1 15 127 Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Alvin L. Young Collection on Agent Orange Description An account of the resource <p style="margin-top: -1em; line-height: 1.2em;">The Alvin L. Young Collection on Agent Orange comprises 120 linear feet and spans the late 1800s to 2005; however, the bulk of the coverage is from the 1960s to the 1980s and there are many undated items. The collection was donated to Special Collections of the National Agricultural Library in 1985 by Dr. Alvin L. Young (1942- ). Dr. Young developed the collection as he conducted extensive research on the military defoliant Agent Orange. The collection is in good condition and includes letters, memoranda, books, reports, press releases, journal and newspaper clippings, field logs and notebooks, newsletters, maps, booklets and pamphlets, photographs, memorabilia, and audiotapes of an interview with Dr. Young.</p> <p>For more about this collection, <a href="/exhibits/speccoll/exhibits/show/alvin-l--young-collection-on-a">view the Agent Orange Exhibit.</a></p> Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Box The box containing the original item. 028 Folder The folder containing the original item. 0443 Series The series number of the original item. Series III Subseries I Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Adler, Jerry Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived Newsweek Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource June 16 1980 Title A name given to the resource Search for an Orange Thread Subject The topic of the resource human exposure Ranch Hand dioxin ao_seriesIII https://www.nal.usda.gov/exhibits/speccoll/files/original/15c6074fa9e4ee0834c2963be90102b2.pdf 1d958b238c6aae3d4acaf1c5465acefc PDF Text Text Item ID Number 00212 Author Bills, Ray W. Corporate Author Report/Article Title Memorandum: Report of Investigation into Possible Herbicide Damage at Vietnamese Naval Compound at Da Nang, from Cpt. Ray W. Bills to III MAP Chemical Officer (Cpt. Lott), 26 September 1969 Journal/Book Title Yeer 0000 Month/Day Color 'n Number of Images 6 DOSCrlptOU Notes Includes these attachments : Memorandum on Reported Herbicide Damage (very poor print quality); one page handwritten notes; map of Da Nang Combat Base; and one typed page on prohibiting movement of drums into Danang City. Monday, January 22, 2001 Page 224 of 341 �Chemical Operations Division MACJ3-09 26 September 1969 FOR: SUBJTCT? III MAP O2MICAL OFFICER (CPT LOTT) Report of Investigation into Possible Herbicide Damage at Vietnamese Kaval Compound at Da Nang 1. On 2U Sep 69 the III MAP Chemiuo.l Officer, CPT Lott, and CPT Bills frcsc Hi MACV vieited the Vietnamese Kaval Compound at Da Nang to investigate possible herbicide dacage. Personnel contacted were: a. LCMDR Jesses - US Advisor. b. Mr. Xuan - Chief'of Staff (YH)« G. LT Shirk - US Advisor. £-. All the Australian pine (casaarioa) located oa the compound appeared to be dead. Most of the faroadleaf trees were either ccapletely void.of foliage or in various otagea or loosing their Leaves. Wherever it was possible to observe new growth, the growth showed the effects of herbicide. The broadleaf vine growing on the elopes around the hilltop housing compound also shoved herbicide/ deiaage. The herbicide d&uoge was limited to the Kavy cosapound. Vegetation gr-wlng on low hills near the compound did not show herbicide deme.ge. ?. While surveying the compound <*. total of e.! ,',-bt ORAKGE hei-bicide barrels -.»er<= found. Four of these were locat.-Kl in the POL vard; tyo of thea had a strong -.dor of herbicide. The remaining four barrels were located near a signal van and were filled with t.jssolice. The gasoline was used to operate a power generator. It vas explained to ZXSC3R Janes and Mr. Xuon that the gasoline in the barre;.3 v."?./ ;;oat:tv!n sjuell quc.ntltieo of herbicide, aad whan bui aed in the generator engines the exhaust produced will contain vaporized herbicide capable oi" e^'feotir.y vegetat5.on in the Liatediate area. It was also pointed out that vcporn frcn residual herbicide left in empty barrels are a potentin), source of herbicide damage to nearby vegetation. �MACJ3-09 SUBJECT: 26 September 1969 Report of Investigation into Possible Herbicide Damage at Vietnamese Waval Compound at Da Wang k. LCMDR James and Mr. Xuan stated that the signal v&n and generator had been on the compound for approximately four months. The severe damage to the broadleaf trees surrounding the hilltop housing compound has occurred since the generator has been in operation. 5. It was recommended that all herbicide barrels be made uausuable and removed from the compound and a control system be established to prevent herbicide barrels from entering the compound in the future. RAY W. BILLS CPT, USA Gsal Cpns Officer Copy Furnished LTC Simonson, 11ACJ3-053 �I I I "."run* '.nnhiMous rorce i l i t v r y Assistance i ' x f a n d , Vi < • " > '-m Frnnci.sco %602 •i * ; : - r ? <" ••• st.ai one A-dri :;.))-, V v ; > l Advisory Croup, '- v i K o r y "i f>v- K3, F; v- ' .v'an Prancisco %602 T J' ':v "TV '•>:*•-* "• ! eo^rt,-,' - e r b i c i d c P.-srnape .«f: (n) Mr, n-.) >c!' - irst C,-c sr.a I Zone ^dvi'or, dtd 16 ^*-^ -cv r..j,jr ::t ( i.i ' : r, r . •'•••• "ilit^py ••f 1. .•.c-> bO ssi stft 'f'icrr <* of t"-is <<. .. «>£ :.-r-.«- ir-*'i; . Howr-v^r, th« darw^r definitely did nor rosuit <>•-•»• cri a i <;-,.-? jc.. 1 >r ! !»r*.ici-'ii» o;>cr ; 'ti ?-ns since ncmp hav«» ^c«*»n conductc:) in thf V i c i n i t v of t.!-e *>va !•{ . In rr-x.v>ris<» *^ A rtHjiipst ? y t)>is It^-ndqi^rt ?rs a plant I'nthn ! •<:T-i ' ' 'V.-r. • . . ' : .".';-.'•< - J c - i J >yt»rt«ti>ms P-ivisi^n visit^ your tv'^sp on ^!4 5"p n-.." > M1 i; t j ; . i l j r c . T i"-eirfir. r, ^ t i i c h is filled fr-^n .S3- pa HDD used !:f»rhicif ! ." 'n-. •.;.-. .s t: ""t.- ; . > » .v. . s itMrneJ fr<»' o f f i c e r - n t t!-p ba s«* r!wit tf • » ,':"•! •••r-'-' t .«»•• ; .-.sfrt 1.1. •' .- ••or') ur*- 1 ely four m o n t h s <•£•:' '"-^ th-:t r h f > rr-^'r'r" 1 •- • :•«•? l^;^-->: .. ;- v-Tl "-;- ;-'-.>'ir t.hrec r,.:'r;t'iJ- -irro. * !s»? ^cxrw.i^c' i^ e t ; t i i « - ! > I x - . i l i z ' -•:t t:,.:- l...s'-<. Tf- ; :>sf* }>ct-'-rs are simi f ica'it. 3. !: i»!'rTcnc-.: '' } f - ' f . i c s thai '-"^r-.tre t, - t"-.i i j ; - " ^ c-^n l<c Cs'MjSr-- ' y ; •-^"-' ,,- '•• a r * j; ; ; f • v-.' 1- t i li z ; r. i.in r»f ''.-rl'-ic.Jd^ in tho /TMfn't-or. Tr * j. r: -c • - • c-1"0 t t > H l ;f«rV-icioc N r r . - > l s Vr» rw rivp.-' fr*T f h p ^ - v ; , ! ' • i t : - ; ! It ' T ••„••.'.?• i-.v./jry r o a s « T P . v bf r.- hen :\; :T»»cl;r.1<* f ' s c i r 'iri-.T-T.: R.L �/W • �DA NANG COMBAT BASE PREPARED FIGURE 6 3-69 �- 2- Materials coded RED and BLUE are specific for defoliation of broad leaf plants. The material coded white is uced for crop destruction and only a small quantity is used. Drums coded white arc not considered hazardous to most plants in the city. 1. The defoliant arrives in Dananr; and is turned over to the 511 Ordinance Depotf A?..VM. This Unit is responsible for moving the material to Danang Air Ease. The contents of the drums are transferred to underground tanks at the Air Base. The physical transfer is done by the 202 Hanalin-; and Loading Platoon, I Corps Hq. , Danang. ' We believe that the damage caused by residual material in the used drums can be minimized if the drums are burned out before they are brought into town. We recommend action be initiated which will result in a prohibition against movement of these drums into Danang city and surrounding rural areas unless they have been properly cleaned. We have personally recommended to the Chemical Warfare Officer, KA.CY/ICTZ that a flushing system be installed on the aircraft which are used to apply defoliants in the ICTZ. This will minimize damage to vegetable producing areas around and in Danang City. '*-> � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Alvin L. Young Collection on Agent Orange Description An account of the resource <p style="margin-top: -1em; line-height: 1.2em;">The Alvin L. Young Collection on Agent Orange comprises 120 linear feet and spans the late 1800s to 2005; however, the bulk of the coverage is from the 1960s to the 1980s and there are many undated items. The collection was donated to Special Collections of the National Agricultural Library in 1985 by Dr. Alvin L. Young (1942- ). Dr. Young developed the collection as he conducted extensive research on the military defoliant Agent Orange. The collection is in good condition and includes letters, memoranda, books, reports, press releases, journal and newspaper clippings, field logs and notebooks, newsletters, maps, booklets and pamphlets, photographs, memorabilia, and audiotapes of an interview with Dr. Young.</p> <p>For more about this collection, <a href="/exhibits/speccoll/exhibits/show/alvin-l--young-collection-on-a">view the Agent Orange Exhibit.</a></p> Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Box The box containing the original item. 018 Folder The folder containing the original item. 0212 Series The series number of the original item. Series II Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Bills, Ray W. Title A name given to the resource Memorandum: Report of Investigation into Possible Herbicide Damage at Vietnamese Naval Compound at Da Nang, from Cpt. Ray W. Bills to III MAF Chemical Officer (Cpt. Lott), 26 September 1969 Subject The topic of the resource herbicide damage assessment herbicide storage Ranch Hand herbicide disposal https://www.nal.usda.gov/exhibits/speccoll/files/original/fc67fd9aca9b9a30ad09fe6c23dabb0b.pdf 13bcf5171a814a53f28087f3d63e67e4 PDF Text Text Item ID Number °0307 Author Carrier, Joseph M. Corporate Author National Academy of Sciences - National Research Cou Tne Effects of Herbicides in Sounth Vietnam, Part B: Working Papers, February 1974: The Location of Herbicide Missions and Mickey's Informants in South Vietnam: An Appraisal Journal/Book Title Year 1974 Month/Day February Color ' ' Number of Images is Descripton Notes Monday, January 22, 2001 Page 307 of 341 �1 ( 1) USE ONE SET FOR EACH TITLE OR DOCUMENT. ( 2 ) USE BALL-POINT PEN OR TYPEWRITER FOR CLEAR COPIES. .:-*• (3) NAL CALL NO. - - U S Govermentrvintinq Office: 1974—558-507 " KEEP PART 4. OF THIS FORM FOR YOUR FILE. AD-245 (8-71 ) S X^) /ft U.S. DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE NATIONAL AGRICULTURAL LS3RARY ^-1 LENDING DIVISION BELTSViLLE. MD. 2O7O5 ,0929^"^ I FORf>UBLIC TION * Erne Glenn IMF ,._._ i-, LOAN HOLD SEND i-. R E A D I N G 1_ IDESK QMAIL i_ 1 ROOM REPORT TO REQUESTER N03T SENT BECAUSE: U3DA, ARS APR 11 1975 Dc-.-t. ;.-- ?.~-'?2 Science [T\NOT OWNED [__] IN USE "6 # % ! SPECIAL 04/22/75 ITBRARY V) ,JZ]Rc 1 PC . YOUR NAME. AGENCY & BUSiNESS ADDRESS (INCLUDE ZIP C - NAL USE ONLY } | | NON.CIRCULATING { INSUFFICIENT DESCRIPTION PLEASE V E R I F Y Colleg Siation, Texas TELEPHONE: DESCRIPTION Or PUBLICATION: 77843 76X33 A&M DATE OF REQUEST: 4/11/75 (AUTHOR. TITLE. P E R I O D I C A L TITLE. VOLUME. Y E A R . PACE. E T C . ) Carrier, J. M. [The location of herbicide missions and Rickey's informancts in South Vietnam: an appraisal.] (The effects of herbicides in South Vietnam. Part B. Working papers. Washington, B.C.; National Academy of Sciences ( 9 4 , 15 pp) 17) . •7/-tCJ? (p • [ 7 4 Castellammare Drive, Pacific Palisades, CA 90272] 147 REFERENCE SOURCE OF THE REQUESTED PUBLICATION. IF AVAILABLE: TJRE/LJBRARY KfVS TAKEN THE FOLEjS-WiW-e-S'CTION ON YOUR REQUEST: r^]|:'ESERVE P L A C c D . WILL SEND WHEN IT BECOMES A V A I L A B L E f VI TRY TO OBTAIN FROM ANOTHER LIBRARY r | PURCHASE ORDER PLACED RESULTS OF ABOVE ACTION MAY BE EXPECTED WITHIN REMARKS: /; �THE EFFECTS OF HERBICIDES IN SOUTH VIETNAM PART B: WORKING PAPERS FEBRUARY The Location of Hcirbicido Missions and jjickey's Informants in South Vietnam: An Appraiaal , , / -, f v'' ft JOSEPH M. CARRIER 11974 NATIONAIj ACADIMY OF SCIENCES - NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL WASHINGTON, D.C. ;-?0'll8 �The Location of Herbicide Missions and Rickey's Informants in South Vietnam: An Appraisal a JOSEPH M. CARRIER This report presents the available data on herbicide missions carried out in the vicinity of the villages of Flighlanders used by b Hickey as informants for a paper on the perceived effects of herbicides in the highlands of South Vietnarr (SVN) . Some comments on mission objectives and support contained in herbicide proposals submitted by RVN province chiefs and in memoranda submitted by various U.S. officials are also presented. LOCATION OF INFORMANTS' VILLAGES All but one of Hickey's informants were originally from villages located in Kontum and Pleiku Provinces. One informant, a South Vietnamese Highlander who had returned south from North Vietnam in 1969, was stationed in an NLF food production area astride the border between Phu-Yen and PhuBon Provinces. Figures 1 and 2 show the approximate locations of informants' villages; Figure 3 indicates the location of the NLF food production area. It is important to note that the location of informants' villages presented in Figures 1 and 2 are shown as being in an approximate "area" a Dr. Carrier was a Staff Officer with the Committee on the Effects of Herbicides in Vietnam. His present address is 17447 Castellammare Drive, Pacific Palisades, California 90272. b See Hickey, G.C. Perceived effects of herbicides used in the highlands of South Vietnam, Part B of the Report on the Effects of Herbicides in South Vietnam. �Boundary: i. District — — —itVillage 10 Scale: 1:250,000 Kilometers FIG. 1. Informant settlement areas and herbicide missions in Kontum Province. Key to special targets August 1968 August 1968 August 1968 August 1967 November 1968 May 1969 800 100 100 1100 200 770 gallons gallons gallons gallons gallons gallons White White White Blue White White NLF cache site Military base perimeter Military base perimeter Crop destruction Military base perimeter Military base perimeter �0 Kilometers Scale: 1:250,000 Boundary: Village FIG. 2. Settlement Areas of Informants and Herbicide Missions in Pleiku Province. Key to Special Targets Agent Orange (5 missions) 1-5. November 6-30, 1965 - 5800 gallons - Defoliation near Highway Agent White 550 gallons Enemy cache site 6. September 27, 1968 100 gallons Crop destruction 7. October 24, 1968 100 gallons Military base perimeter 8. October 28, 1968 Military base perimeter 9. October 29, 1968 100 gallons 100 gallons Military base perimeter 10. November 1, 1968 Military base perimeter 220 gallons 11. June 10, 1969 a Only one target coordinate given for each mission. �, --• .Wion^iu-.c • i;"-/*O ^. ' :: li) .- ••JLH ' /^.:^.C-' '• .- ^ '• . .•>:-.! '..-1 ( :vir.V'/"N;l ".i Kt v ^ r; -^•';-, ( '. -• r h > t - ' ' ' P^ u. - ?Yon rr ;—r- . .». — i j ^/ .r->.' - / (•_. (2) .w,-- ~-/- S . /!"/.,<.. «1 $<m ' ' ^ V ./ / ' MIA Tjng. ' : ', . • .V7 ? ^ ,-j«ui^jf\ • /.^ . '/ ^^~K— " S ' NW OiC NA».-; ' '^, ««V ••/ •. \^.- . - ' ' - - - -.v •B-owi.o-.. /". V ° v - - " V - . >-. \S •'>• • . - - - . .( , "A Vl y .'VI" • " ' . 'r / • CUMCA -<. 1 " / ',' ' ' / I 1- I ': .<rr. '. ^ > 5 . ' ' - , .fl">-MVMVM.-.\.- 10 I Scale: 1:250,000 miomcters FIG. 3. The MLF Food Production Area Phu Yen/Phu Bon Border Region. �rather than at a specific site. This was necessary for several reasons. First, during the period of intensive herbicide spraying from 1967 to 1970, many of the informants had to move from their native villages because of the intense fighting that enveloped them or occurred nearbyseveral more than once. (In Kontum, one-half of the province's population was reported to have been resettled as refugees by the end of 1970; in Pleiku, close to one-third.) Second, there is the problem of phonetically transcribing the names of villages elicited verbally from informants. Maps showing the names of villages have employed several different phonetic transcription systems. One cannot be absolutely sure, therefore, that a given map name and elicited name—• even if quite similar—represent the same village site. Third, and last, the elicited names, transcription problems aside, may not pinpoint the exact site of the informants' villages. The principal reason for this is the historical fact that both the French and ethnic Vietnamese used different naming systems in establishing administrative control over the people of the highlands. Province and district names assigned to specific geographic areas present no problem. Subunits, however, created by the French and Vietnamese as a controlling device between the district administrative unit and the traditionally named highland settlement, do add to the difficulty of locating a given named site. The French divided the "districts" they created into several "cantons." Each canton enclosed a number of villages and was named after one of the important villages enclosed. The ethnic Vietnamese then superimposed their system , which subdivided �the cantons. The Vietnamese conceptualize a "village" as covering a relatively large geographic area containing three or more settlements. Cantons were thus divided into Vietnamese-defined villages, each of which enclosed several Highlander settlements. The Vietnamese-created "village" was named after one of the settlements enclosed. The outcome of all these administrative subdivisions is that a name elicited from an informant may be the traditional name of the settlement and/or the subunit name imposed either by the French or ethnic Vietnamese. The following are shown in Figures 1 and 2 both as names of settlements and village areas: Dak-Rosa, Plei-Kleng, Plei-Krong, and Plei-Ngol-Drong. LOCATION AND TIMING OF HERBICIDE MISSIONS The location and timing of herbicide missions in the vicinity of Hickey's informants are presented in Figures 1-3 and Tables I-IV. Both the List of 202 Tasks Realized from January 1962 to September 1965 and the DOD computer printout of herbicide missions from the fall of 1965 to the end of the program (File Tape No, C274) were searched for missions carried out in the vicinity of the informants. were also searched for relevant information. The MACV mission files They contain the herbicide proposals made by RVN province chiefs, responses and comments made by U.S. officials (USARV, CORDS, USAID, Embassy, etc.), maps showing flight patterns, after-flight spray reports, and other miscellaneous items. The available data show that the spray missions in the vicinity of the informants' village areas took place from 1965 to 1970. . The major �Table I. Herbicide missions near Ben-Het/Dak-Mot-Kram A. Agent Jar Feb 1967 0 2400 0 1968 6500 0 0 1969 Orange Year 2100 9000 1970 47650 7900 area (Kontum Province) Defoliation "issions (Nuirbcr of gallons) Mar Apr Kay Jun Jul Au-j fc-p Cct 1060 4150 0 0 0 9000 3000 3000 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 White 0 0 7900 16310 0 0 7000 0 15500 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 T o t a l 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3000 3000 0 58550 4400 13200 22600 12200 34800 8800 0 0 0 0 69950 19300 15000 7860 4150 0 0 0 0 0 50200 74700 Agent 0 Crop Destruction Missior.2 Gallons Month Year Blua 2300 August 1967 Orange 1460 July 1967 C. 85100 0 0 B. 0 11800 50200 0 1968 1969 11700 Dec Total 0 1969 • Blue t:ov Miscellaneous Missions Agent Gallons Month Year Mission Khite 600 August 1968 NIJF Cache Site White 200 Auguot 1960 Military Perircter 0 17700 241160 �Table II. Herbicide missions near Plei-Jar/Plei Kleng area (Kontura Province). A. Defoliation Missions (Number of gallor.s) Orange Year Jan Fcb Mar Apr I960 Agent 0 0 0 0 1969 3000 12000 0 0 Jul Aug Srp Get Nov Dec Total 0 0 3000 0 0 0 14600 6000 23600 0 0 0 0 0 0 5000 30900 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 7000 0 1500 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 15500 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3000 0 0 7000 22500 14000 6000 5000 1970 39GCO 314CO 28CCO 1968 Hay Jun 0 7900 0 0 3000 59800 10000 White 1969 11000 Dlue 0 1970 0 T o t a l 3000 3000 0 0 0 0 56600 43400 37800 5000 ?.500 B. Gal Ions 0 3000 Miscellaneous Missions (Agent White) Uor.th Year 200 Noveir.ber I960 Military Perimeter 770 May 1969 Military Perir.eter 8 190800 �Table III. Herbicide missions near Diic-Co/P.lni-Ngo.l-Drong area (Pleiku Province) A. Defoliation Missions: V i c i n i t y Highway 19 (NunJbcr of gallons) Arr May Jim Jul <"A!C Sop Cct N'ov Dec 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5600 0 5800 0 0 0 I860 0 0 0 0 6850 0 8710 0 4750 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 10000 0 14750 1969 5000 3000 Agent Fcb Mar 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 8000 Year Jan 1965 0 0 1967 0 0 1966 Total Orange 0 1967 0 0 0 0 19530 0 2000 0 0 10500 19G8 0 0 0 6000 14700 cooo 3000 0 0 5COO 0 10500 30400 13300 7750 13300 53080 White T o t a l 5000 7750 0 6000 34230 93f,C 0 0 0 0 B. .Miscellaneous Missions (Agent V/hitie) Gallons Month Year Mission 550 Sept 1968 HLF Cache Site 100 Oct 19C8 Crop Destruction 200 Oct 1968 Military I'cri.r.cter 100 Hov 1968 Military Perimetex 220 Jun 1969 Military l-orii!"<?tcr Table IV. Herbicide missions near Phu-Yen/Phu-Bon border area. Crop Destruction Missions Since 1969 Agent Golior.r, .".or.th Blue 3000 July 1969 Orange 2600 July 1969 Orange 1900 July 1970 317CO 122C-10 �spraying effort, however, began in 1967 and ended in 1970. This confirms the consensus of Hickey's informants that "...there had been many spraying operations in [their areas] since 1957." As shown by Tables I and II, the majority of missions in the relevant areas of Kontum were for defoliation, used Agent Orange, and were carried out during the dry season (November to March) . The majority of th'e relevant missions in Pleiku were also for defoliation, as shown by Table III, but Agent White made up 69 percent of the gallons sprayed, Agent Orange comprising the other 31 percent. Missions using Agent White were carried out in both wet and dry months; Agent Orange was used essentially only in dry months. The crop sequence in both provinces, according to Hickey, is as follows. February. The fields are prepared during January and Depending on the beginning of the rainy season, the planting of crops occurs from mid-April to early May. The harvesting of most crops takes place from mid-July to the end of October—depending on when planted and time required for ripening—but some fruits and vegetables are harvested into November and December. With respect to the possible spray damage of crops, it is of interest to note that MACV established the following ral:es for herbicide agents used in crop destruction missions in Kontum and Pleiku: 3 gal/acre; rice, Agents Blue or Orange, broadleaf crops, Agents Blue or Orange, 1-1/2 gal/acre; The established rate for defoliation missions was 3 gal/acre. 10 �WERE TIE INFORMANTS SPRAYED? A comparison of spray runs with areas inhabited by the informants suggests that they were living in relatively close proximity to areas targeted for defoliation and/or crop destruction. The most distant any group of settlements appear to have been from target coordinates is about 15 km. However, because at the time of spraying the location of the informants and their settlements and swiddens cannot be precisely determined, and because there is no way of proving that the spray runs were made exactly along the paths outlined by the coordinates given, there is no way of determining whether Hickey's informants were or were not exactly in the paths of actual spray missions or whether they were or were not close enough to have been affected by spray drift. As noted above, the major objective of the relevant spray missions in Kontum and Pleiku was defoliation. Judging from the herbicide proposals made by the province chiefs and the memorandums of U.S. officials, an effort was made to prevent the sprayed chemicals from affecting the crops of "friendly" Highlanders. Contained in every province proposal was a signed pledge by the province chief "....to pay compensation for damages to the crops of the people affected by the spraying of defoliants." This was meant to apply, however, only to the crops of people living in RVNcontrolled areas. In several RVN herbicide proposals this was explicitly stated. Judging from the herbicide proposals and memoranda in the mission files, it was a known fact that Highlander settlements and swiddens were located in or near the targeted areas. 