1 15 54 https://www.nal.usda.gov/exhibits/speccoll/files/original/13903b005994a2d329f5464ceb7c03c0.pdf 1dedfd603139d64340b2c51accc18ee8 PDF Text Text Item D Number 01 947 Dorrance, John C. Corporate Author Report/Article Title Typescript: United States Security in the Pacific Islands, Revision two Journal/Book Title Year Month/Day Color Number of Images September D 21 Descripton Notes Thursday, July 26, 2001 Page 1947 of 1957 �REVISION TWO UNITED STATES SECURITY INTERESTS IN THE PACIFIC ISLANDS John C. Dorrance Author's Address: Office of Australia and New Zealand Affairs Department of State Washington, D.C. 20520 SEPTEMBER, 1983 Washington, D.C. Office Tel: (202) 632-9690 Home Tel: (301) 299-5310 The views expressed in the paper are those of the author and not necessarily of the Department of State or the U.S. Government. �UNITED STATES SECURITY INTERESTS IN THE PACIFIC ISLANDS* by John C. Dorrance 1 The World War II seizure and then the transfer of administration of the Micronesian islands from Japan to the United States brought new responsibilities in the area to the • U.S. For the first time the U.S. controlled nearly all of the islands north of the equator between the U.S. West Coast and the Philippines. Nonetheless, for most Americans the Pacific islands faded into history in the two decades following the region's sea and island battles; consciousness of this vast area was limited to perceptions offered by James Michener's classic "Tales of the South Pacific" and "Return to Paradise." Major defense-related American decisions having an effect on the area in the immediate post-war years were few indeed. The islands of Micronesia, previously governed by Japan under a League of Nations Mandate, were formally transferred to U.S. administration in 1947 by an agreement between the U.S. Government and the United Nations Security Council which established the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands. Although that agreement recognized and protected American defense interests in the Trust Territory, all World War II bases in these and other Pacific islands, except those on Guam and in the Hawaiian islands, were closed. The only significant U.S. defense activities were nuclear testing (which ended in 1962) and the later establishment of the Kwajalein Missile Range facility in the Marshall Islands. American neglect of the area was perhaps natural. The non-U.S. territories and colonies were administered by NATO or ANZUS allies and pressures for change within the region were minimal and peaceful. There were no threats -- internal or external — to vaguely defined American interests. Washington thought it could ignore the Pacific islands and focused its attention on pressing problems elsewhere. The 1960s and the 1970s brought change, both internal and it external, that Washington eventually recognized and decided i must deal with. By 1980 most of the non-American islands had *The following analysis relates primarily to the Pacific Ocean area occupied by American Samoa, Cook Islands, Fiji, French Polynesia, Guam, Kiribati, Nauru, New Caledonia, Niue, Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands, Tokelau Islands, Tonga, Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands (Northern Marianas, Palau, Yap, Truk, Ponape, Kosrae, Marshall Islands), Tuvalu, Vanuatu, and Western Samoa. �-2achieved independence or full self-government. Moreover, negotiations on the future political status of Micronesia promised further changes in the Pacific political map; the four political entities that make up the Trust Territory — the Northern Mariana Islands, Palau, the Federated States of Micronesia and the Marshall Islands — were moving separately to a commonwealth or free association relationship with the United States. Parallel to these developments, the Soviets had begun to probe the area politically; their navy, fishing fleets and research vessels also regularly cruised South Pacific waters. Although Soviet efforts to establish close diplomatic relationships with the new island states have thus far met with failure, Moscow has had some success in developing political links through such devices as trade union relationships. Moreover (and of key importance to this discussion of security interests), by the early 1980s the long-term'Soviet military buildup in the Pacific had reached proportions that now threaten a military balance so long favorable to the US and its friends and allies in Asia and the Pacific. Following are illustrative data on the Soviet military inventory in the Pacific at the end of 1982; in some areas they already exceed those for U.S. forces. The ships and aircraft listed operate from bases in Vietnam, the Kuril Islands and the Soviet Asian mainland. 2 Soviet Combat Aircraft (excluding air defense aircraft) in the Pacific Area 175 medium bombers 1,200 tactical aircraft 445 naval aircraft Soviet Navy Ships in the Pacific Area 1 124 83 327 aircraft carrier submarines principal surface combatant ships other combatant ships This inventory represents a growth of several hundred percent in the past ten years, continues to expand, and bears little or no relationship to the defensive requirements of Soviet interests in the Pacific. The capabilities of these forces are little recognized outside professional defense circles. As one example, the "Backfire" bombers in the above inventory represent a four-fold increase in that capability over the past decade. They have a combat radius which permits them to attack, from Soviet Far East bases, targets throughout the North Pacific and some of the South Pacific. Operating