2 15 99 Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Alvin L. Young Collection on Agent Orange Description An account of the resource The Alvin L. Young Collection on Agent Orange comprises 120 linear feet and spans the late 1800s to 2005; however, the bulk of the coverage is from the 1960s to the 1980s and there are many undated items. The collection was donated to Special Collections of the National Agricultural Library in 1985 by Dr. Alvin L. Young (1942- ). Dr. Young developed the collection as he conducted extensive research on the military defoliant Agent Orange. The collection is in good condition and includes letters, memoranda, books, reports, press releases, journal and newspaper clippings, field logs and notebooks, newsletters, maps, booklets and pamphlets, photographs, memorabilia, and audiotapes of an interview with Dr. Young. For more about this collection, <a href="/exhibits/speccoll/exhibits/show/alvin-l--young-collection-on-a">view the Agent Orange Exhibit.</a> Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Box The box containing the original item. 027 Folder The folder containing the original item. 0409 Series The series number of the original item. Series III Subseries I Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived Nature Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource April 10 1980 Title A name given to the resource News in Brief: US agency denies Agent Orange cover up; News in Brief: Australia orders Agent Orange inquiry Subject The topic of the resource VA AVHS government liability Agent Orange controversy ao_seriesIII Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Alvin L. Young Collection on Agent Orange Description An account of the resource The Alvin L. Young Collection on Agent Orange comprises 120 linear feet and spans the late 1800s to 2005; however, the bulk of the coverage is from the 1960s to the 1980s and there are many undated items. The collection was donated to Special Collections of the National Agricultural Library in 1985 by Dr. Alvin L. Young (1942- ). Dr. Young developed the collection as he conducted extensive research on the military defoliant Agent Orange. The collection is in good condition and includes letters, memoranda, books, reports, press releases, journal and newspaper clippings, field logs and notebooks, newsletters, maps, booklets and pamphlets, photographs, memorabilia, and audiotapes of an interview with Dr. Young. For more about this collection, <a href="/exhibits/speccoll/exhibits/show/alvin-l--young-collection-on-a">view the Agent Orange Exhibit.</a> Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Box The box containing the original item. 028 Folder The folder containing the original item. 0427 Series The series number of the original item. Series III Subseries I Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived Time Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource February 25 1980 Title A name given to the resource Where Is My Country?: Agent Orange's victims step up demands for compensation Subject The topic of the resource popular press Agent Orange controversy litigation VA ao_seriesIII Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Alvin L. Young Collection on Agent Orange Description An account of the resource The Alvin L. Young Collection on Agent Orange comprises 120 linear feet and spans the late 1800s to 2005; however, the bulk of the coverage is from the 1960s to the 1980s and there are many undated items. The collection was donated to Special Collections of the National Agricultural Library in 1985 by Dr. Alvin L. Young (1942- ). Dr. Young developed the collection as he conducted extensive research on the military defoliant Agent Orange. The collection is in good condition and includes letters, memoranda, books, reports, press releases, journal and newspaper clippings, field logs and notebooks, newsletters, maps, booklets and pamphlets, photographs, memorabilia, and audiotapes of an interview with Dr. Young. For more about this collection, <a href="/exhibits/speccoll/exhibits/show/alvin-l--young-collection-on-a">view the Agent Orange Exhibit.</a> Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Box The box containing the original item. 050 Folder The folder containing the original item. 1301 Series The series number of the original item. Series III Subseries II Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Minutes: Citizens Against Toxic Herbicides Meeting, April 22, 1980 Subject The topic of the resource Agent Orange Controversy dioxin EPA VA ao_seriesIII Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Alvin L. Young Collection on Agent Orange Description An account of the resource The Alvin L. Young Collection on Agent Orange comprises 120 linear feet and spans the late 1800s to 2005; however, the bulk of the coverage is from the 1960s to the 1980s and there are many undated items. The collection was donated to Special Collections of the National Agricultural Library in 1985 by Dr. Alvin L. Young (1942- ). Dr. Young developed the collection as he conducted extensive research on the military defoliant Agent Orange. The collection is in good condition and includes letters, memoranda, books, reports, press releases, journal and newspaper clippings, field logs and notebooks, newsletters, maps, booklets and pamphlets, photographs, memorabilia, and audiotapes of an interview with Dr. Young. For more about this collection, <a href="/exhibits/speccoll/exhibits/show/alvin-l--young-collection-on-a">view the Agent Orange Exhibit.</a> Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Box The box containing the original item. 050 Folder The folder containing the original item. 1317 Series The series number of the original item. Series III Subseries II Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived Pesticide and Toxic Chemical News Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource April 29 1981 Title A name given to the resource Pesticide and Toxic Chemical News Subject The topic of the resource Agent Orange Controversy VA veteran health and hygiene IWG ao_seriesIII Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Alvin L. Young Collection on Agent Orange Description An account of the resource The Alvin L. Young Collection on Agent Orange comprises 120 linear feet and spans the late 1800s to 2005; however, the bulk of the coverage is from the 1960s to the 1980s and there are many undated items. The collection was donated to Special Collections of the National Agricultural Library in 1985 by Dr. Alvin L. Young (1942- ). Dr. Young developed the collection as he conducted extensive research on the military defoliant Agent Orange. The collection is in good condition and includes letters, memoranda, books, reports, press releases, journal and newspaper clippings, field logs and notebooks, newsletters, maps, booklets and pamphlets, photographs, memorabilia, and audiotapes of an interview with Dr. Young. For more about this collection, <a href="/exhibits/speccoll/exhibits/show/alvin-l--young-collection-on-a">view the Agent Orange Exhibit.</a> Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Box The box containing the original item. 050 Folder The folder containing the original item. 1320 Series The series number of the original item. Series III Subseries II Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived Chemical and Engineering News Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource May 11 1981 Title A name given to the resource VA Contracts for Design of Agent Orange Study Subject The topic of the resource National Veterans Task Force on Agent Orange veteran health and hygiene UCLA Agent Orange Controversy ao_seriesIII Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Alvin L. Young Collection on Agent Orange Description An account of the resource The Alvin L. Young Collection on Agent Orange comprises 120 linear feet and spans the late 1800s to 2005; however, the bulk of the coverage is from the 1960s to the 1980s and there are many undated items. The collection was donated to Special Collections of the National Agricultural Library in 1985 by Dr. Alvin L. Young (1942- ). Dr. Young developed the collection as he conducted extensive research on the military defoliant Agent Orange. The collection is in good condition and includes letters, memoranda, books, reports, press releases, journal and newspaper clippings, field logs and notebooks, newsletters, maps, booklets and pamphlets, photographs, memorabilia, and audiotapes of an interview with Dr. Young. For more about this collection, <a href="/exhibits/speccoll/exhibits/show/alvin-l--young-collection-on-a">view the Agent Orange Exhibit.</a> Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Box The box containing the original item. 052 Folder The folder containing the original item. 1372 Series The series number of the original item. Series III Subseries II Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1984-01-01 Title A name given to the resource Orange Dispatch: The Veterans Coalition Newsletter Subject The topic of the resource Agent Orange Controversy ao_seriesIII Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Alvin L. Young Collection on Agent Orange Description An account of the resource The Alvin L. Young Collection on Agent Orange comprises 120 linear feet and spans the late 1800s to 2005; however, the bulk of the coverage is from the 1960s to the 1980s and there are many undated items. The collection was donated to Special Collections of the National Agricultural Library in 1985 by Dr. Alvin L. Young (1942- ). Dr. Young developed the collection as he conducted extensive research on the military defoliant Agent Orange. The collection is in good condition and includes letters, memoranda, books, reports, press releases, journal and newspaper clippings, field logs and notebooks, newsletters, maps, booklets and pamphlets, photographs, memorabilia, and audiotapes of an interview with Dr. Young. For more about this collection, <a href="/exhibits/speccoll/exhibits/show/alvin-l--young-collection-on-a">view the Agent Orange Exhibit.</a> Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Box The box containing the original item. 052 Folder The folder containing the original item. 1386 Series The series number of the original item. Series III Subseries II Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource May 1 1984 Title A name given to the resource Newsletter: Ranch Hand Vietnam Association, May 1, 1984 Subject The topic of the resource veteran health and hygiene public opinion Air Force Health Study Agent Orange controversy ao_seriesIII Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Alvin L. Young Collection on Agent Orange Description An account of the resource The Alvin L. Young Collection on Agent Orange comprises 120 linear feet and spans the late 1800s to 2005; however, the bulk of the coverage is from the 1960s to the 1980s and there are many undated items. The collection was donated to Special Collections of the National Agricultural Library in 1985 by Dr. Alvin L. Young (1942- ). Dr. Young developed the collection as he conducted extensive research on the military defoliant Agent Orange. The collection is in good condition and includes letters, memoranda, books, reports, press releases, journal and newspaper clippings, field logs and notebooks, newsletters, maps, booklets and pamphlets, photographs, memorabilia, and audiotapes of an interview with Dr. Young. For more about this collection, <a href="/exhibits/speccoll/exhibits/show/alvin-l--young-collection-on-a">view the Agent Orange Exhibit.