11 The decision to go ahead with a �given defoliation mission in spite of the Highlanders present was based on a belief generally held by RVN and U.S. officials that the importance of the mission outweighed the consequences to the human inhabitants. The decision was also rationalized in part by the fact that the target areas were believed to be sparsely populated. And, as one U.S. official put it, not only are the target areas sparsely populated but the Highlanders "... living in or adjacent to the targets are under enemy control and have been for a number of years." The implication of being controlled by the NLF/NVA, as one RVN province official noted, is that the Highlanders were being encouraged "...to increase production of rice and foods for them." As there was an existing herbicide program which targeted the destruction of crops in NLF/NVA territory, the fact that the inhabitants in a defoliation target might lose their crops was perhaps considered a bonus for such missions. Finally, it is relevant to note that neither RVN nor U.S. officials believed the sprayed chemicals to be harmful in any way to human beings or their domestic animals. This was explicitly stated in all province herbicide proposals and in a MACV directive "525-1" dated February 15, 1966. FACTORS OTHER THAN HERBICIDES Assuming that the settlements and swiddens were directly in the paths of herbicide runs or were hit by spray drift as described by the informants, their perceptions of what happened as a result of exposure to chemicals must be evaluated by a number of possible factors, the effects of which cannot be known v/ith any certainty at this point in time. 12 Hickey �notes for example, that: i "A difficult area of inquiry concerned possible deaths due to the herbicides. Sickness and death are common occurrences in highland villages, and infant mortality is particularly high." Wiersma (1970) suggests another factor: "A complicating factor in Vietnam is the possibility that the Vietnamese peasants are less resistant to toxins in their environment than people who are living on proteinrich diets." PROPAGANDA Still another factor is propaganda. The Highlanders have been subjected to conflicting stories about the effects of chemicals both by the RVN and the NLF since 1962 when herbicides were first tested in the field in SVN. In response to an RVN/U.S. test of Agent Blue on 750 acres of crops in the Highlander province of Phuoc-Long on November 21 and 23, 1962, the NLF on the 29lh of November reported the destruction of 1,000 hectares of crops because of the spraying and claimed "...more than 100 people suffered from sore eyes, that many persons were afflicted with beriberi, and that a child had died." Later, on December 1, the DRVN broadcast that: "[the RVN/U.S.] spread noxious chemicals to destroy crops, kill cattle, and poison the people with the aim into concentration camps." of forcing them A North Vietnamese professor, Tran-Huu-Tuoc, in an article published in Nhan-Dan in December 19G2, set forth the basic belief held about the effects of herbicides on human beings and domestic animals: "Persons affected by the chemical are asphyxiated, vomit, faint, or fall sick for 20 hours, and some even four days. 13 �Affected children are seriously ill, suffer hemorrhages, or die. Poultry, pigs, dogs, and other animals that drink chemical-poisoned water die, too." Another DRVN/NLF assertion dealing with the use of chemicals was that "poison was put into the people's water jars for the purpose of killing them." The RVN countered with their own propaganda about herbicides. Every province herbicide proposal contained a "Psywar/Civic Action Annex" which outlined a plan of action. The basic objective of the plan was to explain and demonstrate the harmlessness of the chemical agents on human beings and animals. A countercharge was also supposed to be made to the NLF/NVA "poison" charge. In a Kontum herbicide proposal it was stated as follows: "The population will be urged to be vigilant against the enemy schemes: he may secretly put poison into the wells or in the food, then charge the' government with using poisonous defoliants when some local residents are killed by the poison." OVERVIEW Judging from the available evidence, there can be no dispute about the fact that Hickey's informants came from areas in Pleiku and Kontum Provinces that were severely affected by the military compaigns which took place between the beginning of 1965 and the end of 1970. As reported by the RVN government, 51,474 refugees in Kontum and 58,477 refugees in Pleiku had been resettled as of the end of 1970. As shown by the mission files, large areas of the relevant parts of both provinces were sprayed with herbicides: little over 123 000 gal close to 438,000 gal in Pleiku. in Kontum and a However, because of the uncertainties �involved in locating the settlements of the informants at the time cf spraying and in locating the spray run tracks, the question of whether or how much the informants were directly or indirectly exposed to the sprayed herbicides cannot be definitively answered. REFERENCES Wiersma, G.B. 1970. Ecological impact of antiplant agents and implications for future use. U.S. Army, Combat Development Command, Institute of Land Combat. Vietnam statistical yearbook, Vol. 16. 1970. Number of war refugees, 1967 to 1970, Table 324, p0 391. National Institute of Statistics, Republic of Vietnam. 410 ppn Delmore, F«Jo and C.E. Minarik. 1962„ Destruction of Viet Cong crops, RVN: attack of target 2-1, 21 and 23 November 1962. US/MACV, 3110, Ser. 00333, 26 Dec. 1962. Hanoi. 1962. VNA broadcast in English to Europe and Asia 0639 GMT 10 Dec. 1962, concerning an article in Nhan-Dan by Prof. Tran-Huu-Tuoc. �j'&j , ,% .f f*d cotton seedlings from. 2.25 kg/ha. Wheat and cucumber seedlings were unharmed. BE ANALYSIS AND RESIDUES 328 McKoNE, C. E.; COTTERILL, E. G. Extraction of picloram residues from a sandy loam soil. Bulletin of Environmental Contamination and Toxicology (1 974) 11 (3) 233-237 [En, 8 ref.] ARC Weed Res. Org., Yarnton, Oxford 0X5 IFF, UK. The recovery was examined of low levels of picloram (0.01 to 0.1 ppm.) at pll levels > 7 from soil fortified in the laboratory and from the same soil containing residues from a dose of 1.5 Ib/acre applied 67 weeks before sampling. A series of KOII conc,,s. were prepared in IG% KG! as extractant. Aliquots were shaken with 25 g of. the soil to give filtrate pH's in the range 7.2 to 11.6. The filtrate was acidified to adjust the pH to < 2,, partitioned into chloroform containing 5% ethanol (see WA 21, 477) and methylated • with diazomethane. The methyl ester was determined using a 1.5 m X 4 mm (internal diam.) glass column packed with 1.5% XE 60 on Chromosorb W and fitted with a 63Ni electron capture detector. Operating conditions were [temps. in °C\: column 180, injection port 215, detector 300, carrier gas 80 ml/min oxygen-free Nj. The quantities of picloram extracted were below the limit of detection (0.001 ppm.) where the KOH solution was <pH 8. Above pH 8 the extractable picloram increased almost linearly to 0.038 ppm. at the highest pH. With the fortified soil recovery was obtained at all pH levels which ranged from 60% at pH 7.2 to 96% at pH 11.6. In another experiment using Ca(OH)2 as extractant, selected as it conveniently buffered soils of varying pH to pH 12.4, recovery from soil fortified with picloram in the range 0.01 to 1 ppm. slightly exceeded 100%; Ca(OH)3 (at pH 12.4) also accounted for a considerable increase in extractable picloram in field weathered residues compared with KOH at pH 9.35. JLM 329 ZAWADZKA, H.; ADAMCZEWSKA, M.; ELBANOWSKA, H. [Determination of simazine, atrazine and prometryne in natural water and sewage by thin-layer chromatography.] • Health Aspects of Pesticides 73 - 3003. The best conditions for the detection of small amounts of simazine, atrazine and prometryne were determined in a series of experiments. Abbott's method for the determination of triazine herbicides [see WA 14, 1273] did not lend itself to the detection of these substances in natural waters and municipal sewage because of interfering impurities. The method was modified by introducing an intermediate step of extract purification consisting of column chromatography with basic Al2Oa as the stationary phase and elution with ethyl ether. The thin layer chromatographic results were improved by the addition of fluorescein to the silica gel used for coating of plates, u.v. irradiation of plates and reading under a quartz lamp with a 254 nm filter. Detection of 2.5 ppb. of atrazine and simazine and of 0.5 ppb. prometryne was possible. 330 BRUNS, V. F.; CARLILE, B. L.; KELLEY, A. D. Responses and residues in sugarbccts, soybeans, and corn irrigated with 2,4-D or silvex-treated water. Technical Bulletin, Agricultural Research Service, United States Department of Agriculture (1973) No. 1476, 32 pp. [En, 28 ref.] Irrig. Agric. Res. Ext. Cent., Prosser, Washington 99350, USA. See also WA 22, 2690. Analytical methods for determining 2,4-D and silvex (fenoprop) residues in water, soil and plant material were studied, tested, and modified in preliminary laboratory experiments. The basic method used involved the conversion of the alkanolamine salts of 2,4-D and the propylene glycol butyl ether (PGBE) ester of fenoprop to the methyl ester by esterification with boron trifluoride in methanol, and the derivatives were measured on a gas chromatograph equipped with an electron capture detector. Residues detected were as low as 0.000 01-0.00004 ppm. in water, 0.0005-0.002 ppm. in soil and 0.005 ppm. in plant material. In field trials, herbicides at 0.22-5.51 ppmw. in 2 acre-inches of water (0.1-2.5 Ib/acre) were applied by furrow irrigation on a fine sandy loam soil and concns. of 0.02-2.21 ppmw. were also applied by sprinkler irrigation. In general, no edible purls of crops treated with 0.22-1.1 ppmw. by furrow irrigation or with 0.02-0.22 ppmw. by sprinkler irrigation contained detectable amounts of free 2,4-D or fenoprop residues at harvest time. At the highest concns. Weed Abstracts 1975 Vol. 24 No. 2 residues were detected but were many times less than the official tolerance limits; irrigation with fcnoprop-treated water before adequate degradation has occurred should probably be avoided. From summary. « PK TOXICOLOGY See also abst. 298. 331 WIESE, A. F. Are herbicides environmental contaminants? In Proceedings 27th Annual Meeting Southern Weed Science Society. (1974) 1-7 [En, 28 ref.] Texas Agric. Exp. Stn., Bushland, USA. The author refutes assertions that herbicides cause longterm contamination of the environment by outlining behaviour patterns of herbicides in the air, plants, soil and water, and submits that the economic and other benefits accruing from their use outweighs any possible undesirable short-term effects. JLM 332 BLASZYK, P. [Chemical weed control in and near drainage ditches from the point of view of agriculture.] Schiftenreihe des Vercins fur Wasser-, Boden- und Lufthygiene (1972) ,37, 187092 ,[De] Pflanzensch.utzamt Oldenburg, Landwirtschaftskammer Weser Ems, German Federal Republic. From Pesticides Abstracts 74 - 0609. See also WA 22, 2077. The complex effect of chemical weed control in and near drainage ditches in the Weser-Ems region is assessed. The use,of herbicides over 10 years did not result in any damage to domestic animals even though such animals were given water exclusively from drainage ditches with chemical weed control. The use of herbicides in unfavourable conditions or not in the proper manner caused a few fish deaths and adverse effects on birds. 333 HICKEY, G. C. Perceived effects of herbicides used in the highlands of South Vietnam. The effect of herbicides in South Vietnam. Part B: Working papers. Washington, D.C., USA; National Academy of Sciences. (1974) 23 pp. [En] SE Asia Program, Cornell Univ., Ithaca, New York 14850, USA. Local informants on herbicide effects were interviewed. were not anticipated; informants suggested that there were some harmful effects on humans, animals and fish. The study has been preliminary, however, and considerably more investigation should be conducted. PK 334 CARRIER, J. M. The location of herbicide missions and Hickey's informants in South Vietnam: an appraisal. The effects of herbicides in South Vietnam. Part B: Working papers. Washington, D.C., USA; National Academy of Sciences. (1974) 15 pp. [En, 4 ref.] 17447 Castellammare Drive, Pacific Palisades, California 90272, USA. Appraisal of the data on herbicide effects collected in the area surveyed by G.C. Hickcy in the above paper stresses the difficulties involved in locating the settlements of the informants at the time of spraying and the uncertainties of ascertaining the degree of direct or indirect exposure to the chemicals. JLM 335 BOLIER, G.; MAAS, H. L. VAN DER; BOOTSMA, R. The toxicity of the herbicide dichlobenil to goldfish (Carassius auratud. [Paper in] 25s1" Internationaal Symposium over Fytofarmacie en Fytiatrie. Part I. Mcdcdelingen Fnkulteit Litndbouwwetcnschappen Gent (1973) 38 (3) 733740 [En, 9 ref.] Inst. Vet. Pharmacology & Toxicology, Univ. Utrecht, Netherlands. Goldfish of average length 10 cm were maintained in aquaria containing 6.4, 1.6, 0.4 and 0 mg dichlobcnil/litre for 3 months. During this period none died but those in the 6.4 mg/litre aquarium lost weight and exhibited abnormal behaviour. Autopsies were carried out at the end of the trial. Serum glutamine-pyruvate transaminase and alkaline phosphatase levels were unaffected by exposure to the herbicide, except for a significant increase in the level of the latter en/ymc at the 1.6 mg dichlobenil/litre concn. Glucosc6-phosphatase activity of liver homogcnates was significantly decreased at the 0.4 mg/litre eoncn. and significantly though unexpectedly increased at the 0.4 mg/litre concn. Considerable accumulation of residue in the body tissues was found; concns. here were 15-20 times higher than in the water. At the (>.4 ing/litre and 1.6 mg/litre concns., several fish developed ascites which was taken by the authors as the first indication of dichlobenil toxicity and led them to recommend a concn. of 1 mg dichlobenil/litrc as being sale � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Alvin L. Young Collection on Agent Orange Description An account of the resource <p style="margin-top: -1em; line-height: 1.2em;">The Alvin L. Young Collection on Agent Orange comprises 120 linear feet and spans the late 1800s to 2005; however, the bulk of the coverage is from the 1960s to the 1980s and there are many undated items. The collection was donated to Special Collections of the National Agricultural Library in 1985 by Dr. Alvin L. Young (1942- ). Dr. Young developed the collection as he conducted extensive research on the military defoliant Agent Orange. The collection is in good condition and includes letters, memoranda, books, reports, press releases, journal and newspaper clippings, field logs and notebooks, newsletters, maps, booklets and pamphlets, photographs, memorabilia, and audiotapes of an interview with Dr. Young.</p> <p>For more about this collection, <a href="/exhibits/speccoll/exhibits/show/alvin-l--young-collection-on-a">view the Agent Orange Exhibit.</a></p> Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Box The box containing the original item. 020 Folder The folder containing the original item. 0307 Series The series number of the original item. Series II Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Carrier, Joseph M. Description An account of the resource <strong>Corporate Author: </strong>National Academy of Sciences - National Research Council, Washington, D.C. Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1974-02-01 Title A name given to the resource The Effects of Herbicides in South Vietnam, Part B: Working Papers, February 1974: The Location of Herbicide Missions and Hickey's Informants in South Vietnam: An Appraisal Subject The topic of the resource civilian impact Ranch Hand herbicide application https://www.nal.usda.gov/exhibits/speccoll/files/original/d595d68acb0549b32c3243ca60639ec4.pdf 20b9b45d9ff14d8ad8a1cf26ff287ef9 PDF Text Text 00183 Chapman, R.W. DCA-CGTC-C312, Washington, D.C. Herbicide Orange Proximity Program (HOPP) Journal/Book Title Yffif 1976 Month/Day July 28 18 DBSCriptOIl NOttS "This 'm B 9U!'de to using the HOPP, a computer program designed to answer the question, 'During what time intervals was unit X in proximity to spray missions of herbicide orange?"1 Friday, January 05, 2001 Page 183 of 194 �Herbicide Orange Proximity Program (HOPP) This is a guide to using the HOPP, a computer program designed to answer the question, "During what time intervals was unit X in proximity to spray missions of herbicide Orange ?" RW Chapman DCA-CCTC-C312 Washington, DC 20301 202-697-1731/2439 �?I*L2: I!C?? EXEC Pi ? I L r D " F * O r » DSK HO?? Tll"rj mm*" oc DS-: HOP? co:n:rr FJL::D:;F 09 COM CtS V?.£SI03 J, 3 2S L E E C L SO BISSI23 80 HECFM P FIL"DE? 10 D3K HOP? PATHS LBKCI, 89 01"317r SOOO REC?!t F?, PILZDDF 12 DSK HOP? 3F.POET II-ECL '10 BIKSIZZ 800 P.SCFK F3 ICAD HCPP ST't'T CICSIQ ? 811-17 FH OFF 1 o PEIMTC HO?? eon":-!** •• 0 PEIIIT HOP? 7IL35 0. PHHITC HO?? E3?OHT o ?ni:iT":» on Herbicide Orange'Proximity Program (HOPP) needs the Job Control Cards above for execution on the IBM 360 CMS. * File 05 is user generated input data and run parameters. Three examples of this file are on the following pages. * File 06 contains comments on the run. * File 09 is for console monitoring of the run. * Pile 10 Contains the herbicide Orange flight path data that comes from the HERBO-2 tape of all RVN herbicide missions. The data has been organized into points and segments referenced to a rectangular coordinate system. Corrections to the HERBO-2 data have been made where possible. * File 12 is the HOPP REPORT. It lists the time periods for which a unit (individual) was "in proximity" to agent Orange flight paths. The parameters that can be used for defining proximity are time and distance (both are specidied in File 05). Distance will be from the cenfeerline of the flight path to the unit location (enter in lOths of kilometers). Time will be the period after a spraying for which the agent is considered potent (enter the number of days). In addition- to the "Proximity Periods" for the unit, File 12 also lists the flight paths thatwere within the "proximity criteria", i.e., the flight paths that were within the distance specified during the time interval selecte'd for potency. * Files 06 and 12 could .bo combined. * Piles 05, 06 and 12 are printed out to (a) check th input, (b) check forrun errors and (c) get the "answer", respectively. * A detailed discusion of the files is included in the program comment cards. �PI "II": 00?P 1 f* f# C Cfto 1* ?*^ *~* T / ^ *S I *-i-^iU!i 1 j, j1 f*f ,^*1 ,J f ;j* H 1 ALPHA CC^PAJ: Y, 333 T J 005 01« 050 042 6C0901 660902 660906 650910 6603 11 P609 1H 660116 660917 6609 1D 660921 660927 661001 661010 661015 6f 1017 661019 661022 661023 661030 561101 661102 66 1201 66120U 6G1210 6 61215 67021 a 103 oco 333 XP976565 v r» f) -> f r rj ^ Yl?*'i'j"}7 XD9~"i?{i9 "O 970573 Xn9535 ! ?? The program will insert this location for the 2nd through the 5th of Sep 66 and switch to YD244597 for the 6th through 9th, etc. For periods "out of country", enter "RR9999991 for the location along with the exit date. YD 2^42-5 37 NOTE: Dates must be in. ascendinq order. Y2 2^12-3 7 YD175615 TD252607 YDR35132 YD 85 02*0 YDa^5132 YDtt31399 YP835132 YD 75 0230 last- 1 r»f at- inn for file 05 is set up for one unit, 1st line - Format(215) 1st "1" indicates one unit being processed. 2nd "1" is not needed for one unit runs, but it must be less than "2", 2nd line - Format(16A4)Unit name {up to 64 characters) 3rd line - Format(6P5.1) Distance criteria in lOths of kilometers. Up to 6 values may be entered. 4th line - Format(616) Time intervals in days. Up to 6 values 5th to 30th lines - Format(4X,312,2X,2A1,213) Date of arrival at a location and location(UTM grid coordinataes). Note: Last date is date of departure from RVN and location for this date must* be BLANK, �F1 HOPP 005 050 014 0 4 2 660901 660902 660906 6609 10 £60911 6 f: 09 1ft 660916 66 091? 660919 650921 660927 66 1001 661010 661015 661017 66 1019 661022 661025 661030 661101 661102 661201 661204 66 1210 661215 67021*4 100 000 - Proximity criteria XD976565 XH^f-5^3 ¥32^59"? \D9759A9 XD5"*1";73 :OC635?.2 XD9S2695 7D9626?9 XD 97 6 56 5 Jn i, J J * J- _ vp97«j-,q4 YD 231*i*^ YD2^2607 TDV43604 Yl 2 "12637 Y7)14°r 0^1 YD 17 "6 15 y D1^86QJJ YD 24 2 €.17 YD9?"1"'2 Y3 3532 13 Y3 3 15 1^2 Y3401.199 YD335132 YD759230 - Last location for 1st unit (must be blank) 327A CO?! IV \ N Y , 32f» K i 6C0902 660905 660910 660911 660914 6 609 16 660917 660919 660921 660927 661001 661010 66 1015 661215 <t L :*D 936593 - Dates and locations start right after the YD244597 unit name. v r j 075959 XD 97 0573 XD9 63582 XD 96 2 60 5 XD 96 2 6 00 XD 97 6 56 5 EF.999999 XD97W59'4 YD2'4 1*i9-YD242607 YD 14 1604 - Last location for 2nd unit (must be blank). file 05 is set up for two units using the same "proximity criteria" (time intervals and distances). 1st line - The "2" indicates 2 units being processed. The "1" indicates the "proximity criteria" listed the first unit will be used for ALL units run (no limit on the number of units, but reformat to read more than 99999 into the gram) . after in this'j must pro- �e f t <cir,n fill! HO?? 2 *. J %^*i*^ t * j 4* »^ .i. W,* ~>« i^ TV i *»*«** * ^ J * J T ^ * ^ * 0 ALPHA conr •Li I f I***/ 005 050 OKI 0 4 2 660901 660902 660906 660910 6609 11 660913 660916 660917 660919 660321 660927 661001 66 10 10 661015 661017 661019 66 1022 661025 661030 661101 661102 661201 66120* 661210 661215 67021« T1 050 "1 1 ^ 1n 1 n '.jQ J iJ I ,?* ^ ?J AH ^ *"m *^ '' f D975 365 L- Proximity criteria for 1st unit '.0^:6593 YD2^597 '^T)75"69 XDl^O*"?? ' 4 X3 16 3 53 2 "Cn9i'260 c . Y? 96 2 6 DO " 3 37 6 5 " 5 IT9?9j r3* c X!)974*" *i YD 2^1 159 YP2U2607 YD 1-*3 63 4 T32U2S07 Y? 1 : J3C j^i Y11 7 5 6 1 5 YD1U860U YD232607 YD835132 YD350210 YD 33 5 132 Yn^0139° i YD 33 5 132 YD753230 - Blank location ends 1st u n i t ' s data. 3 TS CC*"' ?Ii!*Y f 005 f*!**;*l*7'M"Tn<£l1 TS i inil^ij^j 3 3D RA.H 100 200 300 -tiOO 1 _ Proximity criteria for 2nd unit 060 090 120 j XD 93 6 59 3 YD2UU597 XT) 97596 9 jfD970573 XD9635B2 X I) 96 26 05 Xn 96 2 600 XD976565 5^999999 XH97y59ll YD 2U 1591 660902 660906 660910 660911 6609 U 660916 660917 660919 660921 660927 66 1001 ' ' ' 66 10 10 YD 2 £12607 661015 YD1II360H 661215 |>This file 05 is set up for two units with different proximity criteria. ' 1st line - The "2" indicates two units. The "0" indicates proximity criteria will follow every unit name in this r u n . The program cannot switch modes of operation within a r u n , i.e., either ALL units are followed by proximity criteria or only tho 1st has proximity criteria which will then be used for all units. 1 �:; HO;?? - : CHS ¥ 2 US 10 'T 3. 3 ?3 Yl X2 ' XI 1 4 34, 4 725.5 439.6 3 418,0 7 2 9 , 5 4 4 2 , 3 5 4 7 4 , 2 732,0 4 7 2. R 6 308.0 311.9 311.0 14 335,0 915,5 345.0 14 4 7 1 , 3 729,0 4 7 0 . 5 14 4 7 0 , 5 *T"> e,- , c 472. 4 /^ / 14 472. 4 726.9 4 7 1 , 2 16 319. 5 913.1 314.0 17 47S, 1 734.0 472.4 17 4 7 2 . 2 733,0 471. 3 13 322.2 919.3 31 Q. 4 13 316, 1 922.9 2 1 5 . 0 13 315.0 925.0 3 1 7. 5 20 317,0 911.0 3 2 S . O 20 325.0 913.0 317,0 20 31 "7, 0 927.0 3 1 0 . 0 21 337,0 072,0 1433, 0 21 4 0 0 . 0 883.5 3 9 4 . 0 21 394, 0 836.0 333.0 21 338.0 335.0 335.5 21 385,5 890,3 377.0 22 337,0 372.0 4 0 0 , 0 22 4 3 0 , 0 333.5 3 3 ^ . 0 836.0 333.0 2 2 39 '4. 0 22 333.0 335,9 335. 5 ]•< T^Y 1976 Length Y2 DATE UTM END POIMTS 5 6 5 Q ? 0 2 \ 3 1 "> 3 2 5 AS ^4 9140 C 503 3 4 1^925233 AH 97 33-'»5 2 650306 83299320 3S 27 5293 3 m 4 6SO"»07 Y T 0 3 0 1 1 3 Y 11 03 60 653315 YD353155 Y D 4 5 0 1 5 9 5 6 5 3815 f S 2 5 5 2 9 0 3 S 2 T 1 2 5 5 6 650815 i'S251255 3S 27 1261 7 a 650115 P3271263 E3 2 5 32 41 Q 9 653817 Y 9 1 5 1 3 1 ?D 1 'i 02 4 0 10 650318 !?3313340 ?.3 2 7 C 2 5 D 11 650213 3S270^30 :.S2!02HO 12 633319 Y D 2 2 2 1 9 3 YD 194? 33 13 653M9 YD 161 229 YD 15 02 5 3 653,319 YD 159 2 53 YD 17*" 241 14 15 530321 Y3170113 YD 2 "9 183 653321 Y D 2 5 0 1 3 3 I D 1 7 3 2 7 9 16 650821 YD 170270 YD 1002 10 17 18 6 5 0 3 2 2 YC370720 ZC 00033 5 19 650822 SC000835 YC 9 4 0 fl 6 -3 w* 650822 YC 34 036 3 YC380350 20 c 21 653322 YC330350 YC855 3-31 •H 6 5 0 3 2 2 YC855933 YC 7 7 08 2 3 fl 22 23 650823 YC870720 ZCO'00335 i4 a 24 650823 7.C000835 Y C 9 4 0 S 6 0 to r 25 6 5 0 8 2 3 Y C 9 4 0 3 6 Q Y C S 3 0 3 O 4J i. - J 650123 YC330853 Y C 3 5 5 9 3 3 •>*> -> G*; f. a 9 0.3 27 650323 YC855903 Y C 7 7 C 3 2 0 •H O 6 53 3 2 '4 Y C 7 3 3 8 0 3 YC950350 ft 23 379, 0 880.0 23 23 369, 0 •^ 3 9, 0 553824 YC 60 on 90 YC710"90 u 29 o 24 3 7 1 . 0 372. 5 ,13 6 5 0 8 2 5 Y C 7 1 0 7 2 5 YC 7 0077 3 4-i '650326 YD330133 YD420160 25 333,3 913.3 31 27 5 2 1 . 2 « 9 3 . 0 BP700900 PP 75 087 7 « 650323 32 28 501,7 512.2 650329 BQ510122 30435162 N 33 29 4 9 4 . 1 516.2 34 650030 BQ435162 BQ510122 f 33 3 0 9 , 5 9 2 4 , 0 35 , 650903 Y D 0 9 5 2 4 0 YD OP 0330 I o 36 3 1 0 . 0 932.0 650906 Y D 1 0 3 3 2 3 36 r 36 50 4. 4 6 4 5 , 0 6 5 0 9 0 6 B2570459 HP 62 5 6 -0 37 37 327.0 910.0 38 6 5 0 9 0 7 Y D 2 7 D 1 0 0 YD 3 65 02 5 650907 Bit 57 04 50 32625650 37 5 0 4 , 4 645,0 39 650908 Y €63 0360 38 368. C 836,0 40 P 41 650909 YD335000 P 19 333, 5 900.0 42 650110 YD! 8 50 00 P . 4 0 333,5 900,0 n 41 352.0 831.5 43 650911 YC520315' 44 4 2 3 4 5. 5 333.5 650912 Y C 4 9 3 H 3 5 P 43 3 2 1, 0 9 3 0 . 0 45 650913 Y D 2 10300 YD 2 7 03 30 4 7 3 4 0 , 2 898. 1 650917 Y C 4 3 2 9 3 1 P 46 47 3 9 4 , 0 752.0 650917 Y 3 9 4 0 5 2 3 47 P 49 4 0c , 5 753.0 6 -40 650919 ZH.065593 P 940.0 51 3 1 . a 49 6 5 0 9 2 1 YD 1534 00 P p 53 5 1 4 . 2 635,5 50 6 5 0 9 2 3 Bn6?3;l55 54 515, 1 672,0 51 650924 B K 6 8 4 7 2 0 P 6 5 0 9 2 4 . X T 4 00640 P 54 2 4 0 . 0 364,0 52 , 55 5 2 6 , 3 666.0 53 B 2 800660 6*0925 P 54 650925 XT 190 755 55 210.0 375, 5 P 56 506.7 670.0 •55 6 5 0 9 2 6 33600700 .. P Printout info only - - •*!* - - - Data needed for calculations ^ .e id - Extraictod froiri HER HO-? ' NUM 1 714. 9 7C6. s a 729. 306, u 915. 9 725. f^ 726. 8 724, 3 924, o 725. 0 7 29. 0 923, 3 925. 0 924. 1 °13. 0 3 27. 3 921. 3 ?83. "t 386. 0 383. 0 390. 3 3 87. 0 333. r. 336. T ° 3 5 ,1 2 ? ?C * 1 3R* . 0 335. •3 12. 6 14.8 2,6 5, 3 10.0 1,7 2. 3 2.3 12. " 9.7 ' 5. 1 3.2 2, '4 2,7 10.5 12, 3 Q .2 17,4 6,5 6. 1 5,9 11.9 17.4 *\)-<m J 6. 1 377,0 395.0 371,3 373,0 342.0 526.3 494.1 501.7 303,0 877. 0 816. 0 487. 7 516. 2 512. "*> Q "* "1 0 509,4 336.5 509, 4 665, 9 9C2. ^1 665, 0 23. 6 12.1 20. 5 327.0 933, 0 6,7 11.9 16. a °c?. 3 1 1,0 4,6 9.2 5. 6 3, r> 8.6 O« 1 v i i- A- , i �f:[IE: HOP? - FQSTEAH CSS Y 2 B S I C S 3,3 P1 *** n nn 3i ciO" C H A N G E c c c c c c c c c PM Ci!AP*IAll ** 28 JTJLY 19?fi r p. ox T MIT? DCA-CCTC-C312, PEGOF'AM *** 23 H A H C H 1980 **!{CPOO'} 202-697-l711'?ClO-"jC; h ' A n H I U f i T O i ; , DC 2030 1 ** ;IO? f 1")n " T H E PAPPOSE OF T H I S P R O G R A M IS 10 F F T E F I i r i E T I « E I !,"TE P V A I, S (C A L !, E D !! C ? "> 1 1 1 • P E C X I K I T Y P E R I O D S 1 ) FOP K l i l C H A H K I T {OF I ! I D T V I D f J A I . ) "A3 I?, P - OX-:' OP 3-)'"" J1IITY TO T H E F L I G H T P A T H {CF P C I H T ) OF A i l E E B l C J OE o n A U G S K I S S I O U HOPOO"n'.-'i 1 -* -' i HATEICES A N D FILES A R E D E S C E I F E H I S HOP I'"'', HCP';3'- THE P P C f J B A E COK30S U L O C { 2 , 2 1 6 7 ) ,*fA.*!S(1S) , J C F : I 7 f f i ) , DC?. IT (6) , F r.i?EGEr; IDAT?.{3) ,LCC {-'*} ,u::ii5,?cEiT,jPA7E{3) {^,6625) f I ? C 6 C 2 5 ) K O P j C V ! ? 0 TJ 3 : 3 1 HOT' 3 3 '." E n ?-" ! r!0?33 1 f c c c c c D A T A I3/ V » l E / ' I i '/ DO 100 1 = 1 , 6 DCRIT{I) = 0 , 0 100 I C B I T ( I ) = 0 0 0 FILE 05 - nopmr USES I N P U T 0? HOP 3 '^ 1 !'OP'"3*" EH:! PAnr.a 2 T E F 5 A X D UXI3T 1ATA TI Q p 1 "- 1 QUITS, PCSIT Oil ITS = .nJMB'ii v* 0!.ITS j. C r -"_ P -5^«~ » .->S ^ t/ S CETT ~ ~L\ 1 '''O P7""'"-'T1 3j^^7r^»«;^ * CF IT7~ !.*• * T (=0) DC2IT 5 1C? IT XUST HE EXT"!^ 7 ) FCE r A C H 'IE IT (=1) CF.ITEPIA FOP, Fimi O K I T W I L L SF I'STD FC 5 ALL OF ITS " *« OT E "* i'l OD -j S C A ii .• 0 T E u M A X i L» r ,,_ \*r C c c c c c c HAKE - _,,„., ,j y !!C ? C "3 ,. | ,p^ .J,^ ^ - HOpm-F0pr02 HOPS 32 FOP y ~, " ...^P *,iio?"":" DHIT D3STr,:!ATIO:: ( U ? TC o^i C H A F A C T - F C ) BCEIT - D I S T A N C E C H I T E E I A ( I H T E N T H S O E E I L C E E T I rs) »,,.,,,»,, OP TO 6 VAL'lES H A Y BE F E O C F S 5 ~ D - S 2 F E 3 V A L I J E ^ f c t - i ^ . j c c c c c c c Jj - ' ^ - •' " HOPJ:: ,-, , T | , ^ _-, ^ -t.:.- 1^^-L - -. -, -T •> --, , ^ j i - j HOP 3 3 no PO"-" f ICP.IX - SSAF.CH I!"i'EE\ AL ( I N D A T ? ) UP TO 6 ¥ALOE5 HAY B2 PECCESSED - A 22 ' C V A L U E r-'tnc *r**- i r r ~ > * j i.* ^BOXIKITY C R I T E R I A * 13 THE CCSDIIi A*TIO:^ OF A DCS IT *.' *J ^ , » i- i- t-pno"'-" HO?? 3 irf V- ~ - i— *- s A"*J ICP.IT "' FOPO:: HOP00.7 nc?oo:' Hc-?or ;""" ESAD (05, 901) IIIIITS, PCRIT 901 F O R M A T (2 1 5) DO 2000 OT= 1,0 SITS R?,AD ( 0 5 , 9 0 2 ) E A H Z 90 2 FOHI1AT (1 6 A ^ ) HE IT E ( 06,<50 3) !lA:'iE 903 ?OP,:!AT{* C O H H E N T S 70R c c c HO? 00 , HOP 3 3:, i;or»o? 4 HO" !