2 15 24 Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Alvin L. Young Collection on Agent Orange Description An account of the resource The Alvin L. Young Collection on Agent Orange comprises 120 linear feet and spans the late 1800s to 2005; however, the bulk of the coverage is from the 1960s to the 1980s and there are many undated items. The collection was donated to Special Collections of the National Agricultural Library in 1985 by Dr. Alvin L. Young (1942- ). Dr. Young developed the collection as he conducted extensive research on the military defoliant Agent Orange. The collection is in good condition and includes letters, memoranda, books, reports, press releases, journal and newspaper clippings, field logs and notebooks, newsletters, maps, booklets and pamphlets, photographs, memorabilia, and audiotapes of an interview with Dr. Young. For more about this collection, <a href="/exhibits/speccoll/exhibits/show/alvin-l--young-collection-on-a">view the Agent Orange Exhibit.</a> Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Box The box containing the original item. 079 Folder The folder containing the original item. 2038 Series The series number of the original item. Series III Subseries IV Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Donovan, John W. Title A name given to the resource Letter: to J. D. Erickson from John W. Donovan, June 27, 1984. Subject The topic of the resource AOWG Australian Royal Commission hearings CDC Birth Defects Study international cooperation ao_seriesIII Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Alvin L. Young Collection on Agent Orange Description An account of the resource The Alvin L. Young Collection on Agent Orange comprises 120 linear feet and spans the late 1800s to 2005; however, the bulk of the coverage is from the 1960s to the 1980s and there are many undated items. The collection was donated to Special Collections of the National Agricultural Library in 1985 by Dr. Alvin L. Young (1942- ). Dr. Young developed the collection as he conducted extensive research on the military defoliant Agent Orange. The collection is in good condition and includes letters, memoranda, books, reports, press releases, journal and newspaper clippings, field logs and notebooks, newsletters, maps, booklets and pamphlets, photographs, memorabilia, and audiotapes of an interview with Dr. Young. For more about this collection, <a href="/exhibits/speccoll/exhibits/show/alvin-l--young-collection-on-a">view the Agent Orange Exhibit.</a> Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Box The box containing the original item. 079 Folder The folder containing the original item. 2030 Series The series number of the original item. Series III Subseries IV Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Donovan, John W. Title A name given to the resource Letter: to Barclay Shepard from John W. Donovan, 27 June 1984 Subject The topic of the resource AOWG international cooperation ao_seriesIII Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Alvin L. Young Collection on Agent Orange Description An account of the resource The Alvin L. Young Collection on Agent Orange comprises 120 linear feet and spans the late 1800s to 2005; however, the bulk of the coverage is from the 1960s to the 1980s and there are many undated items. The collection was donated to Special Collections of the National Agricultural Library in 1985 by Dr. Alvin L. Young (1942- ). Dr. Young developed the collection as he conducted extensive research on the military defoliant Agent Orange. The collection is in good condition and includes letters, memoranda, books, reports, press releases, journal and newspaper clippings, field logs and notebooks, newsletters, maps, booklets and pamphlets, photographs, memorabilia, and audiotapes of an interview with Dr. Young. For more about this collection, <a href="/exhibits/speccoll/exhibits/show/alvin-l--young-collection-on-a">view the Agent Orange Exhibit.</a> Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Box The box containing the original item. 080 Folder The folder containing the original item. 2075 Series The series number of the original item. Series III Subseries IV Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource June 25 1986 Title A name given to the resource Letter: from W.F. Ginnivan to Dr. Al Young, 25 June 1986 regarding Veterans' Affairs memorandum about CDC study Subject The topic of the resource Australia CDC Birth Defects Study AOWG ao_seriesIII https://www.nal.usda.gov/exhibits/speccoll/files/original/e2a19ad1809ce041b16c99bf86949283.pdf 0af61b6b7190abb3653f576f9f511025 PDF Text Text Item ID Number 01572 Author Corporate Author Ronort/ArtlGlB Title Letter: [from Alvin L. Young] to Michele Flicker, [May 14, P 1985] Journal/Book Title Year 000 ° Month/Day Color ^ Number of Imagos 1 Descripton Notes Wednesday, June 06, 2001 Page 1673 of 1688 �DR. MICHELE FLICKER VAMC 4801 LINWOOD BLVD KANSAS CITY,MO 64128 DEAR MICHELE Thank you for sending the data from Rappe's paper. I hope that his present-ation and that of Hardell was worth while. I talked with Dr Houk today (Hay 14) about contributing at Eayreuth on both Risk Assessment and Status of CDC Studies on Agent Orange/Dioxin. We had the opportunity to discuss the VAX EPA ADIPOSE TISSUE STUDY- Without a doubt he feels that he can contribute and support the study,, Count on him to furnish standards and quality control assistance., Thus? I believe that ono the AOWG approves the protocol? it will be time to ask all three agencies for the financial resources to conduct the study. Please keep me informed of your progress on the protocol and if you can draftup cost estimates to complete the task it wouId be worth having them» Best wishes., Sincerely � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Alvin L. Young Collection on Agent Orange Description An account of the resource The Alvin L. Young Collection on Agent Orange comprises 120 linear feet and spans the late 1800s to 2005; however, the bulk of the coverage is from the 1960s to the 1980s and there are many undated items. The collection was donated to Special Collections of the National Agricultural Library in 1985 by Dr. Alvin L. Young (1942- ). Dr. Young developed the collection as he conducted extensive research on the military defoliant Agent Orange. The collection is in good condition and includes letters, memoranda, books, reports, press releases, journal and newspaper clippings, field logs and notebooks, newsletters, maps, booklets and pamphlets, photographs, memorabilia, and audiotapes of an interview with Dr. Young. For more about this collection, <a href="/exhibits/speccoll/exhibits/show/alvin-l--young-collection-on-a">view the Agent Orange Exhibit.</a> Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Box The box containing the original item. 061 Folder The folder containing the original item. 1672 Series The series number of the original item. Series III Subseries III Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Letter: [from Alvin L. Young] to Michele Flicker, [May 14, 1985] Subject The topic of the resource VA/EPA TCDD Assay AOWG study protocol ao_seriesIII https://www.nal.usda.gov/exhibits/speccoll/files/original/761d73c7ad39934f348b08c7815bf5ea.pdf dda590d55280c0870050037ce27d186d PDF Text Text Item ID Number 01469 Author Corporate Author Report/Article Title Journal/Book Title Year 0000 Month/Day Color '—' Number of Images 32 DOSCriptOD NOtOS Includes "Agent Orange Controversy: Is Agent Orange Responsible for Health problems Reported Among Vietnam Veterans?", OSTP Issue 1981-1988; Agenda for the Domestic policy Council Agent Orange Working Group at DHHS; "Air Force Health Study: Study Overview and Update," Air Force Systems Command; three articles, "Agent Orange: An American Tragedy", Joe Cole, The Stars and Stripes National Tribune, November 14,1988, "Legion Testimony Attacks CDC Study of Agent Orange", The Missouri Veterans News, "The Declassified War", Anthony L. Kimery, Veteran, November/December, 1988; correspondence from Congress to Donald M. Newman, Chairman, Agent Orange Working Group, November 22,1988; memorandum from National Vietnam Veterans Coalition, November 1988, No. 48, "Agent Orange: Pending New Legislation" Tuesday, May 15, 2001 Page 1469 of 1514 �OSTP ISSUE 1981-1988 AGENT ORANGE CONTROVERSY Is Agent Orange Responsible For Health Problems Reported Among Vietnam Veterans? �BACKGROUND From 1965 to 1970, USAF Applied in Tactical Operations in South Vietnam, & 42 Million Liters of Agent Orange. 2.5 Million Military Personnel From the U.S., Australia, New Zealand and South Korea Served One-Year Tours During the Same Period. BACKGROUND (Cont'd) �Beginning in 1978 Many Veterans Of That Era Reported Medical Problems That They Believed Stemmed From Exposure To Agent Orange During Their *» Military Assignment. Complaints Have Ranged From Tingling In the Extremities To Skin Disfigurement And Rare Forms Of Cancer. Some Veterans Have Fathered Children With Birth Defects. �DPC AGENT ORANGE WORKING GROUP (AOWG) o 1981 President Reagan Established the AOWG. <5> - Chaired By Under Secretary Of HHS - Serves As Overall Coordinator, Clearinghouse, And Evaluator Of The Federal Research Efforts o Policy Group - HHS, DOD, VA, OMB, OPD and OSTP o Science Panel - CDC, NIOSH, NIEHS, NCI, Air Force, OSHA, EPA, USDA, DOS, & OTA �STATUS OF AOWG ACTIVITIES o • In The Past 7 Years, AOVVG Provided Oversight To 10 Major Health Studies And 5 Major Health Surveillance Programs. • ' • • ' ' . o • * Federal Agencies Have Expended $200 M On Human, ToxicologicJAnd Environmental Studies. o i" CDC/Air Force Developed State-Of-The-Art Methods For Detecting And Verifying • • . - . - • . : • • i Exposure. o Serum Dioxin Studies Completed On Ground Troops. �Serum Dioxin Analyses Underway For Cohorts In Air Force Health Study (The Men Who Served in AF Defoliation Program In SEA And Their Matched Controls). �FINDINGS To Date, No Major Health Effects (Mortality, Cancer Or Birth Defects In Children) Can Be » Associated With Agent Orange Exposure in Vietnam. �RECOMMENDATIONS Retain DPC Agent Orange Working Group Retain HHS As Chair Within 18 Months, CDC Rare Cancer Study And Air Force Health Study Will Be Completed. Publish Findings, Brief Congress Close-Out AOWG �** » s < DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES office of the Secretary \ *0 Washington, D.C. 20201 AGENDA FOR THE DOMESTIC POLICY COUNCIL AGENT ORANGE WORKING GROUP December 6, 1988 - 2:00-3:00 P.M. Welcome and Introductions Report from DOD Chairman Don Newman Admiral Edward Blasser ,DAS/Defense A presentation by Major-General James Sanders, Air Force Deputy Surgeon-General and the USAF Health Study (Ranch Hand) team. Report from Chairman Science Panel Remarks from the Veterans Administration Dr. Vernon Houk Don Ivers Other business from Members Chairman Don Newman Closing remarks Chairman Don Newman �DECEMBER 1988 BRIEFER: COL WILLIAM H. WOLFE EK-RT-i; -.1 �SERUM DIOXIN STUDIES ASSAY DEVELOPED AT CDC TO DETECT DIOXIN IN SERUM AT PARTS PER TRILLON LEVEL JOINT USAF/CDC EFFORTS: HALF-LIFE STUDIES (7.1 YEARS) ASSAY OF AFHS PARTICIPANTS PRETEST OF 200 DEMONSTRATED ASSAY VALIDITY RANCH HAND MEAN = 48.0 PPT COMPARISON MEAN = 4.8 PPT EXPANDED STUDY OF 2010 PARTICIPANTS TO BE COMPLETED IN 1989 FUNDED BY HQ AFSC WITH REIMBURSEMENT FROM EXCESS VA^ FUNDS (S.11) / j DETAILS OF TRANSFER BEING ARRANGED FUNDS TO COVER COST OF ASSAYS AND ANALYSIS J EK-RT-12-11 881122 �STATUS TO DATE SERUM DIOXIN VALUES IN AFHS PERSONNEL GROUP "NUMBER MEAN RANCH HAND 283 35.0 COMPARISON 246 4.8 RANGE 1.6 - 313 0 - 84 1 6 ~313 RANCH HAND ENLISTED GROUND 184 46 3 ' ' OTHER OCCUPATIONAL STRATA ARE TOO SPARSE FOR ANALYSIS AT THIS TIME J SAM/LS-10-11 881122 �AIR FORCE HEALTH STUDY 250 -r SERUM DIOXIN RESULTS 200-- COMPARISONS 150- - RANCH HANDS NUMBER OF PARTICIPANTS 100:, 50-- •llllil 0-9 10-19 20-49 50-99 SERUM TCDD LEVEL (ppt) 100-199 200 or ^ more �SCHEDULE OF REPORTS REPORT PUBLICATION DATE 1989 MORTALITY UPDATE COMPARISON COHORT EXPANDED (N=19, 101) WINTER 1988/1989 BIRTH DEFECT REANALYSIS BASED ON FULLY VERIFIED DATA SUMMER/FALL 1989 THIRD MORBIDITY REPORT FALL/WINTER 1989 SAM/LS-10-4 881122 �FUTURE PLANS 1989 COMPLETE SERUM DIOXIN ASSAYS 1990 ANALYZE SERUM DIOXIN DATA AND PUBLISH REPORT 1991 PREPARE FOR AWARD OF CONTRACT FOR THIRD FOLLOWUP EXAMINATIONS 1992 CONDUCT PHYSICAL EXAMINATIONS 1993 ANALYZE DATA 1994 PUBLISH REPORT SAM/LS-10-13 881122 �AFHS ADVISORY COMMITTEE ISSUES SCIENCE PANEL OF THE AOWG STRONGLY SUPPORTS KEEPING THE CURRENT ARRANGEMENT WITHIN DHHS USAF PRINCIPAL INVESTIGATORS STRONGLY FAVOR CURRENT STRUCTURE ANY ACTION BY USAF OR DOD TO MANAGE THE COMMITTE OR SELECT ITS MEMBERS WILL GENERATE CHARGES OF INTERFERENCE OR CONFLICT OF INTEREST INTENSE CONGRESSIONAL INTEREST EMPHASIZES NEED TO MAINTAIN SCIENTIFIC INDEPENDENCE SAM/LS-10-10 881122 �AFHS ADVISORY COMMITTEE RECOMMENDATIONS RENEW CHARTER OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE RETAIN RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE COMMITTEE WITHIN DHHS SELECT MEMBERS AFTER REQUESTING NOMINEES FROM VETERANS GROUPS SELECT CHAIRMAN FROM CIVILIANS CURRENTLY SERVING DR LEONARD KURLAND DR RICHARD MONSON SAM/LS-10-14 881122 �ADIPOSE TISSUE TCDD LEVELS IN EXPOSED PERSONS MISSOURI 1986 0 - 100 PPT EXPANDED HORSE ARENA RESIDENTIAL WASTE HAULING TCP PRODUCTION 20 50 150 250 350 450 550 PARTS PER TRILLION (PPT) 650 750 60 100 �SENT BY.'Xerox Telecopier 7020 ;12- 5-58 ; 8-52AM 4044884531^ 2024723519I« 3 VIETNAM VETERANS (646 MEN) 1 MAN •4. < •*. < fc * NON-VIETNAM VETERANS (97 MEN) too • 0 • 0 70 BO • 0 40 • 0 BO 10 0 RANCH HAND GROUND CREW (147 MEN) A. • 1 MAN COMPARISON GROUND CREW (49 MEN) TCDD (PARTS PER TRILLION) �30000 1 27821 27032 DC QC LU Q. 20000 ' CO hQC LU > LU _J Q O O 10000 - BACKGROUND REFERENCE RANGE (< 20 PPT) NO NO (.13) (.16) ND NO (.17) (.59) 137 PERSONS FROM UNEXPOSED AREA (ZONE S) PERSONS FROM EXPOSED AREA (ZONE A) WITH NO CHLORACNE PERSONS FROM EXPOSED AREA (ZONE A) WITH CHLORACNE �to CO CM OJ O CM P P 30O-1 i CO CO GOMPANY 25O- TRUCKERS PRODUCTION 20016OCM If* 100 CO u> I ro I CSl o CM o o. o o 50- c cc c c o o o o o o o o o o 01 DA/S EMPLOYED IN PRODUCTION X o o> X *?