</a> Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Box The box containing the original item. 055 Folder The folder containing the original item. 1468 Series The series number of the original item. Series III Subseries II Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Description An account of the resource Corporate Author: Vietnam Veterans of America Title A name given to the resource Includes itinerary for Vietnam Veterans of America's Second Delegation to Vietnam, May 28, 1982 through June 3, 1982; listing and short biographies for members of the delegation; three articles related to delegation, "Hanoi Trip: Gains Seen By Ex-G.I.'s" Subject The topic of the resource Southeast Asia veteran psychological health Agent Orange Controversy ao_seriesIII https://www.nal.usda.gov/exhibits/speccoll/files/original/761d73c7ad39934f348b08c7815bf5ea.pdf dda590d55280c0870050037ce27d186d PDF Text Text Item ID Number 01469 Author Corporate Author Report/Article Title Journal/Book Title Year 0000 Month/Day Color '—' Number of Images 32 DOSCriptOD NOtOS Includes "Agent Orange Controversy: Is Agent Orange Responsible for Health problems Reported Among Vietnam Veterans?", OSTP Issue 1981-1988; Agenda for the Domestic policy Council Agent Orange Working Group at DHHS; "Air Force Health Study: Study Overview and Update," Air Force Systems Command; three articles, "Agent Orange: An American Tragedy", Joe Cole, The Stars and Stripes National Tribune, November 14,1988, "Legion Testimony Attacks CDC Study of Agent Orange", The Missouri Veterans News, "The Declassified War", Anthony L. Kimery, Veteran, November/December, 1988; correspondence from Congress to Donald M. Newman, Chairman, Agent Orange Working Group, November 22,1988; memorandum from National Vietnam Veterans Coalition, November 1988, No. 48, "Agent Orange: Pending New Legislation" Tuesday, May 15, 2001 Page 1469 of 1514 �OSTP ISSUE 1981-1988 AGENT ORANGE CONTROVERSY Is Agent Orange Responsible For Health Problems Reported Among Vietnam Veterans? �BACKGROUND From 1965 to 1970, USAF Applied in Tactical Operations in South Vietnam, & 42 Million Liters of Agent Orange. 2.5 Million Military Personnel From the U.S., Australia, New Zealand and South Korea Served One-Year Tours During the Same Period. BACKGROUND (Cont'd) �Beginning in 1978 Many Veterans Of That Era Reported Medical Problems That They Believed Stemmed From Exposure To Agent Orange During Their *» Military Assignment. Complaints Have Ranged From Tingling In the Extremities To Skin Disfigurement And Rare Forms Of Cancer. Some Veterans Have Fathered Children With Birth Defects. �DPC AGENT ORANGE WORKING GROUP (AOWG) o 1981 President Reagan Established the AOWG. <5> - Chaired By Under Secretary Of HHS - Serves As Overall Coordinator, Clearinghouse, And Evaluator Of The Federal Research Efforts o Policy Group - HHS, DOD, VA, OMB, OPD and OSTP o Science Panel - CDC, NIOSH, NIEHS, NCI, Air Force, OSHA, EPA, USDA, DOS, & OTA �STATUS OF AOWG ACTIVITIES o • In The Past 7 Years, AOVVG Provided Oversight To 10 Major Health Studies And 5 Major Health Surveillance Programs. • ' • • ' ' . o • * Federal Agencies Have Expended $200 M On Human, ToxicologicJAnd Environmental Studies. o i" CDC/Air Force Developed State-Of-The-Art Methods For Detecting And Verifying • • . - . - • . : • • i Exposure. o Serum Dioxin Studies Completed On Ground Troops. �Serum Dioxin Analyses Underway For Cohorts In Air Force Health Study (The Men Who Served in AF Defoliation Program In SEA And Their Matched Controls). �FINDINGS To Date, No Major Health Effects (Mortality, Cancer Or Birth Defects In Children) Can Be » Associated With Agent Orange Exposure in Vietnam. �RECOMMENDATIONS Retain DPC Agent Orange Working Group Retain HHS As Chair Within 18 Months, CDC Rare Cancer Study And Air Force Health Study Will Be Completed. Publish Findings, Brief Congress Close-Out AOWG �** » s < DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES office of the Secretary \ *0 Washington, D.C. 20201 AGENDA FOR THE DOMESTIC POLICY COUNCIL AGENT ORANGE WORKING GROUP December 6, 1988 - 2:00-3:00 P.M. Welcome and Introductions Report from DOD Chairman Don Newman Admiral Edward Blasser ,DAS/Defense A presentation by Major-General James Sanders, Air Force Deputy Surgeon-General and the USAF Health Study (Ranch Hand) team. Report from Chairman Science Panel Remarks from the Veterans Administration Dr. Vernon Houk Don Ivers Other business from Members Chairman Don Newman Closing remarks Chairman Don Newman �DECEMBER 1988 BRIEFER: COL WILLIAM H. WOLFE EK-RT-i; -.1 �SERUM DIOXIN STUDIES ASSAY DEVELOPED AT CDC TO DETECT DIOXIN IN SERUM AT PARTS PER TRILLON LEVEL JOINT USAF/CDC EFFORTS: HALF-LIFE STUDIES (7.1 YEARS) ASSAY OF AFHS PARTICIPANTS PRETEST OF 200 DEMONSTRATED ASSAY VALIDITY RANCH HAND MEAN = 48.0 PPT COMPARISON MEAN = 4.8 PPT EXPANDED STUDY OF 2010 PARTICIPANTS TO BE COMPLETED IN 1989 FUNDED BY HQ AFSC WITH REIMBURSEMENT FROM EXCESS VA^ FUNDS (S.11) / j DETAILS OF TRANSFER BEING ARRANGED FUNDS TO COVER COST OF ASSAYS AND ANALYSIS J EK-RT-12-11 881122 �STATUS TO DATE SERUM DIOXIN VALUES IN AFHS PERSONNEL GROUP "NUMBER MEAN RANCH HAND 283 35.0 COMPARISON 246 4.8 RANGE 1.6 - 313 0 - 84 1 6 ~313 RANCH HAND ENLISTED GROUND 184 46 3 ' ' OTHER OCCUPATIONAL STRATA ARE TOO SPARSE FOR ANALYSIS AT THIS TIME J SAM/LS-10-11 881122 �AIR FORCE HEALTH STUDY 250 -r SERUM DIOXIN RESULTS 200-- COMPARISONS 150- - RANCH HANDS NUMBER OF PARTICIPANTS 100:, 50-- •llllil 0-9 10-19 20-49 50-99 SERUM TCDD LEVEL (ppt) 100-199 200 or ^ more �SCHEDULE OF REPORTS REPORT PUBLICATION DATE 1989 MORTALITY UPDATE COMPARISON COHORT EXPANDED (N=19, 101) WINTER 1988/1989 BIRTH DEFECT REANALYSIS BASED ON FULLY VERIFIED DATA SUMMER/FALL 1989 THIRD MORBIDITY REPORT FALL/WINTER 1989 SAM/LS-10-4 881122 �FUTURE PLANS 1989 COMPLETE SERUM DIOXIN ASSAYS 1990 ANALYZE SERUM DIOXIN DATA AND PUBLISH REPORT 1991 PREPARE FOR AWARD OF CONTRACT FOR THIRD FOLLOWUP EXAMINATIONS 1992 CONDUCT PHYSICAL EXAMINATIONS 1993 ANALYZE DATA 1994 PUBLISH REPORT SAM/LS-10-13 881122 �AFHS ADVISORY COMMITTEE ISSUES SCIENCE PANEL OF THE AOWG STRONGLY SUPPORTS KEEPING THE CURRENT ARRANGEMENT WITHIN DHHS USAF PRINCIPAL INVESTIGATORS STRONGLY FAVOR CURRENT STRUCTURE ANY ACTION BY USAF OR DOD TO MANAGE THE COMMITTE OR SELECT ITS MEMBERS WILL GENERATE CHARGES OF INTERFERENCE OR CONFLICT OF INTEREST INTENSE CONGRESSIONAL INTEREST EMPHASIZES NEED TO MAINTAIN SCIENTIFIC INDEPENDENCE SAM/LS-10-10 881122 �AFHS ADVISORY COMMITTEE RECOMMENDATIONS RENEW CHARTER OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE RETAIN RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE COMMITTEE WITHIN DHHS SELECT MEMBERS AFTER REQUESTING NOMINEES FROM VETERANS GROUPS SELECT CHAIRMAN FROM CIVILIANS CURRENTLY SERVING DR LEONARD KURLAND DR RICHARD MONSON SAM/LS-10-14 881122 �ADIPOSE TISSUE TCDD LEVELS IN EXPOSED PERSONS MISSOURI 1986 0 - 100 PPT EXPANDED HORSE ARENA RESIDENTIAL WASTE HAULING TCP PRODUCTION 20 50 150 250 350 450 550 PARTS PER TRILLION (PPT) 650 750 60 100 �SENT BY.'Xerox Telecopier 7020 ;12- 5-58 ; 8-52AM 4044884531^ 2024723519I« 3 VIETNAM VETERANS (646 MEN) 1 MAN •4. < •*. < fc * NON-VIETNAM VETERANS (97 MEN) too • 0 • 0 70 BO • 0 40 • 0 BO 10 0 RANCH HAND GROUND CREW (147 MEN) A. • 1 MAN COMPARISON GROUND CREW (49 MEN) TCDD (PARTS PER TRILLION) �30000 1 27821 27032 DC QC LU Q. 20000 ' CO hQC LU > LU _J Q O O 10000 - BACKGROUND REFERENCE RANGE (< 20 PPT) NO NO (.13) (.16) ND NO (.17) (.59) 137 PERSONS FROM UNEXPOSED AREA (ZONE S) PERSONS FROM EXPOSED AREA (ZONE A) WITH NO CHLORACNE PERSONS FROM EXPOSED AREA (ZONE A) WITH CHLORACNE �to CO CM OJ O CM P P 30O-1 i CO CO GOMPANY 25O- TRUCKERS PRODUCTION 20016OCM If* 100 CO u> I ro I CSl o CM o o. o o 50- c cc c c o o o o o o o o o o 01 DA/S EMPLOYED IN PRODUCTION X o o> X *?• �CO 04 100 90 IX CD O-J 80 z LU CO 10 CO CO O DC 70 60 so 40 RANCH HAND GROUND CREW (147 MEN) 30 ^ - 1 MAN 20 10 O 01 CO ro oo I to COMPARISON GROUND CREW (49 MEN) CM CD O O X O o> >: >- TCDD (PARTS PER TRILLION) �"To C*r» For Him Who Stull *n 6an>« Th» Sctti* And . Fo> Ht* Wtahm And Ml. OrphtnAbrthMn Lincoln .7 THE STARS AND STRIPES-THE NATIONAL TRIBUNE 14 NOVEMBER 1988 Agent Orange: An American Tragedy In May 1983 officials of the Center for Disease Control (CDC) recommend evacuation of the Quail Run Mobile Home Park near Times Beach, Missouri, after EPA. officials find dioxin contamination in excess of four times that of the town of Times Beach (1,100 ppb.). More than 90 percent of the town of Times Beach, located approximately 25 miles southwest of SL Louis, Mo., was found to be contaminated with more than 100 ppb. of dioxin, according to a January 1983 report CDC officials warned the more than 3,000 residents to stay away because of health hazards. Police were stopping the residents from removing personal belongings out of fear of spreading the contaminants to other areas. Flooding of the Meramec River may have further contaminated vast areas of southern Missouri, Russell Bliss, owner of Russell Bliss By Joe Cole Drain Oil Service, has been identified as the source of much of the contaminated waste oils which were sprayed on over 100 sites in southern Missouri, including Times Beach. The town of Times Beach paid Bliss $4,800 for two applications of the contaminated waste oils in 1971 and 1972. The federal government has since paid a reported 34.5 million dollars for the purchase of Times Beach, as pan of the EPA Super-fund hazardous waste site clean-up program. Last April 1988, Mr. Brian Manza, a disabled Vietnam veteran, visited the Times Beach site, only to be turned away by EPA officials, wearing "moon suits" as Brian described them. Theentireareawas fenced and posted as an extremely hazardous waste site. Brian's concerns are obvious to Vietnam veterans who were exposed to toxic chemicals in Vietnam. Millions of gallons of Agent Orange, contaminated with dioxin were sprayed over vast areas of Vietnam. If two spray missions using less than 5,000 gallons of contaminated oil could do this to a town in Missouri, what could millions of gallons of oil-based herbicides contaminated with dioxin at thousands of times the level found in Times Beach do to a country called Vietnam? In 1986, the Centers for Disease Control conducted blood serum studies of Vietnam veterans, as a possible method of identifying those veterans who may have been exposed to toxic chemicals while serving in the Vietnam War. Their findings indicated that Vietnam veterans' levels of dioxin in blood were similar to those samples of persons who had not served in Vietnam. Since the non-ex- posed comparison group was selected from the Times Beach and Southern Missouri area, one can only speculate as to the meaning of the studies results. Southern Missouri is no better nor worse than Vietnam. Last 7 July 1988, the Department of Defense declassified documents which revealed that the Defense Department-had purchased a chemical plant at NVeldon Springs, Missouri, which was to produce 8 million gallons of Agent Orange per year by late 1969, over and above the entire domestically produced product, which was currently being used for defoliation in Vietnam. Declassified USMACV reports indicate herbicide use in Vietnam during 1967 through 1969 was 11.9 million gallons per year. V/eldon Springs, Missouri is located approximately 25 miles west of SL Louis.