerequisites for finding that humans are exposed to
the suspected agent.

Indeed, most, if not all, of the

twenty or so chemicals which are now widely recognized as
human carcinogens were confirmed as such through epidemiclogic studies which did not include, much less require,
physiologic residue analyses.

In studies providing conclu-

sive evidence of the carcinogenicity of substances such
as asbestos, vinyl chloride, chromium and bis(chloromethy)
ether, the only method of confirming human exposure was
the simple fact that the exposed group worked at a given
*

*

*

'

occupation and the control group did not.

•

Perhaps the most

striking example of an etiologic agent which would not be
identified as such if measurement of chemical residues in
human tissues were viewed as a sine qua non of exposure is
sunlight, an established carcinogenic agent which could not
be detected in human tissues by customary chemical analyses.
Rather, a key test of epidemiologically established
associations is their bi.ologic pluasibility.

Part of this

plausibility depends on whether the study group was actually
exposed to the substance.

Depending on the level or cer-

tainty needed, evidence of exposure can be as strong as a lung

�48

cancer patient's admission that he smoked forty cigarettes
a day for twenty years or as speculative as information that
a raesothelioma patient lived in the same household as an
asbestos worker.

In cases where, as here, absolute certainty

is not required (See Section —, infra.), the suspect chemical is highly toxic and there is a definite opportunity for
exposure, the fact that there is a potential for exposure
can reasonably be regarded as adequate evidence of the actual
occurrence of exposure to the chemical.
Dow contends that the "study is deficient because there
are no data establishing any pesticide exposure levels for
the women who experienced miscarriages."

Dow Comments at 24.

Dow further claims that "measurements made elsewhere in
humans and animals exposed to 2,4,5-T and TCDD indicate that
•the maximum amount of 2,4,5-T and TCDD which could possibly
have been absorbed into the body, if any, by the residents
of Alsea, Oregon would be far too low to cause any adverse
health effects."

Gehring Affidavit at 7.

Because Dow has supplied no data of any kind or any
other information on the measurements to which they refer,
the Agency.cannot fully evaluate this statement.

However,

in view of Dow's criticism of the Agency for failure to
provide residue data in support of its finding of probable
exposure of the Alsea area residents, it is surprising that
Dow itself neither provides the measurements to which they

�refer nor any other data showing that human tissue residues
are biologically insignificant.

Furthermore, even if such

data were available, because there is no known no-effect
level in humans or animals for fetotoxic or carcinogenic,
effect there is no basis for Dow's statement.
This inconsistency

in Dow's approach to this question

illuminates the problem facing both Dow and the Agency.
The pesticidal uses of 2,4,5-T and silvex necessarily result
in the distribution of these pesticides to the environment
and thereby create a potential for human exposure.

However,

because the available analytical methods can at best detect
TCDD only down to 1-10 ppt, if TCDD is present at 1-10 ppt or
lower, it would not be detected.

As a result, Dow and the

Agency can determine that there is no more than --ppt in
a particular sample, but neither party can make supportable
statements as to the actual residues of TCDD in any environmental or human sample.

The Agency's approach, consistent

with its obligation to protect the public health, is to view
the data on toxicity in animals, and the opportunity for
human exposure as indicating that the Alsea residents (and
other persons living and working in areas where 2,4,5-T
and silvex are used) may be exposed to injurious amounts
of the chemical.

�C.

In connection with the suspension orders,
Alsea I was utilized only to develop the
hypothesis, later confirmed tnrough Alsea II,
that there was a relation between the use
of 2,4,5-T and the occurrence of an excess
incidence of miscarriages in Alsea.

In issuing the suspension order, the Agency explained
that eight women residents of Alsea, Oregon had reported
that as a group they had experienced an unusually large
number of miscarriages and they thought that their miscarriages mights be related to the use of 2,4,5-T because the
miscarriages generally followed the annual spring spraying
of 2,4,5-T in the forests near their homes.
at 34; Silvex Order at 37-8.

2,4,5-T Order

EPA conducted a study of

these women to determine if there was any validity to
their suggestion of a relation between their miscarriages
and 2,4,5-T use.
A clear distinction must be recognized and maintained
uetween the studies now identified as "Alsea I" and Alsea
II."

Alsea I comprised an intensive, health questionnaire

study of nine rural women residing within a 12-mile radius
of Alsea, Oregon, who had experienced a total of thirteen
miscarriages between 1973 and 1978 which they associated
in time and proximity with forest spraying of 2,4,5-T.

The

questionnaire asked for detailed information on the women's
pregnancy and medical histories and on pregnancy outcomes
of their sisters.

It also included questions on diet,

environmental aspects, occupations, household pesticide
usage, and educational background.

�The purpose of Alsea I was to rspond rapidly to a
concerned citizenry to determine hether or not the miscarriages could be explained by causes other than potential
exposure to forest herbicides and to examine the degree of
association between conception-to-miscarriage of periods and
locations, dates and rates of forest herbicide applications.
The Alsea I cohort of nine women was recognized as being
too small and potentially biased to establish more than the
possibility of correlation between forest spraying and miscarriages .
Because it was anticipated that medical cause of these
miscarriages could not be positively identified, and were
not, and because of the apparent seasonal relationship between
spray and conception-to-miscarriages of 20 weeks duration
or less, the Agency decided to investigate miscarriage ratesin an expanded forest area centered about the Alsea area
and in a comparable control area in Oregon,

Plans for the

expanded investigation were developed prior to the completion
of Alsea I, the actual decision to conduct the study being
dependent on the outcome of Alsea I.
The study of miscarriage rates'in the expanded study
area and the comparable control area, reported February 20,
1979, has become identified as Alsea II.

It is a retrospective

study of records of hospitalized miscarriages in the study
and control areas relative to the number of births' in those
areas, and compares seasonal miscarriage patterns with 2,4,5-T

�spray patterns.

It is not a continuation of Alsea I and

is virtually independent of that study with the exceptions
that the miscarriages of the nine women maybe included in
total miscarriages for the entire Alsea area and the spray
data assembled for Alsea I were utilized in the Alsea II
cross-correlationanalyses.
EPA neither took any regulation action nor prepared to
take regulatory action based solely on the data from the nine
women.

Rather, EPA interpreted that data as indicating that

there was a possibility that other Alsea area women might
also have an unusual incidence of miscarriage and that the
data suggested serious enough consequences

that further

investigation was necessary to determine whether action
to protect the public health was necessary.

This decision

was consistent with the views of the reviewers who, consistent
with customary epidemiologic caution, indicated that the
data did not indicate a cause and effect relationship but
was inconclusive and that further analysis was necessary.
(1)

The reviewers inability to find a "causual"
relationship between 2,4,5-T and miscarriages
in Alsea I is not surprising and has no
bearing on the results reported for Alsea II.

We have previously explained that epidemiologists generally
avoid the term "causation" because the of the inexact nature
of cause and effect relationships.

Alsea I was a retrospective

study of the miscarriage experience of a self-selected

group of

eight women, all personally concerned about those experiences.

�53

^

Scientists would not reasonably expect the study to provide
evidence of causation.
Despite the obvious limits on finding a cause and effect
relationship from this data, Dow repeatedly emphasizes that
the specialists who reviewed Alsea I reported that they found
"no evidence of a

causal relationship."

Dow Critique at 2.

Cautious interpretation of the Alsea I data, based only
on questionnaries and medical records of only nine women,
was fully consistent with thgouthtful epidemiologists' careful avoidance of drawing etiological inferences on the basis
of case histories alone.

Rather, they seek to identify

populations and to estimate the relative incidence of death
and disability.

Thus, the Alsea I reviewers reasonably and

responsibly explained that they could find none on the basis
of.the information supplied by eight women in reponse to a
questionnaire.
For this reason, it is difficult to understand plaintiffs'
contention that the Agency should have followed the advice
of the reviewer who, on the basis of nine case reports, concluded that further study would "be a waste time and fund."
To the contrary, the Agency would have been derelict in its
statutory obligation to determine whether the use of pesticides may cause unreasonable adverse effects had the Agency
not pursue this indication in Alsea I that there was a
relation between the use of the pesticide and the increased
incidence of miscarriages in areas where the pesticide was used

�D.