• �CO 04 100 90 IX CD O-J 80 z LU CO 10 CO CO O DC 70 60 so 40 RANCH HAND GROUND CREW (147 MEN) 30 ^ - 1 MAN 20 10 O 01 CO ro oo I to COMPARISON GROUND CREW (49 MEN) CM CD O O X O o> >: >- TCDD (PARTS PER TRILLION) �"To C*r» For Him Who Stull *n 6an>« Th» Sctti* And . Fo> Ht* Wtahm And Ml. OrphtnAbrthMn Lincoln .7 THE STARS AND STRIPES-THE NATIONAL TRIBUNE 14 NOVEMBER 1988 Agent Orange: An American Tragedy In May 1983 officials of the Center for Disease Control (CDC) recommend evacuation of the Quail Run Mobile Home Park near Times Beach, Missouri, after EPA. officials find dioxin contamination in excess of four times that of the town of Times Beach (1,100 ppb.). More than 90 percent of the town of Times Beach, located approximately 25 miles southwest of SL Louis, Mo., was found to be contaminated with more than 100 ppb. of dioxin, according to a January 1983 report CDC officials warned the more than 3,000 residents to stay away because of health hazards. Police were stopping the residents from removing personal belongings out of fear of spreading the contaminants to other areas. Flooding of the Meramec River may have further contaminated vast areas of southern Missouri, Russell Bliss, owner of Russell Bliss By Joe Cole Drain Oil Service, has been identified as the source of much of the contaminated waste oils which were sprayed on over 100 sites in southern Missouri, including Times Beach. The town of Times Beach paid Bliss $4,800 for two applications of the contaminated waste oils in 1971 and 1972. The federal government has since paid a reported 34.5 million dollars for the purchase of Times Beach, as pan of the EPA Super-fund hazardous waste site clean-up program. Last April 1988, Mr. Brian Manza, a disabled Vietnam veteran, visited the Times Beach site, only to be turned away by EPA officials, wearing "moon suits" as Brian described them. Theentireareawas fenced and posted as an extremely hazardous waste site. Brian's concerns are obvious to Vietnam veterans who were exposed to toxic chemicals in Vietnam. Millions of gallons of Agent Orange, contaminated with dioxin were sprayed over vast areas of Vietnam. If two spray missions using less than 5,000 gallons of contaminated oil could do this to a town in Missouri, what could millions of gallons of oil-based herbicides contaminated with dioxin at thousands of times the level found in Times Beach do to a country called Vietnam? In 1986, the Centers for Disease Control conducted blood serum studies of Vietnam veterans, as a possible method of identifying those veterans who may have been exposed to toxic chemicals while serving in the Vietnam War. Their findings indicated that Vietnam veterans' levels of dioxin in blood were similar to those samples of persons who had not served in Vietnam. Since the non-ex- posed comparison group was selected from the Times Beach and Southern Missouri area, one can only speculate as to the meaning of the studies results. Southern Missouri is no better nor worse than Vietnam. Last 7 July 1988, the Department of Defense declassified documents which revealed that the Defense Department-had purchased a chemical plant at NVeldon Springs, Missouri, which was to produce 8 million gallons of Agent Orange per year by late 1969, over and above the entire domestically produced product, which was currently being used for defoliation in Vietnam. Declassified USMACV reports indicate herbicide use in Vietnam during 1967 through 1969 was 11.9 million gallons per year. V/eldon Springs, Missouri is located approximately 25 miles west of SL Louis.* �THE MISSOURI VETERANS NEWS PAGES Legion Testimony Attacks CDC Study of Agent Orange WASHINGTON (ALNS) • smaller than the size of New — The government has Jersey during the war. "It is "fallen short of its responsi- absurd that the CDC says bility" to compensate vic- that it cannot find enough tims of Agent Orange expo- people to study," Sommer sure, an American Legion said. He told the members spokesman has told a House that the CDC developed a subcommittee. study that was "destined to The statement submitted fail." by John Sommer, director of Basic research flaws were the Legion's Veterans Af- committed by the CDC, . fairs and Rehabilitation Di- Sommer said. Among the er1 vision, expressed serious rors made were what he concern for the govern- called "cardinal sins of ment's lack of responsibility epidemiology." First, the in recognizing any problems CDC research diluted the efassociated with dioxin expo- fects of Agent Orange exposure. Sommer criticized the sure by including in the Centers for Disease Control study group every person in for its mishandling of re- Vietnam. For example, search data, and for its about Lin every 5 men who interpretation of the data the served in Vietnam actually CpC researchers did gather. served in combat. The CDC Sommer pointed out that "generalized" exposure to the CDC study of Agent Agent Orange across the enOrange exposure was so tire service population in limited by the restrictions Vietnam, so that the 20 per upon just what veterans cent likely to be exposed would be included that an was diluted by the other 80 accurate picture of these per cent of the non-exposed veterans was not developed. men. Veterans eliminated from To further weaken the the group which the agency . CDC's study, the veterans looked at were those who who were not included in the served more than one tour in . study took away the "statisVietnam, those who served tical power" of the potential In a particular unit for fewer dioxin victims. "A knowthan 180 days, those who ledgeable epidemiologist were above the rank of E-S, would try to optimize the those who transferred from chance of observing an one unit to another during effect by including, rather their tour, and any veteran than excluding, the veterans who served any number of who are most likely to have days before or after the pro- suffered from exposures in posed study window (Janu- question," Sommer said. ' ary, 1967-December, 1968). Sommer also alleged that The U. S. sprayed more the CDC would minimize any .. flndlng^wWcnf^niuld^tte^ ffAgefir'Orange'16nvafci;area ^ Vietnam service to health •" ' ' ' ' ' ' problems. Levels of combat were not analyzed, nor were other studies which showed that levels of combat had a great deal to do with health problems of Vietnam veterans looked at. "It seems that every time the CDC came up with a positive finding, it was interpreted to be either negative or wrong," Sommer told the committee. The CDC also failed to avail itself of the compre; hensive computer analysis .of Vietnam service and •where troops were during different periods. He said that the data, developed by the U.S. Army and Joint Services Environmental Support Group, is one of the most carefully developed and extensive records of any environmental exposure to be found anywhere. He chastised the CDC for opting for a simplistic approach, rather than using this vital and readily available tool Despite Congressional mandates calling on the Veterans Administration to pay a certain amount for certain diseases, not one Agent Orange claim has yet to be paid. The VA also denied a presumption for certain problems to be related to dioxin exposure, denying even more veterans the right to collect disability compensation. Sommer's testimony also endorsed a legislative initiative which would exclude payments made to veterans and their survivors under the Agent Orange liability settlement In 1984 from being counted as income when determining eligibility for or entitlement to a veteran's or survivor's pension or a veteran's medical care under means test provisions. He also called for the bill to be extended beyond VA programs, to include any. based government ass tance program. • �Declassified War Documents Disclose A/O Use Counterproductive And Ineffective By Anthony L. Kimery I has been nearly 20 yean since the last orangetripcd, 55-gallon drum of Agent Orange was prayed on the green canopy of Southeast Asia. Since that time, the debate about its use and lethal side effects has appeared steadily throughout what are now yellowing pages of newsprint, scientific journals, congressional hearings, and scholarly attempts to relate ' 'the history of its use. abuse, and deadly, devastating consequences. Yet, after all that, there is still another story to be told. It is the story about the internal policies, politics, and decision-making regarding the use of chemical defoliants in Southeast Asia. The story is based on reams of newly declassified military records that -were recently released by the Army for ' storage at'the National Records and Archives Center near Washington. DC. This reporter spent weeks examining these records, most of which were declassified for the first time since being turned over to the National Archives. The documents show that America's use of defoliants in South Vietnam—a program that would be expanded to include Laos and Cambodia in direct violation of MACV directives governing the use of herbicides—was a holly debated and often strongly contested concept among military and political planners, strategists, and analysts. Agent Orange and its chemical cousin. Agent White, were first introduced to South Vietnam in 1962, albeit in limited quantities. According to the documents turned over by the Army to the National Archives, the defoliants were earmarked for three broad purposes. First, they offered a means to destroy crops and therefore deny foodstuffs to the burgeoning Vietcong movement in the coumryside';"second, they offered a means to dampen infiltration by providing observation corridors to South Vietmunete aerial spotters; and third, they offered support for allied operations—by clearing out landing zones and firebases. Between its introduction in 1962 and the end of the program in the early I970's, the U.S. government dumped 20 to 40 million gallons of the chemical on Southeast Asia, according to the documents. Exact figures are hard to come by, in apparent reflection of the willy-nilly planning of the U.S. program. While actual day-to-day chemical operations were under the titular control of the South Vietnamese government, it's clear the U.S. initialed and monitored the program's effectiveness. Contrary to popular belief, the most healed debates about the use of defoliants were not over the dangers they posed to human health, but over whether the principal reasons for their being used were justified. The Archives' records indicate that the military has long been aware that the saturation of South Vietnam widi herbicides was actually causing more problems than it was solving. The declassified records show that the horrific aftermath of Ranch Hand should have been avoided on the grounds that the program was counterproductive with respect to the objectives it hoped to achieve. Yet it was allowed to continue. The documents also indicate that within just a few years of their introduction to Vietnam, and continuing through the early I970's, there was overwhelming evidence that the use of defoliants was not hindering the VC by depriving them of foodstuffs. A study conducted on the use of herbicides between 1%) and June 1967, for instance, found that there had been nd effects of any significance from the use of the herbicides. The study concluded that their use was instead causing damage with respect to winning the hearts and minds of the Vietnamese. This report, and many others, clearly pointed to the negligible benefits of the further use of defoliants. A major policy review was convened in 1968 which, while conceding that the risks of using the defoliants did not outweigh the benefits, concluded that defoliation efforts should be intensified. As a result of this study, a clause was built into subsequent directives for using herbicides to permit their use in heavily populated areas, "in those cases of extreme military necessity." More important stilt, the military documents show that economic considerations brought about by the government's murd-million-dollar commitment to bringing on-line a government-run Agent Orange production plant was an important factor in escalating defoliation efforts. I n late 1967, prior to the broad-based policy review on the use of defoliants in South Vietnam, the American military command in South Vietnam prepared a memorandum containing harsh language about the "disadvantages" of using herbicides. "The herbicide program carries with it the potential for causing serious adverse impacts on the economic, social, and psychological .fields." the report concluded. Nevertheless, the proponents of Agent Orange within MACV continued to push for expanded use of Agent Orange and other herbicides. Consequently, the debate about their use continued to be rigorously fought in Saigon, despite doubts about the herbicides' actual effectiveness. Probably no better illustration of the conflict within the military over the use of herbicides is a July 1967 MACV memorandum setting forth new criteria for defoliant use. "Crop destruction should continue to be the highest priority for the use of herbicides." (he memorandum states. It adds, "there has never been a question as to the effectiveness of crop destruction." This conclusion, however, is in glaring contrast to what militarily contracted studies and intelligence reports were showing. A RAND Corporation report concluded in October 1967 that the VC required only three percent of the total food consumed in the country, that the crop-destruction operations were not in any major sense denying food to the VC, and that Vietnamese peasants, the target of long-range pacification objectives, bore (he brunt of the crop-destruction efforts, and they held the U.S. and the Government of Sourh Vietnam (GVN) responsible. As of July 31, 1968. the VCand North Vietnamese Army (NVA) had a daily food requirement of about 215 short ions, according to the documents. About 58 percent, or 124 short tons, could be internally procured in South Vietnam. Of that, "only a small portion is produced by the enemy in areas subject to herbicide operations," a MACV report concluded. This report added that "food shortages are reported in captured documents, but they are temporary in nature and are often the result of distribution problems. The enemy usually meets the minimum food requirements of his military forces." Numerous internal MACV reports, memorandums, and intelligence briefs support these conclusions. A 1968 MACV report on the RAND and other studies states, "reported food shortages have been the result of Allied sweep operations, not of herbicide operations.'' This had already been spelled out earlier, in a December 1967 field report to MACV, which states, "this headquarters does not have empirical data on the effects of herbicide operations on VC/NVA food stocks, nor is there evidence that enemy combat operations have been cancelled because of food shortages resulting from crop destruction. Such food shortages as Continued on next page Above: Three Air Force C-I.Ws spray Orange in the A Shau. Right: A USAF airman operates spray equipment during defoliation mission NOVEMBnR/OECF.MRF.R |0«» �are known (o exist among the VC arc the results of a many-faceted program to deny resources to the enemy." The report went on to stale that "the effort and cost of employing crop destruction is insignificant in comparison to (he troop effort required to control and secure an equivalent area of rice." (n a 1968 MACV evaluation of crop-destruction programs which followed the final 1%8 herbicide policy review, Col. John Moran, chief of the Chemical Operations Division, slated (hat "herbicide crop destruction is only one aspect of a comprehensive fooddenial program." Moran went on to stale that deprivation of food is due more to "Allied sweep operations" and only "occasionally to herbicide operations." The 196)1 MACV evaluation also emphasizes, as did the contracted private studies, (hat "very few POWs who have infiltrated ever mention the efforts of U.S. herbicide operations. Some stale (hat they have seen areas where vegetation has been killed but do not mention any infiltration problems caused by (he defoliation. There are indications that U.S. herbicide operations have had a negligible effect on NVA infiltration and combat operations." Yet, while this report says, "herbicide operations . . . appear to cause temporary food shortages in the area defoliated, but have little lasting effect on the VONVA food supply." it nevertheless states, "the CINCPAC Scientific Advisory Group concludes, without qualification, (hat the crop-destruction program is an essential and effective part of the total effort in South Vietnam." If there was ever any doubt about the ineffectiveness of U.S. defoliation operations, however, they were put firmly to rest in a MACV briefing paper dated December 1967. "Within the context of what has been studied, it would appear the crop-destruction effort may well be counterproductive. The VC continue to feed themselves, while the peasant bears the brunt_of the deprivation and doesn't like it." In other words, the U.S. policy of spraying Agent Orange over wide areas of South Vietnam in order to deny the VC and NVA the use of cover and food resources was not only not working and unnecessary, it was actually harming the American war effort. ile it was agreed by military planners in Saigon that the use of herbicides was sucT T cessful in denying the enemy cover, there is abundant evidence that defoliants did not significantly deprive the Vietcong access to food stores. One of the most damning condemnations of the use of herbicides found in the National Archives came in a November 20. 