* �THE MISSOURI VETERANS NEWS PAGES Legion Testimony Attacks CDC Study of Agent Orange WASHINGTON (ALNS) • smaller than the size of New — The government has Jersey during the war. "It is "fallen short of its responsi- absurd that the CDC says bility" to compensate vic- that it cannot find enough tims of Agent Orange expo- people to study," Sommer sure, an American Legion said. He told the members spokesman has told a House that the CDC developed a subcommittee. study that was "destined to The statement submitted fail." by John Sommer, director of Basic research flaws were the Legion's Veterans Af- committed by the CDC, . fairs and Rehabilitation Di- Sommer said. Among the er1 vision, expressed serious rors made were what he concern for the govern- called "cardinal sins of ment's lack of responsibility epidemiology." First, the in recognizing any problems CDC research diluted the efassociated with dioxin expo- fects of Agent Orange exposure. Sommer criticized the sure by including in the Centers for Disease Control study group every person in for its mishandling of re- Vietnam. For example, search data, and for its about Lin every 5 men who interpretation of the data the served in Vietnam actually CpC researchers did gather. served in combat. The CDC Sommer pointed out that "generalized" exposure to the CDC study of Agent Agent Orange across the enOrange exposure was so tire service population in limited by the restrictions Vietnam, so that the 20 per upon just what veterans cent likely to be exposed would be included that an was diluted by the other 80 accurate picture of these per cent of the non-exposed veterans was not developed. men. Veterans eliminated from To further weaken the the group which the agency . CDC's study, the veterans looked at were those who who were not included in the served more than one tour in . study took away the "statisVietnam, those who served tical power" of the potential In a particular unit for fewer dioxin victims. "A knowthan 180 days, those who ledgeable epidemiologist were above the rank of E-S, would try to optimize the those who transferred from chance of observing an one unit to another during effect by including, rather their tour, and any veteran than excluding, the veterans who served any number of who are most likely to have days before or after the pro- suffered from exposures in posed study window (Janu- question," Sommer said. ' ary, 1967-December, 1968). Sommer also alleged that The U. S. sprayed more the CDC would minimize any .. flndlng^wWcnf^niuld^tte^ ffAgefir'Orange'16nvafci;area ^ Vietnam service to health •" ' ' ' ' ' ' problems. Levels of combat were not analyzed, nor were other studies which showed that levels of combat had a great deal to do with health problems of Vietnam veterans looked at. "It seems that every time the CDC came up with a positive finding, it was interpreted to be either negative or wrong," Sommer told the committee. The CDC also failed to avail itself of the compre; hensive computer analysis .of Vietnam service and •where troops were during different periods. He said that the data, developed by the U.S. Army and Joint Services Environmental Support Group, is one of the most carefully developed and extensive records of any environmental exposure to be found anywhere. He chastised the CDC for opting for a simplistic approach, rather than using this vital and readily available tool Despite Congressional mandates calling on the Veterans Administration to pay a certain amount for certain diseases, not one Agent Orange claim has yet to be paid. The VA also denied a presumption for certain problems to be related to dioxin exposure, denying even more veterans the right to collect disability compensation. Sommer's testimony also endorsed a legislative initiative which would exclude payments made to veterans and their survivors under the Agent Orange liability settlement In 1984 from being counted as income when determining eligibility for or entitlement to a veteran's or survivor's pension or a veteran's medical care under means test provisions. He also called for the bill to be extended beyond VA programs, to include any. based government ass tance program. • �Declassified War Documents Disclose A/O Use Counterproductive And Ineffective By Anthony L. Kimery I has been nearly 20 yean since the last orangetripcd, 55-gallon drum of Agent Orange was prayed on the green canopy of Southeast Asia. Since that time, the debate about its use and lethal side effects has appeared steadily throughout what are now yellowing pages of newsprint, scientific journals, congressional hearings, and scholarly attempts to relate ' 'the history of its use. abuse, and deadly, devastating consequences. Yet, after all that, there is still another story to be told. It is the story about the internal policies, politics, and decision-making regarding the use of chemical defoliants in Southeast Asia. The story is based on reams of newly declassified military records that -were recently released by the Army for ' storage at'the National Records and Archives Center near Washington. DC. This reporter spent weeks examining these records, most of which were declassified for the first time since being turned over to the National Archives. The documents show that America's use of defoliants in South Vietnam—a program that would be expanded to include Laos and Cambodia in direct violation of MACV directives governing the use of herbicides—was a holly debated and often strongly contested concept among military and political planners, strategists, and analysts. Agent Orange and its chemical cousin. Agent White, were first introduced to South Vietnam in 1962, albeit in limited quantities. According to the documents turned over by the Army to the National Archives, the defoliants were earmarked for three broad purposes. First, they offered a means to destroy crops and therefore deny foodstuffs to the burgeoning Vietcong movement in the coumryside';"second, they offered a means to dampen infiltration by providing observation corridors to South Vietmunete aerial spotters; and third, they offered support for allied operations—by clearing out landing zones and firebases. Between its introduction in 1962 and the end of the program in the early I970's, the U.S. government dumped 20 to 40 million gallons of the chemical on Southeast Asia, according to the documents. Exact figures are hard to come by, in apparent reflection of the willy-nilly planning of the U.S. program. While actual day-to-day chemical operations were under the titular control of the South Vietnamese government, it's clear the U.S. initialed and monitored the program's effectiveness. Contrary to popular belief, the most healed debates about the use of defoliants were not over the dangers they posed to human health, but over whether the principal reasons for their being used were justified. The Archives' records indicate that the military has long been aware that the saturation of South Vietnam widi herbicides was actually causing more problems than it was solving. The declassified records show that the horrific aftermath of Ranch Hand should have been avoided on the grounds that the program was counterproductive with respect to the objectives it hoped to achieve. Yet it was allowed to continue. The documents also indicate that within just a few years of their introduction to Vietnam, and continuing through the early I970's, there was overwhelming evidence that the use of defoliants was not hindering the VC by depriving them of foodstuffs. A study conducted on the use of herbicides between 1%) and June 1967, for instance, found that there had been nd effects of any significance from the use of the herbicides. The study concluded that their use was instead causing damage with respect to winning the hearts and minds of the Vietnamese. This report, and many others, clearly pointed to the negligible benefits of the further use of defoliants. A major policy review was convened in 1968 which, while conceding that the risks of using the defoliants did not outweigh the benefits, concluded that defoliation efforts should be intensified. As a result of this study, a clause was built into subsequent directives for using herbicides to permit their use in heavily populated areas, "in those cases of extreme military necessity." More important stilt, the military documents show that economic considerations brought about by the government's murd-million-dollar commitment to bringing on-line a government-run Agent Orange production plant was an important factor in escalating defoliation efforts. I n late 1967, prior to the broad-based policy review on the use of defoliants in South Vietnam, the American military command in South Vietnam prepared a memorandum containing harsh language about the "disadvantages" of using herbicides. "The herbicide program carries with it the potential for causing serious adverse impacts on the economic, social, and psychological .fields." the report concluded. Nevertheless, the proponents of Agent Orange within MACV continued to push for expanded use of Agent Orange and other herbicides. Consequently, the debate about their use continued to be rigorously fought in Saigon, despite doubts about the herbicides' actual effectiveness. Probably no better illustration of the conflict within the military over the use of herbicides is a July 1967 MACV memorandum setting forth new criteria for defoliant use. "Crop destruction should continue to be the highest priority for the use of herbicides." (he memorandum states. It adds, "there has never been a question as to the effectiveness of crop destruction." This conclusion, however, is in glaring contrast to what militarily contracted studies and intelligence reports were showing. A RAND Corporation report concluded in October 1967 that the VC required only three percent of the total food consumed in the country, that the crop-destruction operations were not in any major sense denying food to the VC, and that Vietnamese peasants, the target of long-range pacification objectives, bore (he brunt of the crop-destruction efforts, and they held the U.S. and the Government of Sourh Vietnam (GVN) responsible. As of July 31, 1968. the VCand North Vietnamese Army (NVA) had a daily food requirement of about 215 short ions, according to the documents. About 58 percent, or 124 short tons, could be internally procured in South Vietnam. Of that, "only a small portion is produced by the enemy in areas subject to herbicide operations," a MACV report concluded. This report added that "food shortages are reported in captured documents, but they are temporary in nature and are often the result of distribution problems. The enemy usually meets the minimum food requirements of his military forces." Numerous internal MACV reports, memorandums, and intelligence briefs support these conclusions. A 1968 MACV report on the RAND and other studies states, "reported food shortages have been the result of Allied sweep operations, not of herbicide operations.'' This had already been spelled out earlier, in a December 1967 field report to MACV, which states, "this headquarters does not have empirical data on the effects of herbicide operations on VC/NVA food stocks, nor is there evidence that enemy combat operations have been cancelled because of food shortages resulting from crop destruction. Such food shortages as Continued on next page Above: Three Air Force C-I.Ws spray Orange in the A Shau. Right: A USAF airman operates spray equipment during defoliation mission NOVEMBnR/OECF.MRF.R |0«» �are known (o exist among the VC arc the results of a many-faceted program to deny resources to the enemy." The report went on to stale that "the effort and cost of employing crop destruction is insignificant in comparison to (he troop effort required to control and secure an equivalent area of rice." (n a 1968 MACV evaluation of crop-destruction programs which followed the final 1%8 herbicide policy review, Col. John Moran, chief of the Chemical Operations Division, slated (hat "herbicide crop destruction is only one aspect of a comprehensive fooddenial program." Moran went on to stale that deprivation of food is due more to "Allied sweep operations" and only "occasionally to herbicide operations." The 196)1 MACV evaluation also emphasizes, as did the contracted private studies, (hat "very few POWs who have infiltrated ever mention the efforts of U.S. herbicide operations. Some stale (hat they have seen areas where vegetation has been killed but do not mention any infiltration problems caused by (he defoliation. There are indications that U.S. herbicide operations have had a negligible effect on NVA infiltration and combat operations." Yet, while this report says, "herbicide operations . . . appear to cause temporary food shortages in the area defoliated, but have little lasting effect on the VONVA food supply." it nevertheless states, "the CINCPAC Scientific Advisory Group concludes, without qualification, (hat the crop-destruction program is an essential and effective part of the total effort in South Vietnam." If there was ever any doubt about the ineffectiveness of U.S. defoliation operations, however, they were put firmly to rest in a MACV briefing paper dated December 1967. "Within the context of what has been studied, it would appear the crop-destruction effort may well be counterproductive. The VC continue to feed themselves, while the peasant bears the brunt_of the deprivation and doesn't like it." In other words, the U.S. policy of spraying Agent Orange over wide areas of South Vietnam in order to deny the VC and NVA the use of cover and food resources was not only not working and unnecessary, it was actually harming the American war effort. ile it was agreed by military planners in Saigon that the use of herbicides was sucT T cessful in denying the enemy cover, there is abundant evidence that defoliants did not significantly deprive the Vietcong access to food stores. One of the most damning condemnations of the use of herbicides found in the National Archives came in a November 20. 