The data on the spontaneous abortion index for
a neighboring urban area and the spectral analysis
data which were included in the Alsea Report were
supplementary in character and were not part of
the data used to derive pertinent findings
concerning use of 2,4,5-T

In Subsection A we isolated and summarized the
fundamental objectives, results, and conclusions of the Alsea
Study.

During the course of the Alsea Study, as in most

scientific investigations, the investigators considered

infor-

mation, methods and analyses that were peripheral to those
considerations which formed the center of the study.
corollary features included analysis of spontaneous

These
abortion

data from Corvallis, an urban area near Alsea, and use of a
statistical technique designed to determine whether the
seasonal characteristics of the spontaneous abortion index in
the Study area co'uld'be attributed solely to the apparent
cyclic variations in each of the areas.
In challenging the suspension decisions, Dow has frequently
cited alleged defects in these corollary data and analyses
as indicators of error or invalidity in the Alsea Study.

Dow's

emphasis on these features obscures the central nature and
strength of the Study and even creates false issues.

In this

section of the memorandum, we again explain the nature and
relevance of each of these corollary features and respond to
Dow's changes .

�(1)

The data and analyses relating to the
occurrence of spontaneous abortions in
the urban area have no bearing on the
differences in the spontaneous abortion
indices in the control and study areas.

Many of the women residents of the study area use hospitals
in Corvallis, an urban area adjacent to the study area.

For

this reason, Corvallis hospital records were examined to obtain
spontaneous abortion data for study area residents who had been
treated in the urban area hospitals -at the time of their
miscarriages .
These records also provided spontaneous abortion data
relating to urban area residents and these data were analyzed
along with data from the study and control area.

The data on

miscarriages among urban area women were of interest because
2,4,5-T is not used in the urban area, but they had limited
utility because many spontaneous abortions were treated at
clinics which had no counterparts in the study and control
areas.

Because the clinics were not fully investigated, the

hospitalized spontaneous abortion index for the urban area
under reports the spontaneous abortions for which medical
treatment is given.

Significantly, if study area women use

the urban area clinics as well as urban area hospitals, the
spontaneous

abortion index for the study area probably under-

estimates the abortion rate for the study area because urban
clinic abortion data were not included ia the data for the
study area.

Because there are no such clinics in the control

�area, the spontaneous abortion index there .would not be underestimated for that reason.
Dow mistakenly treats the data and analyses relating to
the spontaneous abortion index in -the urban area as information
wnich negates the observations of an increased incidence of
spontaneous abortions in the study area.

See e.g. Dow

Comments at 19.
The urban area data in no way influence the Agency's
conclusion that there is an increased abortion rate in the
study area in the time period following the spray or our
conclusion that the abortion rate in the study area exceeds
that in the control area.

2,4/5-T Order at 35; Silvex Order

at 39 .

The urban data are unrelated to the simple and specific .
hypothesis which the Alsea II Study was designed to test.

The

urban area data were carried along in the analysis because the
records of the urban area hospital had to be used to provide
data on the study area abortions and because, in the event
that there was a June increase, the urban area data might be
useful in providing a measure of monthly and seasonal trends
in abortion frequencies in a nearby area.

Report at .19.

More specifically, Dow charges that the Alsea Report
"capriciously combines the obviously lower values from the
urban area with those from the control area for many of the
subsequent analyses."

Dow Critique at p. 9,

�In fact, even a cursory review of the study shows that
no such combination of urban and control area data was made
in testing the major hpothesis and reaching the conclusion
that there was an increased incidence of spontaneous abortions
in the study area relative' to the control area..

Rather,

consistent with a more thorough testing of the initial results
showing a significant June trend, such combinations were made
to determine if the observed June peak might be accounted for
by seasonal trends.

Moreover, whenever the urban and control

data were combined for these analyses, the same analysis was
conducted for the control area data alone.

Report at

Therefore, contrary to Dow's contentions, combinations
of uroan and control area data did not bias the results.
(2)
. •

The complex spectral analysis in the Alsea
Study' was performed solely to determine
whether or not the June peak in incidence of
spontaneous abortions in the Study area could
reasonably be attributed to innate periodic
variations in the data.

Dow has alleged that the spectral analysis used in the
Alsea Study was "a manipulation of the data to devise
a desired result."

Critique at 13-14,

Such a statement

reflects a fundamental misunderstanding of the reasons why
the spectral analysis was performed.

The objective of this

complex collateral analysis was not to demonstrate

the

existence of a June peak in the incidence of spontaneous
abortions in the study area, which had already been independently established, but rather to determine whether or not

.

�th.e observed June peak might simply reflect a cyclical tendency
in such data which had never before been reported in the
scientific literature or spontaneous abortions.
The spectral analysis was designed to test the hypothesis
that tne June peak in the abortion index for the Study area
merely reflected a cyclic variation of unknown origin which
might be common to all the areas studied but which, for
equally unknown reasons, might differ between areas in its
correspondence to months of the year.

To test this highly

speculative possibility, an attempt was made to fit the
spontaneous abortion data for the Study area with that for the
Control Area, in order to determine whether or not a significant
similarity between the observed patterns could be established by
shifting the phase relationship.

Even after apparent cyclic

variations in the two areas had been synchronized, the June
peak in the Study area remained and could not be reconciled
with Control Area data.
The spectral analysis was a supplementary evaluation
of the basic Alsea data and in no way altered or manipulated
the data base upon which che authors of the Study and the
Agency ultimately relied.

Rather, the spectral analysis

demonstrates that the authors of the Alsea Study were sensitive
to and considered even highly speculations alternative explanations of the origin of the June peak in the Study area.

�(3)

The alternative statistical treatments proposed
by Dow do not contradict the basic findings of
the Alsea S tudy .

The petitioner has employed certain alternative statistical
approaches which were not utilized by the'authors of the Al-sea
Study, in an attempt to demonstrate that the data base does not
support the findings of the Alsea Study.

Dow alleges that the

demonstrated correlations between monthly spraying and the
monthly abortion index in the Study area are "correlation"
between monthly spraying in the Study area and the monthly
hospitalized abortion index in the Control Area.
at 23.

Dow Comments

In addition, Dow suggests that a "simple statistical

Chi square test" may be used to demonstrate that there was no
statistically significant increase in the hospitalized spontaneous
abortion index for the Study Area, as compared to the Control
Area.

Dow Critique at 9, 12.
Both of Dov;' s criticisms are without merit.

The allegation

of a "correlation" between spraying in the Study Area and
abortions in the Control Area comparable to the correlation
oetween spraying in the spring and June abortions found in
the Study area is•irrelevant.

Moreover, even though use

of a Chi-square test in the manner suggested by Dow is of
questionable theoretical validity, the results of such
calculations nevertheless corroborate the basic conclusions
of the Alsea Study.

�(a)

The alleged "correlation" between monthly
spraying of 2,4,5-T in the Study Area and
the hospitalized spontaneous abortion index
in the Control Area is irrelevant.

The petitioner's allegation that there is a significant
correlation between the amount of 2,4,5-T sprayed on the Study
Area and the spontaneous abortion index for the Control Area
is of highly questionabel relevance.

If Dow is contending

that it is possible to find a coincidentally "significant"
correlation somewhere if you do enough independent tests
using unrelated variables, respondent agrees.

However, it is

entirely illegitimate to suggest as Dow does that the results
of such an abstract experiment can be meaningfully compared to
a calculation expressly designed to test the validity of a
specific hypothesis.
We do-not believe that Dow. intended to test the hypothesis
that abortions in the Control Area are related to spraying
in the Study Area.

Even if a significant 'correlation" could be

found between these essentially unrelated variables, this finding
would have absolutely no relevance to the reliability of a
separate test of a single well-defined hypothesis.

No

doubt the laws of chance would enable Dow to identify by
experimentation many "significant'" correlations between 2,4,5-T
spraying and totally unrelated variables, but such data would
have no probative value here.

Regardless of which figures

Dow's allegation is based on, it should be apparent that Dow'3

�selection of a single example from a series of equally
implausible alternative hypotheses is a meaningless exercise
designed to obfuscate the real issues.
(b)

Even though the suggested use of a Chisquare test to determine whether or not
the incidence of hospitalized spontaneous
abortions in the Study Area was greater
than the incidence of such abortions in
the Control Area is of questionable
theoretical validity, such a test nevertheless confirms the basic findings of
the Alsea Study.