-')HOP')"""HOP "33 :* Ii'OPOv '!!0 n 03'; HCn33'i" HO POO T *,1cAa) FILE 06 - C O H M E U T S S E B B O H R E S S A S ^ S 200 300 901 905 WO 906 IF ( P C R I T - 1 ) 3 0 0 , 2 0 0 , 4 0 0 PCEIT=2 EEAD{05,90'»)DCr,rr. FOfii'i AT 1C F*">« 1) F'lAD ( 0 5 , 9 0 5 ) ICFTT FOEHAT (615) B E A D ( 0 5 , 9 0 f . ) JOATr:, LCC r O B H A ? ( t t X , 312, 2X, 211,213) jforooa" HOPOP" H OP o ;)••-. HOP03*"- ; H0l»00 r HGPQCF" HOPOO' c - ' ,,,,,^. , ,,,-, T; , T ,^ —^, �PILE:, ISO?? ?OS?rJ»!I c JDATE,LOC C PI cm V S B S I 0 3 3,3 2 8 J t f L I ' 1'575 IDA??,LCC . tln?oov HC">30r" JDAT~ = DAT:: u:ni Ai?rr?E?. AI ™IPST » L 3 C f IICCATIC::) c HCP^-IS: C C C SIDE? ?!?L' U'lIT TC BE LOCATED AT 1112 FIEST 'I.OC 1 770", J D A T F ' J ' J T I L ^ O ? ^ ? ^ " T:!K DAY P.^I'DRE I DAT" /-KP 7!i?r Si'ITCJ TO T!!L' NI-V f l , C C * — T H I C HOP-1'" ?EATIIP.r, ALLOV'S ?!KIT DATr/L'JCATIO!;n TO S c S P F C I F I E ? O V ? 7 A LCJ'l "3?01',: c FOE 2Ac:i n:iiT, T H ~ PAY A?T"P "vrTiN", rv:i AiiD A "LA::-; frcA^ic:: C M'JST. BE THE LAST r!tTJ:Y - C T* *' *T* T5 */ £*ii A Zi * c T^itr^ll** jJii X . # !T t* T—r^»f"tlyir%^* A* WW* * l « , - L w - i i 703 " H C K ? ft|-,'f»-»^ *»wW4jiJ . DO ^50 1=1,3 ' H50 I D A T E ( 1 ) = J P A T E { I ) ilP.ITE ( 1 2 , 9 0 7 ) 907 F O E f l A T {' 11 ,79 ( ' * ' } ) . ,~ —, L. .2, n ^'-nr'- "FIC')C C'JT C? C O ' f U T F Y , i:"CS! JJO?^:'" ,^,»,.u. ,_,_.,.,„, 1*111 *il ^L A JL nr -w - T *ji 4 . ^ 4 , .It •*,«.*., v, «, ^- .f-O^'^i*-'- * rb'pocp- * * l "-n''-07" !-W"-:}7 ' -JO?" :--- : ::e:"'^7. - c ^:o??:7 - C TILE 12 - HO?P ES202T ( P R O G R A M OUTPUT) 908 " . rOEHAT |1),J WHITE (12, 909) KAIiS Q H Q F fw P 'i*- f*A " f * ^ W J? 4 ) it ' ' j*. I n '-n* ^ •srnrj'O'T' •*-/ i* * Ttf *,* W *, * - —j i VJ » > i * FIOX'37-' I!C^307 r - II r S 'l\ * fIl J Li| P I,! .j. j. ^ I ij j,- * y v? "/ 1 i"i f\ i,'j j/j n -. FI Lij J9 * CO I* ^>OL Cf 0 J'j. PUT (TO KG** TC OE /* L! ?• !•-**. !!-!> P? C-i P A"!) r- •• : CALL Z Y C 0 2 D { L O C » X 1 , Y 1 ) , HOrO .j _^ ^, ^ ' XYCOPD - coirvnsTS UTH COOEDINATE LOCATION IKTO X,Y COCTDISATE^ HCPO, I? (ilDI.LT, 1)GC TO 1200 575 IF (lIDl.Gr.21fi7) GO TC 1700 ULOC(2,S)=Y1 HO?-3 HOP'1 \ U L O C { I , K ) - r r M I T L O C A T I O N OH D A Y K X COOED (1=1}, Y COOED {1 = 2} ENTP.IES FOR M = !1D1,NB2 K H E P E N D 1 = "T^S"" BAY IS COO'JTPY KD2 = LAST DAY IK C C 1 I K T H Y 500 E E A D ( 0 5 , 9 0 f ' , E T i n = s 1 1 0 3 ) i n A 7 E , L O C CALL S ; D A T E { I D A T H f N D 2 ) I F ( L O C ( 1 ) . EQ, IB .OE. LCC (1) . K G - I R ) GO TO f > r O CALL X Y C O U D ( L O C , X 2 , Y 2 ) ' 550 I f C n 0 2 . L E . II) GO TO 1600 600 N = N * 1 . . - nor- 1 ,]- 1 HOn013C :!C?D101 :i-OP010r fUP3103 !!0pf>1 0" IIOP010? HOP0107 HOPfMOr HCP0109 HOP0110 �ril!!i-HQPP P08TPAM PI ? 8 J U L Y 1976 CHS V K E S I Q J I 3,3 f 650 C C C C nom i no? 01 : IF (H. G E. 2 167) GO TO I f i O O IF f::C2.EQ. *J)8G TO 800 HOP31 1 'IOP01 " THIS LOO? F I L L S I!? Til?. D A Y S B Z T W r ^ U D A I E E!1TPI£S WHKJI THE M E X T D A T F (!:D2) IS HTi/.CfiFO, IT K I C K S CUT no?" 1 1 i-OPOl * !! 1 1' 0 1 *!GrC: 1 ' "'J"'"1 " 700 ULCC { 1 , ? ? } = X 1 IJLCC { 2 , " ) = Y 1 GO TO COO H O P O i "; C !;CPC 1 I 800 IF (I.CC (1). HO. I?) HO TO SOO IF (LOG (1},L*2> i") no TO 1000 uLoc{i f ::} =X2 ";!CtJ0 " 2 no: 1 ?*: ro !1 "i: ULCC (2 f ?!) = Y2 c C C • C HC ? - 12 *? 0 P T 1 - jvt't?^*T< vi?" LOC * " "^ C *" 3 "*" **C "' ^''py" n ^ **" ^ "\*5 " P ^ ^ j T- t *. £ H " r) S A K E ll?/fi LOCATIO:; T H E OLD L C C A T I C M A " H THSM 3E7 A !,'K" ' : : E K ' L-CC :i?,p-i.. PO"" " "/ X1 = 7? Y1=Y2 GO TO 500 ;! 0 "" " " 2 ~ 1 t? i ~ - C -, j 900 X1=9999. Y1=9999, frtT> i fji\ C c c ' c c jjrsp-" " r-.tt*"" rsT? Uu« UT r*f\H ?,'^~r«v *_ i- W U ,< i «">- I »? < tiT'r i ri<- ft — »' T " p1, « ^ ^ p »,, i. w » ( » ^ U - T . » T^i »t, T*? , AT ». _ DISTA:;CH CEIT^ITA riT*/r»?m "i 1T V ». * <-• a ,* ii .• 1 c?i\sc':AEL"" : ;}??^ :• •iO?" ' " ' - '. "1 ' * " „ f^ ,~, !:0?:.-' ! : Q p -, • ^ GET EEE::TEY DATS For ?ILH oe CCHBEIIT B F F O B E PZJCIIIIIIG K A T!I H0?n 1 ! ! 0?C- ' -'• I I O P l I :. CALL 3DAT2{IDATZ,!:D2) CALL X Y C 0 2 D { L O C , X 2 , Y 2 ) CALL ij^rtr, •» * f:wl w - k6^-?r. DATZ(JEE) K H i ^ B f O C 911) inn JTJP 911 F O O H A T C OUT 0? C O U S T E Y F P O X * , ! ? * K= K- 1 GO TO 1 !!CP 0 1 110? 0"? '• HOP 01" 1 T O , 17) ncpTi " 550 HOP 2 1" C 100^ 1 V# W v c C C *T O *1 ^ * " T: ^t> ".">"; i **t - J ! 1 ISS= 10000*IDA?E {1} +1 O O ^ I D A T E {2} + T D A I " ( 3 ) E E A D { 05, 906) I , D A T E f L C C C J ;!3? 1* j HOP" 1 " IIOI'O 1 ' 1 I1T w w i / * t * V i ^ = Y 1 1 M irf Of" UQT5 -1 1 ~ ULOC ( 2 , i ; ) = Y l ALL D A T A FOP THIS TISIT H A S ESHi; i S T E ? E D • ' 1050 eniTE ( 1 2 , 9 1 2 ) , t ! > A T E , I D A T E 912 PORK AT { 3 X , » S T A ? . T " D A T E = f , 13 , 1H/,I2 ,1 H / , I 2 , ' 112 1 !!/ 12) y p T « w i39*"^-| 2) JHA""1" I D A T F * BRITS{12,908) GO TO 1900 nor" i " HOP^I:; HOPG 1 MOPT1" = * , 13, 1 !!/, HOP;) 1 " LAST DAT" HOP01, HO P C I . noT»o v HOP01-HOPOIs-. C 1100 HOP 011, WRITE (06, 91 3) '! * "* r, , ,,,,,,^ TT , n 1 �. F I L E ; HOP? FGETBO PI CES V E E S X C ' f 3.3 28 J O L Y 1976 F O R M A T {« LAST F I L E S ItECOHD DOES JiCI C G M & I N ELA!IX LDCATIO'1 1 } . HOP'H HOPHl- c IK?KO?ER LAS? sroY - IT W I L L ?,r. con si DEE ED T H E LAST DAY 1:1 HCPOI C COOS T H Y - THE L O C A T I O N 1ISIED SILL A P P E A R C S L Y Cll THAT D A Y P-0?Ot' GO TO f!C?OV HO? 3 1 ' 913 C c c c c c c noror - * 1050 1203 W 91 £» F O R M A T (9H 65/03/02,* = DATE C? j I T S T T P F A T KISSIGN, E A T L I F B tin I 1ATES K I L L :,*CT BE C O H S I D E H E D . ') . U H S f ! 1'AELY U H I T DATES AF.* IISTE", T H E F E C G F A 3 ICCT5 "OF -THE 7 Hi 37 i:oi:-EASLY D A T E K I I I L E E O L M I t G THE ITIH EJ! 4T E l Y P5*!CSSDII«G ' L C C 1 BHICH W i l l 3E DSHD AS TEE 0!'IT LCC CS 65/03/02, T H E E J 2 S T '1ISSICN !.'= 1 1300 U L O C { 1 , 1 ) = X 1 3LOC ( 2 , 1 ) = Y 1 E S A D { 0 5 , S 0 6 , E S D = 1 3 0 0 ) I DATE, IOC CALL SDA1S{IDAT^,::D2) I? (LCC {1}."Q,I3 .OR. L O C ( 1 J , - E Q . I E ) GO TO 1 H D O CALL X Y C O T . D ( L O C , X 2 , Y 2 ) J?(SD2.G7. 1)50 70 633 • !:C? A 1 HO!»D1 HOP 01 X1-X2 H-Y2 GO TO 1300 " ' WO IE (I D2.GT, 1)50 1:3 600 JF (LOC (1). EQ. 13) GO TO 1500 X1=9999. Y1=9939, GO TO 1300 1500 BEITE{12,903) 915 POB:i&T(2l,I2,1H/ f l2,1!!A T2, » 1BAY M = I AST U?IIT BXT c C c - GO TO 20 DO . !!-?-* 0 0 1500 K E I T E { 1 2 / ) 0 3 ) S?,ITE(12 919) 319 POBI1AT ( 3 X » ' U l I I T DATES A B E HOT IK A S C F M D I i l G C T D E ^ 1 } GC TO' 2000 1700 FSITE{12,903) 916 r O B M A 7 ( 2 X , T 2 f 1 K / , I 2 , 1 H / f T 2 , » = F i n s ? H S T I *)«TE — MCEF. T H A U UH A F T E R LA5T S P 2 A I HI3SIC'! — HO C A l C I I i A T IOIIS M A D E " ) • : YEKOPO" : H0»02 c HOP 02 C C fill 0!IE Y E A S CHT Of" CAtI BE E X T E N D E D BY I N C P F A S I K G T O E 216? J K l?iE110?02 !!0?02 M A T i l l X U L O C { 2 » 2 1 6 7 ) , A T A D D R E S S E S «'7r- A K D 650 A K O IS T I M D I S �FILE:'HOP? FQHTOAM Pi C!1S V"Bf.IO!I 3.3 ?R JDLY 1976 * c HOP: 1750 17 (LOG ( 1 ) - H O , IB) GO TO 2000 r H E A D (Q i, 913) L O C ( 1 ) HOPC KQp: • • ^ "> *"*5 1 ^ GO TO 1750 C 1800 K I ! I T E ( O f » , 9 1 7 ) 917 F O R M A T {9!! 71/07/07,» = OSS YEA!* A F T F E LAS? S P 3 A Y M I S S I O N A N D 15 T 1S LAST U N I T D A T E FCH U H I C H C ALCJI. ATIO*:." fiZUS K A D Z ' ) HD2=2167 C C C SEE LAS? COMMENTS ' ' 1830 IF [LOC(1),FQ, IB) GO TO 1900 BEAD (05, 91 8} LCC(I) 918 FQ!u!AT(125:f A1) GO TO 1850 f C 1900 CALL TIMDIS (ND1,*II)2) 2000 COKTIKUE STOP END SOBEOUTINS IYCOED{I!!,X,Y) C C C C UTX COOEDIIIATES 1*1 2 V S ' A A I I I I I I 1 I - F A D AS ( 2 A 1,213) E Z C T A K G U L A 8 COCIDI!!AT?3 FIT!! OEGIH AT » ¥ < 2 3 0 0 G D D t IK ['4) - • X,Y - n » T '. jJrtijl 11 I ^ Iff L. TT/ Jf A A/ '' '1 f I'M/ u f ' V * f * it * f * .* * f t L *f V V V ¥ 1Y / t I 1 / / JA/ A I ^5 1 ^ ^ ^ f p f / U 1L I/ / f ± !V / » •±i" . • , f,*-. 1 •? T / ' « t •} V /1 •• 1 / / U */ .. » l»-t .» r 1p* i. f Ic 1 ~t t * r> I -c » I , . —I int , _, < » •• T' t let ... f ITi • » IT| ^ f 1 f •• 3 1 ! tM • DATA NIX/-1000,0, 1 000, 20§0, 3 D33, ^00D/,!.TI Y/C, 1 CCC,2 C-OG, ?,000f U 2 0 , 6 0 0 0 , 7 0 0 3 , 8 0 0 3 , 9 COO/ c nor'jrv COH?EESICN TO E E C T I K G O L A S COOE3INATFS IS C O H P I I C A T E D BY TIE SPLIT I!0?"Z r ^ HA? PROJECTIONS T H A T C O ¥ 2 B E V N - IX 0 s JX () DETE?::!!,*:-: THE POINT IS ON A K D ESTABLISH THE KOP.I70NTAI r>IGTA!!C7 TO T H E UT.1 G E I D 5QUA2E - IY {) OR JY J) CAN T H E N 3E OSFD TO GET OF Y E m C A L DISTANCE - ?ALin ONLY FCB SOUTH VIET!,*?. II - SCI'IE D I 3 T C E T I C N IS INT20D3CED FOE POINTS Ifl THE T I G H T P F O J R C T I C N , SEE COrHiFir PELG!! C C C C C C C DO 10 1=1,6 Hcr3? ; n=i c Z F ( I K { 1 ) . S Q . I X ( I ) ) GO TO 20 10 CONTINUE GO TO 50 ' . . 20 X = F L O A T ( N I X ( H } +IN (3) ) / 1 0 . DO 30 .1=1,10 • 30 C t t O Y « F L O A T { M I Y ( I I ) +IH (*») ) / 1 0 . HOPO:-' HO?"):HOPO* 1 : ' U=i I F C I N { 2 ) .Sp. IY ( I ) ) G O TO HQ CONTIKOH GO TO 100 - HOF3"*-' HCt'O:HC?D3i ' • - HOPO?" If0pa3" HOP02'*;: HOP02 �JLE: 'HOP? FOr.TKAH PI HETURN 50 DO 60 1=1,9 - II=I . I F { I H { 2 ) . E Q . J Y ( I ) } GO TO 70 60 CGi'TINTJE GO TO 100 CSS VESSIOS 3.3 . 28 JTJLY 1976 PQP027? HOP02?. 3 '"}*")27" F'O^lPTj POP12B1 . , . Y=FLOAT{!?Y)/13. DO 80 1=1,3 11=1 IF (IN (1),. EQ, JX {!)) GO TO 90 80 COIITIIIHE -. GO TO 100 " * G 2 I D 5 Q U A 2 E 3 B O R D E R I N G THE PROJECTION f,?LTT ME TEA P Z r . O I D A I THE S C U A - I O S 3E10B IS A B O U G H ADJ'JS' :'" I? FCr. T H E HCr.I"C rTA I H a G H I T U D " OF T H E V E R T I C A L DISTC"TIO: •'A?. THE S:LIT j~, TZLA:!'/::] FLIGHT P A T H LOCATIONS ALSO EIGOROJS SC3UTISY BUT I N T F E T &KD NOT ABSOLUTE LOCATIONS KM, TEE SAXIMU3 EBBOR SKOHID SCBIT USED SHOULD BE 0.5 Kii THIS T?CH .'ICUS CCULC *JCT '/IT'iSTAND IS TO BETEIU'lISE SPUTIYE L C C A T I O V 3 F03 » C I S T A K C i C E I T E F I A * LESS THA!' 23 EF 0 . 2 ' K S - COIIVZ3SELY, T H E KIKI.VJ3 S2TUEII V- 100 H R I T E ( 0 9 , 9 1 S ) I N 914 P O E H A T C I N V A L I D IJ7H COORD F O R X Y C O S D CALC « , 2 A 1 , 2 i : - ) W R I T E ( 0 6 , 9 1 J t ) IN ^-, G 1 3 -. I':^011'r^->Q??c, Y=9999E'W SUBROUTINE' TI8DIS{XD1,XD2) -M^O^o" ::2^029J^D297 HOP0290 u-->nin-" HCP03^ TT?03 , THIS D S T E H H I N E S PH02INITY PERIODS FOD STECIFIEP. T I ^ E A " D D I S T A N C E CEITEEIA - EFFECTIVE FLIGHT PATHS AEE I D E N T I F I E D £ LISTED COMHO!,* ULOC{2,2167) , ! T A X E { 1 6 ) ,IC?,I?(6) , D C E I T (C) , P (K f 6 6 2 e » ) , IP (662'•] DIHSUSIOS I D A Y { 2 1 6 7 ) f L O C ? ( 6 G 2 5 ) ,1?ATH ( 5 , 6 6 2 5 ) , N D A Y ( 2 , 3 0 0 ) ' 1UTEGSE P I ) A 7 S { 6 5 2 5 ) , P L D ( 1 P 0 1 ) DATA 1ITIHE/0/, H/0/ , HL*6 IF (iITIME,GT.O)<30 TO 200 ' NTME=1 DO 100 J = 1 , 6 C 2 5 1DO K E A O ( 1 0 , 9 1 5 ) { I P A T H { I , J ) , I = 1 , 5 ) , T ? ( J ) , ? n A T 7 ( J ) , { P < I , . 7 ) , T = 1,'») . 91 5 F O H M A T (9 X, 16 , 2 { VX f 2A«) , I X , A1 1 I C, U {1X, F6, 1) ) FILE 10 - FLIGHT PATH DATA EOF. l i E ^ B I C i n - C H A N G E SISSICHS X?AT11(I;J) - D A T E C UTS LOCATION OF P A T H ( O U T P U T fOE",) (HOT IISF.D "CR C A L C U i A l I C X S ) . IP(»1) - FLAG FOR POi:!T S P R A Y HISSICNS PDATC(J} - R2QOENTIAL D A T E OF BISHICJ! • ' i:'j^.-)31" TOP011!'Qf>0.1T r HO? 031HOP031 " HCP0320' IIOP012T H'ir»f)i22 :i.:?0323: !! OP03 2'4 : ;?opo32' : '-': HOP032»' HOP.1327: HQP032 C > HOP032 C K HOPOIIC' �'ItS: HOPP : .... PQifEAM P(X,J) - P1 Cf.S VETSTOH 3,3 2? J U L Y 137?) XI,11,12,¥2 C e t P M ' f A f Z S OF F L I G H T P A T H . I!C?01!1 KOPTP 1 J;OP-r>1.1-'. BEAD(10,916)PLD 916 F O M A T ( 1 6 I 5 ) 11 r\ PLD{I) - LOCATES FIHST HISS10I! OH OH AFTES THE ITH DAY WHITE (09,9 17) 917 . FOPHA? { PATH LOCATIONS FILED 1 } ' 200 DO 2100 ID=1,6 I? (DC? 17 (ID), 2Q.3. 0}GO TO 2200 DO 2000 IC=1,6 IF (ICR1T ( I C J . Z Q . O ) GO TO 2100 » B I T E ( 0 9 ,918)DC2IT (ID) , ICHIt (1C) 918 F O K ^ A T C 1 DCEIT = 1 » F 5 , 1 » ' ICEIT =',13} I1IITIALJZ3 DO 300 "OPO? ;'*)n-J" i H^r- "J.r3 ' . • " 1 = 1,6625 ' * 300 DO «00 1=1,2167 400 I D A Y { I ) = 0 MO 1 " 13 31 HO? 1352 « • • ' KD1 - FIItST 0:iIT DATE * 500 u=:i + i * " "j '^ . HQ=!l-ICai? | I C ) + 1 "c:-^ " I"^7 • IJQ - ?I5S? DAI I" TEE S E A 5 C H IJIT^r.Yr.L i'HICH "JILL COVES T H T O K I T ' D A T E A!ID THE ?EHCESDI!IG !1-1 D A Y " - v J H Z T Z I'1—ICriT V f t L H Z r IF (NQ.LT.1) 50 TO 1800 IP{NQ. GT. 1801) GO TO 1900 H0?,r HOP 3 ' C?" H'JT"-' HOP016-: HOP03.'? HOP016- 1PI - THE FIHST UISSI08 O C C D R R I K G III THE SEARCH I N T E R V A L SEAECH 1!ITERVAL STOPS OS THE OKIT DATE HOF03t n HCPC37C HOP3371 flOP03?: HOPOJ73 CALL DIST(S,IP1,D) HOP3.175 IFCD.GT, DCSITCID}) GO TO 600 HOP 3 37*' HOP 0^7 1 ??.*:> 1?7;< 600 I?L=I?L+1 IF {I PL. 31. 6625) GO 10 700 I? (PDATE (IPL).GT,S)GO TO 700 ' - IDAY {!-,') - COV3P.S THE P3FIOD FEO« THE FIRST XTSSICJ1 TILL C»?F TEAR AFTEF T:IK LAST *i:isic:i - «H?:;: t TH3 P K C X I H I T Y o i i f p , i \ - is HOP :)'•''< MET, THE A P P r O P H T A T E D A T E 1 5 / L A G G E D L O C P { I ) - M A R K IDSS1ITY (I?L) OF M I S S I O N S EFFECT I SG THS U K I T IDAY(N)=1 LOCP(I?L) =1 GO TO COO MOPO^-?: IIOPOJ-U IIOP0312 ' - !!OPOl n �»1 FILE: HOPF, CHS VKHSTOy 3,3 28 J"LY "C 700 c c c IF (Ii'.LE. !!D2)GO TO *JOO t| ^ rj ^ -» -: , * „ , , ? _ •J , 3 1102 - L A S T US IT D A T E HCP-J3" 800 c c c c c i: C?01 -' n IGO=0 !I?=0 H0 33' D^irHJlTl.'E ?P.02i:*ITY P ' P I C D S , r O I O D S W I T H IDA! F L A G G E D UP ~ T»!E NU"i?E»-. G» t'f. 4; iOD !JL - H'JMBSR OF P R I K T K D IIKES CH H O E ? r.SFOPT '! -n -\i/ *. \s i DO 1000 I = N D 1 , K D 2 I F ( I D A Y {IJ.oQ. 0 ) 5 0 TO 900 IF (IGO.EQ, 1) GO TO 1000 ISTAST=I GO TO 1000 900 IF {IGO.EQ. 0) GO TO 1000 IGO=0 CALL DATE (1START) KD'IY (1,N?) =IS?/\ET UDAY {2, II?} =I3TO? C C c : J D A Y { I » J ) - ?ILH O F P R O X I M I T Y P"HIC3S F C 3 P3INTO T IT 1000 . I ? ( A D S ( ? L O A T ( U L - 5 3 ) ) . L 7 . 7 . 1 ) G O TO 1*703 C C • C STJtP.T HEV PRINTOUT PAGE '-'HSU SEAR THE BOTTOH C? A ?AG 1100 NL=1IL*3 HOITE{12,919) 919 F O U M A T ( I X ) H H I T 3 { 1 2 f 9 2 0 ) DCSIT(ID) ,TC?I? {1C) DISTANCE C H I T Z F I a = ' , F 5 . I , 1 KX 920 FOSHI-T 1VAL = » * X 3 , ' D A Y S ',10 ( * * ' ) ) TOIT3{12,9iq) IF (II?. E O . D ) GO "0 1600 C C c M L = N L + 5 t {NP/5. 1) i R I T E C 12,922) 922 FORMA?{11Xf10{»- * ) » * ?^OXIHIfY PERIODS KBITS { 1 2 , 9 2 3 ) { ( K D A Y (I, J) , 1= 1 1 2) , J* 1, HP) 923 FORMAT {5 ( 3 X f !«'»,»-'.16)) I WRITE (12,924) 92Q FORMAT (1 1:<,9(«- ») , ' SPFECTIf E 11-0 FLIGHT -')) Sr?»?.CH i: �PILE:. FORTBO PI " CMS VEESIOM 3,3 28 J3LY 1976 12=0 C C HOI HOI HO' 02TSi!1I!,'K 8 A P K 2 D FLIGHT PATHS ' c r flQ: 00 1100 I = 1 , 6 G 2 > IF {LGC? ( ) "Q,0) GO TO 1U03 I. IF (Xl.GT.O) GO TO 1200 HO! «r GO TO 1«00 C 1210 IF ( I 2 - G T . O ) HO TO 1300 12=1 GO TO mt)3 ' - c. C i!-?i, S3ITS TKES OUT I!' G H O O P S 0? KlI-^S ( S A V E S LOIS) c 1300 HO^C-V !!C?^' K g I 7 E { 1 2 , 9 2 5 ) ( I P A 7 H ( J , 1 1 ) , J = 1 , 5 ) / (I P A T H (:'.,I2) ^^l,^) , (TP.'rH (I , 1 ) »L^:^r p h i * " i * - - - U 9 ^ ^»,,#C " ti rWA* T^>i iM |^~ ^r !J* A |?pl- *l-Y £^*r* ' " j »I" ^ -^>^ * ' ^ £ w : s J I — 1 f * t?*j% li j r * "1T1 / *-"^ • * \ ^ .-*^ -• Y/ 11=0 12=0 1^00 COIITIXyH IF (II. EQ.O) GO TO 2000 C j',_"_"-* HC?':>U. !!C~04 HCi-O^i!0 "'?;* . PICK UP ANY I2FT 0?EE FECH THE GSOOP O F T,!:!^? K!?ITi:'G , c ML=KL+1 . "G:"^--' '"v HOT'I-. HC''"- nc * T w O LZFT 0¥EB • ' BP.ITE{12,926) ( I P A T K { J , H ) ,J=1 ,5) » {IPATH ( K , I 2 ) , K = 1 , 5 ) 92G F O R M A T (2 {1 X , T 5 , 1 X , 2AU f '- • , 2A U , I X ) ) GO TO 2000 C C C O N E LKF? 0¥EH ' , 1500 H R I T E ( 1 2 , 9 2 7 ) ( I ? A ? I ! ( J , I 1 ) , J = 1 , S ) 927 F O ^ S A T ( U , I 6 , 1 X , 2 A a , l - ' , 2 A U ) GO TO 2000 C ' 1600 B R I T E { 1 2 , 9 2 8 ) 928 c C ^ no-r: HP" ' . IF (12. ED,-3) GO TO 1 5 0 0 ' C C C HCP'^i- ' "O n -3"-* HOPO'." i!0?^'.' HO?:--" HO?') • HO^^';HO^?-;' F O R M A T (1 I X , 5 { ' - • ) » » NO F L I G H T S K F E 1 T H I S P P O T I r i T T Y C P T T P RT A • , r '( * -:!3?C:;.' nTs-Mr*"* GO TO ^2000 . TOP 0? CO;!TIM"J?,TIo:i P A G E 1700 W R I T E ( 1 2 , 9 2 9 ) 9 2 9 F O B K A T { « 1' ,71 ( • * ' ) ) UHITS(12,919) jmiTE(12,930) HAHE 930 Fona/i7{» HOIIE DATA OH «,16M) % ' !iC?-T- ; nop^'i' n no 3u JIH^O^^ ,, ,. liOPOV HOPO'; HOPO-I �uiiCLfis:;! 7 I rtl) -FIL": !JO?P FORTSAS Pi C**S V F K S I C N 3,1 2ft J U L Y 1 9 7 5 io?<vr- WRITS (12,919) NL=it GO TO 1100 C C SEARCH I N T E R V A L E X T E N D E D I N T O N E G A T I V E T I K E , I.E., B E F O E E THE FIHST MISSION - STAET HITH THE FIHST M I S S I O H c c 1800 IPL-0 GO TO 600 HOPOS: C c c 01IIT D A T E (N) IK BF.YOED R A N G E OF MISSION DATA 1900 CALL D A T Z ( S ) ' W R I T S ( 0 6 , 932) M , ICE IT (1C) 932 FORMAT (I7,' 1 M I N O S 1 , I« » f D A Y S -IS GSEAT3R T H A N L A S T F L I G H T ' ) GO TO 800 C 2000 J ? R I T E ( 1 2 , 9 1 9 ) _ 2100 CO !J TIN US 2200 EsiosN HOP050 HOPOS 3 HOPOS 0 HO POSC HC?Q^ * HOPOS 1 HCPD51 ;,: n r> o "-, i J;C r> 0 5 1 HOP 05 1 ' , HOPOS 1 HOP 05 1 ;- T f;p35 1 END S U B R O U T I N E DIST ( I I U , "?,!)) C i OF 0^9 HOP 0*1^ HOPOy 5 !!OP050 HOP 050 HOP 050 HOP050 HOP 050 CALCULATES D I S T A N C E (D) ""02 U N I T L C C A T I C " , 11LOC {!,!:«} TC THE PA TI: i-:.-;pO"-i :!0"*" '" r P ( I , U ? 3 F1TH V'I=Ti:iT DAT3 A S S N P - P A T " I D r K T T I ? . *'^PO = . 2 r CCMHOX f J L C C { 2 f 2 16?) , i : A * 2 { 1 ' 3 ) » ICT.I" [•'•) , D C H I T (C ) > ? ( : i , c C 2 " ) , IP ( 6 5 2 ) :;:PO-"Z :*/:':• po^r. .DATA I3/ 1 */ C c c c :J ' P 0 ' T c c H'^P ;1\ 2 !r 0? 0 ~ ~ X 1 , T 1 - UNIT LOCATION HO? or- 2 X 1=0 LOC ( 1* - ir J) T 'OP05~ t1=t!LGC(2,tn) X2,Y2 - c c c :i3?o r >: HOP05- OSE END OF THE FLIGHT PATH p;J^ t,'QP^)" jinT>f) r, "^ Y2=?(2*5!?) I12=X1-X2 f12=Y1-Y2 I F ( I P ( N ? ) . E Q . I B ) G O TO 10 c c c I P C « ' P ) = 1 P t FOE POINTS (GO TO 10 IS T-T f~\ f} *\ ^ °* no? 05^ t j n n r j ', l UOPO'"- 7 ii f\ Y$ r^ -> ~", fOF. S E G K A T J T S ) TI /^ 75 r^ *", " ' D « X12*X12 + Y12*Y12 D = S2ET(D) c c 1J A t> A *" "* PYTHAGORAS c c c c c RETUKM X3,Y3 10 ' ' THE 07117.3 EHD OF T H 3 PATH piCtf B C 3 K I K G W I T H A U S E SBIG^EIIT, A LEG OF A M I S S I O N ) POP05', I! OP 05-', HOPOS?! HO?OS<j HO^O'i^ i!OPO f >i" HOP05'i HOP05?i �j=TL3: HOP? FOSTRAU Pi CSS VH3SIO!! 3 - 3 Y3 = ? { U , N P } 3M3=X1-X3 «3=x2-o 1976 . Y13=Y1-Y3 Y23=Y2-Y3 • X23S-2-X23*X23 • Y23f»Q=121*Y23 2fl J f J l Y ' _' - TO THE L I K 3 C? 7K2 5L1GI11 P A T H { T l i F C a G I ? ~J,3 ?CI!IT3 07 I"") i10''1]- A = { X 3 * Y 2 3 3 Q *• : < 1 * X 2 3 3 Q + Y 1 3 * Y 2 3 * X 2 3 } / D S I I C X I = { Y3*X23SQ * Y 1 * Y 2 3 S O * X13*X2.1*Y23 } / - D F K C . 1 . HO-"?"-' IIOP304' D E T E R ^ I H E LOCATIO" 0? II*Tj!nCHPT K I T H F"SP^CT TO 1HZ 7,"~ P O I ^ I T S , I.E., IS T H 2 IST2P.C2P7 CK TH2 LEG 02 B ! Y C " D THE E I I D 20I!CTS m?^'-.f J^^Tl X5=X3 IF ( X 4 . G £ . X 5 ) G O TO 20 H - X5=X2 20 IF (Xa.LT.S) GO TO 30 IF IXS.r-T. X) GOTO M !1C?0-" °??rC KOP057 HO.O s7 HOP15? Y5=Y3 IF (Y4.GS. Y 5 J G O TO 30 Y5=Y2 30 IF (YS.LT. Y ) G O TO -40 IF (1S.GT. 1 * ) G O ' T O «l3 C C C c - IKTE3CEPT IS OK T H E LEG - DTSIAEC2 Fill 3Z T K E r2!>?"%'DICULAr DIST F20H TIO OKI? LCCA7IOU TO THE FLIGHT P A T H • . HOPXX1=X-X1 • "3 — "r HOP"' • P n ;; ••-"HO?"' I N T T R C F P T IS B3Y011D TI1~ Siin POi:!T1 - D I S I A ' X E V I I L P^ TI'H D T f T \!lC"l!or "!' PEO« TK1 U'JIT L O C A T I O N TO THE SHAF.EST USD FCI'^T YY1=Y-Y1 D = XS1**\Al * YY1*YY1 D=SQRT(D) EHTOIJ'J H0? - i|0 X13F,Q=:<13*X13 Y13S2=Y13*Y13 Ol=X13S2*Yl3f.Q Y125Q=Y12*Y12. D2=X12SQ+Y12SQ " " ^ - D=D1 IF (D2.LT, D) D-D2 J>=SQHT (3) HI: TOR!: . •. !!0?0: HOPO-- HOPOf nopof l!OP:1f �fit": HOP? Fortran PI ens VHSSTON 3.3 20 JULY 1975 EffD SUEEOOII'IE :,'DAT2{ID,IDA) ~ tO¥EHf :!OP050* !!OP3f>(V ' YE/Mr/DA DA12 IHTO A SZQ-JT57IAI, DATE DIM2HSIO!: I I > { 3 ) , I X ( 1 2 ) DATA 1:1/0, 3 1, 5 9 f 0 0 , 1 2 0 , 151, 1 8 1 ,2 1 2 , 2 U 3 , 273, 301,33«/ I^POAOH On 36 1H0?36r !'-?06 V IOA=355* ( I D { 1 ) -6 r >) +IS (ID (2) ) *ID ( 3 J - 2 1 3 I" (IDA-9'12) 4 0 , 2 0 , 3 0 ^ 'iOPIt'r "a?06r i c c C ACCOOilTH FOI? IT!1? 7 S A H 29 :c*'')5i' F H S 68 23 I? ( I D C 2 } - H : 2 , 1 ) 00 TO 30 GO TO (40 . "0?061 . * MOP051' :i .")-"> 0-3 2 aO EETOEH 50 I D A = - 1 E21IIS:! ' "OTO->,":. "r-;?')'2-' I*ap052 HC7062 C C01.TEST A SE2*J72fTIAL D A T E IIITC A Y R / S 1 I / D A C A T 2 c DII1EN510!! I:! ( 1 2 ) DATA i : V 3 3 « / 3 - ) ^ , 2 7 3 , 2 ^ 3 , 2 1 2 , 1 6 1 , 1 ' 1 , 1 2 0 , 9 0 , 5 9 , 3 1 / 0 / ID=ID+213 IF (in-952) 33,1 0, 20 :iO?062 HO ? 0 - 5 2 ' *:irOc 3 C C ACCOUNTS FOR L E A ? YE31E 29 ?EB 6S C 10 13=680229 EI310R1! 20 ID-ID-1 30 I=ID/365 ' • 1=1 + 65 ' DO »IO JJ = 1,12 . J=JJ I P { I D . 3 T . I H ( J J ) ) G O ID 50 WO COSTING 50 K=ID-I!1(J) J-13-J 10 = 10000*1 * 103*J + K BE73S3 EJD • "OPO-,, HOPO-'HOP06HOP06-' HOPO-V* :H)?3r4 HOP064. HOPOt)-; IlOPO^n^ ! *"^ er � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Alvin L. Young Collection on Agent Orange Description An account of the resource <p style="margin-top: -1em; line-height: 1.2em;">The Alvin L. Young Collection on Agent Orange comprises 120 linear feet and spans the late 1800s to 2005; however, the bulk of the coverage is from the 1960s to the 1980s and there are many undated items. The collection was donated to Special Collections of the National Agricultural Library in 1985 by Dr. Alvin L. Young (1942- ). Dr. Young developed the collection as he conducted extensive research on the military defoliant Agent Orange. The collection is in good condition and includes letters, memoranda, books, reports, press releases, journal and newspaper clippings, field logs and notebooks, newsletters, maps, booklets and pamphlets, photographs, memorabilia, and audiotapes of an interview with Dr. Young.</p> <p>For more about this collection, <a href="/exhibits/speccoll/exhibits/show/alvin-l--young-collection-on-a">view the Agent Orange Exhibit.</a></p> Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Box The box containing the original item. 017 Folder The folder containing the original item. 0183 Series The series number of the original item. Series II Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Chapman, R.W. Description An account of the resource <strong>Corporate Author: </strong>DCA-CCTC-C312, Washington, D.C. Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource July 28 1976 Title A name given to the resource Herbicide Orange Proximity Program (HOPP) Subject The topic of the resource Ranch Hand herbicide application human exposure https://www.nal.usda.gov/exhibits/speccoll/files/original/47a7e0307c6335f6255e68dd91fa9ac9.pdf 155e16fff18ea7a7f77de1e6ead1ca5c PDF Text Text Item ID Number 00230 Author Clifford J. Horkans Corporate Author Report/Article Title Typescript: Insecticide Spraying in Ninh Thuan Province, 4 October 1971 Journal/Book Title Year 000 ° Month/Day Color n Number of Images 1 DeSOriptOD Notes Note: There was no letter attached as referenced in the typescript. Monday, January 22, 2001 Page 242 of 341 �(7 Of- "* "k'r *.C, 11 Insecticide Spraying in Jfinh Thuan Province 315CS6 f'JC) L. Telecon fo*ti«en Major *ioux (313 TAJ* DOC-S) and Major Carrestia (MACV KfttOHolofiet) provided the following bleu of information *?hi*h *ay b* helpful in answering the eewJOTWJ paragraph of the «tfe«eh*J letter, «. Yher* la no connection between any crop damaga «r • the us* of tsa lath ion. This e«n b« readily suhstsntiAtad by -rnagron««Bi*t but it ia doubtful that th« f^owlace chi«f h«» anvo»* with that background available to hisn for conaattation. b. 0«r spray cr«ws have b««tt Eoid to start «nd stop spraying ntli within the confine* of the p*ri»#t«r of th« ba»«. This ha» c«it«ed no redaction ia th« effectivenea* of th® spraying bet should shcsw our good inreatioas. craft alwayt ofwir«t« *& low l*vel», aitproxiaMtely 150 f««t abov« th* terrain. To operate at a higher level a«je>t*s t value of apraying at all. It would he virtually to plan our spray operetlon around th* vimi blowlag o«t the north; ho*?*v*r, we <So not spray anytia* the wind 8 knots, »o lietle if any drifting should occur, c, Th® concentration o.t «slathiott if one half pound pa acre to b« sprayed and chat is exactly the sa»e anetmt u**d to 0pf«y l*R<i back in th© states. We have no r«c»rd«d co!3p frofe che etates referencing crap damage. U»ing tbat solution, the r,vfi lath ion i« 93% effective aad in Actual .fact, probe bl v k i l l s many o'.'^r living ia^-ecta that co1.;:. ;i be hernful to crop*, 2. Tt further info route ion or guidar.ee i *. d*eir«4, contact Major Carres tie. at USA8V Hesdquactcrig, Long Binh, ptione 923-2043 or call Major Rioux, 3i5th'TAK B0€ ac «xtenaion 3411. nil'. CLIFFORD J. HOKUM, Colonel, USAF 1 A&eh Deputy OMMUMlejr for Operation* Siah item Ada Off, 25 fep LOT Wt »t«lt. ^ , • � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Alvin L. Young Collection on Agent Orange Description An account of the resource <p style="margin-top: -1em; line-height: 1.2em;">The Alvin L. Young Collection on Agent Orange comprises 120 linear feet and spans the late 1800s to 2005; however, the bulk of the coverage is from the 1960s to the 1980s and there are many undated items. The collection was donated to Special Collections of the National Agricultural Library in 1985 by Dr. Alvin L. Young (1942- ). Dr. Young developed the collection as he conducted extensive research on the military defoliant Agent Orange. The collection is in good condition and includes letters, memoranda, books, reports, press releases, journal and newspaper clippings, field logs and notebooks, newsletters, maps, booklets and pamphlets, photographs, memorabilia, and audiotapes of an interview with Dr. Young.</p> <p>For more about this collection, <a href="/exhibits/speccoll/exhibits/show/alvin-l--young-collection-on-a">view the Agent Orange Exhibit.</a></p> Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Box The box containing the original item. 019 Folder The folder containing the original item. 0230 Series The series number of the original item. Series II Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Clifford J. Horkans Title A name given to the resource Typescript: Insecticide Spraying in Ninh Thuan Province, 4 October 1971 Subject The topic of the resource crop damage pesticide application Ranch Hand Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Alvin L. Young Collection on Agent Orange Description An account of the resource <p style="margin-top: -1em; line-height: 1.2em;">The Alvin L. Young Collection on Agent Orange comprises 120 linear feet and spans the late 1800s to 2005; however, the bulk of the coverage is from the 1960s to the 1980s and there are many undated items. The collection was donated to Special Collections of the National Agricultural Library in 1985 by Dr. Alvin L. Young (1942- ). Dr. Young developed the collection as he conducted extensive research on the military defoliant Agent Orange. The collection is in good condition and includes letters, memoranda, books, reports, press releases, journal and newspaper clippings, field logs and notebooks, newsletters, maps, booklets and pamphlets, photographs, memorabilia, and audiotapes of an interview with Dr. Young.</p> <p>For more about this collection, <a href="/exhibits/speccoll/exhibits/show/alvin-l--young-collection-on-a">view the Agent Orange Exhibit.