1968. letter from Robert II. Marian, USAID assistant director for economic planning and policy and embassy counselor for economic affaire to U.S. ambassador Ellsworth Bunker. Marian protested the expanding use of defoliants in Quang Due and Phu Bon Provinces. "I feel compelled to nonconcur in both proposals," Harlan wrote. "Although crop destruction operations may have had some successes, we suspect their effectiveness in hampering enemy military operations may have been exaggerated. The Report of the Herbicide Policy Review Committee, itself, on Page 17 pointed out, 'herbicide crop destruction is only one aspect of the efforts to deny foodstuffs to the VONVA. The enemy relies on commercial purchases, imports, taxation, requisition, and confiscation for some 90 percent of his food requirement.' " The negligible contribution!! of herbicide operations were equally evident with respect to the effect that herbicide operations were having on the Vietnamese population. In the early !960's. a herbicide evaluation report noted, "the chief sufferer from crop-destruction operations is the local worker." Such findings con- At right: USAF sprayers in stables in South Vietnam; they called for thousands of gallons. Below: Loading White on an Irotjuois prior to defoliation mission. U.S. dispatched special chemical teams VETERAN tinued (o mount through the balance of the 1960's and up until (he 1968 policy review. The same inconsistencies found in the debate about the effectiveness of denying food to the VONVA were just as replete in the debate over the psychological effects (he defoliants were supposed to bring. One MACV report. Advantages and Disadvantages of the Use of Herhicides in Vietnam, states, "the herbicide program dues not loom large as a public-opinion issue at the present lime." At the same lime, a MACCORDS evaluation report was staling that "the herbicide program is one of the most widely known programs" among the population, and it "is a natural topic of interest with people whose livelihood is in the land." "The principal effect on pacification is the animosity the peasant feels initially towards the U.S. for being responsible for the damage," the MAC-CORDS evaluation says, "and then toward the GVN for its failure to rectify the situation. There is nothing that can be done beforehand lo head off the alienation the peasant develops when his crops are destroyed." The MACCORDS report then summarizes the inadequacy of South Vietnam government efforts to compensate antiVC peasants for the inadvertent loss of their crops. "The present system is completely unsatisfactory from the point of view of rectifying the economic damage and its psychological impact by demonstrating lo the peasant the concern of the government for his welfare," (he report states. "The slowness and unfairness of this system usually result in further alienation of the peasant. He is left to his own devices to find the means with which to replant his crop, if there is enough time left in the growing season, or lo find some other means of supporting his family. Even if his claim were approved, the time lapse between submission and payment and the fact that it represents only a fraction of the actual damage, have the result of leaving the peasant in the hole and bearing the responsibility for an act he was helpless to prevent. As long as the present system remains, the pacification program is going lo suffer unpredictable .setbacks which h is at present unable to alleviate wnh-^ny—' effectiveness . . . The net effect is to alienate him further from his government. The report's conclusion seems to indicate that the spraying of Agent Orange was having more than just a slight impact on VC and NVA resources—it was actually turning pro-government peasants into antigovernment guerrillas. Col. Moran's report corroborates the MAC-CORDS evaluation. "The vast majority of (he enemy's daily food requirement is procured through taxation of the people and purchases from the local markets," Moran wrote. "While the enemy's production capability has been reduced, his procurement efforts have enabled him to sustain his forces. The taxes levied on the people arc in the form of food, money, and services. Through these measure!!, the enemy has been able (o. procure enough food from outside his areas to nearly offset his production losses. "The obvious reaction of the peasant whose labors have been destroyed is one of bitterness and haired. He will frequently direct this hatred toward the U.SXJVN for accomplishing the destruction. If he has previously leaned toward the VC, he is likely to side with them completely after the crop destruction. "Captured documents and interrogation reports indicate that the detrimental effects of herbicide operations far outweigh the beneficial effects." Moran concludes. "Civilians living in VONVA-conlrolled areas, whose crops are destroyed by herbicide operations, have no recourse but lo face famine and possible starvation as a result of Allied destruction of their crops." The declassified documents clearly present a picture which shows that the U.S.'s defoliation program nullified pacification efforts by alienating the Vietnamese from not only the U.S.. but from their own government as well. By the time the defoliation operations were stopped, the damage was irreparable. The documents also show that in other areas, the U.S. defoliation campaign was counterproductive to the U.S. war effort. The records show, for instance, that the destruction of valuable resources, such as harvestable limber and rubber trees, was far greater than was reported or admitted by the U.S. during (he war. �s public concerns over the use of herbicides intensified, the need for a policy was quickly L recognized and embarked upon by (he U.S. It is clear from (he minutes of those meetings (hat the intent was to allay fears by not only continuing defoliation efforts, hut by expanding them. The first meeting on this subject took place on January 17, 1968. under (he chairmanship of David Carpenter, political officer at the U.S. embassy. In a memorandum for the record distributed (he following day by Col. Morin. he stresses thai Carpenter "emphasized that if (here should be a leak of this information to the press, (he embassy would receive m a n y inquiries which would be d i f f i c u l t to respond to." Not only was the embassy keeping the true intent and purpose of the policy review from the press, it was also keeping it secret from the GVN. "Mr. Carpenter cautioned the members of the committee that there should he no release of the purpose and actions of the committee (o the Republic of Vietnam," Moran wrote. ' 'There may be a need to call on officials of the Republic of Vietnam for certain data; however, such contacts should be limited to (he specific subject area involved without divulging any information of the policy review. He further requested that contacts with the Vietnamese government concerning these matters be conducted with his office." Such secrecy contrasted with the U.S.'s repeated assertion (hat herbicide operations were strictly under the control of (he GVN. with (he U.S. providing only support and logistic roles. This was again reiterated at a September 20.l%8. background briefing for the press in Saigon following the policy review. The answers provided to questions raised by the press during the briefing glaringly contradict information about the negligible effects of the defoliation programs. A memorandum to the secretary of stale from Ambassador Bunker, drafted the week before the press briefing, establishes that the press, public, and even l*eft: Dr. James flrwn inspects results tif defoliant sprayin/t. Below: Ranch hands inspert chemical Murage tank onboard U.S. aircraft In secret briefing papers prepared during late 1967, imum use of Orange." at a time when the Department of Defense was purling Another memorandum emphasizes the nerd to use into motion an Agent Orange expansion program, it is ' 'Orange in lieu of White (o avoid further procurement evident that orders for Agent Orange had consistently of White.'' Contracts for Agent Orange were having (o far exceeded both the ability and capability for using be "terminated at msts in excess of 1.5 million dolthis herbicide, which had caused an enormous lars." with "ultimate" contract terminations costing surplus—a surplus that was only going to get worse ihe government $19.1 million—a reflection of the US with a new multi-million dollar, government-run government's inability lo draw-down the Agent Agent Orange production plant soon to come on-line as Orange surplus. a result of the expansion program. ' 'Considerable dollar savings may he expected from One of the conclusions of these briefing papers, acceptable and maximum use of Orange." another which helped to prepare the way for the pending policy memorandum stales. "Forestalling potential future review, was that "MACV could be embarrassed if criticism of herbicide procurements should result if [the) plant expansion is carried out, and the pro- Orange can be employed to a greater extent*... regrammed herbicide cannot be used." quest review of requirements for both Orange and A report prepared by USAF Col. H.F. Greenhow, White herbicides and recommendations concerning Material Division, put the economic reasons for un- possible means to increase substitution of Orange for precedented increase in the use of Agent Orange vivid- While." ly in focus: "In view of the large inventory on hand, Memorandum after memorandum reiterates Ihe sur(he huge investment in production capability, and the plus problem. "White is being consumed at higher future low cost of Orange, it is imperative from an than forecast rates and is in short supply, while Orange economic point of view (hat Orange be used to the is heavily overstocked." one report notes. "Every maximum extent possible and that White be used only effort must be made lo schedule herbicide operations in when there is a compelling operational requirement." such a manner that White will not be used in lieu of Greenhow stressed that "the MACV staff computing Orange." another report says. requirements need to be more accurate in (heir com"Considerations argue strongly for use of Orange, putations and project their requirements into the future which is overstocked." wrote Army deputy assistant and realize die dollar impact caused by changes in chief of staff. MACV. Brigadier General John G. requirements." Wheelock. 111. By the time Greenhow prepared his report, howevFinally, on April 14. 1969, the U.S. embassy suser, MACVs "overstatement of requirements" had pended its policy requiring the use of Agent Orange on caused "excess quantities (of Agent Orange) having certain restricted defoliation targets, such as rubber been purchased." resulting in an 18-month supply on plantations and other valuable natural resources, and hand in (he system, with an additional eight million allowed the "use of Orange herbicide on all defoliation gallons per year to begin being produced in December targets." adding, "for economic reasons, the use of 1969 by the government's facility. Orange is preferred." The pressure was on. Twenty-eight million gallons had been committed for the completion of this plant, located at Weklon Springs. Missouri, as a result of the . hen concerns about the dangers dioxin deputy secretary of defense having, on erroneous information, ordered an Agent Orange expansion proposed to human health began to explode gram on July 31, 1967, an order that came at a time seven months later, in late 1969. there was when MACV was well aware that the use of Agent still little attention paid to Ihe ramifications of the allOrange was far less than it was forecasting, or had the out effort to deplete Agent Orange stockpiles. A memcapability to use. It was also at a time when the MACV orandum from the deputy secretary of defense to the the GVN. were being deliberately deceived about the secret briefing papers were pointing out that chairman of (he Joint Chiefs of Staff sent lo CINCPAC "MACV could be embarrassed if plant expansion is carried concludes that "large-scale substitution for Orange consequences of herbicide operations. will not be permitted." "We would prefer not to draw attention, even by out. and the programmed herbicide cannot be teed." By early 1969. the problem with the surplus of Despite (he fact that the memorandum points out implication, to the serious shortcomings (he |policy| review revealed in (he aspects of (he |hertncide| pro- Agent Orange was embarrassingly out of hand. Com- (even at this early lime) that the National Institutes of grams." Bunker said. munications traffic during this time period was frenetic Health had presented evidence that 2.4.5-T "can cause Among the shortcomings (hat were being concealed with requests and discussions about reducing the sur- malformation of offsprings and stillbirths in mice, was the growing concern over the economics of too plus of Agent Orange. Asa result. Agent Orange began when given in relatively high doses." and that "this much Agent Orange having been procured. By (his to be used for every defoliation purpose. The use of all material is present in defoliant Orange." Ihe largetime, "the entire commercial production of Orange other herbicides was brought to an abrupt halt, while a scale, and apparently counterproductive, spraying of (had been | diverted from domestic use to military re- number of policies governing the use of defoliants the chemical went forward. .quirements in Southeast Asia." were relaxed in order to deplete (he Agent Orange Within a few years, though, (he outrage over using Throughout the late I960'], beginning in 1967. surplus. chemical defoliants had grown so intense, both back Since "Agent Orange stocks were in long supply, home and in (he world community, that Ihe U.S. was military records declassified for the Veteran began to reflect that (here were pressing economic reasons and costly contract terminations were involved," one forced lo cancel its defoliation operations. But. by that favoring (he apparent unjustified reason (o increase the memorandum states in communications used in the time, following a decade of having negligently satuse of defoliants, especially Agent Orange, which had decision to halt the use of other defoliants, the termina- urated Southeast Asia with the chemical, the damage wrongly been ordered in vast quantities because of a tion of the use of other herbicides "should result in had already been done by a program, Ihe objectives of considerable dollar savings from acceptance and max- which all along were not being achieved." domestic shortage. W NOVF.MBF.R/DF.CEMBKR I 17 �Congreste of tfje ®mteb JB.C. 20510 November 22, 1988 Honorable Donald M. Newman Chairman Agent Orange Working Group 200 Independence Avenue, S.W. Washington, D.C. 20201 Dear Don, As Chairmen and Ranking Minority Members of the House and Senate Veterans' Affairs Committees, we are writing to request that the Agent Orange Working Group review and provide comments on five studies recently