The petitioner alleges that use of a "simple
Chi-square

statistical

test" demonstrates that there is no significant

difference between the incidence of spontaneous abortions in
the Study Area and the incidence of spontaneous abortions in
the Control Area.

Since Chi-square represents a type of

distribution and may be used in many different ways, Dow's
naked assertion does not provide a definitive basic for identification of the exact test Dow used.

However, the most reasonaole

assumption is that Dow used the Chi-square test for binomial
proportions.
Use of this Chi-square

test involves an implicit

assumption that the error variance of the distribution
of hospitalized spontaneous abortion indices is binomial
variance.

This assumption is of questionable validity

because the indices are not actually binomial proportions.

v

V
See Chiang, E. L., Standard Error of the Age-Adjusted
Death Rate, Vital Statistics Special Reports, Vol. 47, No. 9,
for a discussion of this problem.

�(flIn contrast, the authors of the Alsea Study estimated the
error variance directly by using three-way interaction
terms from the available empirical data.
Even if we assume that application of a Chi-square test
to this type of data is appropriate, the results are consistent
with the conclusions of the Alsea Study.

The Chi-square test

indicaces that the hospitalized spontaneous abortion index in
the Study Area is significantly (p

.05) greater than the
A A /

hospitalized spontaneous abortion index in the Control Area.
Perhaps Dow concluded that the difference is not significant
by use of a two-tailed test.

However, since the alternative

hypothesis to be tested here is whether or not the spraying was
A A f /

associated with an increase in spontaneous abortions,
the one-tailed test is clearly the more appropraite one.
If the validity of the Chi-square method suggested by Bow
is accepted, it can also be used to demonstrate that the
difference between the June abortion index for two areas
is highly significant (p = .01).

Thus, corroborates the

findings of the Alsea Study.
**_/
If the 188/2344 abortion rate in the Study Area is compared
to the 109/1666 aoortion rate in the Control Area and Yataes'
ccorrection for continuity is applied, x = 2.89 and p = .04
(one-tailed) .
'_/_
The Alsea Study was not designed to determine whether
or not 2,4,5-T could prevent spontaneous abortions.

�III.

The Suspended Uses of 2,4,5-1 and Silvex. result
in direct exposure to humans through aerial drift
and/or through chemical contamination of vegetation
food and water which humans use or consume•A.

Introduction
As the Administrator acknowledged in his 2,4,5-T and

Silvex suspension decisions, a chemical cannot pose a risk
to human "health if no one is exposed to it.

The Administrator

then provided to analyze carefully the questions of exposure.
He concluded as follows:
In my judgment, the information which as
recently come to my attention as a result of the
Alsea study constitutes a dramatic and troubling
new point of departure for analysis of TCDD
exposure concerns.. As indicated above, these
data show a striking relationship between 2,4,5-T
use and increased incidences of spontaneous
abortions among women residing in the use area.
As further developed above, this effect is an
effect w.hich one would have predicted as a
likely outcome o'f human exposure, based upon
a body of animal data of almost unprecedented
conclusiveness. The Alsea study, to be sure,
contained no data showing actual exposure. However,
concern for the health of humans who may be
exposed to TCCD, and therefore, to 2,4,5-T or silvex
contaminated with TCDD, is heightened because
scientists have not demonstrated that there is a
level of exposure that has no adverse effects in
humans. Thus, in the face of the highly significant
relationship which the study showed, and the animal
data, I conclude it is reasonable and in the public
interest to assume that the women in Alsea study were
exposed to TCDD.
Moreover , I also conclude that it is prudent
that individuals who frequent or live in areas
where 2,4,5-T or silvex ace used may be exposed
-co TCDD in vasy and under conditions which may
cause these indivicduals to be exposed in ways
qualitatively similar to those experienced by the
Study area women. 2,4,5-T Order at 50-51; Silvex
at 50-51.

�As developed

above chemical regulation inevitably

involves uncertainty which must be dealth with by framing
prudent assumptions which are consistent with the available
d a t a , and which reflect the situations as it may exist,
if the uncertainties were resolved in favor of higher,
rather than lower risks.

The Agency's position is that the

Administrator's exposure assumptions are fully consistent with
this approach.
We will show below that Dow attempts to meet its burden of
proof in this area by rebutting the Administrator's exposure
analysis are unpresuasive, and that the Administrator's exposure
concerns, as set out in this suspension decisions, remain unanswered.
In addition, we will present additional information developed since
the Administrator's February 28 decisions which is consistent with,
and therefore corroborates, the exposure analysis set out in those
decisions.

This information consists, for the most p a r t , of

case histories showing that uses of 2,4,5-T and silvex result in
distribucion of these chemicals (and presumably TCDB as
well) to sites of human work and habitation.
E.

The Use of 2,4,5-T and/or silvex leads to direct
human exposure to these chemicals and to TCDD
The current methods of application of 2,4,5-T and silvex

necessarilly result in the distribution of these chemicasis to the
environment.

In the first instance, the application methods

are specifically designed to direct the pesticide to a site that
includes not onlv taraec brush and weeds but also includes a wide

�v a r i e t y of non-target organisms and environmental media.
That is, any target site necessarily includes in addition
to the target .brush and weeds, other non-target vegetation,
the soil substrate, surface water and ground water, and,
of course, the surrounding air.
Thus, the intended and actual use of the pesticide
unavoidably and invariably leads to the presence of 2,4,5-T,
silvex, and TCDD at each and every site of affication.
This
\
fact is indisputable and even if none of the facts discussed
below influenced the environmental distribution of these chemicals, the use of these chemicals clearly leads to contamination
of the living and non-living organisms and materials at the
site of application.
In addition, although regulations and/or industry practice,
generally prohibit use of these chemicals in areas
of human work habitation, if persons are present at the site
of application, these persons would also be directly exposed
to the pesticide.

Thus, even assuming full conforming with

all regulations in the pare of applicators, the applicators
themselves are necessarily present at the place and time of
application and therefore are directly exposed.

Any other

person inadvertently or unknowningly present at an application sita would also be exposed.

�F u r t h e r , because normal difffusion though air and w a t e r ,
as well as wind and currents distributes the pesticide beyond
the site of application, any persons, plants and animals,
water, soil and other environmental media which lie in the
path of chemical-bearing drift or water will aslo be exposed
J/
to these chemicals .
For example', in a November 1978 letter
to the Administrator, the Chief of the Forest service explained
contamination of water was unavoidable:
Most applications of 2,4,5~T in forest ...
situations necessarily involve water to some
extent, and although we have vary stringent
criteria for preventing unnecessary water
contamination, it is not possible to
to completely avoid it. We are becoming
increasingly aware of this with improvements in analytical detection capabilities.
Our go.al in respect to 2,4,5-T residues '
in water has been not to exceed the maximum
contaminant level of 10 parts per billion
( ppb ) established for silvex, a very closely
related herbicide (40 CFR 141). Almost all
of our water samples taken on site immediately
after application projects show no 2,4,5-T
residues, but some do — usually less than 1 ppb,
and in almost every case less than 10 ppb,
Together these factors conclusively establish the use
of these pesticides leads to exposure of persons, plants and
animals, and environmental media to these chemicals.
™ _~™™™_™__,_^ subject of spray drift indicates that
exposure due to drift is likely. For e x a m p l e , Oregon State
Univerisity staff conducted spraying experiments in an area
20 miles northwest of Alsea , Oregon. They reported that
between 60 and 75% of the 2,4,5-T sprayed from aircraft
did not reach the target areas.
Norris, 1967 .

:.-•&lt;;*-

�-47Dow contends that c u r r e n t technology permits precise
application of 2,4,5-T and silvex, thereby eliminating spray
drift as a source of human exposure. Comments at 32.
The error of this statement is readily demonstrated
through simple discriptions of actual exposure
which have been reported to the Agency.

incidents

Drawing from the

Agency's Pesticide Episode Reporting System (FEES), the
2,4,5-T RPAR rebuttal file, and other sources, the
Agency has selected several case histories which rebut
Dow's contention that the use of the pesticide does not result
in exposure.

Each case was selected on the basis of the

following criteria:
1.

2,4,5-T was the pesticide used,

2.

The use resulted in injury or damage to
humans, animals, or vegetation.

3.

The site of injury was some distance away
from the site of application.

4.

The incident was the subject of a contemporaneous report.