1968. letter from Robert II. Marian, USAID assistant director for economic planning and policy and embassy counselor for economic affaire to U.S. ambassador Ellsworth Bunker. Marian protested the expanding use of defoliants in Quang Due and Phu Bon Provinces. "I feel compelled to nonconcur in both proposals," Harlan wrote. "Although crop destruction operations may have had some successes, we suspect their effectiveness in hampering enemy military operations may have been exaggerated. The Report of the Herbicide Policy Review Committee, itself, on Page 17 pointed out, 'herbicide crop destruction is only one aspect of the efforts to deny foodstuffs to the VONVA. The enemy relies on commercial purchases, imports, taxation, requisition, and confiscation for some 90 percent of his food requirement.' " The negligible contribution!! of herbicide operations were equally evident with respect to the effect that herbicide operations were having on the Vietnamese population. In the early !960's. a herbicide evaluation report noted, "the chief sufferer from crop-destruction operations is the local worker." Such findings con- At right: USAF sprayers in stables in South Vietnam; they called for thousands of gallons. Below: Loading White on an Irotjuois prior to defoliation mission. U.S. dispatched special chemical teams VETERAN tinued (o mount through the balance of the 1960's and up until (he 1968 policy review. The same inconsistencies found in the debate about the effectiveness of denying food to the VONVA were just as replete in the debate over the psychological effects (he defoliants were supposed to bring. One MACV report. Advantages and Disadvantages of the Use of Herhicides in Vietnam, states, "the herbicide program dues not loom large as a public-opinion issue at the present lime." At the same lime, a MACCORDS evaluation report was staling that "the herbicide program is one of the most widely known programs" among the population, and it "is a natural topic of interest with people whose livelihood is in the land." "The principal effect on pacification is the animosity the peasant feels initially towards the U.S. for being responsible for the damage," the MAC-CORDS evaluation says, "and then toward the GVN for its failure to rectify the situation. There is nothing that can be done beforehand lo head off the alienation the peasant develops when his crops are destroyed." The MACCORDS report then summarizes the inadequacy of South Vietnam government efforts to compensate antiVC peasants for the inadvertent loss of their crops. "The present system is completely unsatisfactory from the point of view of rectifying the economic damage and its psychological impact by demonstrating lo the peasant the concern of the government for his welfare," (he report states. "The slowness and unfairness of this system usually result in further alienation of the peasant. He is left to his own devices to find the means with which to replant his crop, if there is enough time left in the growing season, or lo find some other means of supporting his family. Even if his claim were approved, the time lapse between submission and payment and the fact that it represents only a fraction of the actual damage, have the result of leaving the peasant in the hole and bearing the responsibility for an act he was helpless to prevent. As long as the present system remains, the pacification program is going lo suffer unpredictable .setbacks which h is at present unable to alleviate wnh-^ny—' effectiveness . . . The net effect is to alienate him further from his government. The report's conclusion seems to indicate that the spraying of Agent Orange was having more than just a slight impact on VC and NVA resources—it was actually turning pro-government peasants into antigovernment guerrillas. Col. Moran's report corroborates the MAC-CORDS evaluation. "The vast majority of (he enemy's daily food requirement is procured through taxation of the people and purchases from the local markets," Moran wrote. "While the enemy's production capability has been reduced, his procurement efforts have enabled him to sustain his forces. The taxes levied on the people arc in the form of food, money, and services. Through these measure!!, the enemy has been able (o. procure enough food from outside his areas to nearly offset his production losses. "The obvious reaction of the peasant whose labors have been destroyed is one of bitterness and haired. He will frequently direct this hatred toward the U.SXJVN for accomplishing the destruction. If he has previously leaned toward the VC, he is likely to side with them completely after the crop destruction. "Captured documents and interrogation reports indicate that the detrimental effects of herbicide operations far outweigh the beneficial effects." Moran concludes. "Civilians living in VONVA-conlrolled areas, whose crops are destroyed by herbicide operations, have no recourse but lo face famine and possible starvation as a result of Allied destruction of their crops." The declassified documents clearly present a picture which shows that the U.S.'s defoliation program nullified pacification efforts by alienating the Vietnamese from not only the U.S.. but from their own government as well. By the time the defoliation operations were stopped, the damage was irreparable. The documents also show that in other areas, the U.S. defoliation campaign was counterproductive to the U.S. war effort. The records show, for instance, that the destruction of valuable resources, such as harvestable limber and rubber trees, was far greater than was reported or admitted by the U.S. during (he war. �s public concerns over the use of herbicides intensified, the need for a policy was quickly L recognized and embarked upon by (he U.S. It is clear from (he minutes of those meetings (hat the intent was to allay fears by not only continuing defoliation efforts, hut by expanding them. The first meeting on this subject took place on January 17, 1968. under (he chairmanship of David Carpenter, political officer at the U.S. embassy. In a memorandum for the record distributed (he following day by Col. Morin. he stresses thai Carpenter "emphasized that if (here should be a leak of this information to the press, (he embassy would receive m a n y inquiries which would be d i f f i c u l t to respond to." Not only was the embassy keeping the true intent and purpose of the policy review from the press, it was also keeping it secret from the GVN. "Mr. Carpenter cautioned the members of the committee that there should he no release of the purpose and actions of the committee (o the Republic of Vietnam," Moran wrote. ' 'There may be a need to call on officials of the Republic of Vietnam for certain data; however, such contacts should be limited to (he specific subject area involved without divulging any information of the policy review. He further requested that contacts with the Vietnamese government concerning these matters be conducted with his office." Such secrecy contrasted with the U.S.'s repeated assertion (hat herbicide operations were strictly under the control of (he GVN. with (he U.S. providing only support and logistic roles. This was again reiterated at a September 20.l%8. background briefing for the press in Saigon following the policy review. The answers provided to questions raised by the press during the briefing glaringly contradict information about the negligible effects of the defoliation programs. A memorandum to the secretary of stale from Ambassador Bunker, drafted the week before the press briefing, establishes that the press, public, and even l*eft: Dr. James flrwn inspects results tif defoliant sprayin/t. Below: Ranch hands inspert chemical Murage tank onboard U.S. aircraft In secret briefing papers prepared during late 1967, imum use of Orange." at a time when the Department of Defense was purling Another memorandum emphasizes the nerd to use into motion an Agent Orange expansion program, it is ' 'Orange in lieu of White (o avoid further procurement evident that orders for Agent Orange had consistently of White.'' Contracts for Agent Orange were having (o far exceeded both the ability and capability for using be "terminated at msts in excess of 1.5 million dolthis herbicide, which had caused an enormous lars." with "ultimate" contract terminations costing surplus—a surplus that was only going to get worse ihe government $19.1 million—a reflection of the US with a new multi-million dollar, government-run government's inability lo draw-down the Agent Agent Orange production plant soon to come on-line as Orange surplus. a result of the expansion program. ' 'Considerable dollar savings may he expected from One of the conclusions of these briefing papers, acceptable and maximum use of Orange." another which helped to prepare the way for the pending policy memorandum stales. "Forestalling potential future review, was that "MACV could be embarrassed if criticism of herbicide procurements should result if [the) plant expansion is carried out, and the pro- Orange can be employed to a greater extent*... regrammed herbicide cannot be used." quest review of requirements for both Orange and A report prepared by USAF Col. H.F. Greenhow, White herbicides and recommendations concerning Material Division, put the economic reasons for un- possible means to increase substitution of Orange for precedented increase in the use of Agent Orange vivid- While." ly in focus: "In view of the large inventory on hand, Memorandum after memorandum reiterates Ihe sur(he huge investment in production capability, and the plus problem. "White is being consumed at higher future low cost of Orange, it is imperative from an than forecast rates and is in short supply, while Orange economic point of view (hat Orange be used to the is heavily overstocked." one report notes. "Every maximum extent possible and that White be used only effort must be made lo schedule herbicide operations in when there is a compelling operational requirement." such a manner that White will not be used in lieu of Greenhow stressed that "the MACV staff computing Orange." another report says. requirements need to be more accurate in (heir com"Considerations argue strongly for use of Orange, putations and project their requirements into the future which is overstocked." wrote Army deputy assistant and realize die dollar impact caused by changes in chief of staff. MACV. Brigadier General John G. requirements." Wheelock. 111. By the time Greenhow prepared his report, howevFinally, on April 14. 