published in "Environmental Research." (A copy of the journal is enclosed.) The studies examine the health effects of herbicide exposure and service in Vietnam based on questionnaires completed by American Legion members. We would appreciate your comments with respect to the scientific methods used, the validity of the statistical analyses, and the strength of the studies' findings. As always, we appreciate your continuing cooperation and support. We look forward to your response. With warm regards, Cordially, ^-»-A^ruc<i G.V. (Sonny) Montgomery Chairman ' <j y i f 1 ans't'on Chairman Solomon nority Member Frank H. Murkowski Ranking Minority Member Senate Committee on Veterans' Affairs ,„/,„/„ BZ AOW e<? Q3A House/Committee on Vete/ans1 Affairs �NATIONAL VIETNAM VETERANS COALITION 1000 Thomas Jefferson St.. Sixlh Floor Washington. D.C. 20007 (202) 338 NVVC J. IVmu* Hnrrh. Jr. November 1988 . No. 48 AGENT ORANGE Pending New Legislation The omnibus veterans benefits legislation following new provisions on Agent Orange: contains the (T)his agreement (i.e. the bill) would extend, from September 30, 1989 to December 31, 1990, the authority to provide basic VA health-care services for veterans' disabilities if it is found that the veteran, during active duty, may have been exposed in Vietnam to any toxic substance in a herbicide or defoliant. . . . (T)he agreement also includes a provision that states that amounts received as part of the settlement of the agent orange product liability litigation will not be considered as income for purposes of any of the needs-based programs administer by the VA, including nonservice-connected VA pension. (T)he proposed amendments would require the VA to conduct an outreach program to Vietnam veterans oriented to notifying them of health risks, if any, resulting from exposure to herbicides in - 13 - �Vietnam, as information on such health risks becomes known. In order to facilitate such an outreach effort, the bill would require the VA to take reasonable actions to organize and update the information contained in the VA's agent orange registry, particularly the addresses of veterans listed in the registry. (Remarks by Rep. G.V. (Sonny) Montgomery, Congressional Record, Oct. 19, 1988, H10353.) The committee report accompanying the legislation includes the following comments: Section 1203 of the bill treats Agent Orange payments "as reimbursement for prior unreimbursed medical expenses." (Id., H10338, 10555) (Ed. Note: The bill, however, does not make a similar exception for Social Security disability pensions or food stamp eligibility.) . . . . > After February 28, 1989, not less than one-third of the total number of members of the Ranch Hand Advisory Committee shall be individuals selected by the Secretary of Health and Human Services from among scientists who are recommended by veterans' organizations . . . . (Id., H10334, H10339) The House . . . rejected a Senate bill that, for the first time, would award disability benefits to veterans exposed to Agenent Orange during the Vietnam War [i.e., for soft tissue sarcoma, no-Hodgkins lymphoma] (Rep. Sonny) Montgomery said further studies were needed to prove a connection between various diseases and Agent Organge. (Philadelphia Inquierer, Oct. 20, 1988) "Sprayed and Betrayed" - Round II More newly declassified documents emerge from the National Archives: The State Department was involved in policy-making re spraying operations. "On 14 April 1969, the U.S. Embassy suspended its policy requiring the use of WHITE herbicide on certain restricted defoliation targets and will now allow use of ORANGE herbicide in all defoliation targets. For economic reasons, tfie use of ORANGE is preferred . . . . We respectfully request that you assure WHITE stocks are kept available for use should the policy be deinstituted." (Memorandum for Col. Tran Dinh Tho from Col. Harold C. Kerne (?) , Jr., "Use of Defoliants ORANGE and WHITE (V), 17 April 1969). LTC John A. Sullivan, CONVSNACV notes in a memo to CINCPAC "Ambassador Sullivan's approval has been requested for the use of CS in those areas of Laos approved for spray operations. ("Use of Riot Control Agent CS," undated) MIAs. During the week ending 4 Feb. 67, the following defoliation missions were flown in Laos with C-123 aircraft: - 14 - �31 Jan 3 sorties . . . Acft 611 lost to ground fire. 5 KIA (Ed. Note: the five men are now on the MIA list) (Memorandum from Maj. Philip L. Boster, COMUSMACV to NMCC, "Herbicide Report (V)," undated. Access Number (?) 0380818) The Empty Drums. The New Jersey Agent Orange Commission interprets other reports: • "It seems that as far as the US Government was concerned, "empty" Agent Orange drums were the property of the,, ARVN, and they could dispose of then anyway they chose. The problem was the drums weren't really empty, and each contained about 2.2 gallons of Agent Orange that was not pumped o,ut. The ARVN, in their constant quest to turn an extra buck, sold the drums to anyone who wanted them, generally civilians for about $2 each. The creative Vietnamese civilians used them for all sorts of things, spilling the residual Agent Orange all over the place and seriously damaging plants and shade trees throughout the city of Danang. The defoliant was even killing the civilians' vegetable gardens. Since we were using about 1000 gallns per day of herbicide out of Danang at the time, about 20 "empty" drums of Agent Orange were hitting the streets of Danang every day!! to compound this lunacy even more, it seems that the Vietnamese Navy compound purchased some of the drums to store gasoline for their generators. The result is that they ended up fogging their entire compound through the generator exhaust with Agent Orange, effectively killing all vegetation in sight!! "The report recommended that the practice of allowing the ARVN to sell the drums be discontinued, but we're not sure that ever happened. It also should be mentioned that Agent Orange was also stored at Bien Hoa, Phu Cat, Nha Trang, and in Saigon and was presumably disposed in the same manner." (NJAOC, Agent Orange Update, Oct. 1988) Miscellaneous 1. From studying the injuries among the tens of thousands of Kurdish refugees, the doctors believe the Iraquis are using a mixture of herbicide and a form of tear gas known as CS to drive the Kurds from their mountain villages. (Edmonton Journal, (?) Sept. 21, 1988) 2. (Vietnam veteran Ron Heiman) was 38 years died in January of this year . . . . The doctor put of death, on his death certificate, the type of killed him, and added that it was a direct result of poisoning. This is the first time such a statement an official record. old when he as the cause cancer that Agent Orange appeared in Well, the Death Certificate on file at the County Medical examiner's office has been changed! Any reference to Agent - 15 - �Orange has been removed from the official files! letter from George L. Claxton, Oct. 19, 1988) (Attachment to 3. Was the morbidity of women Vietnam-era veterans affected by assignment in Vietnam? . . . (N)o remarkable differences (between a control group of 720 U.S.-based Vietnam-era veterans and a study group of 28 Vietnam veterans) are seen in the percentage of those who had an acute illness, GYN condition or miscarriage. However, three interesting differences are observed. First, a higher percentage of those who were assigned in Vietnam have chronic conditions and disabilities, and they have more of them. Second, a higher percentage have been told they have cancer. Third, although a smaller percentage of Vietnam-assigned women ever had a baby, a higher percentage of those who did have children born with defects and/or die before their first birthday. (Le Donne, Trends in Morbidity and Use of Health Services by Women Veterans of Vietnam, Navy Medicine. May-June 1988, p. 24) 4. What's Evidence?, by Joe Cole (Mahess Productions, Inc. states: "blows the lid off") Send $15.00 to Joe Cole, 6806 36th Ave., S.E., Olympia, Washington 98503 5. As part of a budget austerity program in Massachusetts, the state's funding of its prestigious Agent Orange Commission has been reportedly "substantially reduced." 6. The Washington (Me) Sunrise Memorial; Made of two large, rugged stones, standing like the tattered pages of an open boo, the memorial carries three messages: one for those who are still missing in action or prisoners of war; one for all the men and women who served in Southeast Asia; and one for the veterans who have died, and the veterans and their families who continue to suffer, from medical and psychological problems associated with exposure to the chemical defoliants, such as Agent Orange, used in the war. (Bangor Daily News, Oct. 24, 1 9 8 8 ) ( E d . N o t e : This is claimed to be the first memorial in the country to honor Agent Orange victims . J •-14 - � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Alvin L. Young Collection on Agent Orange Description An account of the resource The Alvin L. Young Collection on Agent Orange comprises 120 linear feet and spans the late 1800s to 2005; however, the bulk of the coverage is from the 1960s to the 1980s and there are many undated items. The collection was donated to Special Collections of the National Agricultural Library in 1985 by Dr. Alvin L. Young (1942- ). Dr. Young developed the collection as he conducted extensive research on the military defoliant Agent Orange. The collection is in good condition and includes letters, memoranda, books, reports, press releases, journal and newspaper clippings, field logs and notebooks, newsletters, maps, booklets and pamphlets, photographs, memorabilia, and audiotapes of an interview with Dr. Young. For more about this collection, <a href="/exhibits/speccoll/exhibits/show/alvin-l--young-collection-on-a">view the Agent Orange Exhibit.</a> Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Box The box containing the original item. 055 Folder The folder containing the original item. 1469 Series The series number of the original item. Series III Subseries II Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Includes "Agent Orange Controversy: Is Agent Orange Responsible for Health problems Reported Among Vietnam Veterans?", OSTP Issue 1981-1988; Agenda for the Domestic policy Council Agent Orange Working Group at DHHS; "Air Force Health Study: Study Overvie Subject The topic of the resource AOWG DHHS Air Force Health Study Agent Orange Controversy ao_seriesIII Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Alvin L. Young Collection on Agent Orange Description An account of the resource The Alvin L. Young Collection on Agent Orange comprises 120 linear feet and spans the late 1800s to 2005; however, the bulk of the coverage is from the 1960s to the 1980s and there are many undated items. The collection was donated to Special Collections of the National Agricultural Library in 1985 by Dr. Alvin L. Young (1942- ). Dr. Young developed the collection as he conducted extensive research on the military defoliant Agent Orange. The collection is in good condition and includes letters, memoranda, books, reports, press releases, journal and newspaper clippings, field logs and notebooks, newsletters, maps, booklets and pamphlets, photographs, memorabilia, and audiotapes of an interview with Dr. Young. For more about this collection, <a href="/exhibits/speccoll/exhibits/show/alvin-l--young-collection-on-a">view the Agent Orange Exhibit.</a> Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Box The box containing the original item. 054 Folder The folder containing the original item. 1444 Series The series number of the original item. Series III Subseries II Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Gough, Michael Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived Issues in Science and Technology Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1987 Title A name given to the resource Environmental Epidemiology: Separating Politics and Science Subject The topic of the resource Agent Orange controversy AOWG CDC ao_seriesIII Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Alvin L. Young Collection on Agent Orange Description An account of the resource The Alvin L. Young Collection on Agent Orange comprises 120 linear feet and spans the late 1800s to 2005; however, the bulk of the coverage is from the 1960s to the 1980s and there are many undated items. The collection was donated to Special Collections of the National Agricultural Library in 1985 by Dr. Alvin L. Young (1942- ). Dr. Young developed the collection as he conducted extensive research on the military defoliant Agent Orange. The collection is in good condition and includes letters, memoranda, books, reports, press releases, journal and newspaper clippings, field logs and notebooks, newsletters, maps, booklets and pamphlets, photographs, memorabilia, and audiotapes of an interview with Dr. Young. For more about this collection, <a href="/exhibits/speccoll/exhibits/show/alvin-l--young-collection-on-a">view the Agent Orange Exhibit.</a> Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Box The box containing the original item. 053 Folder The folder containing the original item. 1411 Series The series number of the original item. Series III Subseries II Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Young, Alvin L. H. K. Kang B. M. Shepard Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived Chlorinated Dioxins and Dibenzofurans in the Total Environment II Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1985 Title A name given to the resource Chapter 13: Rationale and Description of the Federally Sponsored Epidemiological Research in the United States on the Phenoxy Herbicides and Chlorinated Dioxin Contaminants Subject The topic of the resource herbicide toxicology AOWG ao_seriesIII https://www.nal.usda.gov/exhibits/speccoll/files/original/e2e570d4f610e7605bedc7e2617927bd.pdf 6c8b9205aedaaf306a0c0df9afa774f8 PDF Text Text Item ID Number 01336 Author Smith, Pamela W. Corporate Author Science Policy Research Division, Library of Congress, Report/Article TitlO Agent Orange: Veterans' Complaints Concerning Exposure to Herbicides in South Vietnam, Issue Brief Number IB80040 Journal/Book Title Year 1982 Month/Day APHI 20 Color n Number of Images DeSOriptOU Notes 21 Date originated: 09/06/79, Date Updated: 04/20/82. Includes a table of military projects involving agents orange, purple, pink, or green, with dates and descriptions of projects. Also includes a table of the signs, symptoms, and disorders reported after occupational exposure to TCP, 2,4,5-T or TCDD. Item gives an overview of background and policy analysis, health effects, perseonnel exposure, veterans' problems, Department of Defense efforts, health studies, the Interagency Work Group and Agent Orange Working Group, Congressional action, and legislation and hearings Thursday, May 03, 2001 Page 1336 of 1403 �AGENT ORANGE: VETERANS' COMPLAINTS CONCERNING EXPOSURE TO HERBICIDES IN SOUTH VIETNAM ISSUE BRIEF NUMBER IB80040 AUTHOR: Pamela W. Smith Science Policy Research Division THE LIBRARY OF CONGRESS CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE MAJOR ISSUES SYSTEM DATE ORIGINATED 09/06/79 DATE UPDATED 04/20/82 FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION CALL 287-5700 0426 �CRS- 1 IB80040 UPDATE-04/20/82 ISSUE DEFINITION From 1962 to 1971, the United States Air Force (USAF) sprayed various herbicide mixtures (chemicals that kill plants) in South Vietnam. The purpose of the spraying was to defoliate jungle growth to deprive the Communist forces of ground cover, and to destroy enemy crops to restrict food