As the discussion to follow demonstrates, the use of these
chemicals does lead, directly and indirectly, to human
exposure .

�1.

Use of these pesticides results in direct exposure
to bystanders.
During the spring of 1976 .the area near the home

of Patricia Clary (Candrian) in Milo, Oregon was sprayed with
2,4,5-T as well as other chemicals.

Curing this period

Ms. Clary suffered from uterine hemorrhaging .

Her case was

sufficiently severe so as to require transfusions of eight pints
of blood and five pints of plasma.

Her health returned to

normal during the summer after the spraying.

The next spring

spraying resumed as did Ms. Clary's health problems.

She

experienced abnormal and heavy "spotting," extremely extended
menstrual periods and dizziness and nausea.

In September of the

same year (1977) spraying with 2,4,5-T was undertaken again,
this time within several yards of her home.

Analysis of water

from a nearby spring by the Oregon Department of Agriculture
revealed residues of 2,4,5-T at concentrations of 0.3 ppm . For
the week following this spraying incident, Ms. Clary, her husband
and two children as well as a visitor suffered drowsiness,
nausea, and d i a r r h e a .
abnormal.

Once again Ms. Clary's menstrual cycle was

Finally, in February of 1978 an area 1/2 mile away

�from the Clary house was sprayed.

Ms. Clary and her son

experienced nausea and d i a r r h e a for 4-5 days after the spraying.
Ms. Clary's menstrual cycle .was again abnormal.

(Exhibit O

)

A parallel case history was related by Barbara Eurkett
also of Milo , Oregon.

During the same spring, 1975 spraying

operations described by Ms. Clary, the 16 year old daughter'of
Ms. Eurkett also experienced

unexplained

as severe headaches and backaches.

hemorrhaging , as well

In September of 1977 the

area was again sprayed with 2,445-T.

Ms. Eurkett stated, "The

drift was heavy enough to bring this spray across highway 227
and onto our property.

The spray could be seen, left (sic)

and smelt and tasted.

At the time of the spraying I received

a very sore throat."

(Exhibit / )

Eloise Cromwell of Fope, Arkansas, related the following
incident, "During the spring of 1972, our immediate neighbors
sprayed the chemical 2,4,5-T on land directly above our spring
and into our watershed.

Since the spraying, there have been

seven pregnancies among the women living on our farm.

Three

of the babies were m i s c a r r i e d , one visibly deformed.

One baby

died at age three months of crib death, no medical explanation,"
(See, also, F.FAS rebuttals S139A [3000/26]; $264 [3000/26];
O'Hagan A f f i d a v i t ; Weber Affidavit)

(Exhibit a t )

The foregoing incidents demonstrate that spray operations
result in direct human exposure.

F u r t h e r m o r e , the evidence

strongly suggests that these airborne exposures occur at levels

�sufficient to cause severe adverse effects in exposed humans.
The Agency is'currently collecting mere recorts of incidents
similar to those described above.

These will be presented in

the suspension hearing.
2.

Use of these pesticides results in direct exposure
to applicators.

Pilots, ground spray crews, mixers and loaders of the pesticides, and flaggers are all exposed during the application process
See 2,4,5-T Decision and Order at 60; Silvex Decision and Order
at 57-58.

Their exposure can occur throughout a work day and

for succeeding days and weeks during the spray season.

These

workers inhale pesticide spray, and some of them have direct skin
contact with concentrated formulatives or with spray.

Moreover,

the.spray or .concentrate can adhere to clothing, causing exposure
to last during one or several days.
Dow contends that applicator exposure is insignificant.

They

argue that if the Agency had not ignored data submitted by them
during the 2,4,5-T SPAR, the Agency would have agreed with them
that "exposure to applicators to 2,4,5-T and silvex, with their
trace contaminant TCDD, cannot cause the kinds of toxic effects
claimed in the Administrator's decisions."
36.

Dow's comments at

Prom these contentions, Dow constructs the argument that,

for the general population, "the margins of safety are of course
many orders of magnitude greater."

I_d_.

�The d a t a which Cow and others claim the Agency failed to
consider are the results of a Dow-National Forest Products
Association field test to d e t e r m i n e actual exposure of forestry

*/

applicators exposure to 2,4,5-T and TCDD.

These data demonstrate

that application workers are exposed to 2,4,5-T in amounts ranging
* */
from 0.51 mg per hour to 6,75 mg per hour.
Despite the difficulties of detecting TCDD, the NF?A study also reported that two
samples contained TCDD.

Conceding that actual exposure occurs,

Dow's pegs their argument that this level of exposure is safe
to the fact that the d a t a from the NFPA Study demonstrates exposure
to be substantially lower than no-adverse effect level presented
in che 2,4,5-T RPAP .

Record at 1.

Dow comments p, 35.

The flaw in Dow's argument is that it assumes that the
Agency's tentative conclusions with respect to a no-effect levelj
presented for comment in A p r i l , 1978, were definite conclusions.
The probable no-effect level calculated a year ago was based on
animal studies available at the time and on the basis of assumed
inter-species variations in sensitivity.

Since the issuance of

Position Document Mo. 1 4 additional animal data and the Alsea

V

HP A R~ R¥b"u t"t aT~¥l 0 2 3 H .

V
Exposure data are presented in terras of milligrams per hour
of spray operation. Corrections have been made for efficiency
of excretion. The estimates presented here are the upper r a n g e
figures reported in the study; the Agency believes these are
the most appropriate figures.

�T2-

Study have become a v a i l a b l e ; these new d a c a necessitated revision
in the Agency's t e n t a t i v e conclusions with respect to exposure
levels that may be deemed to be safe for humans.

Animal data, now

available show that fetotoxic effects occur in animals at doses
of TCDD as low as one hundred millionth of a g r a m , substantially
lower than the doses at which effects occurred in the studies
previously available.

Moreover, the Alsea Study shows the like-

lihood that either human exposure is g r e a t e r than either EFA
calculations or the NFPA Study indicates, or that human sensitivity
to the fetotoxic effects of these chemicals bears a d i f f e r e n t
relationship to animal sensitivity than the Agency originally
believed.

In any event, the new data leads to the conclusion t h a t ,

even though actual exposure appears to be lower than the Agency
had estimated in issuing the SPAR, exposure poses serious fetotoxic
risks to humans.
In fact, as discussed above, the best evidence now available
to the Agency indicates that it is not possible to establish a
no-effect level for TCDD-induced fetotoxic effects.

Accordingly»

although actual exposure appears to be lower than chat originally
estimated, the more significant fact is that effects
appear to occur at levels of exposure substantially below those
that the Agency had believed would cause these effects.
ingly, the Agency cannot give credence to Cow's a r g u m e n t ,

Accord-

�which are based on che assumption chat che Agency a d h e r e s co
the view that a probable no-effect level exists at the level
*/
indicated in the RPAR,
3.

Home Uses of silvex result in d i r e c t exposure
to family m e m b e r s
Silvex products are used for weed control on home

lawns and gardens, and the application techniques create the
potential for exposure to users.

Home users apply these products

with small tank sprayers , hose-end d i l u t e r s , and aerosol cans
for spray applications, and mechanical spreaders for g r a n u l a r
formulations.

Exposure is likely to result from applications

by some or all routes:

splashing and low-distance drift of

droplets from tank sprayers, hose-end d i l u t e e s , and aerosol

_^7~ Cf couTIe, even ""If the data justified adherence co che
Agency's position at the beginning of the PFAS process on the
"no-effect level" for r e p r o d u c t i v e effects, it still would not
follw that the TCDD human exposures which are likely to occur
would be "safe." This is because TCCD is a carcinogen, and it is
recognized by SPA and other federal regulation agencies involved
in protecting public h e a l t h that no level of exposure co a
carcinogen can be considered safe. See ^c^, Health Risk and
Economic Impact Assessments of Suspected"CaTcinogans , Interim
Procedures and Guidelines, 41 FB. 21402 (1975) Dow appears to
concede this point, and argues instead that the l^svej.. of risk would
be. insignificant. In light of data which has come, to the Agency's
attention since the beginning of the RPAP process showing that TCDC
is a more potent carcinogen than the Agency originally believed
it to be, this assertion is troublesome. (This data show that doses
as low as o_rvs b_ilJLj.oneth of a g r a m of TCDD cause marked carcinogenic
effects in animals.) In.any e v e n t , as we point out above,
a'c^olutje level of risk has no meaning under FIFRA; under FIFPA,
decTiTons turn on whether a given level of risk is greater than
che economic, social, or e n v i r o n m e n t a l benefits of the use of
the cesticice cosine; the r i s k .