1969, the U.S. embassy suser, MACVs "overstatement of requirements" had pended its policy requiring the use of Agent Orange on caused "excess quantities (of Agent Orange) having certain restricted defoliation targets, such as rubber been purchased." resulting in an 18-month supply on plantations and other valuable natural resources, and hand in (he system, with an additional eight million allowed the "use of Orange herbicide on all defoliation gallons per year to begin being produced in December targets." adding, "for economic reasons, the use of 1969 by the government's facility. Orange is preferred." The pressure was on. Twenty-eight million gallons had been committed for the completion of this plant, located at Weklon Springs. Missouri, as a result of the . hen concerns about the dangers dioxin deputy secretary of defense having, on erroneous information, ordered an Agent Orange expansion proposed to human health began to explode gram on July 31, 1967, an order that came at a time seven months later, in late 1969. there was when MACV was well aware that the use of Agent still little attention paid to Ihe ramifications of the allOrange was far less than it was forecasting, or had the out effort to deplete Agent Orange stockpiles. A memcapability to use. It was also at a time when the MACV orandum from the deputy secretary of defense to the the GVN. were being deliberately deceived about the secret briefing papers were pointing out that chairman of (he Joint Chiefs of Staff sent lo CINCPAC "MACV could be embarrassed if plant expansion is carried concludes that "large-scale substitution for Orange consequences of herbicide operations. will not be permitted." "We would prefer not to draw attention, even by out. and the programmed herbicide cannot be teed." By early 1969. the problem with the surplus of Despite (he fact that the memorandum points out implication, to the serious shortcomings (he |policy| review revealed in (he aspects of (he |hertncide| pro- Agent Orange was embarrassingly out of hand. Com- (even at this early lime) that the National Institutes of grams." Bunker said. munications traffic during this time period was frenetic Health had presented evidence that 2.4.5-T "can cause Among the shortcomings (hat were being concealed with requests and discussions about reducing the sur- malformation of offsprings and stillbirths in mice, was the growing concern over the economics of too plus of Agent Orange. Asa result. Agent Orange began when given in relatively high doses." and that "this much Agent Orange having been procured. By (his to be used for every defoliation purpose. The use of all material is present in defoliant Orange." Ihe largetime, "the entire commercial production of Orange other herbicides was brought to an abrupt halt, while a scale, and apparently counterproductive, spraying of (had been | diverted from domestic use to military re- number of policies governing the use of defoliants the chemical went forward. .quirements in Southeast Asia." were relaxed in order to deplete (he Agent Orange Within a few years, though, (he outrage over using Throughout the late I960'], beginning in 1967. surplus. chemical defoliants had grown so intense, both back Since "Agent Orange stocks were in long supply, home and in (he world community, that Ihe U.S. was military records declassified for the Veteran began to reflect that (here were pressing economic reasons and costly contract terminations were involved," one forced lo cancel its defoliation operations. But. by that favoring (he apparent unjustified reason (o increase the memorandum states in communications used in the time, following a decade of having negligently satuse of defoliants, especially Agent Orange, which had decision to halt the use of other defoliants, the termina- urated Southeast Asia with the chemical, the damage wrongly been ordered in vast quantities because of a tion of the use of other herbicides "should result in had already been done by a program, Ihe objectives of considerable dollar savings from acceptance and max- which all along were not being achieved." domestic shortage. W NOVF.MBF.R/DF.CEMBKR I 17 �Congreste of tfje ®mteb JB.C. 20510 November 22, 1988 Honorable Donald M. Newman Chairman Agent Orange Working Group 200 Independence Avenue, S.W. Washington, D.C. 20201 Dear Don, As Chairmen and Ranking Minority Members of the House and Senate Veterans' Affairs Committees, we are writing to request that the Agent Orange Working Group review and provide comments on five studies recently published in "Environmental Research." (A copy of the journal is enclosed.) The studies examine the health effects of herbicide exposure and service in Vietnam based on questionnaires completed by American Legion members. We would appreciate your comments with respect to the scientific methods used, the validity of the statistical analyses, and the strength of the studies' findings. As always, we appreciate your continuing cooperation and support. We look forward to your response. With warm regards, Cordially, ^-»-A^ruc<i G.V. (Sonny) Montgomery Chairman ' <j y i f 1 ans't'on Chairman Solomon nority Member Frank H. Murkowski Ranking Minority Member Senate Committee on Veterans' Affairs ,„/,„/„ BZ AOW e<? Q3A House/Committee on Vete/ans1 Affairs �NATIONAL VIETNAM VETERANS COALITION 1000 Thomas Jefferson St.. Sixlh Floor Washington. D.C. 20007 (202) 338 NVVC J. IVmu* Hnrrh. Jr. November 1988 . No. 48 AGENT ORANGE Pending New Legislation The omnibus veterans benefits legislation following new provisions on Agent Orange: contains the (T)his agreement (i.e. the bill) would extend, from September 30, 1989 to December 31, 1990, the authority to provide basic VA health-care services for veterans' disabilities if it is found that the veteran, during active duty, may have been exposed in Vietnam to any toxic substance in a herbicide or defoliant. . . . (T)he agreement also includes a provision that states that amounts received as part of the settlement of the agent orange product liability litigation will not be considered as income for purposes of any of the needs-based programs administer by the VA, including nonservice-connected VA pension. (T)he proposed amendments would require the VA to conduct an outreach program to Vietnam veterans oriented to notifying them of health risks, if any, resulting from exposure to herbicides in - 13 - �Vietnam, as information on such health risks becomes known. In order to facilitate such an outreach effort, the bill would require the VA to take reasonable actions to organize and update the information contained in the VA's agent orange registry, particularly the addresses of veterans listed in the registry. (Remarks by Rep. G.V. (Sonny) Montgomery, Congressional Record, Oct. 19, 1988, H10353.) The committee report accompanying the legislation includes the following comments: Section 1203 of the bill treats Agent Orange payments "as reimbursement for prior unreimbursed medical expenses." (Id., H10338, 10555) (Ed. Note: The bill, however, does not make a similar exception for Social Security disability pensions or food stamp eligibility.) . . . . > After February 28, 1989, not less than one-third of the total number of members of the Ranch Hand Advisory Committee shall be individuals selected by the Secretary of Health and Human Services from among scientists who are recommended by veterans' organizations . . . . (Id., H10334, H10339) The House . . . rejected a Senate bill that, for the first time, would award disability benefits to veterans exposed to Agenent Orange during the Vietnam War [i.e., for soft tissue sarcoma, no-Hodgkins lymphoma] (Rep. Sonny) Montgomery said further studies were needed to prove a connection between various diseases and Agent Organge. (Philadelphia Inquierer, Oct. 20, 1988) "Sprayed and Betrayed" - Round II More newly declassified documents emerge from the National Archives: The State Department was involved in policy-making re spraying operations. "On 14 April 1969, the U.S. Embassy suspended its policy requiring the use of WHITE herbicide on certain restricted defoliation targets and will now allow use of ORANGE herbicide in all defoliation targets. For economic reasons, tfie use of ORANGE is preferred . . . . We respectfully request that you assure WHITE stocks are kept available for use should the policy be deinstituted." (Memorandum for Col. Tran Dinh Tho from Col. Harold C. Kerne (?) , Jr., "Use of Defoliants ORANGE and WHITE (V), 17 April 1969). LTC John A. Sullivan, CONVSNACV notes in a memo to CINCPAC "Ambassador Sullivan's approval has been requested for the use of CS in those areas of Laos approved for spray operations. ("Use of Riot Control Agent CS," undated) MIAs. During the week ending 4 Feb. 67, the following defoliation missions were flown in Laos with C-123 aircraft: - 14 - �31 Jan 3 sorties . . . Acft 611 lost to ground fire. 5 KIA (Ed. Note: the five men are now on the MIA list) (Memorandum from Maj. Philip L. Boster, COMUSMACV to NMCC, "Herbicide Report (V)," undated. Access Number (?) 0380818) The Empty Drums. The New Jersey Agent Orange Commission interprets other reports: • "It seems that as far as the US Government was concerned, "empty" Agent Orange drums were the property of the,, ARVN, and they could dispose of then anyway they chose. The problem was the drums weren't really empty, and each contained about 2.2 gallons of Agent Orange that was not pumped o,ut. The ARVN, in their constant quest to turn an extra buck, sold the drums to anyone who wanted them, generally civilians for about $2 each. The creative Vietnamese civilians used them for all sorts of things, spilling the residual Agent Orange all over the place and seriously damaging plants and shade trees throughout the city of Danang. The defoliant was even killing the civilians' vegetable gardens. Since we were using about 1000 gallns per day of herbicide out of Danang at the time, about 20 "empty" drums of Agent Orange were hitting the streets of Danang every day!! to compound this lunacy even more, it seems that the Vietnamese Navy compound purchased some of the drums to store gasoline for their generators. The result is that they ended up fogging their entire compound through the generator exhaust with Agent Orange, effectively killing all vegetation in sight!! "The report recommended that the practice of allowing the ARVN to sell the drums be discontinued, but we're not sure that ever happened. It also should be mentioned that Agent Orange was also stored at Bien Hoa, Phu Cat, Nha Trang, and in Saigon and was presumably disposed in the same manner." (NJAOC, Agent Orange Update, Oct. 1988) Miscellaneous 1. From studying the injuries among the tens of thousands of Kurdish refugees, the doctors believe the Iraquis are using a mixture of herbicide and a form of tear gas known as CS to drive the Kurds from their mountain villages. (Edmonton Journal, (?) Sept. 21, 1988) 2. (Vietnam veteran Ron Heiman) was 38 years died in January of this year . . . . The doctor put of death, on his death certificate, the type of killed him, and added that it was a direct result of poisoning. This is the first time such a statement an official record. old when he as the cause cancer that Agent Orange appeared in Well, the Death Certificate on file at the County Medical examiner's office has been changed! Any reference to Agent - 15 - �Orange has been removed from the official files! letter from George L. Claxton, Oct. 19, 1988) (Attachment to 3. Was the morbidity of women Vietnam-era veterans affected by assignment in Vietnam? . . . (N)o remarkable differences (between a control group of 720 U.S.-based Vietnam-era veterans and a study group of 28 Vietnam veterans) are seen in the percentage of those who had an acute illness, GYN condition or miscarriage. However, three interesting differences are observed. First, a higher percentage of those who were assigned in Vietnam have chronic conditions and disabilities, and they have more of them. Second, a higher percentage have been told they have cancer. Third, although a smaller percentage of Vietnam-assigned women ever had a baby, a higher percentage of those who did have children born with defects and/or die before their first birthday. (Le Donne, Trends in Morbidity and Use of Health Services by Women Veterans of Vietnam, Navy Medicine. May-June 1988, p. 24) 4. What's Evidence?, by Joe Cole (Mahess Productions, Inc. states: "blows the lid off") Send $15.00 to Joe Cole, 6806 36th Ave., S.E., Olympia, Washington 98503 5. As part of a budget austerity program in Massachusetts, the state's funding of its prestigious Agent Orange Commission has been reportedly "substantially reduced." 