</a></p> Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Box The box containing the original item. 050 Folder The folder containing the original item. 1325 Series The series number of the original item. Series III Subseries II Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Conrad, Charles J. Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1981-07-01 Title A name given to the resource Typescript: The Agent Orange Hoax Subject The topic of the resource Ranch Hand veteran health and hygiene dioxin Southeast Asia ao_seriesIII https://www.nal.usda.gov/exhibits/speccoll/files/original/d4561d74b5ee7a4024ca19182efa3d1c.pdf 4ed2dc3f41201507d57abb4a9481d4cd PDF Text Text Item ID Number 00207 Darrow, Robert A. Corporate Author Report/Article Title Typescript: Report of Trip to Republic of Vietnam, 15 August - 2 September 1969 Journal/Book Title Year 1969 Month/Day September 23 Color ri Number of Images 22 Descriptor! Notes SMUFD-PSL-PH Monday, January 22, 2001 Page 219 of 341 �DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY FORT DETRICK FREDERICK. MARYLAND 21701 IN REPLY REFER TO. 23 September 1969 |f SMUFD-PSL-PH SUBJECT: Report of Trip to Republic of Vietnam, 15 August-2 September 1969 101743 SEE DISTRIBUTION 1. Purpose of Trip: a. To assist US and Republic of Vietnam (RVN) personnel in RVN in recognitiion of herbicide damage on vegetable crops, tree fruits and rubber as differentiated from insect and disease damage. b. To become familiar at firsthand with all operational phases of the defoliation and crop destruction programs in RVN. c. To provide technical assistance in the application and use of vegetation control agents to Chemical Operations Division personnel and other military and civilian personnel associated with the defoliation program. d. To assess the effects of the recent policy suspension on the use of agent WHITE for defoliation. 2. Personnel Contacted: COL LTC MAJ MAJ MAJ H. J. G. L. C. C. E. J. E. A. Kinne, Jr., Chief, MACV, Chemical Operations Division, J-3 Adams, Deputy Chief, MACV and III Corps Chemical Operations Altom, IV Corps Chemical Operations Salomon, I Corps Chemical Operations H. Waller, II Corps Chemical Operations 3. Itinerary of Inspections: a. 15 August 1969 - Arrival at Saigon, MACV J-3, Chemical Operations Division (1) In discussions of the current defoliant program with the personnel of MACV Chemical Operations Division, J-3 Group, COL Kinne briefed the This protective marking is cancelled on 30 Sep 70. �If •it 114 074 SMUFD-PSL-PH 23 September 1969 SUBJECT: Report of Trip to Republic of Vietnam, 15 August-2 September 1969 team concerning claim problems, the lack of qualified agricultureoriented personnel in-country, and the sites which would be visited during our visit. (2) Following the briefing the team met with Mr. George Anderson of the US Embassy staff. He suggested that many of the damage claims are Viet Cong (VC) inspired as evidenced by the fact that a VC-sponsored school for filling out claim forms has been discovered. He also mentioned that the increase in claims appears to be inspired by the knowledge that claimants are receiving money from the RVN government for claims whether they are valid or not. (3) Mr. Marvin D. Davis, Chief of the Agronomy and Research Branch of the United States Agency for Interriatfional Development (USAID), informed us that only a few personnel qualified to determine chemical damage are in RVN at this time. His major responsibility is in the area of rice production but he has been called in to assess damage claims on various crops and tree fruits throughout the country. The major claims he has heard about are damaged rubber and fruit trees. Some rice claims have been processed in the Delta region near Can Tho. b. 16 August 1969 - Trip made by staff car from Saigon to Bien Hoa, Long Binh and return with COL Kinne and LTC Adams. Primary purpose of the trip was to inspect facilities and operations of the 12th Special Operations Squadron in Operation RANCH HAND at Bien Hoa. (1) A briefing was held with the group leader, LTC Rex Stoner, and MAJ Buck Trott who reviewed preparation and application techniques. With MAJ Trott the team observed the chemical storage areas, loading areas and the UC-123K aircraft which are used in the spray program. (2) The team met briefly with LTC Del Payne, Chemical Corps Officer, at II Field Force Headquarters at Long Binh. We then visited LTG Julian Ewell, II Field Force Commander and discussed the defoliation program briefly. LTG Ewell stressed the need in III CTZ to reduce defoliation targets in heavily populated areas. c. 17 August 1969 - Trip by helicopter to Cu Chi, Headquarters 25th Division; Lai Khe, Headquarters 1st Division, and Phuoc Vinh, Headquarters 1st Cavalry Division, with COL Kinne and LTC Adams. (1) Cu Chi - Briefing of 25th Division defoliation activities by CPT Ray Bills. (a) We flew a UH-l/D reconnaissance across the Hobo Woods, Boi Loi Woods along the Saigon River near Tri Tarn, returning over Go Dau Ha and Trang Bang to Cu Chi. During this flight we observed results of For Offomf UM Oalj �114 07: SMUFD-PSL-PH 23 September 1969 SUBJECT: Report of Trip to Republic of Vietnam, 15 August-2 September 1969 helicopter spraying (AGRINAUTICS system) with ORANGE on woody vegetation along river banks. Some additional areas were observed which had been sprayed from a Navy boat using a bilge pump and hose sprayer. Extensive areas were observed which had been sprayed by a UG-123. The results of these three types of applications appeared to give excellent defoliation results. (b) At Cu Chi we met with personnel from Tay Ninh Province including Mr. Robinson, Deputy Province Senior Advisor of Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS), CPT Kiernan and CPT Hansen from the 25th Division in Tay Ninh city. Mr. Robinson mentioned that a great deal of the area which had been Rome-plowed is regrowing and will require additional plowing or defoliation. Recovery of the plowed area is very rapid in most areas during the wet season. Mr. Robinson also mentioned that some damage has been reported on.IR-8 rice which was accidentally sprayed with ORANGE along the Oriental River. Some helicopter spraying of diesel fuel for grass control is being done in areas in Tay Ninh Province. (2) Lai Khe - Briefing on defoliation activities of 1st Infantry Division by LTC Herbert Jeo, Chemical Officer. (a) LTC Jeo said that additional information was needed for chemical officers concerning herbicides and their effects on various plant types than is available in the Chemical Corps orientation booklet available from Fort McClellan. (b) On a tour of the base perimeter several types of grass were found including: Napier grass or elephant grass (Pennisetum purpureum). wild sugarcane (Saccharum spontaneum), and Guinea grass (Panicurn maximum). The base area is almost entirely within a rubber plantation. Some areas outside the base were sprayed with ORANGE during April 1969 with ground spray equipment. The treatments drifted toward the base causing the defoliation of a large number of rubber trees. These trees were recovering at the time of the visit. The team recommended that BLUE could be sprayed under rubber trees to control the grass without damage to the rubber. (3) Phuoc Vinh - Briefing on chemical activities of 1st Cavalry Division by LTC P.O. Bauer. (a) On a tour of the base perimeter at Phuoc Vinh, LTC Bauer stated that fuel oil has been used as a ground spray because JLUE was not available. " (b) With LTC Bauer we made an aerial reconnaissance over the northern part of Tay Ninh Province. We flew over the Michelin Rubber Plantation. Portions of this plantation appeared to be dead or dying from plant For Offitiil �101746 SMUFD-PSL-PH -•...... 23 September 1969 SUBJECT: Report of Trip to Republic of Vietnam, 15 August-2 September 1969 pathogens and lack of care. We landed at LZ Grant, a forward artillery position of the 1st Cavalry Division, and toured the perimeter. Grasses noted in the perimeter area included: Pangola grass (Digitaria sp.), windmill grass (Chloris sp.). and Guinea grass (Panicum maximum) . This landing zone had an urgent need for an effective method of grass control. Because of its isolated location in a forested area, the control of perennial grasses in the perimeter area could be effectively achieved for periods of 6 to 12 months by use of a soil-applied herbicide such as bromacil. Within an hour after the departure of our team from LZ Grant, the CO was shot from ambush. d. 18 August 1969 - The team made a courtesy call to COL Tho of the Joint General Staff (JGS), RVN and MAJ Bom, the J-3 Chemical Officer at Tan Son Nhut. In the afternoon a visit was made -to the Ministry of Agriculture in Saigon. Discussions were held with Mr. Thai Cong Tung, the Director of Agricultural Research, and Mr. Pham Hieu Anh, Chief Soil Scientist. These provided the team with specialized vegetation and soils maps of RVN. They were very cooperative and offered help in identification of plant specimens and in providing other information concerning agriculture. e. 19 August 1969 - Trip by U-21 to Can Tho and Binh Thuy AFB, IV CTZ, and return with COL Kinne. Met by MAJ Gil Altom and MAJ Paul Gardner, IV Corps Chemical Advisor. (1) During the flight to Can Tho, areas of defoliation were observed in the Delta area along canals and rivers. The observed areas showed good defoliation and yet crops in the area appeared to be undamaged. (a) Inspection was made of the Can Tho market to review the wide variety of tree fruits, vegetables and root crops grown in the Delta area. Due to the great importance of rice and other agricultural crops in the IV CTZ as a source of food for other parts of the country, no crop destruction activity is undertaken in this Corps Zone. Defoliation targets are principally of mangrove and other woody vegetation along rivers and canals with ORANGE as the basic agent used. (b) In a briefing by Mr. G. D. Rohlfs, Chief Regional Agricultural Advisor, CORDS, progress in the agricultural assistance programs was reviewed. The new variety of rice IR-8 is being established on 109,000 hectares with a projected yield of over 5 metric tons per hectare in contrast to local variety yields of less than 2 metric tons per hectare. Seventy-five percent of the nation's rice is produced on 1.5 million hectares of rice land in the Delta region. Livestock production in Region IV dominates the local market with 75% of the chickens and hogs, 80% of the ducks, and 707, of the cattle and buffalo. These livestock Qff».'fl n ***«-im U v �101747 SMUFD-PSL-PH 23 September 1969 SUBJECT: Report of Trip to Republic of Vietnam, 15 August-2 September 1969 •-•-.-.industries are dependent on rice mill waste as the primary source of feed. Introduction of purebred swine and chickens is an Important phase of the agricultural development program for the region. Prices for local poultry and hogs are high by US standards. (2) At Binh Thuy AFB we were met by Mr. Fred Gross of PACAF and CPT Powell, USAF, who are involved with the control of vegetation on air base perimeters. (a) Observations were made along the perimeter road on the west side of the Binh Thuy AFB of areas aerially treated with Kenapon (Dalapon ester) and BLUE. Treated areas consisted of principally perennial grasses and reeds growing in flooded or partially flooded soils. The area east of the road in the strip between the road and the airport runway had been sprayed with 5 gal/A of Kenapon on 13 March 1969 and a subsequent treatment with 3 gal/A of Kenapon made on 13 August 1969. On the perimeter strip west of the road, it was reported that four applications of BLUE at 3 gal/A had been made in 1969, followed by a final application of Kenapon at 3 gal/A on 13 August 1969. (b) It was reported that the initial March 1969 treatment with .Kejciapon had given a longer period of grass control than corresponding treatments with BLUE. At the time of our observations, both areas showed the effect of the 6-day-old Kenapon retreatment and no significant differences were noted in the areas treated with BLUE and with Kenapon. f. 20 August 1969 - Trip by helicopter with COL Kinne and LTC Adams to Tay Ninh City, Tay Ninh Province, III CTZ for coordination meeting with District Chief and ARVN personnel on proposed defoliation targets. (1) Personnel present at the meeting included MAJ Bom and CPT Thao of JGS, MAJ H. J. Thomas, the III Corps Chemical Advisor, and CPT McAdams, Intelligence Officer from the 12th SOS group at Bein Hoa. (2) Discussions of the proposed target pointed up the restrictions in UC-123 defoliation missions due to the proximity of cultivated crops. A portion of the proposed target could be sprayed by UC-123's and remaining localized areas would be completed by helicopter spraying. g. 21 August 1969 - Tour of perimeter of Tan Son Nhut Air Base with Mr. Fred Gross of PACAF and CPT Palmer of the civil engineering group. (1) BLUE has been used to control grass along the perimeter but rice crops have been planted up to the fence. A small test which had been conducted with BLUE and Kenapon in 1968 was observed. This test area was not clearly defined because of the spillage of fuel oil or other contaminants in the area. E.v- f\ ££'..- jt Oriy �SMUFD-PSL-PH 23 September 1969 SUBJECT: Report of.Trip to Republic of Vietnam, 15 August-2 September 1969 . (2) Extensive damage to shade trees and fruit trees was observed outside the perimeter caused by an ARVN ground spray application of ORANGE on 29 July 1969. Application of 17 drums of undiluted ORANGE was made by Buffalo turbine during a high wind and thus the chemical drifted outside the fence. h. 22 August 1969 - Trip by staff car to Bien Hoa with COL Kinne and LTC Adams, and by jeep from Bien Hoa to Xuan Loc and Headquarters, 199th Brigade and return trip to Bein Hoa was to attend coordination meeting at Xuan Loc on proposed defoliation targets in Long Khanh Province. Personnel at the coordination meeting in Xuan Loc included MAJ H. J. Thomas, III CTZ Chemical Officer, CPT Thao of JGS and MAJ J. Calvert, 199th Brigade Chemical Officer. (1) At 199th Brigade Headquarters no inspection of base camp perimeter or other chemical activities was possible because of heavy rains. (2) Observations were made enroute from Bien Hoa to Xuan Loc of low stature crops including rice, beans, melons and peanuts which had been planted by local farmers in the 200- to 300-meter wide Rome-plowed strips on both sides of Highway 1. This practice of maintaining a low stature cover along roadsides is compatible with current military requirements and can be expected to play an Important role in agricultural development in the projected pacification program. i. 23 August 1969 - RANCH HAND defoliation mission flights in Phuoc Long Province III CTZ. Return to Saigon by Staff car with COL Kinne and LTC Adams. j. 24-26 August 1969 - Trip to I and II CTZ with COL Kinne and MAJ Salomon; by U-21 from Saigon to Chu Lai, Headquarters Americal Division; by helicopter to Tarn Ky and LZ Bronco and return to Chu Lai; 25 August - by UC-123 RANCH HAND plane in reconnaissance in I CTZ including Sa Due District, Hue, DMZ, Khe Sanh, A Shau Valley and Da Nang; then to Qui Nhon; 26 August - by helicopter from Qui Nhon to An Khe, Headquarters, 1st Brigade, 4th Division; return to Saigon by U-21. (1) Chu Lai - Americal Division Headquarters (a) Personnel contacted included: MG James Ramsey; BG Powell; COL Donaldson, Chief of Staff; LTC W. C. Gibbons, Chemical Officer, Americal Division. (b) Following an orientation on chemical activities by LTC Gibbons we were briefed by COL Donaldson on general division actions. jt 0% �101740 SMUFD-PSL-PH 23 September 1969 SUBJECT: Report of Trip to Republic of Vietnam, 15 August-2 September 1969 (c) BG Powell stressed the urgency of securing replacement parts for the three AGRINAUTIGS spray systems of the Anerical Division. Only one unit was functional due to delays in securing replacement parts for the windmill pumps. An active program of helicopter defoliation had been carried on by the Americal Division and a continued high level of defoliation and crop destruction effort was projected in planned programs. (d) MG Ramsey spoke highly of the defoliation program, indicating its advantages in the divisional operations. (2) Tarn Ky - Brief meeting with MAJ Rothrock and MAJ John W. Kelly, the leader and Chemical Corps Advisor of the Province Advisory Group. MAJ Kelly had earlier experience in Thailand with defoliation tests conducted there by Fort Detrick. (3) LZ Bronco - We then flew south to LZ Bronco where we picked up CPT Grady, Chemical Corps Officer, with whom an aerial reconnaissance was made of 1969 defoliation on San Juan Hill, west of Due Pho, Quang Ngai Province. Evidence indicated that the VC were putting in small rice fields in deep valleys and on hillsides. We then flew over Due Pho and down "Ambush Alley" along Highway 1 in extreme south Quang Ngai Province and observed the results of helicopter spraying. Areas which had been- sprayed by helicopter 2 and 4 weeks previous showed excellent defoliation. The rugged topography of this localized site pointed up the necessity of spraying by helicopter in such critical areas. We flew over LZ Charlie Brown and returned north to LZ Bronco and after a short stop returned to Chu Lai. (4) Reconnaissance flight from Chu Lai to Da Nang and Qhi Nhon The team left Chu Lai on 25 August and flew with MAJ Vergene Ford of the RANCH HAND group at Da Nang. We flew the UC-123 over an area in the Hau Due district near Nong Son in which claims had been received for damaged crops and dead animals. The chemical damage from agent ORANGE all fell within the target area. Sensitive plants such as banana adjacent to the target area were not damaged. Small areas located northeast of the target area had been burned by fire. Additional crop targets were observed in the Tien Phuoc District and on Go Noi Island west of Hoi An. Both areas showed effective control. (a) The UC-123 reconnaissance flight was continued north of Da Nang to Hue, Quang Tri and the Demilitarized Zone. Overflights were made of Khe Sanh, A Shau Valley and other defoliation targets in Thua Thien Province. Effective defoliation had been secured by UC-123 flights over rugged topography on lower valley slopes and in clearing ridge tops peripheral to fire support bases and observation posts. Offidnl Urn Only �115 070 SMUFD-PSL-PH 23 September 1969 SUBJECT: Report of Trip to Republic of Vietnam, 15 August-2 September 1969 Although defoliation targets were widely scattered in this mountainous part of I Corps, their military value in protection of landing zones and fire support bases in advanced positions of friendly troops was readily apparent. Extensive areas of new road construction in the A Shau Valley were provided security by defoliation on both sides of the new right-of-way. (b) After lunch at Da Nang the UC-123 flight was continued with termination at Qui Nhon. (5) Qui Nhon, Binh Dinh Province, II CTZ (a) Personnel Contacted: MAJ C. A. H. Waller, II Corps, MACV, Chemical Operations Division and W. B. McCully, Agricultural Advisor, CORDS. (b) Trip was made by staff car to the village of An Nhon, north of Qui Nhon and to a demonstration planting of improved agricultural crops several kilometers west of Qui Nhon on Highway 19 to An Khe. (c) In discussions of the agriculture of the area, Mr. McCully stated that 12,000 hectares of the new IR-8 rice were to be planted in 1969. (d) Improved crops seen at the demonstration farm included IR-8 rice, sweet corn, sorghum, sweet potatoes, squash and peanuts. (e) Observations were made along Highway 19 of extensive damage of rice due to leakage of diesel fuel from the surface pipeline between Qui Nhon and Pleiku. (6) An Khe - Headquarters, 1st Brigade, 4th Division (a) Personnel Contacted: MAJ Charles Roberts, Chemical Officer, 4th Division, Pleiku and CPT Bailey, Chemical Advisor, An Khe. (b) At the An Tuc District office, the District Chief and CPT Bailey reviewed recent claims of crop damage alleged to be due to herbicides or defoliants. A brief visit by jeep was made to one farm in which damage was reported on peanuts. The peanuts had been harvested but a few residual plants remained in the field. Extensive insect damage was noted on these plants but no chemical damage was observed. Sweet potatoes growing in an adjacent field did not have any chemical injury even though they were closer to the target area. Other sensitive plants in the area were completely healthy. �115 071 SMUFD-PSL-PH 23 September 1969 SUBJECT: Report of Trip to Republic of Vietnam, 15 August-2 September 1969 k. 27 August 1969 - Reviewed the following reports available in the files of Industry Division, USAID at Building B, 45 Nguyen Khac Nhu, Saigon. (1) Vakili, N. G. Response of cultivated plants to herbicide incidence. Report to Victor I Prasisto, Agriculture Branch Director, III CTZ. SECRET. Report dated 18 July 1968. 10 pp, plus 32 photographs, A general report with detailed photographs of herbicide effect on crops and tree fruits based on observations at Bien Hoa and in Binh Long and Phuoc Tuy provinces. (2) Flamm, Barry R. A partial evaluation of herbicidal effects to natural forest stands principally in Tay Ninh Province. Unclassified Report, USAID, dated 15 April 1968. Detailed vegetational composition studies of defoliated and nondefoliated forest areas based on on-site reconnaissance of areas in the vicinity of Special Forces camps at Thien Ngon, Katum, Tong Le Chon, and Bu Dop. It was pointed out that single defoliation treatments, as at Tong Le Chon was not detrimental to timber tree reproduction and that a high percentage of trees showed regrowth. Repeat application of herbicides in 1966 and 1967 as at Katum had severely damaged sawtimber size trees and timber reproduction with an accompanying increase in grasses. 1. 28 August 1969 - Review was made of the damage claims which have been reported to the MACV office during 1968 and 1969. The team flew by UC-123 to Bien Hoa for an awards ceremony for personnel of the 12th SOS group. LTC Stoner, Commanding Officer of the RANCH HAND group was presented the Army Commendation Medal by COL Kinne. Following return to Saigon in early afternoon, a second visit was made to the Ministry of Agriculture to obtain vegetation type maps and literature on the vegetation of Vietnam. m. 29-30 August 1969 - Trip by U-21 from Saigon to Da Nang and return with COL Kinne and MAJ Solomon to inspect herbicide damage on trees and vegetable crops. (1) Personnel contacted: Mr. John Woodward, Agricultural Advisor for Quang Nam Province; Mr. E. M. Stickney, Agricultural Advisor for Region I (CORDS); Mr. Alvin Adams, District Senior Advisor (CORDS), District 3 (South of Da Nang City); Mr. David Chen, Leader of a Chinese vegetable team sponsored by USAID, and MAJ Vergene Ford, USAF group leader of RANCH HAND based at Da Nang. (2) The entire group visited areas which had reported damage from herbicides. The first site was east of the city in Hoa Chong Hamlet, 9 Fjr..0ffiiial ILt 0% �101752 SMUFD-PSL-PH 23 September 1969 SUBJECT: Report of Trip to Republic of Vietnam, 15 August-2 September 1969 a rice growing area. Extensive damage was observed caused by plant pathogens and stem borer insects. No herbicide damage was observed. (3) The group then visited a Catholic church in the hamlet Cam He. The priest claimed that their crops were killed by herbicide spray planes. His description of the planes as silver indicated that he had seen the insecticide spray planes used for mosquito control. Careful inspection showed that slight herbicide damage was in evidence on papaya and mango trees. This damage was probably caused by fumes from empty drums of agent ORANGE which were kept less than 20 feet from the damaged plants. Sensitive weeds in close proximity also had herbicide symptoms. No evidence of damage caused by aerial application of herbicides was noted. (4) The group then visited a village west of Da Nang. At this site there was evidence of herbicide damage on mango and other fruit trees. This damage was scattered and thus appeared to be caused by a leaky valve on a herbicide spray plane. The plants were recovering. (5) The group then visited a village south of Da Nang City which claimed that herbicides had damaged their trees. The trees and crops in the area were suffering from severe drought symptoms. Two jackfruit trees had died during the year but other sensitive species such as Casuarina or Australian pine showed no herbicide damage. No definite implication of herbicide damage could be established. (6) The group then returned to Da Nang City to meet with LTC James Corey of CORDS. During the briefing session, LTC Corey stated that he has taken steps to have the tops and bottoms of all empty herbicide drums punctured, so they will not be suitable for any other use. Empty herbicide drums were noted in all parts of the city; more than a dozen drums were seen within a block of the CORDS office. -> (7) On 30 August the group visited a vegetable growing area at An Hai, east of Da Nang City. The growers were washing off all of the vegetable plants to prevent herbicide damage. This procedure was instituted after the people had seen a silver spray plane fly over, supposedly spraying herbicide. The plane was the mosquito control spray plane which was spraying the insecticide malathion. Several small beds of seedling lettuce were damaged by a damping off plant pathogen but no herbicide damage was observed on any of the vegetable crops in the area. Outside of the area some fruit trees were slightly damaged by herbicide which may have been caused by defective valves on the UC-123 herbicide spray planes. 