�74containers; d i r e c t skin contact and dust particle d r i f t
from granular application,

IV

• Persons who are bystanders could also

receive exposure to silvex by accidental splashing or d r i f t , or
low-level d r i f t of droplets and/or dust particles,
Hose-end diluters create a high potential for dermal
exposure to both applicators and bystanders because the sprayarising from these devices is dispersed over a wide range.

The

coarseness of the spray, however, probably precludes any significant inhalation exposure or drift away from the site of
treatment .
Preparing liquid concentrates for use exposes home users.
While the concentrate is diluted with large volumes of w a t e r , the
concentrate may spill or splash onto exposed skin.

Additional

exposure is likely to occur due ing spraying, m i x i n g , and cleanup
of equipment.

Householders are not likely to exercise the ame

caution as the certified experienced operator, and m a y , for
example spray upwind, thus receiving an unduly high amount of
drift on face, hands, and other unprotected parts of the body.
a d d i t i o n , home-users are likely to exceed label instructions in
regard to application rates and number of applications.

*/ Some~horn.e~ar.d~garden applications of silvex are made by lawn
care professionals, who work much more extensively with this
h e r b i c i d e that would a single homeowner. These professionals
are likely to exercise more care curing the use of pesticide
chemicals? thus, the risks of d e r m a l exposure, resulting from
spills is lower to them than to home users cenerallv.

In

�C.

Use of these pesticides results in contamination
of food and water and thereby presents indirect
exposure to humans
Even in the absence of direct exposure curing

application, there are indirect routes through which
can be exposed to 2,4,5-1, silvex, and/or TCCD.

individuals

Cnce a herbicide

is a p p l i e d j subsequent environmental factors play an important
role in determining its human accessibility.

For example,

animals used for food may eat the treated foliage, thereby
providing a source of d i e t a r y contamination, treated ;' treated
soil run-off could contaminate water supplies; and weather
conditions favoring persistence of the chemical could prolong
possible exposure.

Monitoring studies have detected these

substances in water and a n i m a l s , indicating a very real source
of indirect human exposure and possibly explaining the residues
detected in human urine.

In the following section, sources of

indirect exposure to 2,4,5-T, silvex, and/or TCDD are discussed.
1.

Chemical residues of 2,4,5-T, S i l v e x , and/or
TCDD are detected in environmental media and
human and animal tissues.
The EPA and other Federal agencies support numerous

programs which monitor 2,4,5-1, Silvex, and TCDD in environmental
samples.

For example, EPA monitors u r i n e , a i r , surface w a t e r ,

s e d i m e n t , and soils.

Other agencies have similar p r o g r a m s which

are a p p r o p r i a t e to their needs, i.e.., the Bureau of Land-management
has done water monitoring for Silvex in connection with its
h e r b i c i d e sera 1 / croiects on 5LM forested land.

�-75aDow contends that environmental monitoring has failed to
reveal any significant TCDD residues and that studies fail to
demonstrate the presence of TCDD as a residue in the American
food supply.

They contend that this is because the short half-

lives of 2,4,5-T, silvex and TCDD prevent a significant contamination
of environmental media.
Doubt is cast upon these claims by the evidence.

Monitoring

studies done by EPA indicate that 2.,4,5-T and/or silvex are
present in human urine, ambient air and surface waters.

Recent

preliminary results from a national urine survey show trace
amounts of 2,4,5-T in 3 of 1085 samples, quantifiable silvex
residues in 4 samples, and trace amounts of silvex in an additional
13 samples.

During the period May, 1976 - August, 1978, 2,4,5-T

was detected in 6 of 1350 whole water samples; silvex was detected
twice.

Ambient air monitoring of agricultural areas from 1970-1971
3
3
shows residues of 2,4,5-T ranging from 0.5 ng/m to 36 ng/m .
The U.S. Forest Service has done some limited monitoring
studies in connection with herbicide spray projects on National
Forest Lands in the Pacific Northwest.

Analyses were only done

for 2,4,5-T since Silvex is generally not used by the Forest
Service.

Some of those analyses were positive for 2,4,5-T.

The

Bureau of Land-Management analyzed a limited number of Oregon
water samples for silvex only, since 2,4,5-T is not usually used
by the Bureau.

Silvex was detected within 72 hours after treatment.

Data collected by the U.S. Geological Survey for 1968 - 1971 showed
that 2,4,5-T was the most commonly detected herbicide in western
streams.

�In 1974, the Agency, Dow, United Stages Capartrpent of
A g r i c u l t u r e , and the Environmental Defense Fund joined together'
to form the Dioxin Implementation Flan, which was organized to
develop the analytical methodology for detecting TCDD in the low
parts per trillion range (pet), to conduct monitoring for TCDC
in environmental samples, and to support research on the toxicological effects of TCDD.

Record at E-74.

As a part of the Flan,

samples of birds and mice from forest areas in Oregon which had
been collected in 1973 and analyzed using e a r l i e r , less reliable,
techniques, were re-analyzed in 1976 using improved gas chrcmatography/high resolution mass spectroscopy

techniques.

Three of five

samples which had originally been analyzed as positive showed
detectable levels of TCCD, although exact qualification varied
between laboratories.

Therefore, although precise quantification

is not a v a i l a b l e , it appears from q u a l i t a t i v e standpoint that
TCDD was present in some of the Oregon forest samples collected
in 1973.

Pecord at H-63 and 73.

Three beef fat samples out of 67 collected

in 1975 from areas

where 2,4,5-T was probably used were also found to be positive
(one at 60 ppt and two at 20 ppt') ,

In addition, some ether samples

showed the possibility of TCDD, but levels were at or below the
detection limit of 10 ppt.

Record at R-65.

Studies on the environmental movement of 2,4,5-T and Silvax
indicate that run-off from sites of application is a likely means
of environmental transport.

These herbicides are usually applied

�js a dilute spray, forming a chin film on foliage and soil.
They are thus accessible to r a i n f a l l that occurs subsequent to
application.

Both are fairly soluble in water and are trans-

ported in run-off largely in solution r a t h e r than by adsorption
to suspended
run-off

sediments.

Numerous studies have documented

transport of 2,4,5-T under d i f f e r e n t situations.

For

e x a m p l e » 2,4,5-T levels of at least 7.2 ppb were foundd in a fish
hatchery, 4000 feet downstream from a forest treatment
days after treatment

N o r r i s , 1973

site, six

. (Exhibit 7- ).

For p a s t u r e and range land use, concentrations of
2,4»5-T from 15 to 3,300 ppb were found in surface

run-off

waters collected at the edge of the treated plots.
In sum, monitoring p r o g r a m s have demonstrated the presence
of 2,4,5-T, silvex and TCDD in water, a i r , and foodstuffs.

Proof

that human exposure is actually taking place is demonstrated by
the presence of 2,4,5-T and silvex in u r i n e samples.
2.

Contamination of food and water with
2,4,5-T results in indirect exposure
to humans
Numerous documented incidents establish that,

despite inconclusive or apparently negative results in many
residue analyses samplings, use of 2,4,5-T results in contamination of food or water at considerable distances for the site
of application and that such contamination causes damage and
causes indirect h u m a n exposure.

Dow contends that the environ-

m e n t a l fate of 2,4,5-T is such that "stream c o n t a m i n a t i o n is
negligible" and that "Residues of 2,4,5-T r a r e l y occur ir. m e a t ,
milk and other a g r i c u l t u r a l p r o d u c t s under c u r r e n t r e g i s t r a t i o n s , "
(Cow comments, p. 37)

Cow also implies -hat TCDC does not

�contaminate food and w a t e r : " . . . TCDD is not mobile in soil
and residues nave not been found
application of 2,4,5-T.

in vegetation or water after

Significantly, environmental monitoring

.has failed to reveal any significant TCCD residues."

Id_.

Dow'3

position overlooks incidents such as those described below.
The selection c r i t e r i a used in collecting these incidents
involving

indirect exposure are the criteria used for collecting

reports of direct exposure.
1.

2,4,5-T was the pesticide used.

2.

The use resulted in damage.

3.