6. The Washington (Me) Sunrise Memorial; Made of two large, rugged stones, standing like the tattered pages of an open boo, the memorial carries three messages: one for those who are still missing in action or prisoners of war; one for all the men and women who served in Southeast Asia; and one for the veterans who have died, and the veterans and their families who continue to suffer, from medical and psychological problems associated with exposure to the chemical defoliants, such as Agent Orange, used in the war. (Bangor Daily News, Oct. 24, 1 9 8 8 ) ( E d . N o t e : This is claimed to be the first memorial in the country to honor Agent Orange victims . J •-14 - � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Alvin L. Young Collection on Agent Orange Description An account of the resource The Alvin L. Young Collection on Agent Orange comprises 120 linear feet and spans the late 1800s to 2005; however, the bulk of the coverage is from the 1960s to the 1980s and there are many undated items. The collection was donated to Special Collections of the National Agricultural Library in 1985 by Dr. Alvin L. Young (1942- ). Dr. Young developed the collection as he conducted extensive research on the military defoliant Agent Orange. The collection is in good condition and includes letters, memoranda, books, reports, press releases, journal and newspaper clippings, field logs and notebooks, newsletters, maps, booklets and pamphlets, photographs, memorabilia, and audiotapes of an interview with Dr. Young. For more about this collection, <a href="/exhibits/speccoll/exhibits/show/alvin-l--young-collection-on-a">view the Agent Orange Exhibit.</a> Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Box The box containing the original item. 055 Folder The folder containing the original item. 1469 Series The series number of the original item. Series III Subseries II Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Includes "Agent Orange Controversy: Is Agent Orange Responsible for Health problems Reported Among Vietnam Veterans?", OSTP Issue 1981-1988; Agenda for the Domestic policy Council Agent Orange Working Group at DHHS; "Air Force Health Study: Study Overvie Subject The topic of the resource AOWG DHHS Air Force Health Study Agent Orange Controversy ao_seriesIII Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Alvin L. Young Collection on Agent Orange Description An account of the resource The Alvin L. Young Collection on Agent Orange comprises 120 linear feet and spans the late 1800s to 2005; however, the bulk of the coverage is from the 1960s to the 1980s and there are many undated items. The collection was donated to Special Collections of the National Agricultural Library in 1985 by Dr. Alvin L. Young (1942- ). Dr. Young developed the collection as he conducted extensive research on the military defoliant Agent Orange. The collection is in good condition and includes letters, memoranda, books, reports, press releases, journal and newspaper clippings, field logs and notebooks, newsletters, maps, booklets and pamphlets, photographs, memorabilia, and audiotapes of an interview with Dr. Young. For more about this collection, <a href="/exhibits/speccoll/exhibits/show/alvin-l--young-collection-on-a">view the Agent Orange Exhibit.</a> Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Box The box containing the original item. 055 Folder The folder containing the original item. 1473 Series The series number of the original item. Series III Subseries II Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Description An account of the resource Corporate Author: Office of Technology Assessment Title A name given to the resource Typescript: Agent Orange and the Limits of Science or Facts That're Hard to Get Don't Change Many Minds Subject The topic of the resource Agent Orange Controversy veteran health and hygiene Ranch Hand government regulation ao_seriesIII Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Alvin L. Young Collection on Agent Orange Description An account of the resource The Alvin L. Young Collection on Agent Orange comprises 120 linear feet and spans the late 1800s to 2005; however, the bulk of the coverage is from the 1960s to the 1980s and there are many undated items. The collection was donated to Special Collections of the National Agricultural Library in 1985 by Dr. Alvin L. Young (1942- ). Dr. Young developed the collection as he conducted extensive research on the military defoliant Agent Orange. The collection is in good condition and includes letters, memoranda, books, reports, press releases, journal and newspaper clippings, field logs and notebooks, newsletters, maps, booklets and pamphlets, photographs, memorabilia, and audiotapes of an interview with Dr. Young. For more about this collection, <a href="/exhibits/speccoll/exhibits/show/alvin-l--young-collection-on-a">view the Agent Orange Exhibit.</a> Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Box The box containing the original item. 070 Folder The folder containing the original item. 1881 Series The series number of the original item. Series III Subseries IV Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived Philadelphia Inquirer Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource November 20 1980 Title A name given to the resource Clipping: Agent Orange illnesses called 'hoax' Subject The topic of the resource popular press Agent Orange controversy Dow Chemical Company ao_seriesIII Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Alvin L. Young Collection on Agent Orange Description An account of the resource The Alvin L. Young Collection on Agent Orange comprises 120 linear feet and spans the late 1800s to 2005; however, the bulk of the coverage is from the 1960s to the 1980s and there are many undated items. The collection was donated to Special Collections of the National Agricultural Library in 1985 by Dr. Alvin L. Young (1942- ). Dr. Young developed the collection as he conducted extensive research on the military defoliant Agent Orange. The collection is in good condition and includes letters, memoranda, books, reports, press releases, journal and newspaper clippings, field logs and notebooks, newsletters, maps, booklets and pamphlets, photographs, memorabilia, and audiotapes of an interview with Dr. Young. For more about this collection, <a href="/exhibits/speccoll/exhibits/show/alvin-l--young-collection-on-a">view the Agent Orange Exhibit.</a> Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Box The box containing the original item. 070 Folder The folder containing the original item. 1891 Series The series number of the original item. Series III Subseries IV Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Description An account of the resource Corporate Author: Embassy of Australia, Washington D. C. Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource April 30 1981 Title A name given to the resource Inward Cablegram: Parliamentary Question - Defoliants and Pesticides - Effect on Vietnam Veterans Subject The topic of the resource Agent Orange controversy international cooperation VA ao_seriesIII https://www.nal.usda.gov/exhibits/speccoll/files/original/298a75e552a1a32f29548833a112dbb2.pdf cd614f4003e591867b33d3356a885d60 PDF Text Text Item ID Number 01892 Author Corporate Author Report/Article Title Transcript: Interview given by Dr. William McBride on ABC Radio, January 9, 1980. Journal/Book Title Year Month/Day Color Number of limps DBSCNpton Notes 'tem includes a cover memo from K. A. Watson at Dow Chemical (Australia) Limited, and a routing slip From Alvin Young to Peter Kahn. Wednesday, July 18, 2001 Page 1892 of 1908 �R'OUTING AND TRANSMITTAL SUP Data 11 TO: (Name, office symbol, room number, building. Agency/Post) Initials Date i. -flSHfifiwa?2. Mr Peter Kahn 8. 7 EliEabeth Avenue 4. Bast Brunswick. UJ 08816 B. Action Approval As Requested Circulate Comment Coordination File For Clearance For Correction For Your Information Investigate Justify Note and Return Per Conversation Prepare Reply See Me Signature REMARKS Dear Peters Per our conversation of 5 May a* the Veterans Administration, attached please find a copy of the ABC radio interview on Agent Orange originating from Australia, Although they listed you as "peter Cwnen. Dow Chemical identified it aa> "Peter Kahn% a biaihomistefroni I enjoyed meeting yov. and I look forward to worHng with you in the Sincerely, AL YCOT* DO NOT use this form as a RECORD of approvals, concurrences, disposals, clearances, and similar actions FROM: (Name, org. symbol. Agency /Post) Room No.—Bldg. Phone No. 8041-102 *U.S. QPO. 1«7t-a«1-647/332t OPTIONAL FORM 41 (Rev. 7-76) PmeribMt by GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.208 �DOW TELEX: AA20442 TELEPHONE: 929-8-133 CABLE: DOW1NTAL-SYDNEY CHEMICAL (AUSTRALIA) LIMITED 3BD FLOOR. M.L.C. BVILWXG. NORTH SYDNEY P.O. BOX 384 NORTH SYDNEY, N.S.W. 2060 January 23, 1980 B.A. SCHEWTZ - 1803 Bldg MIDLAND J.H.'DAVIDSON - 9001 Bldg MIDLAND cc: M.J. BLANKENSHIP - Altona G . R . WEATE - Sydney SUBJECT: DR. W. McBRIDE Attached is a transcript of an interview given by Dr. William McBride on ABC radio. The text gives some idea of M c B r i d e f s thinking on the subject of Agent Orange and TCDD which could be useful when you meet him next month. Regards, K . A WATSON Attach: bs T» 0 - Kfirtf, • ; ^ llL •' L . - A . . j..^- ..( •' .. s. '/ »-• ,'_ _ ' . ^ l -' �ABC CURRENT AFFAIRS PROGRAM CITY EXTRA - JAN 9, 1980 To discuss the medical aspect of the possible harmful effects of Agent Orange I have on the line Dr. William McBride, founder of Foundation 41. The Australian doctor who told the world of the effects of thalidomide and who now devotes his working life to the health of children in the first 41 weeks of their life. C.E. speaks firstly to American biochemist before speaking to Dr. McBride. Dr. Peter Carne, a biochemist from Rutger's University in New Jersey speaks to Margaret McKay and is asked how long has he been involved in evaluating the herbicides used in the Vietnam war; Carne 'During the Vietnam war,, beginning about 1968, perhaps 1969, I•accumulated all the literature that existed up until that time and then I left that area until about a year ago, and when at the request of veterans groups in New Jersey, where I live and work, I was asked to go out and speak to a number of groups because of their fears that the exposure to the defoliants was affecting them. And they wanted to know what was the state of Dow Chemical with medical evidence on it; and at that time I began to review the literature that had come out since 1970. I've worked my way back now through 1975 or so in the literature, and on the basis of that, I went out to various veteran groups to tell them what the state of the report was'. C.E. 'What was some of the worries, or some of the questions of the American veterans'. Carne 'There were two kinds. One is that a considerable number of them have low grade chronic symptoms; nervousness, fatigue, dizziness and inability to concentrate. Sometimes their ill-tempered for reasons that they don't understand and they were not ill-tempered before they went to Vietnam. A great many complain of these and often there will be no two people having exactly the same set of symptoms but they are a form of a related constellation. The other kind of �- 2 - thing is that some of them have fathered deformed children and we're afraid that there may be a connection between that and the exposure to defoliants in Vietnam 1 . C.E. 'Could you tell us exactly what Agent Orange is?1 Carne 'It's an equal mixture of two compounds which are usually designated 2,4-D and 2,4,5-T and they have very long names and you'll find them in organic chemical literature. The problem doesn't arise from the defoliants themselves but from the contaminant, usually called dioxin present in the manufacture, primarily of the 2,4,5-T. The material used in Vietnam had dioxin contamination of rather high levels'. C.E. 