from Vietnam, they could reach targets in Australia and parts �-3- of the South Pacific. Although not listed above, about one-third of the Soviet SS-20 intermediate range ballistic missile force has been deployed to the Soviet Far East. This equates to about 250 nuclear warheads targeted on East Asia and the Pacific. As a result of these developments, Washington in the 1970s began to refine the definition of U.S. security interests and associated objectives in the Pacific islands. However, the assumptions on which its analyses were based flowed from the experience of the previous 40 years and represented fundamental premises or principles applicable everywhere: —Wishing away war and its horrors is futile of itself; the only adequate insurance against war, and for national security and survival, is a level of defense preparedness sufficient to assure that potential adversaries will calculate the cost of aggression as too high to contemplate seriously. —War and aggression are no respectors of the non-aligned, the neutral, or of the weak; they can occur in the most unexpected places; witness the Falklands Islands crisis as a recent example of this truism. A global conflict would spare few if any. —The U.S. alone cannot provide adequate deterrence in the face of expanding Soviet offensive war-fighting capabilities. Deterrence requires the full range of post-World War II alliances in Asia, the Pacific, Europe, and the Americas. It also requires a degree of cooperation from friends not linked in formal alliance but nonetheless prepared to strengthen deterrence through other means commensurate with their resources and their other interests. The above of course was only one element in the context of broader reviews of overall U.S. interests and policy related to the political evolution of most of the region from colonial dependency to independence or self-government. Security considerations were by no means dominant; the primary focus was on the need to develop new patterns of political and other relationships. A further consideration was the change in military technology since World War II. The development of long-range aircraft, aerial refueling techniques, nuclear-powered ships, satellite reconnaissance and communications, and of intermediate and intercontinental range ballistic missiles largely eliminated the need for the galaxy of "stepping-stone" Pacific bases essential to both the Japanese and the allies in World War II. ******************************** �-4- If size and population were the sole measures, the island states and territories of the Pacific would have a very small claim to outside attention. Scattered over some 25 million square miles of ocean, the Pacific islands offer a wide range of independent and self-governing states, and of New Zealand, French, and American dependencies which enjoy varying levels of self-government. 3 Although the region's 20 states and territories comprise about 10,000 islands and their peoples speak some 1200 languages (800 in Papua New Guinea alone), the islands are mostly uninhabited, have a total population of only five million, and a land area of merely 215,000 square miles. One state, Papua New Guinea, has 80 percent of the region's land area and 60 percent of its population. A paucity or maldistribution of natural resources, population growth, and population density in some areas assure that the economic and social well-being of most of the region's nations will remain largely dependent on external assistance for the forseeable future. The region nevertheless offers other characteristics that assure it a considerable degree of positive uniqueness. The transition from colonialism to independence or self-government has been without bloodshed and revolution, democratic institutions have flourished, and respect for human rights is without parallel elsewhere in the Third World. 4 The Pacific islands states also have established regional institutions unique in terms of successful, pragmatic political and economic cooperation, and avoidance of ideological content and conflict. Some states have assumed positive global roles, e.g. Fiji's participation in Middle East peace-keeping operations. With the conclusion of Micronesia's 1983 acts of self-determination and with the forthcoming termination of the UN Trusteeship Agreement for these islands, most of the political entities within the region will have become independent or fully self-governing. Two major exceptions, the French territories of New Caledonia and French Polynesia, will continue their political evolution in the 1980s with New Caledonia probably moving to some form of independence. American Samoa and Guam undoubtedly will retain close links with the U.S., although the nature of their relationships could change. As an example, the people of Guam in a recent referendum by a plurality voted to seek a commonwealth relationship with the U.S. which can provide for a greater level of self-government. Within the above context, it has become increasingly clear that U.S. interests in the area are important and are �-5- susceptible to damage by insensitivity or by a return to neglect. These interests are multiple — some are direct and some are derivative of interests elsewhere. 