The iste of injury was some distance
away from the site of application

4.

The incident was the subject of a
contemporaneous report.

The incidents selected are d r a w n from RF&amp;R rebuttal submission
and FSPS Reports,

The Agency is in the process of•collecting .

reports of additional incidents for use in the administrative
hear ing.
In March 1975 , 2,4,5-T was applied by air on timber land
near Poseburg, Oregon, at a time when snow was present on the
ground.

Subsequent melting of the snow caused contamination of

a creek that supplies water to residents of the a r e a .
analysis for one household revealed

Tap water

the presence of 0.0003 ppm

of 2,4 ,5-T.
In M a r c h 1975, 2,4,5-T was applied by equipment to c l e a r
brush along a logging road in Lecombe ., Oregon.

Contamination

of a ditch alongside the unwanted foliage caused d a i r y c a t t l e
to become ill.

Analyses of milk sampled five and eight days

�"after the spraying shewed that 2,4,5-T was present at levels
of 0.03 pprn and 0.002 ppm, respectively.

Two hundred and forty

gallons of milk generated by the sick cows had to be discarded.

( E x h i b i t v5) .
In June 1973, 2,4,5-T was applied in a municipal shop
maintenance area in West Linn, Oregon,

Gardens and surrounding

foliage and trees suffered damages including contamination of
food crops.

(Exhibit £ ).

In June 1973,, application of 2,4,5-T along a right-of-way
caused damage in a garden 150 yards from the right-of-way.
Visible chemical damage occurred on beans, tomatoes, and peas.
In the area surrounding the garden , visible damage occurred to
grapes, apples, clover and foliage.

(Exhibit *J ).

In March 1978, 2,435-T was applied along a power line rightof-way in Gandeeville, West Virginia.

The owner of property

through which the right-of-way ran testified before a local
commission chat the spray caused a "brown-out" which damaged
vegetation, bushes, fruit trees and a creek in the area near the
spray site,

(Exhibit &lt;5 ).

In September 1977, 2,4,5-T was applied aerially on .3 power
right-of-way about 30-40 feet from a school near H e r m i t , West
Virginia, just after children had been dismissed from school.
The teacher of the school testified in a court proceeding that
spray fell both on the schoolyard and on adjacent areas, including
a p a s t u r e , where children walk and play.

Vegetation including

b e r r i e s customarily eaten by the school children, was contaminated.
A veil supplying water for che school was close to the spray site
and may have been contaminated.

(Exhibit '9 ).

�•

_

-7&lt;Ja-

3.

The environmental persistence of TCDD allows for
exposure after the actual use-time.
While 2,4,5-T and silvex are not environmentally

persistent chemicals, TCDD is capable of great persistence.
Helling et al. (1973) concluded that this persistence is not
surprising since it is an insoluble, non-polar, chlorinated
molecule, devoid of biologically labile functional groups.

The

half-life in soil has been estimated to be about one year in two
different soils (Kearney et al., 1972).

Of 100 strains of micro-

organisms which have the capability to degrade other persistent
pesticides, only five showed some ability to degrade TCDD
(Matsumura and Benezet, 1973).

Matsumura (1978) found that TCDD

was stable in lake sediments and had a half-life of about 600 days.
TCDD usually first appears in the environment at a very low
concentration in a thin film on foliage or soil, as a result of
spraying.

The extent of its persistence depends upon the current

environmental circumstances.

Under certain conditions, including

principally the presence of a hydrogen-donating solvent and adequate sunlight intensity, photodechlorination of TCDD to lower
chlorinated dioxins can take place.
Dow contends that TCDD has a short half-life in the environment when "on vegetation in the presence of a hydrogen donor and
that photochemical degradation also occurs in soil."
at 37.

Dow Comments

However, these conditions are clearly not always available.

As noted by Crosby (1977), breakdown would be expected to be slower
in the shade even if efficient hydrogen donors were available.
Much of the forest area in the Northwest is subject to long periods

�~ So

of cloudiness and rain so that sunlight: may not be adequate.

TCDD

which reaches the soil may not be accessible co s u n l i g h t ; in
such a case, the photodegradation process would not.occur.
"No actual measurements of dioxin dissipation from he'rbicide
treated forast appear to have been made"

Crosby, 1977 .

In the most intensive case of environmental contamination
with TCDD, in Seveso, TCDD was observed to dissipate very slowly
even though adequate sunlight was available in this case "effective
contact with photochemical H donors was minimal"

Crosby, 1977 .

Thus,it is clear that, while TCDD photcdegration is po'ssible and
might be rapid under certain circumstances, its likelihood of
TCDD being destroyed by ths process under actual field conditions
is unknown and may be low.
D.

Summary

The implications for human health of the data on animal toxicity
and the results of the Alsea study depends on the extent to which
humans are esposed to toxicclogically significant levels of 2,4,5-T
silvex and/or TCDD.
going

In view of the data from Alsea and the fore-

instances a human e x p o s u r e , Dew's unsupported assertion that

"the actual patterns of use in the Alsea basin should not reasonably
be expected to produce more than negligible exposure to 2,4,5-T and
silvex," Dow Comments at 24, simply cannot stand.
The uses of 2,4,5-T and silvex result in distribution of these
c h e m i c a l s co sites of human work and habitation.

These chemicals

and TCCC are present in e n v i r o n m e n t a l media and h u m a n tissues. There
are no d a t a establishing a no effect level in a n i m a l s or
h u m a n s for fatotcxic e f f e c t s , and even if t h e r e were are no d a t a

�- a; -

on an acceptable margin
of these chemicals,

of safecy or actual environmental levels

Together these factors indicatae that the

uses of these chemicals create an imminent hazard.

�- 32--

The Suspension of the Contested Uses of 2,4,5-T And
Silvex Will Not Result in Substantial A d v e r s e Economi
Impacts
A.

Introduction

In its comments, Dow attempts to demonstrate that where
2,4,5-T and Silvex are used they are essential.

Thus, they

argue, the suspension of these compounds for the uses at
issue here will result in substantial economic losses where
alternative control methods are not available or are less
economical or efficacious.
to these contentions.

There are two general answers

First, the Agency believes that for

every use there is a practical alternative available to replace
2,4,5-T and Silvex.

In some cases these alternatives may

prove more costly than 2,4,5-T and/or silvex.

For these,

the/increased cost has been calculated and reported..in the
Administrator's Decision and O r d e r .

In no instance are

these increased cost substantial in the context of the
o v e r a l l economy or the particular industry involved.
The second response to Dow's argument is that the timing
of treatments with 2,4,5-T and Silvex is very flexible, such
that.a delay in trea-tment, of 1 to 2 years is often feasible.
Hone of the 2,4,5-T uses at issue here involve yearly treatments.
cycles.

Generally, treatments are spread over 5 to 10 year
There is no evidence to indicate that a one or two

year delay in treatments will result in substantial impacts
eitner immediately or over the 2 year suspension period.
Thus, for example, release treatments in conifer forests car,

�- 33-

be, undertaken quite readily in any year between the second
and tenth year after planting.

44 ?R 15333 ,

This type

of flexibility is the rule r a t h e r than the exception for
2,4,5-T and silvex herbicioal treatments.

Former users of

these compounds not only have the option of using a variety
of alternative control methods, but in many instances the users
can simply delay treatment during the pendency of the suspension without experiencing substantial adverse economic
impacts.
Dow bases its analysis entirely upon the document
entitled, "The Biologic and Economic Assessment of 2,4,5-T,"
February 1979 ("USDA Report").

This document was originally

intended as a cooperative effort of the USDA, EPA and State
officials to be used as a major input into the benefits
analysis phase of the RPAR process. In fact, EPA had a very
'
V
limited role in d r a f t i n g this report.
The Agency was never
afforded an opportunity to review and aoorove the final .
X* /

document.

There are portions of the document which the

*/ Cf the 43 members of the Assessment team, only 5 -were
from SPA. USDA Report, V-IX, et §eg.
**/ A memorandum of Understanding between the USDA and EPA (signed
Movernber 26 and December 2, 197-5) and a subsequent supplement
(signed October 14 and 13, 1377) established the mechanism f";&gt;: a
joint U'SCA, EPA, States benefits analysis. The Memorandum of
Understanding provides for a cooperative e f f o r t on an equal basis
for all phases of the u n d e r t a k i n g . The supplement at ?. 6 r e q u i r e s
that the participants './'ill be afforded an opportunity to r e v i e w and
comment on the final document prior to issuance of the report. This
provision was not complied with when rJ3GA issued the r e p o r t b e f o r e
EPA has an opportunity to r e v i e w and comment upon it.