'What sort of results have occured in laboratory tests with dioxin1. Carne 'Its terribly, terribly toxic in minute quantities. In fact one of the problems is being able to analyse the material at the * low levels at which toxic effects are found. Of course in a laboratory study where you start with a bottle of dioxin on the shelf, for example, you can make up any concentration you wish and you know the concentration because you diluted the concentrated stock. In the case of animals collected in the rivers or analysing the human tissue; your analysing there in a very different situation, where the material may be toxic at an extremely low level, in fact it is, but its below the level of detection of most analytical instruments. There are only a few laboratories, perhaps half a dozen in the world, that are capable of analysing at the extremely low levels that are necessary. Its very hard to track it down1. C.E. Carne 'It is a very costly venture as well?.1 'Typically vetween $500 and $1,000 a shot for an analysis' C.E. 'If we were going to examine the veterans in the United States and in Australia that would come into a great deal of money?' �- 3 - Game C.E. Carne 'You certainly would not do that type of examination1. 'You couldn't?.' 'No, that would be out of the question'. C.E. 'Could dioxin be detected in veterans who, for example, were in Vietnam ten or eleven years ago?' Carne 'Probably not. I think that the nature of work there would be quite different. I think the analytical question there is so hard that it can't even be attempted. I think what ought to be done with the veterans is a statistical survey. I would call on every veteran who has served in Vietnam, even a significant number who did not serve but were in the military at that time. I would call them in for medical examination and a questionnaire on the medical consequences in their families. And you really have a very large number of men brought in because of the nature of the evidence you would have to seek is statistical advice for nature. And you would have to have at least two groups - those who are known to be exposed to the defoliant by having been in sprayed areas, and those who are known not to have been exposed. And only by comparing two groups of that kind, and large ones at that, could you assemble sufficient statistical evidence to make a case one way or the other'. C.E. 'From your contact with the American veterans, is there enough statistical evidence to link any of the deformities or ill-health with Agent Orange or with any of the herbicides used in Vietnam?' Carne 'Firm statistical evidence, no. There is a great deal of suggestive and circumstantial evidence collected. But you have to understand the nature of scientific proof, its suggestive at the moment and its not conclusive. It certainly makes me very suspicious'. C.E. 'Well statistical evidence, you mean for example in the case of smoking and cancer, is that purely statistical evidence. And that's beyond doubt?' �- 4 - Carne 'Yes that's beyond doubt, and right now the statistical evidence, in the case of Agent Orange, is simply not enough to make a critical evaluation*. C.E. 'Could that be because not enough have come forward, not enough veterans have come forward? So we have yet to see the full extent of the damage of Agent Orange?' Carne C.E. 'Yes, I think that's the case1. 'The other herbicides used in Vietnam. How many were there'. Carne 'There were thre principal ones that were used. There was Agent Orange which was by far the most heavily used. There were two others; Agent Blue and Agent White. The names arise from the coloured bands which were painted on the drums in which the material was shipped; and one of the others, its active ingredient was an organic arsenical compound. Containing arsenic. Its not the arsenic poison, in fact, its not even very toxic. It was used primarily against grasses, heavily against rice1. C.E. 'Could that have accidentally been sprayed on friendly troops?' Carne 'Yes, it certainly could have. I don't think it would have the damaging consequences of dioxin that's found in 2,4,5-T. For one thing it contains no dioxin1. C.E. 'So there wouldn't be any genetic problems with it'. Carne 'No there wouldn't be any problems of that kind'. C.E. 'To establish any direct link between Agent Orange and genetic defects, as you say would be purely statistical, is that not enough, is that not sufficient1. �- 5 - Game 'Certainly with regard to health benefits for veterans, yes that would be sufficient; and as far as establishing that it can cause genetic abnormalities the biochemical work is not very difficult'. C.E. 'Laboratory tests with dioxin, what sort of deformaties occurred in rats for example 1 . Carne 'Cleft palate, kidney abnormalities, deformities of the limbs. All these are the same kind of things that are being found in children1. C.E. 'Is that still circumstantial evidence, or could that said to be statistical evidence?1 Carne 'That is straight biochemical evidence. The stuff is administered and the consequences are found. There is no question of abnormality there. Those are carefully controlled studies. The difficulty is that the material is administered to female rats who are in pregnancy. We are working with primates now and there are definite chronic effects of low levels of dioxin on both male and female animals and there are definite effects on reproductive capacity of the females. The problem is that the administration of the drug in the laboratory tests done so far has been to females. Whereas it is the men who are exposed in Vietnam and the question then is what do they transmit in their germ cells. That's more difficult to pin down, and those studies havn't been done'. C.E. 'Exposure seems to be a matter of concern in that 2,4,5-T and 2,4-D was used in the United States as a herbicide. Can it be proven that the exposure of the veterans wasn't to various herbicides used in the United States as opposed to, in its form in Agent Orange in Vietnam?' is Carne 'Yes, thisif statistical work is properly done that can be N controlled out because that, in fact, would effect both groups. Those who were exposed in Vietnam and those who weren't. I think that factor could be controlled out relatively easily. I'm very �- 6 suspicious that there is a connection. I'd be surprised if there weren't, based on what I've seen so far'. C.E. 'And how will you pursue that when you get back to the States' Came 'The state government of New Jersey is putting together an investigative commission to look into the effects of defoliant chemicals on Vietnam veterans and the related chemicals on anybody else, because of a great many similar chemicals that are used in the petrochemical industry nearby. The State commission is not yet formed, when it is formed I would offer any help that it will ask. I believe that it is the first such commission of any kind in the United States'. C.E. 'Is there anything that you would like to add?1 Game 'I oppose the use of these chemicals in warfare. But that's a completely separate issue. I think the worst problem for the veterans is the uncertainty. They don't know and often the man goes to the Veteran's Administration for medical help with the few symptoms that are hard to pin down to any specific organic cause right now, and they send him to a psychiatrist because they can't find an immediate organic cause. Why pan him out and tell him that he has some sort of a character defect or that he is a malingerer and that may not be the truth. Its demoralising to a man to be sent out with that kind of uncertainty thinking there is something wrong with his head and there may very well not be'. C.E. now speaks to Dr. W. McBride 'Dr. McBride, is there any point made by Dr. Carne with which you perhaps disagree or which you want to pursue immediately?1 McBride 'No. I thought Dr. Carne spoke very well and I think we could elaborate on some of the problems. I agree the only way you can tackle this is a statistical study. I have a friend \vho is working with dioxins in the United States. It is very toxic and it does produce deformities in animals. �- 7 - Now say 50,000 Australian's served in Vietnam (C.E. states 70,000). O.K. forget about Vietnam now. 50,000 young Australian's got married this year, 50,000 couples, and they all decided to try and have a family. 5,000 or 10% would have great difficulty in getting pregnant, 45,000 would get pregnant, say within 18 months. Now, from our knowledge of birth defects, 1,200 babies born of that 45,000 or 3% would have some or quite severe physical abnormalities. So this is the problem, you've got to find that if the incidence of deformities is higher amongst veterans from Vietnam than say 3%, then perhaps you might get a pattern. Now we know from our statistical studies, over the years, that the commonest congenital abnormality is congenital heart ^disease and they run down, we've got the twelve most common listed from there; that's almost 1%. So one in every 100 babies would have congenital heart disease. So if there is any specific higher incidence than our tables, say of cleft palate which was mentioned, then we could see there was a higher incidence of cleft palate among offspring of Vietnam veterans. So this is the situation. You would have to do a statistical study. Now to my knowledge, it has not been shown that dioxin affects genes. Now any drug that you take or anyone takes, for instance an aspirin; its got what we call half life, within two hours half the amount you've taken has been excreted by the body. Now some of the chemicals with the longest half life are the heavy metals such as lead or gold, things like that which last three months. Now for dioxin to still be acting after many years in a veteran would have to have a very long half life, or the only other way it could produce an effect would be to effect the genetic constitution of the germ cells in the testes. This has not been shown to occur. So you have to have a statistical study to see if the incidence of deformities is higher in the offspring of Vietnam veterans. Not one of us could say that we are going to have a normal healthy child, no matter who you are or what you've done in the past. So there is an incidence of deformities for reasons for which we do not know, some are genetic and some are environmental contaminants. Now as to the effects on the veteran himself I'm not going to comment on those because we know dioxin �- 8 - does cause skin conditions and it could produce other things, I'm not confident to comment there. I think that the birth defects are very vague at present. I know there is going to be a study, set up by the Australian government. But it would be a fairly slow process and on first principles it would surprise me if Agent Orange does produce birth defects1.. C.E. 'It would surprise you if it does produce birth defects or would it surprise you if the scientific evidence can be marshalled to show that it is so'. McBride 'No, it would surprise me that it does. I could see the difference if it were the pregnant women in Vietnam who were sprayed with it, that's different, because they are.pregnant and its an environmental chemical. But to effect the x germ cells of the testes to produce genetic changes is unlikely. I'm not saying its not possible, but I'm saying on the evidence we have of studies we've carried out, I think its unlikely'. C.E. 'Dr. McBride I thought one of the points Carne made was that in the tests on rats the dioxin was seen to have genetic effects which could continue for generations. Did I misunderstand that?' McBride 'You misunderstood that, yes. I've certainly seen no report that dioxin has been proven to produce genetic changes. Now radiation, certainly, but I haven't seen any evidence of dioxin causing changes'. C.E. 