10 E». Official Uju Duly �101753 SMUFD-PSL-PH 23 September 1969 SUBJECT: Report of Trip to Republic of Vietnam, 15 August-2 September 1969 4. Discussion: a. RANCH HAND Defoliation Program (1) Selection of Targets (a) Requests for defoliation targets originated from a Province Chief, US Field Commander or an ARVN Commander and are staffed from the Province or District level to the ARVN Joint-General Staff (JGS), COMUSMACV and the US Ambassador under procedures outlined in MACV Directive 525-1, Herbicide Operations, dated 12 August 1969. Approved defoliation projects are given a final review at a coordination meeting convened at the province capital by the JGS and attended by the MACV J-3, Chemical Operations Division action officer. (b) The two coordination meetings attended in III CTZ (Tay Ninh and Xuan Loc) were good illustrations of the completeness of review and discussion of selected targets by the Province or District Chief and by the US and ARVN representatives concerned with the defoliation program. The targets considered appeared to be of high priority from a military standpoint. (2) Spray Mission Operation (a) In the two defoliation spray missions in which the team participated as observers, the 12th Special Operations Squadron members showed effective coordination and performance. Some delay was experienced in achieving coordination on target with the fighter plane support furnished by another USAF group. General orbiting in formation was carried out in waiting for fighter support. (b) Execution of a defoliation spray mission requires simultaneous positioning of the Forward Air Controller (FAC), two fighter planes and the UC-123 spray planes at the target coordinates. After the three groups have assembled, the FAC marks with a smoke grenade the target position or initial point at which the spray is to be released. If ground fire is received by any of the UC-123"s while spraying, a smoke signal is dropped by the crew chief to position air strikes by the fighter aircraft. Close coordination of the three aircraft units is thus essential in the accomplishment of the missions. (c) On the return trip from the second mission, leaking spray nozzles were observed on the tail booms of two spray planes, following pull-out at the end of the spray run. In spite of a rigorous program of maintenance of the spray systems including frequent replacement of the nozzle diaphragms, leaking nozzles may occur due to trapped sediment or rapid Tui Olfimi 1A(! �101754 SMUFD-PSL-PH 23 September 1969 SUBJECT: Report of Trip to Republic of Vietnam, 15 August-2 September 1969 deterioration of nozzle diaphragms from the action of the chemical. Following the drop in pressure at spray cutoff, the residual herbicide in the spray boom may be disseminated at high altitudes, causing widespread injury to sensitive plants. A system of reverse valves creating suction at the nozzles has been suggested as a method of elimination of this "leaker" problem. It is our understanding that the Hayes Company, engineers for the original spray system, have included such engineering in the latest modification of the A/A45-Y/1 system. b. Defoliation by Helicopter Spraying (1) Under MACV Directive 525-1, corps and divisional commanders are delegated authority to carry out defoliation operations with US helicopter and the AGRINAUTICS spraying systems which have been issued to each corps and to the field force divisions. These defoliation operations are carried out by divisional chemical officers to reduce ambush possibilities and maintain defensive fields of fire around base camps, fire support bases, landing zones, observation posts, and for localized strip spraying along highways, Rome-plowed areas, river and canal banks and other lines of communication. The divisional chemical officers may also utilize ground-based equipment such as PDDA's, Buffalo turbines and other power or hand-operated sprayers for perimeter spray applications. (2) No observations were made by the team of actual spray operations by divisional chemical officers in any of the four corps zones. Aerial reconnaissance of areas sprayed in 1969 made in I, II and III Corps Zones, showed effective results with this highly maneuverable equipment. (3) All divisional chemical officers contacted were strongly in favor of the use of helicopter spray systems and had heavy demands for the use of the AGRINAUTICS equipment on hand. Some of the deficiencies in the equipment were pointed out such as the inability to use a full tank of chemical, reduction of pressure from the wind-driven pump at low speeds, inadequate spray coverage on turns, leaking booms and pipe connections due to vibration and rapid decline in efficiency of the windmill pumps. Lack of replacement parts in some divisions was seriously hampering the effective operation of the spray systems. (4) In general there appeared to be a need for improved engineering of a spray system of more rugged structure and designed to better conform to available space in the UH-1B/D aircraft in relation to center of gravity and weight-and-balance relations. (5) Observations of the defoliation effects of helicopter spraying in the rugged mountain topography of I CTZ strongly emphasized the military advantage of this type of chemical application in providing �115 075 SMUFD-PSL-PH 23 September 1969 SUBJECT: Report of Trip to Republic of Vietnam, 15 August-2 September 1969 protection to friendly troops. Helicopters were invaluable in conducting spray applications in critical highway areas such as "Ambush Alley" in southern Quang Gnai Province and at innumerable landing zones and fire support bases in the advanced positions of friendly troops. c. Availability and Use of Agents ORANGE and WHITE (1) At the time of the team inspection, herbicides available in-country were ORANGE and WHITE for defoliation and BLUE for use in crop destruction and grass control. Prior to April 1969 agent WHITE had been used exclusively on defoliation targets near active rubber plantations. Following suspension of this practice in April 1969, ORANGE has been used for all defoliation targets and supplies of WHITE conserved until further notice. At the time of this change, ample supplies of ORANGE were available and no additional procurement of WHITE was anticipated. (2) Review of the rubber and crop damage claim files at MACV J-3 for the years 1968 and 1969 showed that there was no appreciable difference in the number or nature of damage claims which could be related to the exclusive use of ORANGE near active rubber plantations. From the j&~ evidence at hand, either ORANGE or WHITE can be safely used near rubber plantations under procedures outlined in MACV Directive 525-1. Alternative use of WHITE to utilize in-country stocks would thus appear to be justified. d. Need for Effective Agent(s) for Perennial Grass Control (1) One of the major problems encountered in visits to various division areas was the need for an effective agent for control of large perennial grasses. Tall grasses, commonly called elephant grass because of their height (6 to 12 or more feet), often form dense stands following tree clearing around base camps, installation perimeters, minefields, etc. Weedy grasses grow rapidly under monsoon conditions and create excellent ambush sites and protective cover for enemy infiltration of base camps and other installations. (2) During the inspection tour, three types of area were observed in which control of perennial grasses presented a major problem. (a) Tall reeds and marshy grasses growing under more or less permanently flooded conditions. Example: Binh Thuy Air Base perimeter near Can Tho, IV CTZ. This situation involving perimeter areas of low marshy or poorly drained land occurs in the Delta region and to some extent in coastal lowland areas or along major drainages. Collection and identification of the 13 �115 076 SMUFD-PSL-PH 23 September 1969 SUBJECT: Report of Trip to Republic of Vietnam, 15 August-2 September 1969 ~ ••-• major grasses was not possible at Binh Thuy Air Base because of the flooded condition in the wide perimeter strip. At least three species attained heights of 10 to 12 feet or more including: Common reed (Phragmites karka ) , wild cane (Saccharum spontaneum) , and Napier grass (Pennisetum purpureum) . Intermediate height grasses (4 to 8 ft) included: Sorghum (Sorghum sp.)» Guinea grass (Panicum maximum) and cup grass (Eripchloa sp.). (b) Upland or well drained sites in perimeters of landing zones, fire support bases, Special Forces camps, etc. in nonagricultural areas or cleared forest. Example: LZ Grant, 1st Cavalry Division, Tay Ninh Province. Areas of this type would include most of the forward positions, artillery and fire support bases in upland or mountainous areas in I, II, and III CTZ in which there are no rubber plantations, tree fruits or cultivated crops in close priximity to military installations. Portions of the Demilitarized Zone would be considered in this category. Grasses observed in these locations included: Guinea grass Sorghum, Johnson grass Sorghum ' Napier grass, elephant grass Goosegrass Crowfoot grass Paragrass Bermuda grass Jungle-rice Panicum maximum Sorghum halepense Sorghum aff ine Pennisetum purpureum E leus ine indica Dactyloctenium aegyptium Brachiaria mut ica Cynodon dactylon Echinochloa colonum (c) Upland or well-drained sites in base perimeters or installations in close proximity to rubber, tree fruits, crops and other desirable 'vegetation. Examples: Tan Son Nhut Air Base, Long Binh, Headquarters of 1st Division at Lai Khe in Binh Duong Province. This category would include the permanent type installations in which crop or agricultural land adjoins the perimeter area and in which shade trees, rubber trees, tree fruits and other cultivated plants are maintained within the base. This type would occur in all four Corps Tactical Zones. Grasses and other vegetation in the base or camp perimeter areas are similar to those in the previous category. Additional species identified at specific locations include: Tan Son Nhut Crabgrass Lovegrass Plumegrass Digitaria sp. Eragrr stis gangetica Erianthus fastigiata �101757 SMUFD-PSL-PH 23 September 1969 SUBJECT: Report of Trip to Republic of Vietnam, 15 August-2 September 1969 Lai Khe Vetiver Bristlegrass Vetiyeria, sp. Setaria sp. (3) Currently agent BLUE is the only chemical available in-country which may be used for control of grasses in the three situations outlined. Experience has shown most perennial grasses (including all of the larger forms called elephant grass) show rapid regrowth following helicopter or ground spray application of BLUE. Under conditions in which BLUE has been unavailable and in base camp perimeters with crops or desirable vegetation in close proximity, diesel fuel has been effectively applied for short-term kill back of grasses. (4) Two additional types of chemicals, available commercially but not designated as military vegetation control agents, are effective in the control of perennial grasses. These are grass herbicides and soilapplied herbicides for total vegetation control. (a) Grass herbicides, such as dalapon, are systemic herbicides selectively more effective on grasses than on broadleaf vegetation. Kenapon a liquid ester formulation of dalapon containing 5 pounds active ingredient per gallon, has been experimentally applied at Tan Son Nhut Air Base in \ \;AV 1968 and at Binh Thuy Air Base in 1968 and 1969, in comparative tests y with agent BLUE. Kenapon was reported to have given some systemic root ^••' kill of grasses in contrast to the "burn" or topkill by BLUE, with a ,i '•'"' s$ delay in regrowth for 2 months or more. From the limited tests in i \ Vietnam, Kenapon offers some promise as a chemical for grass control and ?V-. !.,.*—further trials and research and development are warranted. Aii initial •*' treatment at 20 to 25 Ib/A (4 to 5 gal/A) with follow-up or maintenance applications at 15 Ib/A (3 gal/A) at 4- to 6-month intervals appear to be needed. Under the flooded conditions at Binh Thuy Air Base, the larger reeds and grasses growing in deeper water were not as effectively controlled by either Kenapon or BLUE as the intermediate grasses on better drained sites. (b) Soil-applied herbicides are residual herbicides that are absorbed through the root system and may give control for periods of 4 to 12 months. Bromacil, Tandex, and monuron are representative chemicals in this group. Bromacil or Hyvar and Tandex, commercially available as 80% wettable powders, are broad spectrum soil-applied herbicides effective in the control of grasses and broadleaf herbaceous and woody plants. Under temperate zone conditions applications of 12 to 25 Ib/A give effective control of most grasses. On the basis of limited tests in Hawaii and Puerto Rico under tropical conditions, 30 Ib/A or more of bromacil or Tandex may be required for control of the larger grasses 15 �58 1UFD-PSL-PH 23 September 1969 JBJECT: Report of Trip to Republic of -Vietnam, 15 August-2 September 1969 - ueh as Guinea grass, Napier grass, etc. There is an urgent need for valuation of these two chemicals under Vietnam conditions. Bromacil .s also available in liquid formulation and as a 10% pellet for hand •r aerial broadcast. Tandex may be made available in granular formu.ations. Monuron or Telvar has been used extensively in temperate ireas. It is effective for control of grasses at rates of 50 Ib/A or nore. For tropical situations bromacil or Tandex are preferred over nonuron on the basis of lower cost and rates of application. e. Areas Suggested Improvements in Methods of Grass Control in Perimeter (1) In perimeter areas subject to flooding under monsoon conditions, the taller reed-type grasses are often so dense that the vegetation may remain standing after topkill by aerial application of BLUE. The dead vegetation may remain erect for some time and is resistant to removal by burning under the high moisture conditions. On such areas or portions of perimeters without fences or mine installations, the excess top growth should be removed by bulldozing and/or burning during the dry season. Subsequent repeated applications of BLUE or Kenapon may be made to keep down regrowth. At permanent military installations, landfill to eliminate the flooded areas might be feasible so that periodic bulldozing or Rome-plowing could be used'for vegetation control. (2) In perimeters of temporary bases and landing zones in nonagricultural areas, soil-applied or residual herbicides such as bromacil and Tandex are strongly recommended to provide longer periods of grass control without repeat applications as required with agent BLUE or diesel fuel. These materials can be applied in liquid sprays or dry granular or pellet formulations. The residual action of these herbicides is dependent upon soil type, rate of application, and the amount and distribution of rainfall influencing leaching. Effective control can be obtained for periods of one year under tropical conditions. A limited use program under approval authority of MAGV J-3 Chemical Operations Division would ensure proper use and restriction of the suggested agents to nonagricultural areas. (3) R&D tests in both CONUS and tropical OCONUS locations have shown that various kinds of grass such as Napier or elephant grass, Guinea grass and wild cane show selectivity in control with agents such as Kenapon, bromacil and Tandex. Rates of application of bromacil, for example, effective for control of wild cane may not be sufficient to control Guinea grass. Experience has shown that BLUE may be effective in control of some short-lived grasses but repeat applications are needed for most perennials under tropical conditions. It is suggested 16 �SMUFD-PSL-PH 23 September 1969 SUBJECT: Report of Trip to Republic of Vietnam, 15 August-2 September 1969 - that divisional chemical officers make comparative tests of several rates of application of BLUE and of Kenapon or the soil-applied herbicides on an experimental basis to determine suitable control measures for the specific mixture of grasses present at their respective locations. f. Herbicide Damage on Crops, Fruit Trees and Shade Trees (1) Inspections were made of several cases of alleged herbicide damage in the Da Nang and An Khe areas in company with CORDS agricultural advisors, US chemical officers and RVN district or village chiefs or their representatives. In addition aerial reconnaissance was made of the Sa Due area in which alleged herbicide damage occurred in cropland from direct spray application beyond the river marking the terminus of the UC-123 defoliation target. Herbicide damage on shade trees was also observed in the general vicinity of Bien Hoa. (2) A review of possible causes of herbicide damage on crops and other desirable vegetation on nontarget areas shows the following assessment for the conditions observed: (a) Direct spray application due to navigational errors or incorrect mapping coordinates. The chances of herbicide damage from direct RANCH HAND or helicopter spray application are extremely small. The position of RANCH HAND targets is marked by the FAG who is thoroughly knowledgeable of the area and the location of crops and other nontarget vegetation. In most RANCH HAND missions the two lead planes have navigators who check accurately on the position of the target coordinates. In the case of helicopter applications by divisional chemical officers, preliminary ground and aerial reconnaissance made of proposed target areas prior to spraying insures lack of error in placement of spray. One instance was reported to the team of crop damage from helicopter spray application by an ARVN group in IV CTZ due to navigational error. In this particular case the US advisor did not accompany the spray mission. (b) Direct application of herbicide caused by emergency dumps of chemical from UC-123 while in flight. Under extreme situations such as engine failure due to enemy fire or other malfunctioning, emergency dumping of the entire 1000-gallon tankload may be required for the safety of the plane and crew. Examination of Chemical Operations Division files at MACV showed that five such emergency dumps from RANCH HAND planes had occurred in the period since 1 December 1968. One of these dumps had been made at a location 10 kilometers offshore over the South China Sea, south of Bac Lieu Province. The remaining four were within a general radius of 20 to 25 kilometers from Bien Hoa and had been made from elevations of 2000 to 3500 feet. Inspection of one dump location 20 Oll.uml UJL Oulj �101760 SMUFD-PSL-PH 23 September 1969 SUBJECT: Report of Trip to Republic of Vietnam, 15 August-2 September 1969 kilometers up the Song Guai by Marvin Davis, USAID, showed damage to broadleaf fruit trees, palms, and ornamentals and considerable crop loss over an area 1 kilometer long; and 1 kilometer wide. At another location near My Quoi village in Bien Hoa Province on which OMNGE was dumped fromjZSOO feet altitude^ the area of damage was 1 kilometer wide and 2 , to 3 'kilometers long as reported by Marvin Davis, USAID. Citrus, mango llcUiauay, coconut and betelnut were most severely damaged. However, annual crops planted within six weeks after the incident showed no herbicide effect. Severe herbicide damage caused by emergency dumps thus appears to be limited in area affected although lesser damage occurs over a wider area under conditions conducive to drift of spray released at these altitudes. Undoubtedly spray from the emergency dumps that have occurred in the immediate vicinity of Bien Hoa may account for some of the damage to shade trees observed east of that city. (c) Direct application of herbicide from leaking nozzles during overflight of UC-123 or helicopter spray aircraft to or from target area. As stated in the earlier discussion of RANCH HAND operations, leaking nozzles may occur despite a rigorous maintenance and inspection schedule on the UC-123 spray systems. Leaking nozzles are most likely to occur in the return flight following the spray mission due to clogging of the diaphragms and gravity release of the small amount of residual chemical in the booms after pump pressure has been cut back. The extent of herbicide damage by the UC-123 systems on crops and other nontarget vegetation from this cause is not known but it is believed to be of a low order of magnitude, due to the small quantities of herbicide involved and its further dilution with the great altitude of release. Helicopter spray systems are subject to close surveillance before and after spray operations and the incidence of crop damage from this source should be negligible. (d) Spray drift during application to designated defoliation targets. If aerial or ground-based spray operations are conducted in conformance with the procedures outlined in MACV Directive 525-1, the possibilities of damage to crops and desirable vegetation in proximity to targets by drift are negative or extremely negligible. The restrictions in distance to crops, wind velocity and air temperature at the time of spray application and recommended height of spray release from aircraft are all designed with safety factors that should eliminate damage attributable to drift. Spraying under high wind, high temperatures, and/or lapse conditions probably accounts for most of the cases in which damage to crops occurs due to spray drift. (e) Volatility of herbicide vapor from sprayed areas. A detailed discussion of the possible effects of volatility from ORANGE and WHITE is available in Appendix D of the US Embassy-MACV Policy Review of �101761 SMUFD-PSL-PH 23 September 1969 SUBJECT: Report of Trip to Republic of Vietnam, 15 August-2 September 1969 -•- • ......... August 1968. As discussed under the previous section (d) on spray drift, adherence to the procedures outlined in MACV Directive 525-1 should preclude any incidence of damage to crop plants or desirable vegetation in proximity to sprayed areas. The incidents of damage to shade plants on the Tan Son Nhut Air Base perimeters and to rubber trees at Lai Khe caused by perimeter spraying with ORANGE were attributable to direct drift of chemical applied under wind and temperature conditions other than those delineated under the MACV directive and not to volatility from sprayed areas subsequent to application. Thus, under proper application procedures, volatility of herbicides is a negligible factor in causing crop damage. (f) Indiscriminate distribution and use of empty defoliant barrels. Widespread distribution of empty herbicide drums containing residues of as much as 2 to 3 gallons of chemicals has taken place from the two principal RANCH HAND loading sites at Bien Hoa and Da Nang. The transport of these empty drums throughout the cities and adjoining areas and the consequent leakage and volatilization of the residual herbicide has undoubtedly caused considerable damage to shade trees', fruit trees, and other desirable vegetation in the area of dispersal of these drums. Recognition of this problem in Da Nang was given in a report dated 25 March 1969 "Defoliant Damage in Da Nang City" from LTC Jim Corey, Deputy Chief, CORDS/NLD/I CTZ to R. M. Urguhart, Chief, CORDS /NLD/I CTZ, from files of Chemical Operations Division, MACV J3-09. As cited in this report and observed by the team members in the Da Nang area, empty defoliant barrels are widely and abundantly scattered throughout the city and environs . Drums are used as containers for gasoline, diesel fueland water without complete removal of residual chemical. The widespread use of herbicide -contaminated gasoline in motorcycles and other vehicles has undoubtedly contributed substantially to the herbicide damage caused •by volatilization from promiscuous storage of empty drums. The magnitude of the damage problem in the city of Da Nang has led to restrictive measures in the distribution of the drums. A procedure for burial or safe disposal of the contaminated empty drums is needed to prevent continuation of this problem. (3) There is an evident need for well trained agricultural advisors in the CORDS program with backgrounds in entomology, horticulture and pathology qualified to differentiate between herbicide damage and the effects of insects, plant diseases and improper crop culture and management. Such qualified personnel could provide technical assistance in handling claims from Vietnamese residents for alleged herbicide damage and in differentiating between valid herbicide damage and the effects of insects, plant diseases and other conditions causing abnormal growth of crops or desirable vegetation. During the brief inspection tour in the An Khe and Da Nang areas, the team found the following cases of insect or disease damage which the local Vietnamese farmers were 19 .» *»L.QjBllB �101762 SMUFD-PSL-PH 23 September 1969 SUBJECT: Report of Trip to Republic of Vietnam, 15 August - 2 September 1969 attributing to herbicide damage: (a) Leaf roller insect damage on peanuts near An Khe. (b) Stem borer damage causing sterile grain in paddy rice in Hoa Chong near Da Nang. (c) Oriental sheath and leaf spot (Corticium) in paddy and broadcast rice in Hoa Chong near Da Nang. (d) Leaf curl and damage caused by mites on manioc near Catholic church in Cam He, near Da Nang. (e) Damping-off disease of seedling lettuce in vegetable crop area at An Hai near Da Nang. (4) The mistaken identity of the "silver" plane which sprayed malathion for malaria control with the defoliation spray program encountered among the Vietnamese farmers in the Da Nang area pointed up the far-reaching effects of VC propaganda and the need for an intensive public information program explaining the nature and purposes of the two spray programs. (5) On the basis of the limited field observations of the team, it was evident that several species of plants susceptible to the defoliants ORANGE and WHITE could be used as indicators of herbicide damage. Among the tree fruits, jackfruit, papaya, and star apple, showed marked damage by defoliation, topkill and loss of fruit yield. Other trees sensitive to herbicides included kapok, Australian pine or Casuarina and rain tree or monkeypod tree. No vegetable crop damage was observed by the team. Annual crops grown in RVN which are known to be highly susceptible to herbicide damage include tomatoes, soybeans, beans, and sweet potatoes. In general rice and grain crops are more resistant to the systemic herbicides used as defoliants. An information manual for recognition of herbicide responses of the major crops and tree fruits and shade trees would be of considerable value to agricultural advisors and other CORDS personnel. 7. Recommendations: a. Regular semiannual meetings should be held in Saigon and at Fort Detrick to keep all personnel directly involved in the defoliation program informed of operational problems and procedures and the general state-ofthe-art. The desirability of these meetings has also been expressed by MACV J-3 and CINCPAC personnel. 20 �SMUFD-PSL-PH 23 September 1969 SUBJECT: Report of Trip to Republic of Vietnam, 15 August-2 September 1969 b. All US Army chemical officers and USAF pilots assigned to the defoliation program should visit Fort Detrick for an orientation program of at least one week duration concerning the handling of herbicides and their effects on plants. c. A continuing effort should be made to have at least one qualified botanist or plant scientist familiar with herbicides on the staff of MACV J-3 Chemical Operations Division at all times. d. More effective measures are needed for the disposition of empty herbicide drums to avoid the hazards of volatilization and spillage of residual herbicides and the indiscriminate use of contaminated drums as storage containers for gasoline, diesel fuel and water. Widespread herbicide damage to shade trees and other desirable vegetation has been causied~in~§Xigon^*TCJa"Nang and"TJ ierf Hoa "by yolat ile""fumes °"f rom empty" drums and from contaminated gasoline "oV TueT'used in private motorcycles and . °.,«- --•.,,. •. *1-1 .1. 