�Agency does not concur w i t h ; accordingly, the Agency has not and
cannot adopt, all portions of the r e o o r t as reflecting the
* ** /
Agency position on the matters discussed therein.
There is useful information contained within the 'JSDA
Report.

However, it must be kept in mind r.hat the USDA

Report was designed and directed at assessing the impact of
a permanent cancellation of 2,4,5-T and not a short term
2 year suspension.

Basic information (e.g., use data reported

on a yearly basis)/ in the Report was used by the Agency in
assessing short term impacts, however, much care was
exercised by Agency staff in identifying and employing these
data to avoid using data only applicable to long term impacts.
Dow has failed in many instances to exercize similar care
in using the data from the USDA Report.

As a consequence ,

many of the citations in Dow's comments are to data which
are applicable only to long term economic impacts.

In the

following discussion these e r r o r s as well the more serious
allegations made by Dow and Chevron in their comments are
aea11 with in detail.
3.

Rights-of-Way

The Dow comments on the rights-of-way use attempt to
create an impression that 2,4,5-T is an essential tool for
maintenance of many rights-of-way acres.

In fact, a large

number of acres receive no vegetation management of any
***/ .v&gt;r_e Agency used portions of the 'JSDA Report which it
felt it could a p p r o p r i a t e l y rely upon. In the context of
the emergency conditions s u r r o u n d i n g the p r e p a r a t i o n s and
'promulgation of the Decisions and O r d e r s in this m a t t e r , it
was sometimes necessary to rely upon benefits data in the
U3DA Report which the Agency may u l t i m a t e l y w a n t to s u p p l a n t

�- -X5

typ.e .

44 FR 15839 .

For those acres under vegetation

management, chemical control is the exception rather than the
rule.

Id. . The suspension of 2,4,5-1 for rights-of-way

use will not cause significant economic

impacts because

a variety of efficacious alternatives are available, including
manual, mechanical and several chemical control
Id,, .

methods.

In some instances, these alternatives are less expensive

than 2,4,5-T.

Most of the chemicals (Dicamba, 2,4-D, dichloroprop,

and piclorarn) are less expensive for a e r i a l , selective basal
and stump sprays which account for the majority of annual
treatments by acreage.

Id .

Thus, to the extent that these

chemicals might have a shorter active life than 2,4,5~T,
they partially, compensate

for this with lower initial application

costs .
The weakness of Dow's position on rights-of-vay uses
is f u r t h e r illustrated by their misuse of cited materials.
Thus, for example, Dow claims that 2,4,5,-T does not cause
adverse environmental effects.

Dow Memo/ p. 48 .

accompanying citation is to the U3DA Report.

The•

The C3SDA

report does' contain several comments regarding the relative
persistence of 2,4,5-T and its alternatives.

However, the

Report does not state nor infer, as Dow suggests, that no
e n v i r o n m e n t a l hazards are posed by use of 2,4,5-T.

Perhaps

more importantly, the use of the USDA Report to support any
statements about environmental impacts must be questioned.
The "3DA Report was intended to collect, e v a l u a t e and document data needed by the Agency to evaluate the economic

�significance of 2,4,5-T use.

It was not designed nor does

it d i r e c t itself to an assessment of broad environmental
issues .
Dow relies on the USDA Report to support its statement
that dica.-'oa is less effective than 2,4,5-T for control of
several weed species on rights-of-ways.

The USDA Report

(at 3-50) does suggest that dicarnba is not effective for
these pests, 1 but it does not provide any basis for this
statement.

There is no indication that any form of scientific

or formal observation was relied upon as the basis for this
conclusion.

As such, the Agency properly chose not to rely

upon this statement.
Dow claims that the annual increased costs of utilizing
alternatives in place of 2,4,5-T for rights-of-way use would
amount to $32 million per year rather than the §1.3 million
estimated by SPA.

This is erroneous.

The 532 million figure,

taken from the USDA Report, is excessive for purposes of
assessing the impact arising d u r i n g a 2 year suspension
because the USDA figure assumes a p e r m a n e n t cancellation.
SPA figure cited by Dow -- 31.3 million —
on a two year suspension.

The

is an estimate based

A major reason for the relatively

slight short term impact is the substantial flexibility
in the timing o£ 2,4,5-T rights-of-way treatments.

In fact,

on the a v e r a g e , 2,4,5~T is only used onca every four years.
44 £R 15339 .

In many cases t r e a t m e n t can be postponed

for some time with little or no economic impact.

Thus, a

2 year suspension would have a auantitativelv lesser impact

�than a permanent suspension.

In addition, on those acres

for

*

wnich immediate treatments are desired, treatment can be
undertaken wich any one of a number of efficacious and
economical alternatives' Ij3. .
C.

Forestry

It is Dow's position that serious economic

impacts will

be experienced as a result of the suspension of 2,4,5-T for
forestry uses.

For site preparation activities Dow claims

that alternatives are more costly than 2,4,5-T.

For release

treatments there are no chemical alternatives and the manual
alternative is very expensive and often impractical.

Thus, for

release treatments on those acres where manual methods
are feasible there will be a substantial cose increase.

Dow

further alleges that there will be production losses on
chose acres where manual methods are not feasible.
*/
contentions are incorrect.

These

The Agency has found that 2,4,5-T is not an essential
tool for forest management.

44 FR 15333 .

only C.23% of all U.S. commercial acreage.

It is used on
IcL

.

This

level of use does not suggest that the chemical is essential
to the entire industry.
of alternatives available

Furthermore, there are a variety
for site preparations.

In addi-

tion to manual and mechanical methods there are a variety
of efficacious and economical chemicals which are reaistered
*/ The U3DA agrees with the Agency that the short term economic
impacts on forestry management arising from the suspension will
ce minor. Thus, the Assistant Secretary of A g r i c u l t u r e , M . Rupert
C u t l e r recently stated, " . . . the emergency suspension of 2,4,5-T
for forest management uses would have no short-term impacts
on the national forest timber h a r v e s t p r o g r a m . " U3DA Mews, "U3DA
to ouscend Use of 2,4,5-T in Forest Manarer.ent" 3/1/79. U3DA 494-79.

�and available for use this season.
*

Id. .

It is important

&gt;

to nottf that site p r e p a r a t i o n does not r e q u i r e a selective
method of treatment,

Selectivity is the primary special

q u a l i t y claimed by Dow for 2,4,5-T.

R a t h e r , sice preparation

involves the suppression of all types of vegetative growth
in the site.

Thus, a variety of compounds other than 2,4,5-T

are widely used for this purpose as well as mechanical clearing
techniques.
Release treatments require a selective method which will
not harm the young conifers.

In addition to 2,4,5~T, fosamine

and glyohosphate provide selective control of indigenous
pest plants and are registered in Washington and Oregon for
this use.

Manual treatments p r o v i d e the most selective and

effective release treatments, albeit at a greater cost.

How-

e v e r , both Dow and USuA overestimate the cost and underestimate
the cost effectiveness of manual release methods.

The Agency

will adduce evidence in the suspension hearings which will
demonstrate that manual treatments are c u r r e n t l y in use in
commercial forests.

These operations have been successful both

economically and biologically.
Notwithstanding the availability of a v a r i e t y of
alternatives, the Agency believes that for many managers the
•most likely course of action during the suspension will be
to delay release treatments temporarily.
release activities is v e r y flexible.

The timing of

Release is generally

u n d e r t a k e n at almost any time d u r i n g a 2 to 10 year ceriod
aft^r p l a n t i n g .

I d. .

The growth dyanamics of a newly

"1 an tec f o r e s t are such that the timina of treatments within

�after p l a n t i n g .

Id. .

The growth dyanamics of a newly

•

planted forest are such that the tiding of treatments within
this 3 year "window" often per~.it delays of a year or two
and would, not have rneasureable effects on overall, production.
Finally, Dow has assumed tha.t c u r r e n t practices, particularly for release treatments, have been cost effective.
There is evidence to indicate that the effectiveness of
current 2,4,5-T treatment techniques has 'been substantially
overestimated.