5 Direct interests flow from the U.S. territorial presence (the State of Hawaii and the Territories of Guam and American Samoa) and from the present and anticipated future political relationships with the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands. With termination of the Micronesian trusteeship, the Northern Mariana Islands will become an additional territorial interest as they enter into a commonwealth relationship with the U.S. Approved in a 1975 plebiscite, the relationship provides for U.S. sovereignty over the islands, and U.S. citizenship for their inhabitants. The Republic of Palau in a February 1U, 1983 plebiscite rejected independence or a close relationship with the U.S. in favor of free association with the U.S. by a vote of 62 percent. The citizens of the Federated States of Micronesia (Yap, Truk, Ponape and Kosrae) by a vote of 79 percent opted for free association in a similar plebiscite on June 21, 1983. The people of the Republic of the Marshall Islands chose free association by a vote of 58 percent, with the same range of options, on September 7, 1983. All three acts of self-determination were observed and reported on by United Nations observation teams. 6 The Micronesian states' free association relationship will assure continued economic and security links with the U.S. and a special political relationship somewhat akin to that between the Cook Islands and New Zealand. The U.S. obviously also has a strong interest in close and friendly relations with the island states of the South Pacific, in the success of regional institutions (although it participates only in the South Pacific Commission and the South Pacific Conference), and in the stability and economic well-being of the region. U.S. direct economic interests are less significant and relate primarily to the welfare and development of the American territories and of Micronesia, and to non-discriminatory access to marine resources in a manner that also serves the legitimate interests of the island states. In contrast to the foregoing, U.S. security interests in the Pacific islands are in some degree indirect in that they are largely derivative of interests and objectives elsewhere. Aside from the fundamental interest of the security of Hawaii, Guam, American Samoa and Micronesia, the primary U.S. defense interest within the region is that of secure lines of communication through the Pacific — air and sea -- to our friends and allies in Asia, to Australia and New Zealand, to the Indian Ocean, and to island states with which we have ties �-6- of friendship. 7 Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger recently summed up U.S. security interests in another way. "Five of the seven defense agreements to which the United States is a signatory are located in the Asian/Pacific region. They include bilateral treaties with Japan, Korea and the Philippines; the Manila Pact which adds Thailand to our treaty partners; and, of course, the ANZUS Treaty. From the United States perspective, each of these agreements is more important today than on the day we signed it. United States interests in the Pacific, already vital to maintaining our security, are becoming even more important. For example, our trade with our Asian-Pacific neighbors — valued at over 137 billion dollars last year alone — now accounts for 28 percent of all U.S. foreign trade, more than our trade with any other region. Free world economies depend increasingly upon essential raw materials and trade which travel the vital Pacific sea-lanes. Thus, the security of the United States has become increasingly interdependent with the security of each of its Pacific allies." 8 Discussion of these interests, of related American objectives, and of operational requirements can best be divided into those that relate primarily to the islands north of the equator, and to those that relate to the islands of the South Pacific. The importance of the northern Pacific islands is manifest. Guam is a politically secure and strategically located island under American sovereignty. From bases on Guam, U.S. air and sea power can support allies and friends in Asia or meet a Soviet thrust into the North Pacific. Distances in the Western Pacific area, the nature of the Soviet threat, the variety of U.S. commitments, the scope of forces required to meet a variety of possible contingencies, the small size of Guam itself, and the military necessity of dispersing forces assure that Guam alone cannot suffice to support a U.S. defense presence in the Western Pacific. Thus Guam is only one element of a broader commitment of U.S. forces to Japan, the Philippines, and Korea. The U.S. also has leased land in the Northern Mariana Islands, mainly on Tinian, for possible future use by the U.S. Air Force and the other services. Any future reactivation of the World War II airfields on Tinian would complement bases on nearby Guam and could be of critical importance should the U.S. lose access to major facilities elsewhere in the Western Pacific. Absent that unlikely contingency, a future Guam-Tinian-Saipan complex of facilities would continue to be �-7- only one element in the U.S. defense presence in the Pacific and East Asia mentioned above. The Micronesian islands and Guam have strategic value in still another sense. In peacetime they lie to the south of major sea and air lanes across the North Pacific. However, in any Pacific war scenario involving the Soviets, U.S. lines of communication would shift to the south and run through or near the Micronesian islands; ships and aircraft would attempt to move beyond the range of Soviet attack aircraft operating out of bases in the Kuril Islands and on the Soviet Asian mainland. For this reason, but also because of the threat that would be posed to Hawaii and to areas south of the equator, a rimary U.S. objective in the political status negotiations with the Micronesian governments has been an arrangement that assures no adversary