'Now the other point arising, surely is, that if we had access to the Vietnamese records we may well find some interesting occurrences there because in the late sixties, if I remember properly, there were bitter complaints of birth defects in the Vietnamese population, whether or not they were properly documented, they were certainly mentioned. And there was some concern, presumably in war time and with the shifting population and with all the disruption they had, maybe those records would no longer be accessible1. �- 9 - McBride 'As I said, that's different^ that's exposure to pregnant women and that's an environmental contaminant. Now I could believe very likely that this Agent Orange was fairly impure, its not like commercial 2,4-D or 2,4,5-T, it was pretty impure, so it had a fairly high content of dioxin. Now exposure to a pregnant woman is quite different, that's an 'environmental contaminant and I wouldn|t be at all surprised if it did cause birth defects amongst the population of the war area. But its a different matter to say that it effects the genes of the germ cells of the male testes'. C.E. 'But do we know it was the environmental affect on the women in that situation rather than those fathers of these Vietnamese children?' McBride 'Well you don't. You've got me there. You don't know but its more likely to be that if a woman is pregnant and she inhales the stuff that's been sprayed around, or takes it in the food or drinking water it would go straight across to the foetus'. C.E. 'But the authorities here don't even recognise that yet do they?1 McBride 'I don't know \vhat they acknowledge. I have read these claims, and counter-claims have been made that this is not true, but I can imagine that if dioxin was sprayed around the pregnant women in the war zone that they would more likely to have babies with congenital deformities. But I think that its a different matter to the babies of women who are now married to veterans of the war. We had quite a number of calls to the Foundation yesterday, people who are worried that should they have a baby or should they have another child. We can only say at this stage, yes, they should because today there is no evidence of an increase in incidence of birth defects over the 3%'. C.E. 'Presumably what you are saying about the environmental impact of dioxin would, you'd think, be sufficient reading to make sure that the 2,4-D and 2,4,5-T were not used again in that situation, I mean the effects on the Vietnamese population alone'. �- 10 - McBride 'Look I think any war is terrible and I don't like the idea of using defoliants in the war. I think it is a terrible thing to do to a country. Still it was done and I'm not going to go into that. This question has to be considered and I think the government are going to enquiry into this but it will be a slow business. You would have to contact the veterans who are married, who have had children, and see how many incidences of birth defects they have had in their family. C.E. 'Won't the method used in such a study be similar to the method used in the study of thalidomide and its effects?' McBride 'Just the same. Only on a bigger scale. You said there were 70,000 so there would be 70,000 questionnaires. But of course this could be done, its not difficult, its just sending out 70,000 letters and I'd imagine the Veteran's Affairs department would know the addresses of these people'. C.E. 'Then having sent out these questionnaires and getting the answers you believe then it would be'possible to establish a result one way or the other?' McBride 'Definitely yes'. C.E. 'Because I seem to recall someone saying, was it a Melbourne biochemist yesterday saying that it may never be possible to establish scientifically that there is this cause and effect relationship between the dioxin and the birth defects, but you would believe, in fact, it would be possible1. McBride 'I know dioxin does produce birth defects in animals, that is well established, it's very toxic; so we know that. Now if you did a survey and found the incidence of birth defects was 5% or that the incidence of congenital heart disease was 2% instead of a II of the rest of the population you know there is a higher incidence of birth defects among the offspring of veterans of the Vietnam-war. So you could say that, fairly simply, it would take some time to get the replies in but it is not insurmountable'. �- 11 C.E. 'Had you thought of any possible connection before this last burst of publicity?' McBride 'Yes. In 1971 I was at a meeting in Paris when this was very topical, it was debated very fiercely by the American's themselves. There were two factions of American scientists, some thought that the war was still going on and some thought that Agent Orange was causing deformities. Others said that there was no p r o o f . So that this was hotly debated, the meeting almost came to blows. I had never seen anyone in a scientific meeting get so violent. So it has been thought for a long time that this was a possibility but not in the offspring of veterans certainly. Now we take histories of the parents of the children w e ' r e s t u d y i n g ' . C.E. 'But that wouldn't be one of the questions would it?' McBride 'I was just going to say, we certainly don't ask about war service. But you could always find out something you have missed out and we can easily check up on the effects of children by writing to the parents and asking did the husband have war service and if so where'. C . E . 'One other thing that occurs to me, lets say that the study were done, lets say that it was discovered that there was some higher incidence of defects in the babies of Vietnam veterans, that still wouldn't be enough would it,to say the cause was dioxin. Someone might say, well they ate a very special sort of food which had certain preservatives in it, or whatever. I mean could there be other factors?' McBride C.E. 'Well there could be other factors, certainly'. 'Wouldn't that confuse the issue again? 1 McBride 'Perhaps slightly but you would know. You then have to work out the chances that there are other complicating factors or dioxin 1 . �- 12 - C.E. 'So at the moment it could grow into another thalidomide or it could be laid to rest'. McBride 'I don't think so. I think that there is a big monitoring centre in Atlanta in the U.S. and they are monitoring birth defects all the time. I think it would have shown up because there are certainly more veterans.in the U.S.A. than here and I think people have been aware of this since 1971 and I think that it would have shown up in the monitoring'. C.E. 'Except that Carne says that the veteran population of the United States hasn't been fully covered statistically.' McBride 'Yes, but the centres that do the monitoring in the United States are very thorough and they monitor a certain area. The Atlanta one in Georgia I think there would be a lot of veterans in that area, I think there should have been a pickup'. C.E. 'Any other point at this stage, could we take it any further Dr. McBride, or not at the moment; in your opinion?1 McBride 'No, not at the moment. I think it should be investigated but I don't think there is any undue cause for alarm for Vietnam veterans and their wives, whether they should have their children. I would say on the evidence to-date there is no reason why they shouldn't have children'. C.E. 'Say a link was proven, what then would we be saying to people about having families in the future'. McBride 'Well that's a bit like crossing your bridges before you come to them, isn't it? You have to prove that there is a genetic defect and on the evidence and first principle I think it is unlikely' � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Alvin L. Young Collection on Agent Orange Description An account of the resource The Alvin L. Young Collection on Agent Orange comprises 120 linear feet and spans the late 1800s to 2005; however, the bulk of the coverage is from the 1960s to the 1980s and there are many undated items. The collection was donated to Special Collections of the National Agricultural Library in 1985 by Dr. Alvin L. Young (1942- ). Dr. Young developed the collection as he conducted extensive research on the military defoliant Agent Orange. The collection is in good condition and includes letters, memoranda, books, reports, press releases, journal and newspaper clippings, field logs and notebooks, newsletters, maps, booklets and pamphlets, photographs, memorabilia, and audiotapes of an interview with Dr. Young. For more about this collection, <a href="/exhibits/speccoll/exhibits/show/alvin-l--young-collection-on-a">view the Agent Orange Exhibit.</a> Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Box The box containing the original item. 070 Folder The folder containing the original item. 1892 Series The series number of the original item. Series III Subseries IV Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Transcript: Interview given by Dr. William McBride on ABC Radio, January 9, 1980. Subject The topic of the resource popular press dioxin congenital birth defects Agent Orange controversy ao_seriesIII Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Alvin L. Young Collection on Agent Orange Description An account of the resource The Alvin L. Young Collection on Agent Orange comprises 120 linear feet and spans the late 1800s to 2005; however, the bulk of the coverage is from the 1960s to the 1980s and there are many undated items. The collection was donated to Special Collections of the National Agricultural Library in 1985 by Dr. Alvin L. Young (1942- ). Dr. Young developed the collection as he conducted extensive research on the military defoliant Agent Orange. The collection is in good condition and includes letters, memoranda, books, reports, press releases, journal and newspaper clippings, field logs and notebooks, newsletters, maps, booklets and pamphlets, photographs, memorabilia, and audiotapes of an interview with Dr. Young. For more about this collection, <a href="/exhibits/speccoll/exhibits/show/alvin-l--young-collection-on-a">view the Agent Orange Exhibit.</a> Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Box The box containing the original item. 070 Folder The folder containing the original item. 1893 Series The series number of the original item. Series III Subseries IV Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1981 Title A name given to the resource Clippings and Press Releases Regarding the Agent Orange Controversy in Australia Subject The topic of the resource congenital birth defects Agent Orange controversy international cooperation Australian veterans compensation ao_seriesIII Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Alvin L. Young Collection on Agent Orange Description An account of the resource The Alvin L. Young Collection on Agent Orange comprises 120 linear feet and spans the late 1800s to 2005; however, the bulk of the coverage is from the 1960s to the 1980s and there are many undated items. The collection was donated to Special Collections of the National Agricultural Library in 1985 by Dr. Alvin L. Young (1942- ). Dr. Young developed the collection as he conducted extensive research on the military defoliant Agent Orange. The collection is in good condition and includes letters, memoranda, books, reports, press releases, journal and newspaper clippings, field logs and notebooks, newsletters, maps, booklets and pamphlets, photographs, memorabilia, and audiotapes of an interview with Dr. Young. For more about this collection, <a href="/exhibits/speccoll/exhibits/show/alvin-l--young-collection-on-a">view the Agent Orange Exhibit.</a> Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Box The box containing the original item. 072 Folder The folder containing the original item. 1916 Series The series number of the original item. Series III Subseries IV Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Materials Related to Dr. Alvin Young's Trip to Australia, 21 May - 3 June 1982. Subject The topic of the resource international cooperation popular press congenital birth defects Agent Orange controversy ao_seriesIII