1%. other vehicles." A disposal program is needed to eliminate this continuing" source of vegetation damage. Personnel involved in this program should be thoroughly briefed in the hazards of improper use of herbicides. e. A public information program should be initiated to stress the reason for the antimalarial insecticide spray program. Emphasis could be given to inform vegetable producers that the malathion would give them an added benefit by killing the insects on plants. ^*I~"" f. In certain base perimeter situations the team recognized a definite need for a soil-applied herbicide to control grass for periods of 3 to 6 months or more. This type of compound is used routinely by the US Army and US Air Force for control of vegetation at military installations throughout the United States and other areas of the world. In situations where inadequate grass control leads to the enemy infiltration of bases with the resultant loss of personnel and materials, the use of soil-applied herbicides to provide these "installations with the most desirable agent is amply justified. g. Based on the recent operational experience with ORANGE on defoliation targets in proximity to active rubber plantations, the alternative use of ORANGE or WHITE for such targets is recommended under the limitations set forth in MACV Directive 525-1. h. The need for a positive valve shut off or other system for the spray systems of the UC-123 spray planes is desirable to eliminate leaking nozzles. A reverse pump which would draw the herbicide out of the spray booms and into the spray tank following a spray mission might be a satisfactory answer. It appears that damage caused by these leaky booms could be totally eliminated. �116 074 SMUFD-PSL-PH 23 September 1969 SUBJECT: Report of Trip to Republic of Vietnam, 15 August-2 September 1969 i. The AGRINAUTICS spray systems currently used in helicopter spray operations need engineering modification for improvement in efficiency of operation under field conditions. Major problems have been experienced with the fan windmill system used for driving the pump in maintaining adequate pressure. Redesigning the tank in a contoured form to provide proper weight and balance in relation to center of gravity would permit loads of 200 gallons instead of the present 150 gallon capacity. A more effective method of providing replacement parts is needed. 8. Significant Attitudes: a. All of the military personnel contacted in the field consider defoliation a major contribution to the war effort. This was emphasized at the division level by the increase in number and area of proposed targets suggested for the divisional areas of operation. With the increase in defoliated area the enemy is being denied a place he can hide his men and materials. Another major advantage is that the US personnel can operate in zones of relative safety because areas along roads and waterways have been defoliated to prevent ambush. b. The team was impressed by the excellent morale of the men involved in the chemical program. The men of the MACV J-3 Chemical Operations Division, the chemical personnel in the field and the members of the USAF 12th Special Operations Squadron are doing an outstanding job to carry out all of the many facets of an extremely difficult program. It should be noted that this has been accomplished despite extensive opposition to military use of defoliation from various groups in the United States and other parts of the world. ROBERT A. DARROW Senior Team Member REED C. BUNKER Team Member J. RAY FRANK Team Member 22 � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Alvin L. Young Collection on Agent Orange Description An account of the resource <p style="margin-top: -1em; line-height: 1.2em;">The Alvin L. Young Collection on Agent Orange comprises 120 linear feet and spans the late 1800s to 2005; however, the bulk of the coverage is from the 1960s to the 1980s and there are many undated items. The collection was donated to Special Collections of the National Agricultural Library in 1985 by Dr. Alvin L. Young (1942- ). Dr. Young developed the collection as he conducted extensive research on the military defoliant Agent Orange. The collection is in good condition and includes letters, memoranda, books, reports, press releases, journal and newspaper clippings, field logs and notebooks, newsletters, maps, booklets and pamphlets, photographs, memorabilia, and audiotapes of an interview with Dr. Young.</p> <p>For more about this collection, <a href="/exhibits/speccoll/exhibits/show/alvin-l--young-collection-on-a">view the Agent Orange Exhibit.</a></p> Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Box The box containing the original item. 018 Folder The folder containing the original item. 0207 Series The series number of the original item. Series II Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Darrow, Robert A. Reed C. Bunker J. Ray Frank Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource September 23 1969 Title A name given to the resource Typescript: Report of Trip to Republic of Vietnam, 15 August - 2 September 1969 Subject The topic of the resource Ranch Hand herbicide white herbicide damage assessment herbicide storage Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Alvin L. Young Collection on Agent Orange Description An account of the resource <p style="margin-top: -1em; line-height: 1.2em;">The Alvin L. Young Collection on Agent Orange comprises 120 linear feet and spans the late 1800s to 2005; however, the bulk of the coverage is from the 1960s to the 1980s and there are many undated items. The collection was donated to Special Collections of the National Agricultural Library in 1985 by Dr. Alvin L. Young (1942- ). Dr. Young developed the collection as he conducted extensive research on the military defoliant Agent Orange. The collection is in good condition and includes letters, memoranda, books, reports, press releases, journal and newspaper clippings, field logs and notebooks, newsletters, maps, booklets and pamphlets, photographs, memorabilia, and audiotapes of an interview with Dr. Young.</p> <p>For more about this collection, <a href="/exhibits/speccoll/exhibits/show/alvin-l--young-collection-on-a">view the Agent Orange Exhibit.</a></p> Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Box The box containing the original item. 032 Folder The folder containing the original item. 0592 Series The series number of the original item. Series III Subseries I Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource DeHart, Roy Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived Aviation, Space, and Environmental Medicine Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1982-05-01 Title A name given to the resource Guest Editorial: Herbicide Orange Health Effects Subject The topic of the resource Ranch Hand health studies ao_seriesIII Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Alvin L. Young Collection on Agent Orange Description An account of the resource <p style="margin-top: -1em; line-height: 1.2em;">The Alvin L. Young Collection on Agent Orange comprises 120 linear feet and spans the late 1800s to 2005; however, the bulk of the coverage is from the 1960s to the 1980s and there are many undated items. The collection was donated to Special Collections of the National Agricultural Library in 1985 by Dr. Alvin L. Young (1942- ). Dr. Young developed the collection as he conducted extensive research on the military defoliant Agent Orange. The collection is in good condition and includes letters, memoranda, books, reports, press releases, journal and newspaper clippings, field logs and notebooks, newsletters, maps, booklets and pamphlets, photographs, memorabilia, and audiotapes of an interview with Dr. Young.</p> <p>For more about this collection, <a href="/exhibits/speccoll/exhibits/show/alvin-l--young-collection-on-a">view the Agent Orange Exhibit.</a></p> Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Box The box containing the original item. 020 Folder The folder containing the original item. 0292 Series The series number of the original item. Series II Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Fawcett, Denby Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource October 21 1966 Title A name given to the resource Clipping: Defoliation Has Its Drawbacks Subject The topic of the resource Ranch Hand popular press military impact https://www.nal.usda.gov/exhibits/speccoll/files/original/21247b07701a0a5cd8bbca4d42809134.pdf 1dcff3384c2b9034c451f24d15b06bb2 PDF Text Text Item ID Number °0227 Author Fowler, David L. Corporate Author Report/Article Title Memorandum: from David L. Fowler to Commander, Seventh Air Force with subject Aerial Dispersal of Insecticides, September 19, 1971 Journal/Book Title Year 000 ° Month/Day Color Number of Images D 2 Descripton Notes Monday, January 22, 2001 Page 239 of 341 �-3 '!„- I, -,coir<UsK.e wit*-. MA,1* at ', . , r ten ~,i,, t air ? >" *> a i*» (. fll. t. 1, 14)- n§ iK \.ni: H*> i^iG B x. Pm-" f A ,K* �Cf .->! � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Alvin L. Young Collection on Agent Orange Description An account of the resource <p style="margin-top: -1em; line-height: 1.2em;">The Alvin L. Young Collection on Agent Orange comprises 120 linear feet and spans the late 1800s to 2005; however, the bulk of the coverage is from the 1960s to the 1980s and there are many undated items. The collection was donated to Special Collections of the National Agricultural Library in 1985 by Dr. Alvin L. Young (1942- ). Dr. Young developed the collection as he conducted extensive research on the military defoliant Agent Orange. The collection is in good condition and includes letters, memoranda, books, reports, press releases, journal and newspaper clippings, field logs and notebooks, newsletters, maps, booklets and pamphlets, photographs, memorabilia, and audiotapes of an interview with Dr. Young.</p> <p>For more about this collection, <a href="/exhibits/speccoll/exhibits/show/alvin-l--young-collection-on-a">view the Agent Orange Exhibit.</a></p> Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Box The box containing the original item. 019 Folder The folder containing the original item. 0227 Series The series number of the original item. Series II Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Fowler, David L. Title A name given to the resource Memorandum: from David L. Fowler to Commander, Seventh Air Force with subject Aerial Dispersal of Insecticides, September 19, 1971 Subject The topic of the resource pesticide application Ranch Hand Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Alvin L. Young Collection on Agent Orange Description An account of the resource <p style="margin-top: -1em; line-height: 1.2em;">The Alvin L. Young Collection on Agent Orange comprises 120 linear feet and spans the late 1800s to 2005; however, the bulk of the coverage is from the 1960s to the 1980s and there are many undated items. The collection was donated to Special Collections of the National Agricultural Library in 1985 by Dr. Alvin L. Young (1942- ). Dr. Young developed the collection as he conducted extensive research on the military defoliant Agent Orange. The collection is in good condition and includes letters, memoranda, books, reports, press releases, journal and newspaper clippings, field logs and notebooks, newsletters, maps, booklets and pamphlets, photographs, memorabilia, and audiotapes of an interview with Dr. Young.</p> <p>For more about this collection, <a href="/exhibits/speccoll/exhibits/show/alvin-l--young-collection-on-a">view the Agent Orange Exhibit.</a></p> Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Box The box containing the original item. 033 Folder The folder containing the original item. 0656 Series The series number of the original item. Series III Subseries I Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Fox, Jeffrey L. Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived Science Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource March 16 1984 Title A name given to the resource Agent Orange Study Is Like a Chameleon Subject The topic of the resource VA veteran health and hygiene dioxin Ranch Hand ao_seriesIII https://www.nal.usda.gov/exhibits/speccoll/files/original/71332416a2039bdbfe8b31b2bfa512d0.pdf f4807ecfcb23146c11a29eb6b3adced6 PDF Text Text 00186 Fox, Roger P. COTDOratB Author Office of Air Force History, United States Air Force, Washington, D.C. RBPOrt/AftiClB TitlB Air ^ase Defense in the Republic of Vietnam 1961-1973 Journal/Book Titls YW 1979 Month/Day Number of Imaoes pp.74-79 discuss herbicide defoliation, pp.214-217 describe agents orange, blue, and white Friday, January 05, 2001 Page 186 of 194 �AIR BASE DEFENSE IN THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM 1961-1973 Roger P. Fox OFFICE OK AIR FOKCF HISTORY L'NITFD STATf-S AiR I ORCfWASHINGTON. DC., 1979 �explosives devices dictated that this complex he kept free of concealing vegetation. Ignoring the French experience, the USAF discovered anew the problems associated with defoliation of the perimeter harrier system. 46 Rarely if ever charted, the minefields of the perimeter harrier prohihited use of mamml labor to cut and remove the vegetation. The mines, fencing, and wiring prevented mowing or v.Tiipir)g by rruvruni/i.'il equipment (turning w.is un-.jtist'.iciorj on several counts. Vegetation was highlv fire resistant, particularly during the rainy season when growth was most rapid. Ii ignited slowly, even if sprayed with a flammable such as contaminated jet fuel. Because fire hardly ever consumed the vegetation, the residue went on obscuring ihe barrier syMk-m and offering cover to pcnctrators. Burning also detonated or destroyed mines and flares within the complex. Next in importance was defoliation of the base interior. Here too, the ideal was to clear the ground cover that concealed pene'raiors and reduced surveillance by defense forces. For example, the defense vegetation ne- gated sentry dog detection—the base's most reliable alarm. And the exertion in plowing through this thicket sapped dog and handler. Because the interior was without the perimeter's hazards or obstructions, it seemed that the clearing methods mentioned earlier could be given full play. In practice this was not the case. Safety factors forbade burning in or near fuel and munitions storage areas. The immense labor entailed in clearing a si/able area m .1 rcutonaMc lime ciiruili'tl manual culling C u t t i n g by hanJ nonetheless left the root .lyatcm intact, and so was well-suited to Cam Kanh Bav's wry unstable soil Flsev.-h.ere. however, an undisturbed root system meant rapid regrowth of vegetation. F.ven though scraping served well in the base interior, ihe conventional USAF civil engineer squadron usually idCKcu IMC mx-dcii iiKX(iaru/t.'ii equipment In light of these facts, ihe answer to vegetation control in the interior as on the perimeter appeared to be herbicides. By the time the Air Force turned to herbicides for base vegetation control, they were in full-scale military use in support of other ground operations The dispensing of defoliants centered on foliage along thorough fares to deny the enemy ambush cover. Spraying also focused over VC/NVA camps and assembly areas, as well as over crops intended for feeding the foe. The acreage treated with agents from the 1,000-gallon tanks of USAF UC-12.1 (Ranch Hand) aircraft rose from 17.119 in I««i2 to 608,106 in 1966."' None of these herbicides was believed to endanger humans or animals. All had been widely used in the United Slates for more than 20 years on foods and other crops, rangcland, and forests. None persisted in the soil and periodic respraying was required to kill regrowth. All were liquids. Those dispensed in RVN were designated Orange, White, and Blue. Appendix 5 gives general data on their composition, application, effect, and safety precautions. The use of these, herbicides was. a GVN program supported by the United States. The U.S. Ambassador and COMUSMACV acted jointly on GVN requests for herbicide operations on the basis of policy formed by State and Defense Departments and approved by the President.-"" Senior U.S. Army advisors at ARVN corps and division level were delegated authority to approve requests in which dispersal of the herbicides was limited to hand or ground-based power-spra> methods. A herhicidal defoliation request from a USAF air base was prepared and documented by the base civil engineer, using a set checklist. (See page 77.) It was then processed through U.S. military channels to the senior U.S. Army headquarters in the corps tactical zone. If approved there, it wiis sent on to ihe ARVN commanding general of the same CTZ for military approval and political clearance. It was at this point that delay most frequently occurred, due to opposition from the district and/or province chief. These officials were influenced by such things as superstition, concern for local crop damage, and possible propaganda value to the VC- NVA. Final action on requests for ground-delivered herbicides was taken at this level. If aerial delivery was desired, the request could only be approved at USMACV/JCS level. A C-123 sprays defoliation chemicals over South Vietnamese jungles �Technical factors also entered into the dispensing of herbicides. Dry weather was essential, because rain quickly washed chemicals from ilie target vegetation to nearby crops und other desirable growth. Ideally, spraying was di>ne between dawn and 1000, at ambient temperatures under 10'; C (8fi r I-"), and in calm or very low wind conditions to minimize drift. Storage and mixing points had to be kept to a minimum, isolated from cultivated areas I-'mpty herbicide drums required close control to avoid aa-i dental contamination.*' Approval and execution of herhicidal defoliation projects were lime- consuming and uncertain. In February 1968 Phan Rang requested defoliation of a 200-meter strip both inside and outside the perimeter, around the entire circumference of the base. The approving authority reduced the scope of the project to one-half the perimeter. In addition, problems in obtaining herbicide and other obstacles delayed completion of the project for 1 year.52 t- ',egeiaiu>n at Tan Son Shot and Uicn lloa hindered the base defenders throughout the 196S Tet attacks/' 1 ' 1 At Bien Hoa the approval piocess for aerial defoliation was termed "hopelessly complicated," one Checklist for Defoliation Requests 1 . Overlays or annotated photographs depicting the exact area. a. b. c. d. e. Area — province and district. UTM cooidinatcs. length and width. Number of hectares, Type of vegetation. a. Objectives and military worth. b. .Summary of incidents. Psychological warfare annex (prepared hy sector): a. Leaflets. b. Loudspeaker texts. 'v. Civil affair-* annex (prepared hy sector): a. No crops within 1 kilometer. b. Contingency plan to piovide food or money to families whose crops are accidentally damaged by rho defoliation operation 6. Certification by province chiefa. Province chief approval. t). Indemnification w i l l be made b> the Republic ot Vietnam lor accidental damage to crops. SOl.'R< f - : I.it> of Cong Rprt, it Aim <>'•>. 10 'lit.1- HIHIM.- SuKoiiiriultec on Science anil AilKMi.iulJL'h, 9!sr C iing, ! •>! ss::>\, A 1 1; l.nt't <i:nul Aiw,\rn<nl ••/ th* Viet- 77 76 �that might take two or more months. Plant growth meanwhile continued unabated. F.ven when authorized, a project was apt to l>e fettered with restrictions. Thus aerial delivery of Orange was denied at Bien Hoa, and only parts of its perimeter were approved (or chemical defoliation. Accordingly, because Blue and White were not suited to local conditions. Orange had to be dispensed from a tank truck by a power spray that did not reach beyond the second fences. Local terrain made it impossible to go outside the third and fourth fence and spray inward. 5 * As noted earlier, Binh Thuy faced the most extreme defoliation problem. Here the one herbicide approved for use was Blue, which killed only those portions of plants with which it came in contact. With the root systems left intact, regrowth was rapid. In 1 month, 2,420 gallons of Blui: valued at $22,000 were sprayed over limited areas of the interior and a narrow z.one around the perimeter of the 550acre installation without making any significant inroads against the. teeming vegetation." Herbicides for air base defense seldom if ever improved the horizontal view at installations by the desired 40 to 60 percent.*• Defoliation needs of the 10 primary bases were specific, permanent, and known in advance. Still no ongoing long-term program to satisfy them was ever set up. Instead the job was done piecemeal, with each base handling defoliation requests. Despite administrative and technical controls, chemical agents remained the single sure way to control vegetation in places where other means could not—notably in the critical perimeter complexes. As the war drew to a close, however, curbs on the use of herbicides grew more and more rigid. The last herbicide mission by fixed-wing aircraft was flown on 7 January 1971. 78 On \ May, a presidential directive ended all U.S. herbicide operations.57 In the ensuing months, mines killed eight and injured seven Army personnel who were trying to clear vegetation by band from wire entanglements and (kids of fire." With the Ambassador's full backing, COMUSMACV urged Washington to alter at once the ban on chemical herbicides because immediate defoliation was "essential to security of ba«.es." s° On IS August the President petmilted the resumption of chemical defoliation until I December 1971. He authorized the use of Blue and White but not Orange:. Approved herbicide operations were restricted to the perimeters of firehoses and installations, with delivery limited to solely helicopter or ground-based spraying equipment, under ih<* same regulations applied in the United Slates."0 As the expiration date for this authority neared, COMUSMACV asked for an extension. On 26 November 197! the President authorized continued use of herbicides and set no termination date. At the same time, he stipulated that 11 S defoliation assistance to the Government of Vietnam be confined to "base and installation perimeter operations and limited operations for important lines of communications." This policy prevailed until the last U.S. forces departed RvN in 1V73." 1 No defoliant method tried for air base defense purposes in South Vietnam proved to be at once efficient, economical, and politically acceptable. The practical value of herbicides was much impaired by technical, administrative, and political constraints, For chiefly technical reasons, the same could be said for techniques such as burning and scraping For the United States— as it had for F-'rance-—vegetation remained a major unresolved problem. V. USAF GROUND DEFENSE FORCES The enormous mass of non-combatant personnel who look after the very few heroic pilots, who alone in ordinary circumstances do all the fighting, is an inherent difficulty in the organization of the air force. Here is the chance for this great mass to add a fiehting quality to the necessary services they perform. F.vcry airfield should be a stronghold of fighting air-groundrnen, and not the abode of uniformed civilians in the prime of life protected by detachments of soldiers. Sir Winston Churchill, 194!. By lair. 196' it U:C alike Ccitdiii that U.S. ground combat forces would lake part in offensive operations, and that the Air Force would be expected to protect its own installations. The USAF reaction to this unwelcome task was alien 10 the U.S. armed forces.3 It was to ship the basic means of air base defense to South Vietnam man by man and item by item. Then in the combat zone the Air Force assembled, organized, and trained these troops More than 8 months passed before this process began to turn out forces that showed elementary skill in executing their unit mission.-' Security police squadrons were formed in this manner at the 10 major bases in RVN. These units became the focal point of USAF ground defense during the entiie war. Tactical versus Nuniaclurai Organization The governing USAF directives* wert silent on how to organize and employ security police in a hot war. Hence USAF ground defense forces in RVN were structured to cope with CONUS contingencies in a cold war. A security police squadron in RVN * Air Force Manual ( A I M ) 207-1. Doctrine, and Requirements for Security of Air f-orce Weapons Systems, 10 June L%4 <Mir*r\e.letl by M-M ?07-1. 10 Urn 68. and in turn by AF-M 207-1, 10 Apr 7 0 ) . AF-M 205-1 Air Police Security Operation*. !5 February I0!)!? l.-epla.ed by AF-M 2(17-7, Handbook for Security F'oices. IS J u l h6, which w-'a by A I - M ?i>7 ?. 1 5 .Suiif f> ! >> 79 �APPENDIX 5 Herbicides Employed in Air Base Defense Operations* General Antiplant agents are chemical agents which possess a high offensive potential for destroying or seriously limiting the production of food and defoliating vegetation These compounds include herbicides that kill or inhibit the growth of plants; plant growth regulators that either regulate or inhibit plant growth, sometimes causing plant death; desiccants that dry up plant foliage; and soil sterilants that prevent or inhibit the growth of vegetation by action with the soil. Military applications for antiplant agents are based on denying ihe enemy food and concealment, Antiplant agents in use a. ORANGE. (1) Description Agent ORANGE is the Standard A agent. It is composed of a 50:50 mixture of the ri-butyl esters of 2,4-D and 2,4,5-T (app D and Cl. TM 3-215). ORANGE appears as a dark-brown oily liquid which is insoluble in water but miscible in oils such as diesel fuel. It weighs about 10.75 pounds per gallon and becomes quite viscous as the temperature drops, solidifying at 45° F. It is noaeorrosive, of low volatility, and nonexplc.sive, but deteriorates rubber, (2) Rate of application. The recommended rate of application of ORANGE is 3 gallons per acre. This may vary depending on the type of vegetation. In some situations better coverage may be obtained by diluting ORANGE with diesel fuel oil, which results in a less viscous solution that is dispersed in smaller droplets. Dilution may also be required when using dispersion equipment which does not permit the flow rate to be conveniently adjusted to 3 gallons per acre, (3) Effect on foliage. ORANGE penetrates the waxy covering of leaves and is absorbed into the plant system. It affects the growing points of the plant resulting in its death Rains occurring within the first hour after spraying will not reduce the effectiveness of ORANGE to the extent that they reduce the effectiveness of aqueous solutions. Broadlcaf plants are highly susceptible to ORANGE. Some grasses can be controlled but require a much higher dose rate than broadleaf plants. Susceptible plants exhibit varying degrees of susceptibility to ORANGE. Death of a given plant may occur within a week or less, or may require up to several months depending on the plant's age, stage of growth, susceptibility, and the dose rate. (4) Safety precautions and decontamination. ORANGE is relatively nontoxic to man or animals. No injuries have been reported lo personnel exposed to aircraft spray. Personnel subject to splashes from handling the agent need not be alarmed, but should shower and change clothes at a convenient opportunity, ORANGE is noncorrosive to metals but will remove * Lib of Cong Rpt, 8 Aog 69, lo ihe House Subcommittee OR Science, Research, and Development of the Committee on Science and Astronautics, 91st Cong, 1st sen, A Technological Assessment of the Vietnam Defoliant Matter: 4 Cast History, pp 67-73. 