of the United States or of its allies would have access to these islands for military purposes. The UN Trusteeship Agreement provides such an assurance while it remains in force. The commonwealth status chosen by the people of the Northern Mariana Islands in their 1975 act of self-determination also provides that assurance for those islands after the trusteeship is terminated. Similarly, the free association relationship with Palau, the Federated States of Micronesia, and with the Marshall Islands will provide for U.S. responsibility for the defense and security of these states — and thus assurance of denial of military access to potential adversaries. Unlike the Northern Marianas' commonwealth status, the Compact of Free Association with the Micronesian states, when fully in effect with termination of the UN Trusteeship Agreement, will establish three new sovereign states in a political relationship with the U.S. that has no precise precedent either in international practice or in U.S. constitutional law and will provide to the Micronesian governments authority and responsibility for their internal and foreign affairs. The U.S. also is committed to provide approximately US$2.2 billion in grant assistance to the three states during the first 15 years of the relationship, with adjustment of that amount to take into account inflation. The Micronesian states may become independent, or seek a closer relationship with the U.S., by terminating the free association relationship with the U.S. through a plebiscite demonstrating that such was the freely expressed will of the people. The defense and security provisions of the Compact of Free Association with the three states provide that: —the U.S. undertakes to defend the three states as it would the United States and its citizens for a minimum period �-8of 15 years in the cases of the Marshall Islands and the Federated States of Micronesia, and 50 years in the case of Palau; —during those same periods the U.S. would have the right, after consultation, to disapprove any action by any of the governments which in the U.S. view compromised the U.S. ability to provide such defense; and, —the U.S. has the right to foreclose use of the territory of any of the three states for military purposes by any third nation. That right extends indefinitely in each state until otherwise mutually agreed. In return (after any termination of the time-limited defense provisions mentioned above) the U.S. would guarantee the defense of each of the states on a basis comparable to that which underlies U.S. mutual security agreements with its closest allies. The U.S. also has concluded with these three Micronesian governments agreements covering specific military requirements. —In the Palau Islands, a Military Use and Operating Rights Agreement provides the U.S. the right to make contingency use of various areas, after consultation with the Government of Palau. These rights, which will run for 50 years, provide for contingency access to anchorage rights in Palau 1 s main harbor and use of a 40-acre nearby land area for support facilities; for contingency joint usage of Palau's two main airfields (including their improvement and small adjacent areas for support purposes); for contingency use of 2000 acres for logistics installations; and for periodic access to areas on Babelthuap island for occasional training exercises, after consultation with the Palau Government in each instance. —Arrangements have been concluded for continued use of the Kwajalein Missile Range facility in the Marshall Islands for up to 30 years — a peacetime requirement. There is no wartime role for Kwajalein. —No basing or other military arrangements, other than the ability to transit the area, have been sought for any of the islands in the Federated States of Micronesia (Yap, Truk, Ponape, and Kosrae). There is agreement on the continued presence of the Coast Guard station on Yap Island. Contrary to a current Soviet "disinformation" campaign and speculation by some writers, the U.S. does not plan in any contingency to establish a nuclear submarine base in Palau, nor to store nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons in Palau (in �-9- fact the U.S. has renounced biological weapons). Such usage is neither politically practical nor militarily necessary and most certainly is not contemplated; these and other allegations about military use of Palau have been accurately described as "tendentious rubbish" by the American Ambassador to the UN Trusteeship Council. 9 The Government of Palau is fully aware of the foregoing from frequent discussions with the U.S. Government. Indeed it is probable that most of the contingency rights provided by the agreement with Palau will never be exercised; they are intended primarily for contingencies which hopefully will never materialize. One such contingency could be loss of access to facilities in the Philippines. Under such circumstances the strategic importance of not only Palau/ but also of Guam and the Northern Marianas, would increase as possible sites for the relocation of some U.S. military .operations presently at Subic Bay and Clark Air Base. However, a combination of cost factors, strategic considerations, Palau 1 s small size, and the narrow range of contingency rights in Palau assures that most military operations and facilities in the Philippines could not be duplicated in Palau. In the event of war, the U.S. might need to utilize contingency rights in Palau to provide protection of sea lanes running north-south between the Philippines and Palau — if access to the Indian Ocean through