supplies. The most extensively used of these herbicide mixtures was known as Agent Orange, a 50:50 mix of two common herbicides called 2,4,5-T and 2,4-D (2,4,5-trichlorophenoxyacetic' acid and 2,4-dichlorophenoxyacetic acid). A third chemical present in the mixture in small amounts was TCDD, an inevitable by-product of the manufacture of 2,4,5-T. This chemical, called tetrachlorodibenzo-para-dioxin or simply "dioxin," is highly toxic to laboratory animals when administered in its pure form. Acute (short-term) toxicity values in humans have not been established, although Gosselin et al., in the 1976 edition of Clinical Toxicology of Commercial Products, puts TCDD in a class of chemicals for which the "probable lethal dose" for humans would be less than 5 mg/kg, or about 7 drops for a 150 Ib (70 kg) person. CRS has been unable to locate any report of a human death from exposure to pure TCDD. The human health effect that has been most consistently documented following exposure to small amounts of TCDD as a contaminant in other compounds is a skin condition known as chloracne. There is other, less consistent, evidence of damage to the liver and the nervous system in humans. Extensive testing on laboratory animals has been done to determine possible long-term effects of exposure to TCDD. It can induce cancer in some strains of rats and mice (carcinogenicity) , cause fetal death in several species (fetotoxicity) and birth defects in developing mouse fetuses (teratogenicity), but has been found not to cause genetic changes in mammalian cells (mutagenicity). The American Medical Association's Council on Scientific Affairs concluded that "there is no scientific evidence that 2,4-D, 2,4,5-T or TCDD has caused reproductive difficulties or hazards in the human. " Congressional interest was triggered by receipt of reports from Vietnam veterans who believed they had been harmed by exposure to herbicides, particularly Agent Orange. The 96th Congress held numerous hearings on the use of herbicides in South Vietnam, and various initiatives to deal with the problem were introduced. P.L. 96-151 was enacted to direct the Veterans Administration (VA) to conduct an epidemiological study on Vietnam veterans to determine whether there may be adverse human health effects associated with exposure to phenoxy herbicides and/or dioxin. This study and other studies planned will help elicit answers to the scientific questions posed by the Veterans Administration in determining whether or not the veterans' medical problems, allegedly due to exposure to Agent Orange and associated herbicides used in Vietnam, are compensable. Following recommendations made by the Interagency Work Group on Phenoxy Herbicides (now the Agent Orange Working Group), legislation was introduced in the 97th Congress to expand the scope of the VA's epidemiological study of the health effects of Agent Orange to include other factors related to military service in Vietnam. The legislation also allows veterans with medically certifiable conditions that might possibly have been caused by exposure to Agent Orange to receive medical care in VA facilities. The bill (H.R. 3499) was considered by the House and Senate in June 1981, put into final form in October, and signed by the President Nov. 3, 1981. Its title is the Veterans' Health Care, Training, and -Small Business Loan Act of 1981 (P.L. 97-72). �CRS- 2 IB80040 UPDATE-04/20/82 BACKGROUND AND POLICY ANALYSIS History During the summer of 1969, the first reports of human birth defects allegedly attributed to Agent Orange appeared in Vietnamese newspapers. Based on these allegations and the results of a study sponsored by the National Cancer Institute that showed that 2,4,5-T contaminated with TCDD caused birth defects in laboratory animals, the USAF stopped spraying 2,4,5-T in South Vietnam by early 1971. Although the Department of Defense maintains that only a limited number of U.S. military personnel can be positively identified as having been exposed to 2,4,5-T in South Vietnam (i.e., crews of aircraft that were used to spray herbicides), it is theoretically possible that large numbers of both military personnel (from the United States, South Vietnam, North Vietnam, Australia, and New Zealand) and civilians (especially South Vietnamese peasants) were exposed to 2,4,5-T through the USAF spraying program. A growing number of U.S. veterans who served in South Vietnam have begun to attribute the cause of various chronic ailments which they are now experiencing (especially nervous disorders, cancers, and birth defects in their offspring) to exposure to 2,4,5-T in South Vietnam, and many have filed claims with the VA for compensation. The VA has not yet awarded compensation to veterans for any claims related to 2,4,5-T exposure because of the lack of valid human data to prove a cause and effect relationship between exposure to 2,4,5-T and/or TCDD and specific health effects (except for chloracne). TCDD Contamination The industrial production "of 2,4,5-T always results in some TCDD contamination although TCDD levels can be reduced to about 0.01 parts per million (ppm) with current technology. Because it was not widely recognized until the late 1960s that 2,4,5-T could contain hazardous amounts of TCDD, manufacturers did not start reducing the level of TCDD in 2,4,5-T until the USAF was already winding down its herbicide spraying program. The average TCDD levels in the 2,4,5-T - containing herbicide mixtures used in South Vietnam were approximately 2 ppm in Agent Orange (which accounted for approximately 96% of the 2,4,5-T used in South Vietnam), approximately 32.8 ppm in Agent Purple, and 65.6 ppm in Agents Pink and Green (Agents Purple, Pink, and Green contained the remaining 2,4,5-T used in South Vietnam). The herbicides procured by the USAF were code named after the colored band that was placed around each 55 gallon drum in order to identify the contents. / Health Effects — Animal Data Although TCDD is well established as one of the most toxic chemicals known for acute (short-term) effects, there is no consensus in the scientific community over the -Chronic (long-term) effects on humans of exposure to low levels of TCDD (such as those levels found in the herbicides used in South Vietnam) . Statistically significant animal experiments have demonstrated that �CRS- 3 IB80040 UPDATE-04/20/82 2,4,5-T containing low levels of TCDD and/or TCDD alone have caused various tumors in mice and rats. A recently-released National Toxicology Program bioassay of TCDD confirms these earlier reports that TCDD is carcinogenic in some laboratory animals. Thymic atrophy (without a corresponding loss in immune function) and severe weight loss have been observed in many species after TCDD exposure. In some species, acute exposure to TCDD can cause liver damage. Birth defects such as cleft palate and kidney abnormalities have been reported in baby mice when the mothers were exposed during pregnancy. A National Toxicology Program animal study of male reproductive effects of exposure to TCDD, however, has failed to reveal a statistically significant increase in reproductive abnormalities in TCDD-exposed animals or birth defects in the TCDD-exposed male animals' offspring. Although there is some experimental evidence that TCDD may cause mutations (changes in the cell's genetic material that may produce birth defects in as-yet-unconceived offspring), these experiments have been few, they have been done mainly on non-mammalian species or in vitro (in test tubes), and they have basically been inconclusive. Some investigators feel that humans are less sensitive than animals to the toxic effects of TCDD. There is wide variation of" responses to TCDD among different species, and the mechanisms of its toxicity and metabolism are not understood. More work needs to be done to clarify whether human exposure to TCDD can produce the same health effects with the same potency as those observed in animal studies. Health Effects. -- Human.TData. If a cause and effect relationship is to be scientifically established between human exposure to a chemical and chronic health effects, a study which meets the following minimum criteria must be conducted to prove that such a relationship exists: a group of people (the "study group") must be identified that has already been exposed to the chemical under study (it would help to know the level of exposure); this study group must be large enough to detect chronic effects with statistical significance (to find an effect that occurred in 1 out of 100 people, one would need to examine at least 100 people); a control group must be found that ideally would differ from the study group only by never having been exposed to the chemical under study (thus, any differences in chronic health effects between the study and control groups could be attributed only to exposure to the chemical under study); and, due to the long latency period for many chronic effects, the study and control groups must be followed for as many years after exposure as it takes for the chronic effects to show up (i.e., in carcinogenicity studies, subjects must be followed for a minimum of 10 to 20 years after exposure to the suspect carcinogen). These exacting criteria are not met by most of the studies that have explored the relationship between human exposure to TCDD and/or 2,4,5,-T and subsequent health effects. Only for chloracne has such a cause and effect relationship been well established. Workers who have been exposed to TCDD and/or 2,4,5-T in industrial explosions or who have had other occupational exposure are frequently found to have a skin condition known as chloracne — which resembles normal acne except that it is caused by chemical exposure. Chloracne can appear from weeks to months after initial exposure and while mild cases (blackheads) may clear in a matter of months, severe cases (inflammatory lesions and scars) may last up to 30 years after exposure has ceased. While the severity of chloracne is not thought to correlate precisely with the intensity or duration of exposure to TCDD and/or 2,4,5-T, chloracne is associated so �CRS- 4 IB80040 UPDATE-04/2'0/82 closely with exposure that some scientists argue that patients who have not exhibited chloracne are unlikely to have suffered other toxic effects of TCDD and/or 2,4,5-T exposure. Studies of these exposed workers have also indicated a variety of other health problems. For example, the United States Air Force Technical Report on the Toxicology, Environmental Fate, and Human Risk of Herbicide Orange and its associated Dioxin (1978) listed a number of symptoms, signs, or disorders that had been reported after occupational exposure to TCP (trichlorophenol, 2,4,5-T's precursor), 2,4,5-T, or TCDD (see Appendix). As noted, these studies, which reported symptoms associated with human exposure to dioxin, were not conducted in such a way as to prove a cause-and-effect relationship between exposure to TCDD and/or 2,4,5-T and any of these effects, but they may be indicative of such a relationship. Several of the above studies have focused on investigating cancer rates among exposed workers. These studies do not show a clear cause/effect relationship between carcinogenicity associated with exposure to TCDD and/or 2,4,5-T because very few exposed workers (with the exception of those in Nitro, West Virginia) have been followed for more than ten years (the latency period for most cancers being 15 to 40 years after exposure) and the results have been equivocal. However, they support a continuing suspicion and indicate a need for further study. When the scientific panel of the Interagency Work Group on Phenoxy Herbicides reviewed five research papers by European scientists, it concluded that despite the studies' limitations, they do "show a correlation between exposure to phenoxy acid herbicides and an increased risk of some forms of cancer." A soft-tissue "sarcoma study has been proposed that will be conducted jointly by the Armed Forces Institute of Pathology and the National Cancer Institute. Studies that have been conducted in non-industrial settings have not been able to prove a cause and effect relationship between exposure to TCDD and/or 2,4,5-T and specific health effects. The National Academy of Sciences (NAS) was directed by Congress P.L. 91-441, sec. 506 (c) to conduct a study on the effects of herbicides in South Vietnam, including health effects. This NAS study, as well as at least three other similar studies that were conducted in South Vietnam during the early 1970s, were unable to find adequate data upon which to reach any conclusions concerning a causal effect between exposure to herbicides and any health effects, including birth defects. An explosion in a Hoffman-LaRoche chemical plant in Seveso, Italy in July 1976 caused thousands of people to be exposed to varying doses of TCDD as a toxic cloud drifted across the Italian countryside in a cone-shaped pattern about a mile long and half a mile wide. Some 5400 people lived in the two zones most directly affected, with an additional 40,000 people potentially exposed. Animals began to die 2 to 3 days after the incident with over 1,100 animals killed by direct exposure to TCDD. Over 700 people were evacuated from their homes. Chloracne was reported in 187 people, mostly children, and it tended to heal rapidly. Long-term human health effects of exposure to TCDD at Seveso are still being studied. Preliminary findings reported in 1979 by Hoffman-LaRoche revealed that Seveso residents had suffered liver damage but that there was no permanent breakdown in liver function. They also reported that rates of spontaneous abortions, fetal malformations, congenital defects, chromosome aberrations, reactions to infectious disease, and morbidity and mortality were not affected by TCDD exposure. As reported by the American Medical Association's Council on Scientific Affairs, "The most recent progress report on the long-term epidemiologic survey of the residents of the Seveso area emphasizes the preliminary nature of their �. . CRS- 5 IB80040 UPDATE-04/20/82 findings and reiterates the conclusions of prior investigators. Except for the skin, no organs or body functions were impaired. No derangement of gestation, no fetal lethality and loss, no gross malformations-, no growth retardation at term and no cytogenetic abnormalities have yet occurred." Health effects of domestic use of 2,4,5-T have been kept under surveillance by various Government agencies for some years. In April 1970, the Departments of Agriculture, Interior, and Health, Education and Welfare jointly announced the suspension of certain uses of 2,4,5-T following studies indicating that it was a teratogen. On Apr. 21, 1978, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) issued a Rebuttable Presumption Against Registration (RPAR) on 2,4,5-T, finding that the herbicide had exceeded certain risk criteria and inviting comments from interested parties. The RPAR was based on toxicological data from animal studies showing a correlation between 2,4,5-T exposure and cancer and birth defects. One of the comments received was from Alsea, Oregon, claiming that there was a high incidence of miscarriage among area women following spraying of the local forests with 2,4,5-T. EPA investigated this claim and reported its conclusion that the incidence of spontaneous abortion over a 6-year period in Alsea was higher than the rates in two other regions of Oregon that had lower rates of 2,4,5-T usage. Based on the combination of evidence from the animal studies and the Alsea study, EPA announced the emergency suspension of the domestic