214 aircraft paint and walkway coatings. Contaminated aircraft should be washed with soapy water to remove the agent. Rubber hoses and other rubber parts of transfer and dissemination equipment will deteriorate and require replacement, since ORANGE softens rubber. 2. BLUE (Phytar 560G) (1) Description. Agent BLUE is an aqueous solution containing about 3 pounds per gallon of the sodium salt of cacodylic acid, the proper amount of surfactant (a substance which increas.es the effectiveness of the solution), and a neutralizer to prevent corrosion of metal spray apparatus. BLUE is 'he agent normally used for crop destruction. (2) Rate of application. BLUE may be sprayed as received from the manufacturer without dilution, if desired The recommended application rate fi'T crop destruction )•> about I to .2 gallons per acre. However, much higher use rates of BLl 'E arc required to kill tall grasses, such as elephant grass or sugarcane, because of the large masses of vegetation For hand-spray operations, two gallons of RI UF diluted with water to make 50 gallons will give a solution that can be dispersed by hand at a rate equivalent to approximately 1 to 3 gallons of pure agent per acre. Air Force C~123s spray defoliation chemicals over the A Shau valley �A Vietnamese soldier sprays fuel oil on dense foliage to determine the effectiveness of defoliation by fire. This failed because the fire would not keep burning (3) Effective on foliage. Enough BLUE applied to any kind of foliage will cause it to dry and shrivel, but the agent is more effective against grassy plants than broailicaf varieties. Best results are obtained when the plant is thoroughly covered, since the agent kills by absorption of moisture from the leaves. The plants will die within 2 to 4 days or less and can then he burned if permitted to dry sufficiently. BLUE in low dose rates can also prevent grain formation in rice without any apparent external effect. The plant develops normally but does not yield a crop. Spray rates higher than about one-half gallon per acre usually kill the crop. Although BLUE can produce relatively rapid defoliation, regrowth may occur again in about 30 da>s. Repeated spraying is necessary to provide a high degree of continuous plant kill. (4) Safety precautions and decontamination. Normal sanitary precautions should be followed when handling BLUE. Although it contains a form of arsenic, BLUE is relatively nontoxic. It should not be taken internally, however. Any material that gets on the hands, face, or other parts of the body should be washed off at the first opportunity. Clothes that become wet with a solution of BLUE should be changed. Aircraft used for spraying this solution should be washed well afterward. When WHITE is added to BLUE, a precipitate forms that will clog the system. If the same spray apparatus is to be used for spraying .agents WHITE and BLUE, the system must be flushed to assure . that all residue of the previous agent is removed. Effects of aerial defoliation c. WHITE (Tordon 101). (1) Description, The active ingredients of agent WHITE are 20 percent picloram and 80 percent isopropylarnine salt of 2,4-1). Active ingredients constitute about 25 percent of the solution. A surfactant is also present. WHITE is soluble in water, noncorrosive, nonflammable, nonvolatile, immiscible in oils, and more viscous than ORANGE at the same temperature. (2) Rate of application. WHITE usually should be applied at a rate of 3 to 5 gallons per acre on broadleaf vegetation. However, the rate may vary depending on the type of flora. Quantities required to control jungle vegetation may vary from 5 to 12 gallons per acre. This quantity exceeds the spray capability of most aircraft spray systems for a single pass. It is usually unfeasible in large-scale military operations to apply such large volumes. For ground-based spray operations, however, high volumes are necessary. Handspray operations cannot evenly cover a whole acre with only 3 gallons of solution. Three gallons of WHITE diluted to a 30-gallon solution can be more easily sprayed over an area of one acre. 'The manufacturer recommends diluting WHITE with sufficient water to make a 10-gallon solution for each gallon of agent. (3) Effect on foliage. WHITE kills foliage in the same manner as ORANGE, since 80 percent of the active ingredient is 2,4-D. PICLORAM is more effective than 2,4-D, but acts slower. WHITE is effective on many plant species, and equal to or more effective than ORANGE on the more woody species. The material must he absorbed through the leaves. The water solution does not penetrate the waxy covering of leaves as well as oily mixtures, and is more easily washed off by rain. (4) Safety precautions and decontamination. WHITE exhibits a low hazard from accidental ingestion. However, it may cause some irritation if splashed into the eyes. .Should eye contact occur, flush with plenty of water. Splashes on the skin should be thoroughly washed with soap and water at the first opportunity. Contaminated clothing should be washed before reuse. When WHITE is used in the mam*- rqnipment as BLUE, all of the WHITE should bo removed bet'oie using BLUE. The two agents produce a white precipitate that will clog spray systems. � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Alvin L. Young Collection on Agent Orange Description An account of the resource <p style="margin-top: -1em; line-height: 1.2em;">The Alvin L. Young Collection on Agent Orange comprises 120 linear feet and spans the late 1800s to 2005; however, the bulk of the coverage is from the 1960s to the 1980s and there are many undated items. The collection was donated to Special Collections of the National Agricultural Library in 1985 by Dr. Alvin L. Young (1942- ). Dr. Young developed the collection as he conducted extensive research on the military defoliant Agent Orange. The collection is in good condition and includes letters, memoranda, books, reports, press releases, journal and newspaper clippings, field logs and notebooks, newsletters, maps, booklets and pamphlets, photographs, memorabilia, and audiotapes of an interview with Dr. Young.</p> <p>For more about this collection, <a href="/exhibits/speccoll/exhibits/show/alvin-l--young-collection-on-a">view the Agent Orange Exhibit.</a></p> Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Box The box containing the original item. 017 Folder The folder containing the original item. 0186 Series The series number of the original item. Series II Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Fox, Roger P. Description An account of the resource <strong>Corporate Author: </strong>Office of Air Force History, United States Air Force, Washington, D.C. Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1979 Title A name given to the resource Air Base Defense in the Republic of Vietnam 1961-1973 Subject The topic of the resource Ranch Hand herbicide blue Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Alvin L. Young Collection on Agent Orange Description An account of the resource <p style="margin-top: -1em; line-height: 1.2em;">The Alvin L. Young Collection on Agent Orange comprises 120 linear feet and spans the late 1800s to 2005; however, the bulk of the coverage is from the 1960s to the 1980s and there are many undated items. The collection was donated to Special Collections of the National Agricultural Library in 1985 by Dr. Alvin L. Young (1942- ). Dr. Young developed the collection as he conducted extensive research on the military defoliant Agent Orange. The collection is in good condition and includes letters, memoranda, books, reports, press releases, journal and newspaper clippings, field logs and notebooks, newsletters, maps, booklets and pamphlets, photographs, memorabilia, and audiotapes of an interview with Dr. Young.</p> <p>For more about this collection, <a href="/exhibits/speccoll/exhibits/show/alvin-l--young-collection-on-a">view the Agent Orange Exhibit.</a></p> Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Box The box containing the original item. 085 Folder The folder containing the original item. 2132 Series The series number of the original item. Series IV Subseries I Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Grimes, Charlotte Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived St. Louis Post-Dispatch Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource February 28 1983 Title A name given to the resource News Analysis: Orange Lining in Dioxin Cloud? Subject The topic of the resource Ranch Hand herbicide poisoning popular press government liability https://www.nal.usda.gov/exhibits/speccoll/files/original/835038e8e77feaf167389af6b7c009d3.pdf f1d7a3dd7f58423b3dbe72642ed3cf69 PDF Text Text Item ID Number oosoe Author Hickey, Gerald C. National Academy of Sciences - National Research Cou Tne E fects of f Herbicides in South Vietnam, Part B: Working Papers, February 1974: Perceived Effects of Herbicides Used in the Highlands of South Vietnam Journal/Book Titlo Year Month/Day Color Number of Images 1974 February n 25 Descripton Notes Monday, January 22, 2001 Page 306 of 341 �3 &° "J K <~ The Effects of Herbicides in South Vietnam PART B: WORKING PAPERS FEBRUARY 1974 Perceived Effects of Herbicides Used in the Highlands of South Vietnam GERALD C. MICKEY NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES STATEMENT!" Approved for public release; �THE EFFECTS OF HERBICIDES IN SOUTH VIETNAM PART B: WORKING PAPERS FEBRUARY 1, 1971!- Perceived Effects of Herbicides Used in the Highlands of South Vietnam GERALD C. HICKEY D DC MAY 29 1974 35E&FE D NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES - NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL WASHINGTON, D.C. 20^18 Approved for public release; 'DistributiQB Unlmfted �Perceived Effects of Herbicides Used in the Highlands of South Vietnam a GERALD C. HICKEY The objectives of this research were threefold. First, an effort was made to determine whether highland villagers in affected areas had actually observed aircraft spraying herbicide and, if observed, the month and year of occurrence. Second, an effort was made to probe into the Highlanders' perception of what happened following the spraying— whether they noticed any changes in the physical surroundings or any unusual occurrences such as an abnormally large number of people falling ill or dying, and similar developments among animals and fish. Third, the inquiry was directed at the villagers' evaluation of the effect of the spraying—whether they saw any relationship between the herbicide and some or all of the perceived changes. DATA ON INFORMANTS Location of Informants One of the difficulties in gaining information on the effects of the use of herbicides in the highlands is that for the most part the spraying missions took place in relatively remote areas that have been a Dr. Hickey, a consultant to the Committee on the Effects of Herbicides in Vietnam, is affiliated with the Southeast Asia Program, Cornell University, Ithaca, New York 14850. �inaccessible to investigators. Since the beginning of the NVA-'VC offensive at the end of March 1972, however, there have been massive movements of villagers from the more distant areas into highland urban centers, notably Kontum, Pleiku, and Ban-Me-Thuot, thus making available some residents of sprayed areas in Kontum and Pleiku Provinces. Finding the residents of sprayed areas, however, proved to be a timeconsuming task, particularly in the sprawling refugee centers in Kontum and Pleiku. A comprehensive analysis of the sprayed areas, correlated with administrative units (provinces, districts, and villages), population, and ethnic groups involved, was not available. A listing of sprayed areas with the administrative units and ethnic groups involved was available, but it proved to be of very limited value since some pertinent districts (such as Dak To in Kontum Province) were not included, some village names were obviously incorrect, and some villages in the sprayed areas were not included. (Some of these shortcomings are more than likely due to the errors in the mapping and the population shifts that have taken place in the past decade.) In order to approximate locations of sprayed areas in the districts from which the refugees had come, it was thus necessary to make a series of correlations using 1:100,000 scale spray overlays and maps. By using the names of villages found in regions believed to have been affected, we located residents of sprayed areas in Dak To and Kontum Districts of Kontum Province and the western districts of Pleiku Province living in refugee camps in Kontum,- Pleiku, and Darlac Provinces. Just outside Kontum City, another group of villagers was found from sprayed �areas west of the city. Still another group of villagers from Dak-Siang, victims of an accidental spraying, was located in a refugee center in Kontum Province. Additional information on the effects of herbicides was provided by a Hroy Highlander from Phu-Yen Province trained as an agricultural engineer. He witnessed some spray missions while carrying out his assignment. Three long interviews were conducted with this informant. Characteristics of Informants 1. Dam San Refugee Center, Darlac Province (November 1972) a. Long Djon 'Village located in the vicinity of Dak To District Headquarters, Kontum Province. Sedang informants. Principal informants were two young men and an older woman. b. Dak Rosa Village located in the vicinity of Dak To, Kontum Province. Sedang informants. Principal informant was an older man. c. Dak Tang Plun Village, located near Tan-Canh, Dak To District, Kontum Province. Halang informants. Principal informants were several older men, several women, and two younger men. d. Plei Ro-O Village, located in the vicinity of Polei Kleng, some 30 km west of Kontum City. informants. Jarai Arap Principal informants were a young man (VC defector) and several women. �2. Mary Lou (Ngok Long) Refugee Center, Kontum Province a. Dak Mot-Khon Village, located west of Tan Canh, Dak To District, Kontum Province. Sedang informants. Principal informant was a village chief. b. Dak Mot-Tri Village, located west of Tan Canh, Dak To District, Kontum Province. Sedang informants. Principal informant was a hamlet chief. c. Dak-Siang Ranger Camp Dependents' Settlement, located northwest of Dak To District headquarters, Kontum Province. Halang informants. Principal informants were a young woman, her father, an older man, and an older woman. 3. Plei Don Village Refugee Group a. Polei Krong cluster of villages located west of Kontum City. Jarai Arap, Halang, and Rengao informants. Principal informants were three men—Jarai Arap, Halang, and Rengao. b. Polei Krong cluster of villages located west of Kontum City. Jarai Arap, Halang, and Rengao informants. Principal informants were Rengao and Jarai Arap older men. Several had participated in the above interview with villagers from Polei-Krong. 4. Prisoner of War Camp Refugee Center, Pleiku Province a. Polei Kleng, west of Kontum City (further west than Polei Krong). Jarai Arap informants. Principal �informants were a young hamlet chief, an older woman, and an older man. b. Plei Jar Turn Village, located to the west of Polei Kleng in western Kontum Province. Jarai Arap informants. Principal informants were five adults—three women and two men. 5. Camp Enari Refugee Center, Pleiku Province Plei Ea Tung Hamlet, Plei Ngol-Drong Village, located in the vicinity of the Edap Enang Resettlement Center, west of Thanh An District headquarters on Route 19. Jarai To~Buan informants. 6. Principal informants were two men. Highlander Agricultural Engineer This respondent is a Hroy from highland Phu-Yen Province. As a young man he followed the Viet Minn. In 1954 he moved to the north and was subsequently trained as an agricultural engineer at Hanoi University. In 1969, he returned to the Phu Tuc District headquarters of Phu-Bon Province; he organized food production for the Viet Cong. At the time of the interview, he was a Viet Cong defector. INTERVIEW METHOD An interview technique with advice of interpreters was employed in gathering data. In the refugee camp in Darlac Province the interpreters were a Sedang villager who translated into French and Bahnar villager who speaks Sedang, and who translated into English. camp leaders. Both are refugee In the refugee camp in Kontum Province, the interpreter �was a Sedang villager who translated into English. In one Pleiku refugee camp, a Jarai villager translated from Jarai to English; in the other two camps a Rhade villager translated from Jarai into English. All of these interpreters are employed by the U.S. government. A Rhade villager acted as the translator in the interviews with the Hroy agricultural engineer. At times direct communication was achieved in Vietnamese. A brief orientation was given each interpreter, and terminology was clarified. Initial questions concerned settlement patterns, particularly location1 of farming areas, type of crops grown, and such economic activities as hunting and fishing. Inquiry was then made into the informant's perception of the spraying—starting with whether he actually saw the aircraft—and its effects, described in his own words as much as is possible under these circumstances. Second interviews were conducted with informants in the Dam San Refugee Center in Darlac Province, and with the group at Plei Don in Kontum Province. All of the informants were very responsive, and although their quantitative information was vague, their perceptions regarding the effects of the spraying appear to have been very clear and well-articulated. While some questions concerning farming and crops were posed, most of the information on the traditional agricultural practices of these groups already was contained in ethnographic notes compiled since 1965. CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK As farmers who rely for survival on successful exploitation of their physical surroundings, the highland people of SVN have acquired �extensive knowledge of the local flora, fauna, aquatic life forms, soils, and water. Their languages reflect this, with vocabularies containing a wide range of words for all of these categories. Their traditions, too, manifest the rich experience they have had in growing diverse crops, in gathering wild food, medicinal plants, bark, and roots, and in the selection of forest products for house construction and fabrication of artifacts. Since they live close to nature, the Highlanders readily detect any changes in the physical ecology. Normally, such changes are much discussed among the villagers in the light of past experiences. The cause of a given change may be defined as physical (they can identify numerous kinds of blights) or occult (such as the wrath of the spirits), and these latter judgments usually rest with older, wiser members of the group. The observations of these individuals normally become knowledge shared with all members of the group. AGRICULTURAL PRACTICES Among the highland people of SVN a wide variety of agricultural practices is found,ranging from Vietnamese-style wet rice paddy farming a to swidden farming. All of the villagers interviewed in this study rely a This form of agriculture also is known variously as slash-and-burn, primitive horticulture, field-forest rotation, shifting-field agriculture, and brand tillage, as well as by such local names as ray (the term used in most French and Vietnamese literature on the highlands of Vietnam). The revived English dialect word swidden for "burned clearing" has been favored in a number of recent works; it has the dual advantage of being a general designation not linked to any particular region, and it can be used as a noun. �on the swidden technique, and this also was the method employed in Viet Cong food production in phu-Yen Province as described by the Hroy respondent. Although the swidden farming techniques vary from group to group, there are some common basic characteristics, particularly among the groups in Pleiku and Kontum. Essentially, swidden farming in highland SVN is a system of rotating agriculture wherein a given field is cleared, the cut wood burned, and the clearing then farmed for a duration of years that depends on the adjudged fertility of the soil. The field then is left fallow until a new growth of trees appears, and eventually it is farmed again. Among the Jarai, Halang, Rengao.. Sedang, and Hroy, the work of preparing the fields for farming usually begins in January or February. Men perform the heavier tasks such as felling trees (large trees normally are left standing) while women and children cut the brush. has dried, it is raked together and burned. When the wood The larger logs are set ablaze, and the fires are controlled as much as possible. When the rains begin, normally in mid-April or early May, the crops are planted; the men make holes in the ground with dibble sticks while the women follow up to plant the seeds. The staple crop is upland dry rice, and several varieties with varying maturity periods (usually three to six months) are planted by all of the groups. Also, maize is cultivated in the swiddens as are a number of secondary crops. These include manioc (a major crop in the Phu-Yen �Province Viet Cong food production), sugarcane, bananas, pineapples, eggplant, onions, yams, cabbage, chili peppers, and various kinds of tuber plants. Papaya trees are planted around the edge of the swidden. Many of these same crops are grown in the village kitchen gardens, which may also contain tobacco, green leafy vegetables, and lemon grass. some villages, coconut and mango trees are grown. In Small temporary structures are built near the swiddens so the young men can guard the fields against marauding animals during the growing season. PERCEPTIONS OF THE INFORMANTS In most of the interviews the informants claim to have seen the actual spraying, although there were some vague responses concerning the timing of the operations. Informants from Dak Mot-Khon (Interview 2a listed in Characteristics of Informants) and Dak Mot-Tri (2b), discussing the same defoliated area in Dak To District to the northwest of their settlements, reported that they had not seen the aircraft spraying, but they gave similar accounts regarding the effects. Those who did witness the spraying were able to describe the type of aircraft and the pattern of the spraying. In the Dak To area of Kontum Province, informants from Long Djon Village (la) noted that there had been many spraying operations in the vicinity since 1967, and they had seen the "large aircraft, each with two engines" that passed over "three in a row." This was repeated by informants from Dak Rosa (Ib), which is not far from Long Djon, as well as by villagers from Dak Tang Plun (Ic), Polei-Krong (3a,b), Plei Jar Turn (4b), and Plei Ngol-Drong (5). The Hroy agricultural �engineer (6) was a more sophisticated informant, since he had been prepared in Hanoi for the possibility of herbicide missions against his food production, and he knew that the aircraft were C-123's. At Dak Siang Ranger Camp (2c), the informants reported the spraying had been done by a helicopter, and this was verified by a former U.S. Special Forces officer who had been stationed at Dak Siang and now is employed as a civilian with the USAID mission in Kontum. Villagers from Polei Kleng (4a) also reported that the spraying was carried out by helicopters. Some informants were very explicit about seeing the spray leaving the aircraft. An elderly lady from Long Djon Village (la) said that "it looked like smoke" and it came from both sides of the aircraft, and this was repeated by villagers from Dak Rosa (Ib). Informants from Polei Krong (3a,b) reported that the spray looked like water, and one man from Plei Ro-O (Id) in the Polei Kleng area noted that "it looked like rain" but when it reached the ground they found it looked black. Informants from Dak Siang (2c) even noticed that a tube protruded from the helicopter, and it turned and began to spew a liquid. At Polei Kleng (4a) the villagers said that they watched the spray descend, and that they could smell it. In none of the interviews did it appear that there was a deliberate attempt to spray the settlements themselves, although in some instances the villagers' swiddens appear to have been targets. however, the spray drifted into the settlements. In most cases, Informants from Long Djon (la) noted that during one of the many missions in that area (Dak To District, Kontum Province), their swiddens were sprayed, and herbicide was.carried into the settlement. Villagers from Dak Rosa (Ib) complained that they and villagers from neighboring Kon Briong farmed about 30 10 �swiddens in the area, and all were sprayed several times over a period of several months. The villagers from Dak Siang (2c) described the way some of the spray drifted into their housing area following the accidental spraying of their fields. One informant from Polei Kleng (4a) noted that the spraying took place over a thickly-forested area northwest of the village and farming area. It was an area the villagers avoided because it was known to be VC-controlled. Villagers from Polei Krong (3a,b) watched the aircraft spray both sides of the Dak Bla River near the settlements. Informants from Plei-Ngol-Drong (5) reported that the spraying was along Route 19. According to the agricultural engineer (6), the first spraying took place in September 1969, and was aimed at the swiddens in the area, some of which were being farmed by villagers. Most, however, were part of an area where there was concentrated food production for the VC. The second spraying in March 1970 was along a trail used exclusively by the VC. With the exception of two villages—Dak Mot-Khon (2a) and Dak MotTri (2b)—where no spraying was observed by the residents, the first effects reported concerned humans, domestic animals, and aquatic life. Perceived Effects on Humans There