the South China Sea had become too risky and if some of the straits through the Indonesian archipelago remain open. At this writing (September, 1983), it is of course by no means certain that the above political and defense arrangements will be implemented. The Palauans must now devise an acceptable method of reconciling provisions of their constitution which conflict with the Compact of Free Association approved by the people of Palau in their February 10, 1983 plebiscite. The constitution presently provides for a nuclear-free Palau, including prohibition of access to Palau by nuclear-powered ships and the transit of nuclear weapons. These provisions are inconsistent with the defense authority and responsibilities of the U.S. in a free association relationship. In the same plebiscite the Palauan people, by a majority of 52 percent, did agree to set aside these nuclear restraints in a procedure provided for by their constitution. However, that was inadequate because the constitutional procedures require a 75 percent majority vote to eliminate these restrictions. The Palauan people do of course have the right to declare their land, air and sea space "nuclear-free," but they must choose between that and free association with the United States. Unlike independence, a free association relationship with the United States is not a matter of right to Palau and cannot be unilaterally defined by Palau. It must be based on mutually acceptable principles and serve the interests �-10of both parties. In these circumstances it is difficult to envisage implementing the free association relationship with Palau until the above conflict is resolved. Although the strategic importance of the northern Pacific islands relates in large measure to lines of communication to Asia and to the Indian Ocean, that of the South Pacific relates to access to Australia and New Zealand — but also in certain contingencies to the Indian Ocean or to Pacific islands states. In peacetime, most ship movements from the Pacific to the Indian Ocean thread their way through the many straits of the Indonesian archipelago or the Strait of Malacca. However, the Soviets now have an ability to interdict shipping through the South China Sea from bases in Vietnam and to close the Indonesian archipelago straits and the Strait of Malacca with mines. Should these contingencies eventuate in a regional or global conflict, Pacific lines of communication (especially from Hawaii and the U.S. West Coast) would shift to the South Pacific, the Tasman Sea, the Bass Strait, and thence westward across the Great Australian Bight to the Indian Ocean. A shorter but more difficult alternative route to the Indian Ocean would be through the South Pacific and the shallow Torres Strait between Papua New Guinea and the north of Australia. In any case, the security of the three ANZUS partners requires freedom of movement through the South Pacific with respect to their own immediate defense but also in connection with any threat in the Indian Ocean or the South Pacific. As in the North Pacific, this interest is best served by the absence of bases from which hostile forces can operate against allied ships and aircraft. It does not require American bases in the South Pacific and none are sought. This interest does require that allied ships and aircraft be able to refuel and replenish within the area and to conduct surveillance of hostile submarines operating in the South Pacific. For the most part U.S. requirements can be satisfied from American Samoa. Moreover, assuming that the ANZUS allies will stand together in any conflict in the Pacific area — actual or threatened — much of the surveillance activity probably would be conducted by New Zealand and Australian aircraft and ships. Fortunately, the possibility that the Soviet Union will acquire military bases in the South Pacific seems very remote. However, Soviet submarines already do operate in the area. Related to that development, Soviet oceanographic research vessels, some of them disguised as fishing trawlers, conduct extensive research relating to seabed mapping, ocean currents, water temperatures, and other data important for submarine operations. To the extent peacetime Soviet submarine operations in the South Pacific become a major potential threat �-11to the ANZUS partners, there will be a corollary requirement to step up the tracking and surveillance of these submarines. In that context, ANZUS tracking aircraft and ships benefit from access to ports and airfields in the South Pacific islands. None of the foregoing requires defense treaties between the U.S. and South Pacific island states. Although some island governments from time to time have expressed an interest in ANZUS membership or in separate defense treaties with one of the ANZUS partners, it has been pointed out at those times that to all practical purposes they are already "umbrellaed" by ANZUS. Moreover, in the author's view, any military attack on any state within the region by an external power would represent a direct challenge to the vital interests of the ANZUS partners and would require a response. The South Pacific island states thus derive the security benefits without the corollary obligations of the ANZUS Treaty. In this connection, it is important to recall that the ANZUS security commitment would be triggered not only by an attack on the metropole of any of the three allies, but also by an attack on the forces or territory of any of the signatories within the Pacific area. As a hypothetical example, the security obligations of all three governments could be triggered