use of 2,4,5-T on forests, pastures, and rights-of-way on Feb. 28, 1979. The Alsea study has been criticized on methodological grounds by various groups, and its results are rejected by a number of writers. EPA hearings on cancellation of 2,4,5-T began in June 1979. On Mar. 24, 1981, EPA and Dow Chemical requested a recess in the hearing to discuss the possiblity of negotiating a settlement. The recess has been extended while the negotiations continue. Herbicide Spraying in Vietnam Approximately 107 million pounds of herbicides were aerially disseminated on 6 million acres of South Vietnam (an area about the size of Connecticut) from January 1962 to February 1971. Approximately 276,000 gallons of Agents Green, Pink, and Purple were sprayed in South Vietnam prior to 1965 when they were replaced by Agent Orange. Approximately 11 million gallo.ns of Agent Orange were then sprayed in South Vietnam — making it the most widely used herbicide of the war. Ninety percent of Agent Orange was sprayed on 2.9 million acres of inland forests and mangrove forests for defoliation, 8% was sprayed on enemy crops for crop destruction, and the remaining 2% was sprayed around base perimeters, cache sites, waterways, and communications lines. The Air Force continued to operate its herbicide spraying program in South Vietnam until the late 1960s when the National Cancer Institute released results of an animal bioassay that showed 2,4,5-T to be teratogenic and/or fetotoxic in rodents, and newspapers in South Vietnam started reporting health problems among the rural populations who had been exposed to such herbicides. The Air Force first restricted the use of Agent Orange to areas remote from populations in October of 1969, then stopped all airplane spraying of Agent Orange in early 1970 and all helicopter spraying of Agent Orange by 1971. All remaining herbicide stocks were gathered and stored at either Gulfport, Mississippi or Johnston Island in the Pacific until they were incinerated at sea in 1977. The following table outlines major military projects involving handling of Agents Orange, Purple, Pink, or Green in South Vietnam. the �CRS-6 IB80040 UPDATE-04/2'0/82 MILITARY PROJECTS INVOLVING AGENTS ORANGE, PURPLE, PINK, OR GREEN PROJECT DATES DESCRIPTION AGILE 1960-68 Selection of herbicides., and development and evaluation of defoliation techniques. RANCH HAND 1962-71 Aerial spraying of herbicides in South Vietnam. Various USAF Projects 1962-70 'Development and testing of aerial spray equipment. PACER IVY 1971 Air Force Logistics Command Project 1972-77 PACER HO 1977 Redrumming and movement of surplus herbicide from South Vietnam to Johnston Island. Maintenance of herbicide inventory and research on options for disposal. Dedrumming of herbicide inventory and at-sea incineration of Agent Orange. Each of these projects involved some human exposure to the herbicide 2,4,5-T and its contaminant, TCDD. The difficulty lies in determining who may have been exposed and at what level. �CRS-7 IB80040 UPDATE-04/20/82 Personnel Exposed The early trials that were conducted in South Vietnam to improve aircraft spray systems (1960 to early 1962) were conducted by USAF personnel assigned to the Special Aerial Spray Flight Division, Langley AFB, Va. (USAF personnel engaged in the herbicide program did not receive permanent change of station assignments to South Vietnam until 1964 -- thus making it more difficult to track personnel who may have been exposed to herbicides). During late 1962 and early 1963, the Crops Division at Fort Detrick and the USAF Armament Laboratory at Eglin Air Force Base, Florida were involved in efforts to provide improvements in spray system components in support of Operation RANCH HAND. Most of the personnel involved in the actual handling of herbicide drums were Vietnamese. However, a USAF flight mechanic or crew chief was responsible for ensuring that the aircraft were properly loaded and that the spray systems were functional. Each herbicide aircrew consisted of a pilot and a copilot (both usually officers) and a flight mechanic/spray unit operator (usually enlisted). The aircrews were frequently joined by South Vietnamese and U.S. observers. As noted in a USAF report, "within the aircraft, it was not uncommon to have herbicide leakage from around the numerous hose connections joining the spray tank and pumps with the wing and aft spray booms. In hot weather, the odor of herbicide within the aircraft was decidedly noticeable." The USAF has data on 6,542 herbicide spraying missions that took place between August 1965 and February 1971 on its "HERBS" computer tape. These data were compiled on a mission-by-mission basis from reports and files in various commands and offices in South Vietnam and the United States. The HERBS tape contains the following data for each mission: date; mission number; location; province and UTM coordinates; type of herbicide (basically, Agents Orange, White, or Blue); quantity of herbicide; area covered; purpose of mission (defoliation, crop destruction, etc.); and type of aircraft (plane or helicopter). The NAS used the HERBS tape in its evaluation of the effects of herbicides on South Vietnam. After evaluating the HERBS data, the NAS concluded that the HERBS tape accounted for approximately 86% of all herbicide operations in South Vietnam and that "despite certain recognized deficiencies," the HERBS tape is "a reliable source for an assessment of the major part of the herbicide operation in South Vietnam" and "is the best and in fact the only available comprehensive computation of the major part of the herbicide operations conducted in the Vietnam war." When the DOD suspended all use of 2,4,5-T in South Vietnam, the USAF was left with an inventory of 2.22 million gallons of unused Agent Orange (1.37 million gallons which had been shipped to South Vietnam and 0.85 million gallons which were waiting to be shipped at the Naval Construction Battalion Center at Gulfport, Mississippi). In April 1972, the 1.37 million gallons of Agent Orange were moved from South Vietnam to Johnston Island in the Pacific Ocean for storage. The total amount of TCDD in the remaining Agent Orange stock was approximately 44.1 pounds. Problems began to arise in both locations as drums reportedly began to leak and the USAF expressed concern over further leakage problems that could occur if a tornado hit the Mississippi site or if a typhoon hit the Pacific site. After exploring a number of options, the USAF decided to dispose of the Agent Orange by burning it at high temperatures at sea on the Dutch incinerator ship named the "Vulcanus." The Agent Orange was drained from the drums at each site and �CRS- 8 IB80040 UPDATE-04/20/82 transferred to the Vulcanus. The empty drums were then rinsed with diesel fuel and crushed. The rinse fluid was combined with the Agent Orange for incineration at sea. A total of 15,480 drums of Agent Orange were processed at the Mississippi site between May 24, 1977, and June 10, 1977, by approximately 110 USAF officers/technicians from the five Air Logistics Centers of the Air Force Logistics Command (located at Kelly AFB Texas; Hill AFB, Utah; Warner Robbins AFB, Georgia; Tinker AFB, Oklahoma; and McCellan AFB, California). A total of 24,795 drums of Agent Orange were processed at the Johnston Island site between July 27, 1977, and Aug. 23, 1977. Approximately 100 civilian employees hired by a contractor performed the dedrumming process. At both the Johnston Island and Mississippi sites, workers were provided with daily changes of work clothes and some with protective clothing. The Agent Orange was incinerated at sea in the period from July to September 1977. Results of industrial hygiene studies conducted at the time of the disposal operation by the U.S. Air Force (Gulfport) and the Battelle Memorial Institute (Johnston Island) revealed no immediate adverse health effects among the personnel involved in the operation. Department of Defense, Efforts The USAF has stated that it can now identify 1,264 servicemen who were directly exposed to Agent Orange as they handled herbicide., containers and flew spraying missions in South Vietnam. The Air Force has initiated a health effects study of Air Force personnel involved in operation "Ranch Hand," who sprayed Agent Orange in Vietnam. The Department of Defense (DOD) believes that these individuals had at least 1000 ti-mes more exposure .to Agent Orange than the average ground troops. The epidemiological study will try to determine whether a causal relationship can be established between exposure to the 2,4-D/2,4,5-T mixture and long-term health effects. Although the study was originally scheduled to begin in October 1979, peer review of its protocols forced delays. The University of Texas School of Public Health, the U.S. Air Force Scientific Advisory Board and the Armed Forces Epidemiological Board reviewed the study protocols and recommended modifications. Then the Air Force asked the National Academy of Sciences (NAS) to review the protocols. On May 6, 1980, the NAS announced recommendations that the scope and duration of the study be expanded to increase the likelihood of obtaining definitive data. NAS also expressed concern about the public perception of credibility and impartiality of a study conducted internally by the Air Force. The Interagency Work Group's Scientific Panel, however, has recommended that the study, as designed by the Air Force, be conducted because, despite its limitations, it provides "a focus as to the type of health effects that may possibly occur in other (ground troop) personnel." The Ranch Hand study is proceeding in several phases and will continue for 20 years. The first phase consists of a detailed medical history questionnaire, which has been administered to the Ranch Handers in their homes by trained interviewers from Louis Harris and Associates. A carefully matched control group, selected from military records held by the Air Force, has also been interviewed. The first data from the questionnaire should be available by mid-summer 1982. Also underway is the second phase of the study, a 3-day series of physical examinations, including a battery of psychological tests, which will be given to both the study group and the controls. The contractor for this phase is Kelsey-Seabold of Houston. The exams are scheduled to be completed by September 1982, with preliminary findings available 2 to 3 months later. Follow-up exams will be conducted at 1, 3, 5, 10, and 20 years. A mortality analysis on the Ranch Hand group is �, , , CRS- 9 IB80040 UPDATE-04/20/82 in progress at the Air Force School of Aerospace Medicine, with data anticipated around August 1982, and a mortality tracking program will be continued throughout the study. Information on the health status of the veterans, as shown by the questionnaires and the physical examinations, will provide data for a morbidity analysis. Many of the veterans who have filed claims with the VA for compensation for health effects caused by exposure to TCDD in South Vietnam did not hold jobs that caused direct exposure to 2,4,5-T. They claim that their exposure occurred indirectly either by being sprayed with overhead planes (although substances other than herbicides were also sprayed from planes) or by being exposed to 2,4,5-T in the environment. According to the DOD, military personnel did not usually enter areas sprayed with Agent Orange until 4 to 6 weeks after treatment. However, a recent General Accounting Office investigation concluded that a large number of Marines in the I Corps section of Vietnam from 1966-1969 were in, or close to, areas sprayed with Agent Orange on both the day of spraying and within 4 weeks afterward. Some Army units were also close to Agent Orange spraying. The Department of Defense has recently made progress in identifying ground troops that may have been exposed to Agent Orange. Two Army and one Marine battalion - 31st Engineer Battalion, 2050 troops; 1st Squadron, 9th Calvary (Air Mobil), 2300 troops and 3rd Battalion, 1st Marines, have been identified as being in areas of Agent Orange operations. Exact numbers, locations, and identities of individuals who may have been sprayed are impossible to determine. Veterans' Problems and Veterans^ .Administration E_f_fO'rts The first reports of veterans' concerns over health effects of exposure to 2,4,5-T began to appear in late 1977 and early 1978, following media coverage of several veterans' claims. Veterans have associated a number of illnesses with exposure to 2,4,5-T, including skin conditions, fatague, nervousness, numbness in extremities, vision and/or hearing impairments, birth d'efects in offspring, reduced libido, miscarriages, impotency, respiratory problems, gastro-intestinal tract disturbances, and various cancers, as well as a variety of other illnesses. As of Apr. 1, 1982, the VA had received 13064 claims for damage reportedly related to in-service exposure to herbicides? 2986 claims have been made due only to exposure to the herbicides and not for any specific condition; 10078 claims have been filed for specific conditions related to herbicide exposure, but 3469 of these have not had the diagnosis con-firmed by medical authority. Of the 6609 claims with a confirmed diagnosis, 923 (13.7%) have been allowed for reasons other than Agent Orange exposures and 5686 (86.3%) have been denied. Approximately 93% or 858 of the total 923 claims allowed were for service-connected skin conditions, and the remaining 7% or 65 claims were allowed for cancer, psychiatric and neurological conditions, and various other miscellaneous disabilities. The 5686 claims denied fall into the following categories (many claims have more than one claimed diagnosis): 3055 for various skin conditions; 2335 for nervousness, headache, or fatigue; 886 for paralysis or numbness; 751 for gastro-intestinal or genito-urinary conditions; 399 for various malignancies; 356 for impaired sexual activity; 394 for eye, ear, nose, and throat conditions; 274 for lung conditions; 227 for cardiovascular conditions; and 137 for miscellaneous conditions. The VA has not awarded compensation for the claims of chronic illnesses related to Agent Orange exposure because of the lack of valid human data to prove a �CRS-10 IB80040 UPDATE-04/20/82 cause and effect relationship between exposure to a 2,4,5-T/2,4-D mixture and/or TCDD and specific chronic health effects. Previously, the difficulty of determining which veterans' were or were not exposed to Agent Orange was also a factor in denying compensation, but more recently the VA has conceded exposure for all veterans who were in Vietnam. The VA is maintaining a registry of all Vietnam veterans who have come to VA hospitals and health care facilities expressing concern about possible herbicide-related health problems. Each such veteran, whether experiencing any health problems or not, is given a physical examination; currently, some 2700-2800 exams are being conducted each month. Data from all the exams is being computerized into a central Agent Orange Registry in addition to the individual records being maintained at the local VA facilities. As of Mar. 25, 1982, 81,670 veterans had received the initial exam, and about 61,000 of the records had been coded into the computer. Information from the registry is being analyzed to determine if the veterans have an increased rate of any particular diseases. Thus far, nothing unusual or unexpected has turned up. Treatment of any health problems uncovered by the exams is handled under normal VA procedures regarding service-connection, ability to pay for medical care, etc., with