was a definite pattern in the perceptions regarding the effect of the herbicides on those residing in or near the sprayed areas. The most common symptoms reported were abdominal pains and diarrhea. Informants from Long Djon (la) also reported that in addition to these 11 �symptoms, the villagers complained of experiencing a stinging sensation in their nasal passages just after the spray drifted into the settlement. Many developed coughs that lasted more than a month. At Dak Rosa (Ib), according to some residents, many villagers went into the swiddens following the spraying, and in addition to the common symptoms noted above, these people broke out with skin rashes that lasted many weeks. Dak Tang Plun (Ic) residents also reported widespread skin rashes, cramps, diarrhea, and fevers. A Plei Ro~0 (Id) informant reported these same symptoms, noting that some villagers coughed blood. Polei Krong (3a,b) informants stated that the villagers suffered these same ailments, and that the skin rashes looked "like they had been burned, with small blisters all over the red areas." Dak Siang (2c) informants noted that after some of the villagers drank from the stream which was in the sprayed area, they became ill with abdominal pains and diarrhea that lasted for days. They also reported that some villagers had eaten bamboo shoots from the sprayed area, after which they became dizzy "like you feel when you have drunk too much from the wine jar," and this was followed by vomiting. Polei Kleng (4a) residents, according to one informant, fell ill with abdominal pains, diarrhea, vomiting, and fever within one day after the spraying, and Plei Jar Turn (4b) villagers with the same symptoms went to get medical assistance at a local dispensary. The agricultural engineer (6) had been prepared in his Hanoi training for the possible use of herbicides by the U.S. and the South Vietnamese. The principal propaganda theme was that the Americans have 12 �no regard for human life, and they were using dangerous chemicals to kill plant and animal life. He had been instructed what to do if herbicides were sprayed; he was told to obtain a gas mask, and, if one were not available, to cover his face with a wet cloth. To save some of the food crop he was to instruct the villagers to cut the manioc roots as soon as possible and wash them well before cooking them. When the spraying did occur he followed the instructions regarding salvaging the manioc roots, and the only villagers who became ill with abdominal cramps and diarrhea were those who had not been told what to do. Some of the VC cadre who came into the area after the spraying ate some manioc roots and drank water from the affected areas, and they also developed abdominal pains and diarrhea. A difficult area of inquiry concerned possible deaths due to the herbicides. Sickness and death are common occurrences in highland villages, and infant mortality is particularly high. Some of the informants expressed the opinion that there was an unusually high number of deaths, particularly among children, following the spraying. However, they were very cautious in concluding that the spraying affected childbirth. Informants from Long Djon (la), had reported a stinging in the nasal passages just after the spray drifted over the settlement, and this was followed by villagers being afflicted with coughs. They added that more children than adults were affected, and that "many children died." The victims developed skin rashes, and those with rashes that did not clear up died. One elderly lady noted that she knew of one stillborn 13 �case following the spraying, but she could not say whether it was due to the herbicide (she, like other informants,, always pointed out that stillbirths were not unusual in their villages). At Dak Rosa (Ib), informants attributed the outbreak of skin rashes to the fact that many villagers went into the swiddens following the spraying. They also noted that some women carried their small children on their backs in the fields, and they brushed against leaves containing the "medicine" that had been sprayed. Some of these children subsequently developed bad rashes all over their bodies. They looked, the informants said, "like insect bites," and all the victims died. One informant knew of three such deaths. Another informant reported knowing of five stillbirths after the mothers, during pregnancy, had worked in the sprayed swiddens. The informants felt that there was an unusually high number of such deaths following the spraying. Dak Tang Plun (Ic) informants reported that "many children" became ill with abdominal pains, diarrhea, fever, coughs, and skin rashes after the spraying, and they estimated that 30 had died. A Plei Ro-0 (Id) informant described all of these symptoms, with the exception of the skin rash, as having affected many children in the settlement following the spraying. He claimed that 38 children died, and villagers thought that they had eaten plants from the sprayed areas. Informants from Polei Krong (3a,b) reported that a higher than usual number of children in their villages died in the period following the spraying, but they could not say how many. One Rengao village chief said that in the week after the spraying, "two children died one day and �two died the next day." Their symptoms were abdominal cramps, diarrhea, and skin rashes, which, as noted above, were described as having the appearance of burns "with small blisters." Dak Siang (2c) informants felt that the children who died were the ones who drank from the stream following the spray mission. following day. They fell ill the first day and died the "Their skin was the color of green in the leaves," one woman noted, and another added that their faces swelled "as if they had been in a fist fight." Informants from Polei Kleng (4a) reported that many villagers of all ages fell ill with abdominal pains, diarrhea, and vomiting within one day after the spraying. They estimated that around 40 people—adults and children—died after manifesting these symptoms. that she had seen four children die. One old woman said Plei Jar Turn (4b) villagers described these same symptoms, and they claimed that five residentsfour children and one adult—died. At Plei Ngol-Drong (5), according to informants, some people died within two days after the spraying. They could not say how many, but they had the symptoms noted above, and they broke out with skin rashes that resembled chicken pox. Perceived Effects on Animal Life Most of the informants interviewed reported widespread deaths among their domestic animals following the spraying. The Long Djon (la) informants noted that since they were refugees they had few animals, but most of their chickens and pigs died shortly after the spraying, and the Dak Rosa (Ib) villagers reported the same thing. Informants from �Dak-Tang-Plun (Ic) said that all of their chickens, most of their pigs, and some of their cattle died, and the young man from Plei Ro-0 (Id) reported the same thing, specifying that this occurred within four or five days after the spraying. He also noted that villagers found a number of dead wild animals, particularly wild boar, in the nearby forests. Polei Krong (3a,b) informants also pointed out they found dead wild boar in the forest. They, too, saw all of their chickens, pigs, dogs, and small cattle die, although the big cattle survived. Both the Polei Kleng (4a) and the Plei Jar Turn (4b) villagers said that their pigs, dogs, and chickens died, and the latter added that they also lost cattle. Plei Ngol Drong (5) informants reported that all of their pigs, chickens, dogs, goats (they noted that goats are "very strong"), and cattle died. One man observed that the cattle that died first were afflicted with sores around the mouth. They also said that they found dead deer and wild boar in the nearby forests. Perceived Effects on Aquatic Life Highland villages normally are located near streams or rivers from which the residents draw water for drinking and cooking. They also wash clothes and bathe and water their domestic animals in the nearby water courses, which also provide fish, an important part in the Highlander's diet. Responses concerning perceived effects on the aquatic life in the streams varied more than did those regarding the effects on humans and animals. Long Djon (la) villagers were not sure whether the dead fish floating on the neighboring stream were caused by the spraying, because the many 16 �soldiers in the area commonly threw grenades in the streams to get fish, so the abundance of dead fish was not an unusual sight. Dak Rosa (lb) residents said they did not perceive any changes in the nearby stream. The interview with Dak Tang Plun (lc) villagers was interrupted before any questions could be posed regarding fish. One Plei Ro-O (Id) informant, however, reported that there were a great many dead fish seen in streams close to the settlement following the spraying. Most of the fish appeared to be swollen, and after villagers ate them they became ill with abdominal pains and diarrhea. Residents of Dak Mot-Khon (2d) had not witnessed any spraying nor did they report an effect on humans and animals, but they did see an unusually large number of dead and dying fish in the Dak Kla River near the village. American military personnel from Tan Canh warned them not to eat the fish, and subsequently, they said, the Americans put some "medicine" in the water. Then they were informed they could eat the river fish, and they did so with no ill effects. Informants from Dak Mot- Tri (2b) had not seen any spraying nor did they experience any ailments or deaths among the villagers or their stock, but they, too, noticed a great many dead fish in the nearby river. Some villagers did cook and eat some of them but they reported no ill effects. The informants from Polei Krong (3a,b) reported that after the spraying they noticed a large number of dead and dying fish floating on the surface of the Dak Bla River, and they specifically noted that the gills of some dead fish were blackened or reddish in color. Some villagers ate fresh dead or dying fish, and most of them became ill with swollen abdomens and diarrhea. 17 Villagers at Polei Kleng (4a) said that �there was a small stream near the settlement but there were no dead fish in it following the spraying. Plei Jar Turn (4b) villagers, however, said that the aircraft sprayed the banks of the Dak Bla River near the village, and afterwards a very large number of fish began to float to the surface. They noticed blood and a reddish discoloration around the gills, and when some villagers cut into them there was a strange explosive effect which they likened to the striking of a match. them, and they did not eat these fish. This frightened Some villagers did eat fish that were dying, and they experienced no ill effects. Informants from Plei Ngol Drong (5) reported that dead fish appeared on the surface of the nearby stream, and those who ate them became ill with abdominal pains and diarrhea. Perceived Effects on Plant Life Responses regarding the perceived effects on plant life were highly patterned. Long Djon (la) informants noted that over a period of weeks following the spraying they observed plants wilting and dying. Where the spray fell directly, all of the crops in the swiddens died, and in kitchen gardens where some herbicide drifted, the plants wilted and did not continue to thrive. They said they did not know what was causing this but they suspected it was the "medicine" that had come from the aircraft and stung their nasal passages. They only gathered wild roots and tubers from areas not sprayed, and they washed them before eating them. Dak Rosa (Ib) informants reported that some of the spraying occurred 18 �over their swiddens, and very soon afterwards the banana plant leaves wilted, and the plants died. and the eggplants as well. This also happened to the manioc plants Some villagers dug up the manioc roots which seemed to be unaffected, but when they cut into them, they were "rotten." Some villagers gathered manioc leaves that had not wilted, and boiled and ate them, but they became ill with abdominal pains and diarrhea. Rice plants that had not died continued to grow, but they did not produce buds. At Dak Tang Plun (Ic) the informants noted that there was spraying over some of the swiddens in which they cultivated upland dry rice, maize, manioc, eggplants, and pumpkins, and all of these crops died. One old man pointed out that in the forests to the west of the village, in the vicinity of the Ben Het Camp (had been Special Forces and converted to a Ranger Camp), there were "many Viet Cong" and the spray killed the smaller plants and brush, but while the leaves on the larger trees wilted and died, the trees remained alive. They had never seen anything like this before, and they decided that they could not eat any of the surviving plants (the rice had just begun to bud and the manioc was tall) or roots in the affected area. The principal Plei Ro-O (Id) informant reported that the villagers grew upland dry rice, maize, manioc, eggplant, and cucumbers in their swiddens, and that all of the crops died where there had been air drifting of spray. At Dak Mot-Khon (2a) and Dak -Mot-Tri (2b) there had been no spraying, but the area to the northwest of the villages had been sprayed, and the informants noted that all of the vegetation had "dried and died," It was an area where residents of both villages hunted and 19 �gathered forest products, but following the spraying they avoided it. One elderly man from the Dak Siang (2c) dependents' settlement described how he had two swiddens in which he cultivated upland dry rice, manioc, maize, sugar cane, and banana trees> and with the spraying all wilted and died. All of the crops where the spray fell "dried and died." As noted previously, informants reported that some villagers ate bamboo shoots from the sprayed area and experienced dizziness followed by vomiting. At Polei Krong (3a,b), according to the informants, villagers cultivated upland dry rice, maize, manioc, bananas, sugarcane, and pineapples in their swiddens. chili peppers, In kitchen gardens they grew tobacco, eggplants, papaya trees, and orange trees. The spray drifted over the fields and gardens, reaching them in varying degrees of strength. Where it was strongest, all of the plants and trees died within about one month. The leaves on the fruit trees "rolled up," while the plants appeared to be drying up, in both swiddens and gardens. In the swiddens and gardens where the spray was not strong the rice did not thrive as it normally would have, and the fruit trees did not bear edible fruit. It was indicated previously that some villagers went into the fields to cut manioc roots and bamboo shoots, which they ate, and subsequently they got diarrhea. At first the villagers thought a natural blight was affecting the plants but a highland soldier from Kontum informed them that the Americans and the government were spreading "medicine" from aircraft to kill forest where the VC were hiding and crops the VC were growing. 20 �Polei Kleng (4a) informants report the same pattern as that noted above; where the spray was strong all of the crops in the swiddens and kitchen gardens died, but plants survived in the less affected areas. Still, the rice did not flourish, and ripening fruit fell from the trees. Informants from Plei Jar Turn (4b) simply reported that all of the crops in the fields on which the spray fell died. Villagers from Plei Ngol-Drong (5) reported that they cultivated upland dry rice, maize, manioc, yams, pineapples, bananas, and papaya in the swiddens, and in kitchen gardens they grew chili peppers, several varieties of green leafy vegetables, and cabbage. Where spray fell directly, the leaves on the trees and plants "rolled up" and died, and then the plants died. One man noted that in some swiddens the yams died but some of the rice plants did not wither, although they produced no buds. Rahlan-Soa (5) reported that in the sprayed areas all of the trees were affected, and the first change was that their leaves died. survived. He added that the low brush Big trees, however, died, and later they were cut for firewood. All or most of the crops in the sprayed swiddens died; this even precipitated a serious food shortage for the VC. They moved further to the north where there was a manioc crop, but it caused a delay in some of their planned operations. Adjudged Effects Responses concerning the adjudged effects on the soil varied considerably. Villagers from Long Djon (la) said that about one month after the spraying they noticed sprouts appearing in affected areas where 21 �the plants had died. They were not convinced, however, that this meant they could replant, so they shifted their farming to new swiddens. Dak Rosa (]b) informants saw the sprouts appear in "two or three months" and they felt that it was a sign that they could farm the swiddens again. Some of the Dak Tang Plun (Ic) villagers tried to re-farm their affected swiddens, but the leaves that sprouted on the plants were shriveled, and they know that such plants do not produce good fruit or vegetables. Most villagers, they said, felt that since all of the crops had died in some fields, the soil would not be good for a long time. One Plei Ro-0 (Id) informant reported that the villagers judged that since the effects were so bad, the soil could not be good, so they shifted to new farming sites. Polei Krong (3a,b) informants reported that the villagers, who had been told the source of the spray by a highland soldier from Kontum, in some cases did replant their swiddens. still replanted again. The crops were not good, but some When the March 1972 Offensive began, however, they had to abandon their fields. The agricultural engineer informant had done some study in Hanoi on the chemicals being used in the herbicides, and he said he knew which affect plants and which affect humans and animals. He judged that the chemicals being used in the food production area in which he was located were intended for plant destruction, and while some people became ill, it would only be a temporary event without lasting effects. He thought that one type of herbicide being used contained a chemical that actually had a beneficial effect on the soil. It remained in the soil as a residue and broke down so that the soil fertility increased. 22 �RECOMMENDATIONS The deleterious effects of the use of herbicides strongly indicated in the informants' response patterns were totally unanticipated in this research effort. These patterns suggest that there were some harmful effects on humans, animals , and fish. This research study has been preliminary, however, and considerably more investigation should be conducted. (1) This further research should cover a wider geographical area, and hopefully the cease-fire areas hitherto inaccessible would be open to investigators. (2) A team of Highlander interpreters could be formed, and they should be given more extensive preparation. This would facilitate probing more deeply into the effect of the herbicides on specific types of plants and fish. These teams should include individuals capable of speaking several Highlander languages, so that they could be used regionally. 23 � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Alvin L. Young Collection on Agent Orange Description An account of the resource <p style="margin-top: -1em; line-height: 1.2em;">The Alvin L. Young Collection on Agent Orange comprises 120 linear feet and spans the late 1800s to 2005; however, the bulk of the coverage is from the 1960s to the 1980s and there are many undated items. The collection was donated to Special Collections of the National Agricultural Library in 1985 by Dr. Alvin L. Young (1942- ). Dr. Young developed the collection as he conducted extensive research on the military defoliant Agent Orange. The collection is in good condition and includes letters, memoranda, books, reports, press releases, journal and newspaper clippings, field logs and notebooks, newsletters, maps, booklets and pamphlets, photographs, memorabilia, and audiotapes of an interview with Dr. Young.</p> <p>For more about this collection, <a href="/exhibits/speccoll/exhibits/show/alvin-l--young-collection-on-a">view the Agent Orange Exhibit.</a></p> Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Box The box containing the original item. 020 Folder The folder containing the original item. 0306 Series The series number of the original item. Series II Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Hickey, Gerald C. Description An account of the resource <strong>Corporate Author: </strong>National Academy of Sciences - National Research Council Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1974-02-01 Title A name given to the resource The Effects of Herbicides in South Vietnam, Part B: Working Papers, February 1974: Perceived Effects of Herbicides Used in the Highlands of South Vietnam Subject The topic of the resource Ranch Hand civilian impact ecological impact https://www.nal.usda.gov/exhibits/speccoll/files/original/6bd4159b6880e9d9756a5e0044d8b02a.pdf 5b7a4878928ce393a81374b41813703b PDF Text Text 00153 Author Hoge, George F. Corporate Author Deprtment of the Army, U.S. Army Combat Developments Command, Liason Detachment, HQ USARV, APO San Francisco Report/ArtiCiS Title Tr 'P Report. 1st Air Cavalry Division, 11-14 Sep 67 Journal/Book Title 1967 September 19 D Thursday, December 28, 2000 Page 153 of 157 �1OF FriE US Liaison Detachment, HQ APO San Francisco CDCCS-L? 96: 19 Se T r i p Report - 1st Air Cavalry TO: of Doctrine, trandsen, LTC p!rtt0$ f BeIvoi.r, Virginia Officer, Officer, 73504 H- 14 67. ATTN: LTC lerrtogton, LTC Fort Belvolr, Yirginia A ™^ LTC MAJ 7 * An»r Agcncy, Fort I«O3cf Artillery Fort Sill, tit O Ftirt 31905 m fi 1. 1st Air tain were: » •? 2, 11-14 September, the Division. The pwpose of £he ^ ^'^ ^^ of user standardiatlen o£ MM 126 iteos. O f this surw w l l l ^ wporfcej- fc Other ;»» £ise of guns in load of the JL of M79 CS ro«ds» o£ aerlal to the »8A3 tank, a«d otter ™ The « „ »ith « _ TC wm Louise lie LTC Jack LTC Bradford CPT AJ -ILT SIC 2LT c -3 CO, 2ct Bn» 8th Cav Qiv C0» Cn 4, 14 Ba, S-3, 1st tst OBV 0i 10, Co A» im fcs Pit Ldr, Co C, 2d Pit Ldr, Co A, 1st 5th ,laf " " �3 f% f* CDCCS-LV au.,,fic A . CJ--,,,,„. ~ , Trip - - i s t Air Cavalry 1 9 11-14 Sep 6? 3- Observations. (Sub-paragraphs a, b. c, and e are to questions from General in »»«««»« a. LTC , his normally carried o LA* wni.e on and More were a i r l i f t e d to .he companies If He stated the 90tei reeoiltess r i f l e was preferred over the LAW for destruction and of night positions of its and the round. All persons questioned stated the LAM was easily from carrying throurfi the jungle and had to be after 2 or 3 days in order to get a replacement. All persons also stated the LAW was not reliable in wet weather the electrical contacts out, LTC Dashielle apparently relt his greatest success in destroying wnkers was when he had a platoon of tanks attached. The tanks used *JBO, tracks, and hand to destroy the with very small loss to infantry. Captain that his ' the LAM during 4 he ««s lft COH»«id They tad appropriate targets, 9fca reeoilless were in kits by helicopter. These preferred over the LA» beof range and round. The 16th Infantry *«* they with Major the 9Qwn round to be very in cUarisw aaa He it&l the same on the UW us J , b. All companies take the MfeQ on and and otner orrensive type operations, In all it was the guns are attached to sqyads. SfC that or reduced strength he usually had only two rifle ir, his platoon, When about the for automatic rirepower in view of the ef tte m§ ^^ persons replied that the tf and chat were rauni;;or. anc avoid Th« 2d lmf laf ^oint tr^r, -ay fire and all The are employed in an role the rf^* - '" toon crosses a clearing or a It is at as an rifle �ru'a UM iCoU. USE CDCCS-LV , Trip Report . c. ist A i r Cavalry Dlvision Infantryman's Load . Whe" a b a t t a l i o r > is on a search and destroy mission r,panles normlly operate from a battalion oper.Ung ba« „ se ln ^, ^ lsc cavairy &0iQi - ^^ «^» * so d^r carries «f n T "'""T8 " ' "-"' er «"«« and , ln8 2-3 ra'-or •a,nc f * f T .* an 2 W 2-5 stated he d« * fc»»*ic» two gr a^ oae ^^i of C c*i oo hu t^ « for Mwself M79 CS I thus it nask. - ens o, water, 2 tragmentaticm the re^i^^^ for tte range " £00" sick to f l g h t - ^STOtdrt« ^ WA These co« apart at the .MM f™ tht they w i n correct tills e. tte of to tte g,f, ti * r*» ef ln th £!l IS t0 105« b .tt.ry w i l l be « *» «• to it U �pr-i--*? yf if ly,-*!!. r i p R^ . ,„ f, Mifn- MT C l v . l r y Of front the The d« by tte tank tank., a a MCM C0« MCMI a ^ ^ «I1 ig that an §« to f t - " An Uo or aH f»l«Mly"«liHU«w""hw» tutu " ^^ �.fill ; i »i||a,p, Sj?% _ lSji M^ H I T I Trip . lt i$ u-14 S«p i l with one f^. to the 1st Air C«v from th* 25th IMv. m occasion in the two to esspect^ thty will and say h*v* ^ V€rf tffKtl ^ a§aifts£ the tasa GS 1st Air C«v Dtv OC, C3C, CO, CO, CO, - "- . » 2 t* W , lie jiir c«v«Iry Tfco h«t not lijifcgll* lift, fc lip* - I H I I � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Alvin L. Young Collection on Agent Orange Description An account of the resource <p style="margin-top: -1em; line-height: 1.2em;">The Alvin L. Young Collection on Agent Orange comprises 120 linear feet and spans the late 1800s to 2005; however, the bulk of the coverage is from the 1960s to the 1980s and there are many undated items. The collection was donated to Special Collections of the National Agricultural Library in 1985 by Dr. Alvin L. Young (1942- ). Dr. Young developed the collection as he conducted extensive research on the military defoliant Agent Orange. The collection is in good condition and includes letters, memoranda, books, reports, press releases, journal and newspaper clippings, field logs and notebooks, newsletters, maps, booklets and pamphlets, photographs, memorabilia, and audiotapes of an interview with Dr. Young.</p> <p>For more about this collection, <a href="/exhibits/speccoll/exhibits/show/alvin-l--young-collection-on-a">view the Agent Orange Exhibit.</a></p> Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Box The box containing the original item. 014 Folder The folder containing the original item. 0153 Series The series number of the original item. Series II Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Hoge, George F. Description An account of the resource <strong>Corporate Author: </strong>Department of the Army, U.S. Army Combat Developments Command, Liaison Detachment, HQ USARV, APO San Francisco Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource September 19 1967 Title A name given to the resource Trip Report - 1st Air Cavalry Division, 11-14 Sep 67 Subject The topic of the resource crops herbicide blue Southeast Asia Ranch Hand