by an attack on the forces of one responding to an attack or the threat of an attack on an island state. In addition, the Treaties of Friendship between the United States and Kiribati and Tuvalu provide for consultations in the event of a perceived threat and that bases will not be provided to third parties without prior consultations with the U.S. However, the main purpose of these treaties (as well as those with the Cook Islands and with New Zealand on behalf of the Tokelau Islands) was not to establish a defense relationship, but rather to clarify territorial sovereignty by relinquishing shadowy U.S. claims to various islands. All four treaties were negotiated during the Carter Administration and were ratified during the Reagan Administration (1983). The most controversial element of U.S. military operations in the South Pacific relates to broader nuclear concerns. The ability of U.S. forces — especially the Navy — to exercise with our allies in peacetime, and to support them or other friends in the area in any contingency, depends on free movement through the South Pacific. Familiarity with the area's waters is an obvious necessity, and the use of ports and airfields is desirable. In peacetime, shore leave by ships' crews is an important morale factor. If South Pacific governments were to determine that nuclear-propelled or nuclear armed ships (and aircraft) should �-12be excluded from their territory, the ability of U.S. forces to respond to contingencies would be severely hampered. Nearly half of the U.S. Navy is nuclear-propelled and, as a matter of firm principle, the U.S. neither confirms nor denies the presence of nuclear weapons on any military ship or aircraft. To do otherwise would only pinpoint targets for an adversary. Any requirement that the U.S. assert the presence or non-presence of nuclear weapons on an aircraft or a ship thus has the practical effect of denying its entry. If none of our ships carried nuclear weapons there would be no counter balance to the Soviet nuclear capability in the Pacific and Indian Ocean areas. This one-sided nuclear capability would generate in others the perception of superior strength and thus the attendant political influence which might be gained by that perception. This is a peacetime implication. Soviet perception of superiority could also lower the threshold for conflict. For these reasons it is imperative that the United States Navy maintain a deterrent nuclear capability which makes it manifestly clear to the Soviet Union that use of their Pacific-oriented nuclear forces, especially at sea, would result in risks which far outweigh any conceivable gain. From the Pacific islanders' viewpoint there are also significant and legitimate concerns and understandable emotions directed against nuclear testing, the dumping of nuclear waste, and the basing of nuclear weapons within the region. These sentiments are summed up in various proposals for a South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone. The U.S. does not intend to dump nuclear waste, to conduct nuclear tests, or to base or store nuclear weapons in the South Pacific. Indeed, nuclear waste dumping is prohibited by current U.S. legislation. However, unless carefully crafted, a South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone could cripple the ability of U.S. forces to exercise in the South Pacific with our ANZUS allies and to transit the South Pacific to Australia, New Zealand and the Indian Ocean in war or peace. The latter point was recognized by the heads of governments of the Pacific islands states, and of Australia and New Zealand, during the August, 1983 Canberra meeting of the South Pacific Forum. The Forum, after considering an Australian proposal for establishment of a South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone, affirmed in its communique: "....that in further addressing the zone proposal it would be important to uphold the principles of freedom of navigation and overflight as provided in international law �-13- and the treaty obligations of some Forum members. It recognized the sovereign right of governments to make their own decisions on their alliance and defense requirements including access to their ports and airfields by the vessels and aircraft of other countries." 10 The potential utility of nuclear weapons free zones is stated in Article VII of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty which acknowledges the right of groups of states to conclude regional treaties in order to assure the absence of nuclear weapons on their territory. The United States has supported the establishment of regional nuclear weapons free zones under appropriate conditions and when consistent with certain criteria based on UN resolutions: —The initiative for the creation of the zone should come from the states in the region concerned; —All states whose participation is deemed important should participate in the zone; —The zone arrangement should provide for adequate verification of compliance with its provisions; —The establishment of the zone should not disturb existing security arrangements to the detriment of regional and international security; —The zone arrangement should effectively prohibit its parties from developing or otherwise possessing any nuclear explosive device for whatever purpose; --The establishment of a zone should not affect the existing rights of its parties under international law to grant or deny to other states transit privileges within internal waters, including port calls and overflights; and, --The zone arrangement should not seek to impose