the exception that special guidelines have been issued for the handling of conditions possibly related to Agent orange. In the Federal Register of Dec. 2, 1981, pursuant to Public Law 97-72, the VA issued guidelines for use by its physicians to "assist them in making determinations in individual cases as to whether a disability may have been caused" by exposure to Agent Orange. Even though treatment may be given for some conditions, the VA specified that "In accordance with congressional intent, a determination to furnish care under this authority does not establish that the condition for which medical care is provided is service-connected" for purposes of compensation or vocational rehabilitation eligibility. Three additional VA activities on Agent Orange include participation in the tissue registry, the Chloracne Task Force, and investigations into TCDD residues in body fat tissue of veterans. When VA facilities perform surgery or autopsies on Vietnam veterans, tissue samples are taken and sent to the Armed Forces Institute of Pathology where a special tissue registry is being maintained. Examination of approximately 800 specimens has so far shown no significant clustering of tumors or other particular disease features. The Chloracne Task Force was established in response to a congressional request to sift out those cases of skin conditions that either resemble or are truly Chloracne. Those veterans whose medical records show a definite possibility of Chloracne will be invited to come to non-VA clinics for re-examination by dermatologists who have an expert knowledge of the disease. The VA has conducted a study to determine if TCDD can be detected in the body fat tissues of Vietnam veterans at any higher levels than in veterans who were not in Vietnam. Dioxin in body fat is measured in parts per trillion, levels which are at the technological limits of available detection methods. The test requires surgical removal of tissue from the abdomen and chemical analysis of the sample on gas chromatography/high resolution mass spectrometry instruments. The results of the study were inconclusive, and the VA has decided that the reliability of the procedure is not sufficient to warran-t its use in attempting to verify dioxin exposure. An additional problem is that dioxin contamination is so ubiquitous (from domestic herbicide use and from its formation in municipal incinerators) that it may likely be found in everyone's fat tissue. As mandated in P.L. 96-151, the Veterans' Affairs Amendments, the VA is currently preparing to perform an epidemiological study of Vietnam veterans exposed to Agent Orange. Although the study's protocol has been developed �CRS- 11 IB80040 UPDATE-04/20/82 and validated by an independent group, the VA will perform the testing and collect the data, with oversight by a non-VA scientific committee. Procurement of an independent contractor for the study's protocol was delayed for 14 months by a protest filed by the National Veterans Law Center (NVLC) . The NVLC alleged that not only was the .VA violating procurement law, but also the study as currently contemplated did not comply with the requirements of P.L. 96-151. On Feb. 2, 1981, the General Accounting Office concluded its investigation and denied the NVLC protest. On May 5, 1981, the VA announced the awarding of a contract to the University of California at Los Angeles (UCLA) School of Public Health for the design of the epidemiological study. UCLA submitted its first draft of the protocol to the VA in August 1981; it was peer-reviewed by the VA Advisory Committee on Health-Related Effects of Herbicides, by the Office of Technology Assessment, and by the Science Panel of the Agent Orange Working Group. All the review groups judged the draft protocol to be inadequate and not in compliance with the contract. UCLA has since modified the protocol, expanding on problem areas and incorporating the suggestions of the review groups; its final submission to the VA is due April 29, 1982. As with the Ranch Hand study, this epidemiological study will have two main parts: a questionnaire on health status and medical and occupational history, and a physical exam with laboratory workup. The study group will be 18,000 veterans, divided into 3 cohorts of 6000 each. Two of the cohorts will have had Vietnam service, and will be distinguished as having a high or a low likelihood of herbicide exposure. The third cohort will be veterans with non-Vietnam military service. Inclusion of the third group will generate data about the health effects of Vietnam service in addition to the information expected about herbicide-related health effects. The study will commence with a pilot project to field test its procedures.and the questionnaire. P.L. 96-151 also mandated the VA to conduct a comprehensive review and scientific analysis of the worldwide literature on Agent Orange and other phenoxy herbicides. JRB Associates prepared the review under contract, and the VA published the 2-volume study in October 1981. The VA is now preparing to contract for an update to the literature review, to reflect new reports and data -that have appeared. The Interagency Work Group on Phenoxy Herbicides and Contaminants, established in December 1979, recommended that the Centers for Disease Control (CDC) perform a case-control study to see if there is an increased incidence of specific malformations in children of Vietnam veterans. The population to be studied is a group of 7500 children who have birth defects and who are registered in CDC's Birth Defects Program (in operation since the late 1960s). Information on the families of these children, gained by extensive interviews and questionnaires, will be compared with that for 300 normal controls. The data will be analyzed to see what risk factors in the parents' lives, including military service in Vietnam, may be related to increased incidence of malformations in their children. CDC has completed a pilot study on a representative sample of the two groups to test the questionnaire and the procedures for finding the families. The main study will be started in late April 1982, and a preliminary report on the issue of Vietnam service is expected in the fall of 1983. Detailed analysis of the data on all risk factors will take several years to complete. On Sept. 22, 1980, the Work Group held its first public meeting to discuss problems and proposals related to exposure to herbicides. On Jan. 19, 1981, the Secretary of Health and Human Services established the "Advisory Committee on Special Studies Relating to the Possible Long-Term Health Effects of Phenoxy Herbicides and Contaminants" to advise the Secretary and �CRS- 12 IB80040 UPDATE-0'4/20/82 the Chair of the Interagency Work Group on Herbicides concerning the Advisory Committee's oversight of the conduct of the Ranch Hand Study being conducted by the Air Force. In its seventh report to the White House, the Work Group's Scientific Panel concluded that: While it is difficult to accept logically that a single causative factor -- Herbicide Orange -- could be responsible for such a diverse set of health effects as alleged by Vietnam veteran claims to the VA , there is no definitive evidence that permits selective exclusion of some of these illnesses. Further, it is possible that some of these health effects are occurring as a consequence of Vietnam^ service but not due to exposure to Herbicide Orange. The Science Panel is not aware of any data that suggest a modification of its previous recommendation that the •focus of a study of Vietnam veterans should be broadened to consider Vietnam service as the exposure factor rather than focus solely on Herbicide Orange exposure.... The Science Panel is in receipt of data which indicate that there is at best a remote chance of accurate identification of specific ground troops who were exposed to Herbicide Orange.... The Panel is therefore of the opinion that design of a scientifically valid Herbicide Orange study of ground troops may not be possible. If the focus of a study of Vietnam veterans is broadened to consider Vietnam service as the exposure factor, a study of ground troops is necessary and a scientifically valid study can be designed. On July 17, 1981, the Interagency Work Group was renamed and its membership expanded. Now called the Agent Orange Working Group, it is part of the Cabinet Council on Human Resources. The Department of Health and Human Services is the lead agency. Because the VA currently recognizes only chloracne as a human health effect that can be proven to be caused by exposure to 2,4,5-T, veterans may have difficulty being compensated for even those effects for which there is strong animal evidence (i.e., cancer and birth defects caused in utero which are those birth defects that cannot be caused by the father and require the mother and fetus to be exposed during the actual pregnancy). Veterans who claim compensation for health effects which are not supported by strong animal data (i.e., mutations -- which could cause genetic defects in the father's sperm that would affect children conceived after exposure) may have an even tougher case to argue. The veteran's question then becomes: How much evidence is required to prove the right to compensation? On whom does the burden of proof lie (the veteran or the VA)? .If more evidence is needed, who will generate it? And finally, what constitutes fair treatment of veterans while the necessary data are being gathered? Congressional Action of the 96th Congress The 96th Congress responded to the problems of establishing a cause and effect relationship between veterans' exposure to herbicides in South Vietnam and the various health problems they are now experiencing by holding hearings and enacting legislation. �CRS- 13 IB80040 UPDATE-04/20/82 The Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, of the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce held hearings on June 24 and 25, 1979, to hear testimony from veterans who allegedly have been affected by herbicide exposure and from the Veterans Administration regarding its efforts to unequivocally determine the relationship between herbicide exposure and health effects. The Subcommittee on Medical Benefits and Facilities of the House Committee on Veterans' Affairs held two sets of hearings on the hazards associated with TCDD, veterans' complaints of health effects associated with Agent Orange exposure, and Veterans Administration's efforts to resolve the Agent Orange problem. The Senate Veterans' Affairs Committee also held hearings to Agent Orange problem. examine the As a step to gain access to records to locate veterans who may have been exposed to herbicides in-service, Title V of H.R. 2282, the Veterans' Disability Compensation and Survivors' Benefits Amendments of 1979, requires the Director of the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health, upon request by the VA (or other appropriate agency) to request the current mailing address from the Internal Revenue Service of persons whom the VA certifies may have been exposed to occupational hazards. H.R. 2282 was passed in lieu of its companion bill, S. 689, and became Public Law 96-128 on Nov. 28, 1979. Title III of H.R. 3892, the Veterans' Affairs amendments, directs the Veterans Administration to conduct an epidemiological study of the long-term health effects on individuals from exposure to dioxins in Vietnam, upon the Office of Technology Assessment's (OTA) approval of its protocol. Its companion bill, S. 1039, was incorporated in H.R. 3892 as an amendment, and the measure was enacted by Congress and signed by the President on Dec. 20, 1979 (P.L. 96-151) . If enacted, S. 2096 would have directed the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare (now, Health and Human Services) to undertake an epidemiological study to determine the long-term adverse human health effects associated with exposure to dioxins produced during the manufacture of phenoxy herbicides. This bill proposed to investigate the long-term health effects of exposure to dioxins, in general, not just to Agent Orange. As similarly incorporated in H.R. 3892, S. 2096 would have required that the study's protocol be approved by the Congressional Office of Technology Assessment. This bill was presented to the President on Dec. 21, 1979, and vetoed by him on Jan. 2, 1980. President Carter vetoed the bill because the White House counsel believed that such a procedure violated the separation of power between the legislative branch and the executive branch. He did not feel that the Department of Health and Human Services' study protocol should be subject to approval by a congressional agency. Title X of H.R. 5288, the Veterans' Rehabilitation Program and Veterans' Educational Assistance Program would have directed the Secretary of Health and Human Services to conduct a study of veterans and other groups exposed to the herbicide known as "Agent Orange" to determine if there may be adverse health effects associated with such exposure. Like H.R. 3892 (P.L. 96-151) and S. 2096, the bill called for OTA approval of the study's protocol. The bill also would have required the Secretary of Health and Human Services to coordinate its efforts with other studies in the Federal Government. During the debate on S. 1188, its companion bill, the Disabled Veterans' Rehabilitation Act, the Senate adopted an amendment offered by Senator �CRS-14 IB80040 UPDATE-04/20/82 Cranston to expand the study on health effects of exposure to Agent Orange to include other factors related to service in Vietnam. The Senate also adopted an amendment offered by Senator Heinz requiring the VA to promulgate regulations regarding guidelines to resolve veterans' disability claims based on exposure to Agent Orange. The ' amendments were striken by the House because they were considered to be "non-germane" to the primary focus of the bill. S. 1872 (the Vietnam Veterans' Act); H.R. 6050 (the Vietnam Veterans' Act); H.R. 6377 (the Vietnam Era Veterans Agent Orange Act); each would have established a presumption of service-connected disability for health effects in Vietnam veterans (and birth defects in their children) exposed to Agent Orange. H.R. 8238 (Independent Agent Orange Study) would have directed the Veterans Administrator to request the National Academy of Sciences to conduct a study on veterans exposed to Agent Orange. H.R. 8300 would have expanded the scope of the Agent Orange study currently being coordinated by the VA and would have established deadlines for promulgating regulations related to Agent Orange exposure claims. These bills received no action. LEGISLATION P.L. 97-72, H.R. 3499 Veterans' Health Care, Training and Small Business Loan Act of 1981. Amends title 38, U.S. Code, to extend the Vietnam-era veterans' readjustment counseling program, to provide medical care for Vietnam veterans exposed to herbicide defoliants (including Agent Orange), to recover the cost of certain health care provided by the VA, and authorizes the VA to expand the scope of its epidemiological study on the health effects of Agent Orange, and other purposes. Introduced May 7, 1981; referred to Committee on Veterans' Affairs. Committee consideration and mark-up session held May 12. Reported to House (amended) by Committee on Veterans' Affairs (H.Rept. 97-79) May 19. Passed House (amended) June 2, 1981. Received in the Senate June 3. Senate struck all after the Enacting Clause and substituted the language of S. 921, June 16. Passed Senate in lieu of S. 921 with amendments, June 16, 1981. House concurred in Senate amendments with amendments