The Agency intends to present evidence in

the hearings which will demonstrate that 2,4,5-T is frequently applied to acres which cannot or do not benefit
from its use; that many applications are needless; and that
2,4,5-T can and does have phytotoxic effects on conifers.
D.

Pasture

Dow states that the suspension of 2,4,5-T for pasture
weed control will result in "substantial" economic impacts
Dow Memo p. 53 .
figures.

However, there is no mention of actual

This is not unexpected in view of the actual

figures.

Approximately 1% of all range and pasture acres
*/
w e r e treated with all herbicides in 1975."
USDA, ESC3,
1973, p. 7 ,

Of the total quantity of herbicides used,

2,4-D accounted for 93.3%.

Ibid. , p. 12 .

All other pesti-

cides including those which account for as little as 0.02%
of the r e m a i n i n c use were listed; 2,4,5-7 did not e v e n aooear
ision and Order at 44 ?R 15390 i n c o r r e c t l y states
that 2,4,5-T is used on 1% of all acres. The statement should
h -5. v e indicated that all c h e m i c 31 h e r b i c i d e s c o m b i n e d a r e
us.-d on only 1% of all acres.

�on. the list.

Thus, to the e x t e n t that any chemical h e r b i c i d e s

are used on pasture acreage, 2,4,5-T a p p e a r s to be one of
the least, if not the l e a s t , favored of the a v a i l a b l e m a t e r ials.

It cannot be said on the basis Of the foregoing data

that the suspension of 2,4,5-T for pasture use will result
in "substantial" economic

impacts.

Dow makes a number of statements, which on closer
inspection are without support.

Thus, for example, Dow

states that, ", . . authorities have estimated as much as
53 of U.S. livestock die each year from grazing on poisonous
plants".

Dow Memo p, 52 .

This statement is footnoted

with a reference to 3. Day, "The Pher.oxy Herbicides" published
by the Council for A g r i c u l t u r a l Science and Technology (CAST).
The CAST report does contain a statement supporting Dow's
statement.

However, the relied upon CAST allegation

is

unsupported by reference to any type of documentary or factual
support.' It is also unat tr i'outed, thus making it impossible
to investigate the source of the claim.

It is worthy of

note that a similar statement also appears in the USDA Report
(at p. 2-113).

H-ere too, the statement appears without

support OL attribution.

In addition, it is explicitly li-mited

to Western rangelands, a use not challenged in this proceeding.
Tnere is no indication that the same r a t e of poisoning is
thought to occur on p a s t u r e acres.

In a similar v-in, Cow

alleges tha.t, " uncesir .-able vegetation on all g r a z i n g land
in the -U.S. causes losses of almost 32 b i l l i o n per year"
Cow .'1-mo, o. 52 .

This estimate is accarer.tlv drawn from

�the "J33A Report at 2-3 where it spaces, "Annual losses from
*

weeds and brush on. rangeland and cost of control are conservatively estimated at ?1,7 oillicn".

In addition to being

excessively rounded off, Dow 1 3 use o if the 52 billion figure
is inappropriate because the USDA estimate is again limited
to rangeland.

It does not encompass pasture land, the only

c

Y?e grazing land at issue in this proceeding.
Finally, Dow argues that taken individually the

available alternatives are not as broadly effective as 2,4,5-T.
Although it nay be true that no single chemical alternative
will replace 2,4,5-T in all areas of the country for all
uses, there are effective chemical, manual and mechanical
methods available to control all of the pest species in
all parts of the country.

44 FR 1590 .

Picloram, dicamba,

2,4,-D -and hand labor can generally provide the same level
of control as 2,4,5-T although at higher r a t e s of application
and/or higher cost.
On those acres where the use of alternatives will cost
more than scheduled 2,4,5-T treatments, treatment may be
delayed, dispensed with altogether or the more expensive
alternative employed.

Since treatments with 2,4,5-T are

generally scheduled for 5 to 10 years intervals, the timing
of subsequent treatments is largely optional.

Therefore,

delay during the suspension period may be practical for many of
the acres now scheduled for treatment.

Treatment may be entirely

dispensed '.-/it h on acres s c h e d u 1 e d f o r 2 , 4 , 5 — T treatment w n i c h

�The Agency agrees with Dow that, "to the extent that
2,4,5-7 and Silvex are interchangeable in use on rights-ofway, forestry and pastures, the above discussion concerning
2,4,5-T applies"

Dow Memo, p. 54 .

Similarly, to the extent

that Dow has failed to rebut the Agency's positions on 2,4,5-T
uses, they have also failed with regard to the same uses of
silvex.
Chevron is the only Registrant other than Dow which
submitted consents on the benefits of either silvex or 2,4,5-T.
Chevron's comments were limited solely to the home and garden
uses of silvex.

Chevron argues that each of the three alter-

natives to silvex for this use have limited effectiveness,
Thus, they allege that dicarnba can adversely affect nearby
shrubs when it is applied to lawns.

MC?? is said to be less

effective than silvex if it is applied to lawns or gardens
during cool periods.

Finally, some species of lawn pasts

are said to be resistant to 2,4-Q.

Hone of these claims are

substantiated by Chevron in their submission.

However, even

if it were assumed, a£g_uendo , t h a t the claims w e r e accurate,
Chevron has not succeeded in demonstrating that adequate
tt

alternatives are not available to replace silvex for lawn
and garden use.

The alleged limitations of the alternatives

are mutually exclusive.

A c c o r d i n g l y , at least one of the compounds

would be effective in virtually any s i t u a t i o n . Thus, the
homeown-• r ~ w*' ^ 1 ^o *~ b^ ^ •? ~ t w^ thou ~ an ^ '•*f ^c t' v^ a 11er ra t *; v^
It follows that t r. e i m o a c 13 3 t e m m i n c from the s j s " e n s i o n of

e .

•? •= : ?. i c ~j 1 j ,

�EPA t r i a l counsel w i l l p r e s e n t evidence at: the hearing
vnich will show that c o n t i n u e d use of 2,4,5-T and silvex
d u r i n g the period required to complete c a n c e l l a t i o n proceedings would result in an imminent h a z a r d .
Respectfully submitted,

,-,'• j

/ ? /(AVVXx"!^
•)'

,\i''vvy&lt;ffi^lj/)

Michae 1 3 . "-7_ner
Oeouty A3.3oc-.ate Gen-ral Counsel

Dorothy S.^Patton
P a t r i c i a PC. Roberts
Ellen Siecier
Kevin M . Lee
Tip.othy D. 3ackscror.i
L"1 ** 7 V 7 T O t'"&gt; ",T *&gt; '1 r~- "-N T "Tn A T

1

G ol V 1 .c\U IN »'I c* *. i -, A ij -"} .'n i^~&gt; rn w .'"' rn T •_/ i-JT A -sj i
%O I t? w 11 ^ ;•• \ *"" i"

A c r i l 4 , 1979

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                  <text>Alvin L. Young Collection on Agent Orange</text>
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                  <text>&lt;p style="margin-top: -1em; line-height: 1.2em;"&gt;The Alvin L. Young Collection on Agent Orange comprises 120 linear feet and spans the late 1800s to 2005; however, the bulk of the coverage is from the 1960s to the 1980s and there are many undated items. The collection was donated to Special Collections of the National Agricultural Library in 1985 by Dr. Alvin L. Young (1942- ). Dr. Young developed the collection as he conducted extensive research on the military defoliant Agent Orange. The collection is in good condition and includes letters, memoranda, books, reports, press releases, journal and newspaper clippings, field logs and notebooks, newsletters, maps, booklets and pamphlets, photographs, memorabilia, and audiotapes of an interview with Dr. Young.&lt;/p&gt;&#13;
&lt;p&gt;For more about this collection, &lt;a href="/exhibits/speccoll/exhibits/show/alvin-l--young-collection-on-a"&gt;view the Agent Orange Exhibit.&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;</text>
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                <text>Winer, Michael S.</text>
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                <text>Dorothy E. Patton</text>
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                <text>Timothy D. Backstrom</text>
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                <text>&lt;strong&gt;Corporate Author: &lt;/strong&gt;United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)</text>
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                <text>April 4 1979</text>
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                <text>Rebuttal Comments of Respondent Environmental Protection Agency in re: Emergency Suspension Orders for 2,4,5-T and Silvex, April 4, 1979</text>
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