restrictions on the exercise of rights recognized under international law, particularly the principle of freedom of navigation of the high seas, in international airspace, and through straits used for international navigation, and the right of innocent passage through territorial seas. In the event that regional governments were to seek implementation of a South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone, the U.S. Government's attitude would be based in large measure on the proposal's compatibility with the above criteria. �-14Another matter, that of U.S. refusal to sign the Law of the Sea Convention, provides a significant irritant in U.S. relationships with a region where national interests are closely linked to marine and seabed resources. However, this controversy need not impact directly on U.S. defense interests. The U.S. opposes only those provisions of the Convention which relate to exploitation of the resources of the seabed. The U.S. endorses all other elements of the Convention, including provisions relating to exclusive economic zones, and to straits and archipelagos. These provisions reflect existing international law and practice regarding navigation and overflights and thus do not represent inappropriate new restraints on freedom of movement of ships and aircraft. H All of the foregoing addresses U.S. security interests and objectives or principles supportive of those interests. The expanding Soviet threat to these and allied interests has required increases in U.S. and allied forces in the Asian and Pacific regions. However, in the Pacific islands those interests generally still translate into a low-profile U.S. military presence. No U.S. ships, aircraft, or forces are based in the South Pacific islands, nor are there any in the North Pacific islands other than on Guam and in Hawaii (as noted earlier, Kwajalein is a test facility without combat capability). In 1982, there were only fourteen South Pacific island port calls by seven U.S. Navy ships. While" the numbers may vary from year to year, it seems unlikely, at least for the foreseeable future, they will become significantly greater. Moreover, all port calls have been of the "good will" variety, and some were for disaster relief operations. As noted earlier, advances in military technology over the past 20 years have largely eliminated the need for the many "stepping stone" bases that were essential in the Pacific campaigns of World War II. Other U.S. military activity in the South Pacific has been limited to a few sales of military equipment to the defense forces of Fiji and Papua New Guinea, assistance in arranging for the deployment of Fiji's contribution to peacekeeping forces in the Middle East, and training of a few members of the defense forces of Fiji and Papua New Guinea. The U.S.. takes the view that Australia's and New Zealand's close relationships and particular interests in the South Pacific — including defense cooperation — suggest that these two countries play the lead role in that area to the extent that island states seek external cooperation. The latter principle, however, does pose questions about a sensitive aspect of regional security: that of the internal security of states within the region. Thus far, among the independent states, only Vanuatu has �-15- experienced a significant internal security problem — and that hopefully was an isolated incident resulting from the unique processes that brought those islands to independence. The future may be less kind. Ethnic mix, land issues, and political emotions in New Caledonia provide an explosive environment for that territory's future political evolution to probable independence. Elsewhere there are other potential causes for internal strife: language and tribal differences, pressures for separatism or political fragmentation, ethnic conflict, or simple economic deprivation. Fortunately, ideological conflict is absent in most areas. Only three island states, Fiji, Papua New Guinea and Tonga, maintain defense forces capable of coping with significant internal conflict; others rely on small and lightly-armed civil police forces or (in the case of New Caledonia and French Polynesia) the presence of the French military. Aside from its responsibilities in its own territories there is at present no need for a U.S. internal security role in the Pacific islands. It is more appropriate that the island states, especially in the South Pacific, rely on cooperation among themselves when external assistance is required — as occurred when Papua New Guinea provided security forces to Vanuatu in the immediate aftermath of Vanuatu's independence. The above premise assumes no foreign involvement in an insurrection, and it is possible that situations could arise that would be beyond the ability of local or neighboring state forces to handle. In such contingencies, a South Pacific government might turn to one or several of the ANZUS .governments for assistance. The response presumably would depend on the circumstances and could pose difficult issues. The governments appealed to would have to weigh the implications of involvement against broader interests, and the consequences of not assisting a beleaguered friendly government. Hopefully such a contingency and the related issues will not arise. ******************************** The foregoing addresses U.S. security interests largely in isolation from political interests and without adequately assessing the political and economic environment — at best a risky and incomplete point of departure. While perhaps it is stating the obvious, the security