Oct. 2, 1981. Senate agreed to House amendments Oct. 16, 1981. Signed into law Nov. 3, 1981. H.R. 523 (Roe) Amends Title 38, U.S. Code, to waive the 1-year limitation on claims for compensation from the Veterans Administration for disabilities and diseases incurred in or aggravated by military service in the case of claims by veterans who served in Southeast Asia during the Vietnam era for compensation for disabilities resulting from exposure to the phenoxy herbicides known as Agent Orange or other phenoxy herbicides. Introduced Jan. 5, 1981; referred to Committee on Veterans' Affairs. H.R. 1173 (Montgomery, by request) Amends section 307 of P.L. 96-151, by assigning the responsibility of designating a protocol for, and conducting an epidemiological study of, veterans who were exposed to Agent Orange, to an independent scientific agency. Introduced Jan. 22, 1981; referred to Committee on Veterans' Affairs. H.R. 1962 (Oilman) �- . , CRS- 15 IB80040 UPDATE-04/20/82 Amends the Veterans Health Programs Extension and Improvement Act of 1979 to require the Veterans Administration and the National Academy of Sciences to enter into an agreement under which the Academy will conduct an epidemiological study of veterans exposed to Agent Orange. Introduced Feb. 19, 1981; referred to Committee on Veterans' Affairs. H.R. 2157 (Mottl) Expands the scope of a study required to be conducted by the Administrator of Veterans' Affairs concerning the effect on humans of exposure to the chemical known as Agent Orange. Introduced Feb. 25, 1981: referred to Committee on Veterans' Affairs. VA requested Executive comment Mar. 2, 1981. Referred to Subcommittee on Hospitals and Health Care Apr. 28. Hearings held Apr. 30. Subcommittee consideration and mark-up session held. Clean bill forwarded to full committee. H.R. 2297 (Downey) Amends Title 38, United States Code, to waive the 1-year limitation on claims for compensation from the Veterans Administration for disabilities and disease incurred in or aggravated by military service in the case of claims by veterans who served in Southeast Asia during the Vietnam era for compensation for disabilities resulting from exposure to the phenoxy herbicides known as "Agent Orange" or other phenoxy herbicides. Introduced Mar. 4, 1981; referred to Committee on Veterans' Affairs. H.R. 2493 (Daschle) Amends Title 38, United States Code, to provide a presumption of service connection for the occurrence of certain diseases in veterans who were exposed to herbicides in Southeast Asia during the Vietnam era. Introduced Mar. 12, 1981; referred to Committee on Veterans' Affairs. H.R. 2953 (Daschle) Entitles veterans exposed to Agent Orange during the Vietnam era to specified medical benefits. Extends the period during which veterans of such era may initially request psychological readjustment counseling. Extends specified educational assistance without delimiting periods for vocational training for specified veterans determined to be in need of such assistance. Introduced Apr. 1, 1981; referred to Committee on Veterans' Affairs. Referred to Subcommittee on Hospitals and Health Care Apr. 28. Hearings held Apr. 28. Subcommittee consideration and mark-up session held Apr. 30, 1981. H.R. 3163 (Railsback) Requires the Secretary of Health and Human Services to arrange for an independent epidemiological study of persons exposed to Agent Orange. Introduced Apr. 8, 1981; referred to Committee on Energy and Commerce. Referred to Subcommittee on Health and the Environment Apr. 9, 1981. S. 636 (Cranston et al.) Entitles the United States to recover the costs of certain medical care and services furnished to a veteran for a non-service-connected disability when disability is covered by another form of insurance or compensation. Permits the expansion of the scope of the epidemiological and literature �CRS- 16 IB80040 UPDATE-04/20/82 study of the long term adverse health effects of exposure to Agent Orange during the Vietnamese conflict to include the effects of other factors. Introduced Mar. 5, 1981; referred to Committee on Veterans' Affairs. S. 689 (Heinz) Amends section 307 of the Veterans Health Programs Extension and Improvement Act of 1979 to require the promulgation of regulations containing guidelines for resolving claims for veterans benefits based on exposure, to Agent Orange, and for other purposes. Introduced Mar. 12, 1981; referred to Committee on Veterans' Affairs. Hearings held Apr. 30, 1981. S. 921 (Simpson) Extends the authority of the Administrator of Veterans' Affairs to contract for hospital care or medical services in Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands without reference to patient loads or incidence of provision of medical services for veterans treated by the Veterans' Administration in the contiguous 48 States. Introduced "Apr. 8, 1981; referred to Committee on Veterans' Affairs. Reported with amendment May 15, 1981 (S.Rept. 97-89); H.R. 3499 passed in lieu (see P.L. 97-72 above) June 16, 1981. S. 1345 <Heinz) Authorizes the Administrator of the Veterans' Administration to provide hospital or nursing home care to a veteran for treatment of a condition associated with exposure to Agent Orange during service in Vietnam. Extends the Vietnam-era veterans' readjustment counseling program. Directs the Administrator to expand the scope of the epidemiological study of long term adverse health effects of other factors involved in such service. Introduced June 8, 1981; referred to Committee on Veterans' Affairs. S. 1953 (Specter) Amends title 38, United States Code to provide a presumption of service connection for the occurrence of certain diseases in veterans who were exposed to phenoxy herbicides while serving in Southeast Asia during the Vietnam era. Introduced Dec. 15, 1981; referred to Committee on Veterans Affairs. HEARINGS U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce. Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations. Agent Orange: exposure of Vietnam veterans. Hearing, 96th Congress, 2d session. Sept. 25, 1980. 249 p. Involuntary exposure to Agent Orange and other toxic spraying. Hearings, 96th Congress, 1st session. June 26 and 27, 1979. 256 p. U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Veterans' Affairs. Ad Hoc Subcommittee. Status of Vietnam veterans in the Bay area. Hearing, 96th Congress, 2d session. Apr. 10, 1980. 64 p. U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Veterans' Affairs. Subcommittee on Hospitals and Health Care. �% .. , CRS- 17 IB80040 UPDATE-04/20/82 Legislation to improve medical programs administered by the Veterans Administration (H.R. 2157, H.R. 2953, and H.R. 2999). Hearings, 97th Congress, 1st session. Apr. 28, 1981. 54 p. U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Veterans' Affairs. .Subcommittee on Medical Facilities and Benefits. Herbicide "Agent Orange". Hearing, 95th Congress, 2d session. Oct. 11, 1978. 62 p. Oversight hearing to receive testimony on Agent Orange. Hearing, 96th Congress, 2d session. Feb. 25, 1980. 121 p. ----- Oversight hearing to receive testimony on Agent Orange. Hearing, 96th Congress, 2d session. July 22, 1980. 459 p. --—•- Scientific community report on Agent Orange. Hearing, 96th Congress, 2d session. Sept. 16, 1980. 145 p. U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Veterans' Affairs. Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations. Current status of Agent Orange studies. Hearing, 97th Congress, 1st session. May 6, 1981. 385 p. U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Veterans' Affairs. Agent Orange update and appendix: Agent Orange activities (part II). Hearing, 96th Congress, 2d session. Sept. 10, 1980. 1368 p. Oversight on issues related to Agent Orange and other herbicides. Hearing, 97th Congress, 1st session. Nov. 18, 1981. (not yet printed) • VA health resources and program extensions and appendix: Agent Orange activities. Hearing, 96th Congress, 1st session, on S. 741 and S. 196. Apr. 10,. 1979. 462 p. • Veterans' Programs Extension and Improvement Act of 1981. Hearing, 97th Congress, 1st session, on S. 26 (titles II and III, only), S. 380, S. 458, S. 636, S. 689, S. 872, S. 914, S. 921, and related bills. Apr. 30, 1981. 685 p. • Vietnam veterans' readjustment. Hearings, 96th Congress, 2d session. Feb. 21, Mar. 4, and May 21, 1980. Part 2. 595-2082 p. ADDITIONAL REFERENCE SOURCES American Medical Association. Council on Scientific Affairs. Health effects of "Agent Orange" and dioxin contaminants (Executive Summary). 1981. 6 p. Behrens, Richard, et al. Comments from CAST (Council on Agricultural Science and Technology): Dioxin. 1978, 9 p. Bucfc, Craig. The Death of a nation. Aug. 28, 1978: 49-50, 52-55. New west, v. 3, �CRS-18 IB80040 UPDATE-04/20/82 Cookson, Clive. "Emergency" ban on 2,4,5-T herbicide in U.S. Nature, v. 278, Mar. 8, 1979: 10'8-110. Davis, Donald E. et al. Comments from CAST (Council on Agricultural Science and Technology): Agent orange. 1978. 5 p. Galston, Arthur W. Herbicides: a mixed blessing. v. 29, February 1979: 85-90. Bioscience, International Agency for Research on Cancer. IARC monographs on the evaluation of the carcinogenic risk of chemicals to man: 2,5,5-T, vol. 15, August 1977. JRB Associates. Review of literature on herbicides, including phenoxy herbicides and associated dioxins. Washington, Veterans Administration, 1981. 2v. Laporte, Joan-Ramon. Multinationals and health: reflections on the Seveso catastrophe. International journal of health services, v. 8, no. 4, 1978: 619-632. National Research Council. The effects of herbicides in South Vietnam: Part A. Summary and conclusions. Washington, National Academy of Sciences, 1974. AD-774-749. 398 p. Peterson, Jeannie. Seveso: 1978: 232-239. the event. Ambio, v. 7, no. 5-6, Reggiani, G. Localized contamination with TCDD - Seveso, Missouri, and other areas. In: Halogenated biphenyls, terphenyls, naphthalenes, dibenzodioxins and related products, ed. Renate D. Kimbrough. Amsterdam, New York, Oxford, Elsevier/North-Holland Biomedical Press, 1980. Severe, Richard. Seveso: lessons from an escape. June 17, 1978: 101-102, 104-106, 108. U.S. Economist, v. 2.67, General Accounting Office. Health effects of exposure to herbicide orange in South Vietnam should be resolved, Apr. 6, 1979. CED-79-22. U.S. ground troops in South Vietnam were in areas sprayed with herbicide orange. Nov. 16, 1979. FPCD-80-23. Young, Alvin et al. The toxicology, environmental fate and human risk of herbicide orange and its associated dioxin. The Surgeon General, U.S. Air Force, Washington, D.C. October 1978. Walsh, John. Seveso: the questions persist where dioxin created a wasteland. Science, v. 197, Sept. 9, 1977: 1064-1067. Whiteside, Thomas. Defoliation. New York, Ballantine, •- The pendulum and the toxic cloud. New Haven, Yale 1970. �, .. k CRS-19 IB80040 University Press, 1979. Zimmerman, David R. Agent Orange: Vietnam's lingering poison. American health, v. 1, no. 1, Mar./Apr. 1982: 68-72. UPDATE-04/20/82 �Signs, Symptoms, and Disorders Reported After Occupational Exposure to TCP, 2,4,5-T or TCDD 0) O -C I/I Q> Q> O> flj o *D 10 ID V 3C Source *j e o >- C ID •— i>- «O Q. >- v. Poland et al. (62) j: o. o- 4 11 8 o >ID — o> a: o < 5 18 30 I a. u a> 17 8 20 48 17 C o (U 0) o c as 0) -C U C — flj D ID 10 — Q. a) •z. a (D </> c m ID cn — c .E o -a JD < a) i_ a. l- o X — Q) 4-1 U •— O E C O a) 0) Q 22 + 87 Hardell (33) K i m m i g and Schulz Jirasek et al. (37) o (/I i- >— a> 3c Dugois et al. (24) Kramer (4g) (D — in Q. L. a B l e i b e r g et al. (1*0 tfl E *-> tj* 3 Baader and Bauer (6) Bauer et al. (9) U (U ID V. > »- V) 31 3 + 12 19 78 Jirasek et al. (33) Pazderova et al. (61) M i u r a et al. (54) 23 O l i v e r (57) 27 2 + Ter Beek et al. (79) Zelikov and Danilov (88) Total number of cases reported c 53 + 1 •f 1 17 15 18 0 47 75 275 0 91 47 17 23 a Number entries in table reflect the number of cases in which sign, symptom or disorder was reported. °+ - Sign, symptom or disorder reported but number of cases not given. c Numbers do not include cases represented by "+" and totals may represent some double counting due to the overlap to studies by Jirasek et al. and Pazderova et al. SOURCE: Young, Alvin et al. The Toxicology, Environmental Fate, and Human Risk of Herbicide Orange and Its Associated Dioxin, p. VI-14. (Numbers in parentheses identify sources in Young's bibliography.) � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Alvin L. Young Collection on Agent Orange Description An account of the resource The Alvin L. Young Collection on Agent Orange comprises 120 linear feet and spans the late 1800s to 2005; however, the bulk of the coverage is from the 1960s to the 1980s and there are many undated items. The collection was donated to Special Collections of the National Agricultural Library in 1985 by Dr. Alvin L. Young (1942- ). Dr. Young developed the collection as he conducted extensive research on the military defoliant Agent Orange. The collection is in good condition and includes letters, memoranda, books, reports, press releases, journal and newspaper clippings, field logs and notebooks, newsletters, maps, booklets and pamphlets, photographs, memorabilia, and audiotapes of an interview with Dr. Young. For more about this collection, <a href="/exhibits/speccoll/exhibits/show/alvin-l--young-collection-on-a">view the Agent Orange Exhibit.</a> Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Box The box containing the original item. 051 Folder The folder containing the original item. 1336 Series The series number of the original item. Series III Subseries II Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Smith, Pamela W. Description An account of the resource Corporate Author: Science Policy Research Division, Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource April 20 1982 Title A name given to the resource Agent Orange: Veterans' Complaints Concerning Exposure to Herbicides in South Vietnam, Issue Brief Number IB80040 Subject The topic of the resource dioxin Agent Orange Controversy AOWG VA ao_seriesIII Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Alvin L. Young Collection on Agent Orange Description An account of the resource The Alvin L. Young Collection on Agent Orange comprises 120 linear feet and spans the late 1800s to 2005; however, the bulk of the coverage is from the 1960s to the 1980s and there are many undated items. The collection was donated to Special Collections of the National Agricultural Library in 1985 by Dr. Alvin L. Young (1942- ). Dr. Young developed the collection as he conducted extensive research on the military defoliant Agent Orange. The collection is in good condition and includes letters, memoranda, books, reports, press releases, journal and newspaper clippings, field logs and notebooks, newsletters, maps, booklets and pamphlets, photographs, memorabilia, and audiotapes of an interview with Dr. Young. For more about this collection, <a href="/exhibits/speccoll/exhibits/show/alvin-l--young-collection-on-a">view the Agent Orange Exhibit.</a> Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Box The box containing the original item. 036 Folder The folder containing the original item. 0779 Series The series number of the original item. Series III Subseries I Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Jemison, Terry L. Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived U. S. Medicine Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource January 1 1983 Title A name given to the resource Agent Orange: Exposure 'Tackled' Subject The topic of the resource veteran health and hygiene dioxin AOWG human exposure ao_seriesIII