interests of the U.S. and of its Pacific allies are best served by a regional political and economic environment that provides to the peoples of the area the security and stability essential to their political, economic, and social development, and that serves their own respective national interests. Put another way, the �-16fundamental shared national interest of Pacific islands states and of the U.S., Australia and New Zealand is freedom from military aggression or pressure, and the ability to focus resources on national needs. To the extent that there is generally a shared perception of common or compatible security interests, the defense interests of the United States are well served. The above perception and a corresponding consensus as to how mutual interests are best protected seem to prevail at this time, but cannot be taken for granted. Governments, nations, and peoples deprived of political stability, of the essential needs of life, or of fulfillment of legitimate aspirations are likely to be short-sighted with respect to "over-the-horizon" potential threats. Fiscal or other desperation can make governments and peoples susceptible to solutions or blandishments potentially damaging to the interests of their neighbors and to the region's stability and security. Equally, island nations whose development or even economic survival may be dependent upon the resources of the surrounding seas, or who perceive their environment threatened by hazards such as nuclear waste, are unlikely to be sympathetic to the interests of those whom they perceive as threatening their own immediate na-tional interests. In these circumstances, U.S. security interests also are well served by policies that reinforce the region's potential for development and the effectiveness of regional institutions that can provide cohesion and economies of scale, and that display sensitivity toward the modest but vital interests and needs of island states. The interests of the region and of the ANZUS allies would appear to be further served by a final elimination of the remaining psychological and other barriers to full integration of the North Pacific islands with the regional life of the South Pacific. The Micronesian states, for a variety of historical and political reasons, have not participated fully in the regional institutions of the area (with the exception of the South Pacific Conference), but will be able to do so upon termination of the UN trusteeship. Effective Micronesian participation in such institutions as the South Pacific Forum and the South Pacific Bureau for Economic Cooperation will strengthen these organizations through an enlarged two-way flow of skills and other resources. In turn, Micronesia stands to benefit from the infusion of ideas and concepts tested elsewhere, and from participation in regional decision-making processes. The region as a whole would benefit from enhanced economies of scale in such fields as education, health services, �-17communications, fisheries, transportation, marketing, and research. Above all, the voice of the region and its influence on others would be more cohesive and effective. Without challenging Australia's and New Zealand's relationships with the South Pacific, the U.S. also must continue to consider how it might better contribute to the development needs of the South Pacific and to the strengthening of regional institutions. The security and well-being of the U.S. territories and of the Micronesian states are directly linked to those of their near neighbors and cannot be dealt with in isolation. Similarly, Australia and New Zealand might consider whether their broader interests in the region might be better served by more active relationships with the islands north of the equator and by working with their island neighbors to integrate Micronesia more fully into the life of the region. �FOOTNOTES 1. John C. Dorrance is a Counselor in the Senior Foreign Service of the United States Department of State, and a specialist in Australia, New Zealand, and Pacific islands affairs. He has served on diplomatic assignments in Vietnam, Fiji, Australia, Micronesia, Jamaica, and Germany. In Washington Mr. Dorrance has been assigned to positions dealing with U.S. policy planning, United Nations affairs, the Middle East, Micronesia, and the Southwest Pacific. A graduate of Georgetown University's School of Foreign Service and of the National War College, he also has an M.S. degree from George Washington University, and was the first U.S. Foreign Service Officer to complete Pacific islands area specialization studies at the University of Hawaii. Between 1978-1979, he served on the faculty of the National Defense University in Washington, D.C. He currently is the Director of the Department of State's Office of Australia and New Zealand Affairs. The analyses provided in "U.S. Security Interests in the Pacific Islands" are based on the author's expertise and involvement in many of the issues discussed — but also on 1982 discussions with other U.S. officials in the Department of State, the Department of Defense, and at U.S. Pacific Command headquarters in Honolulu (CINCPAC). 2. Data provided to author in December, 1982 by the Defense Intelligence Agency, Department of Defense, Washington, D.C. 3. Chile and the UK also possess small territories in the South Pacific: Easter Island and Pitcairn Island. 4. Immediately after independence there was a separatist insurrection in Vanuatu with some associated bloodshed. 5. For a more complete discussion of U.S. interests, objectives, and policy in the Pacific islands, see: John C. Dorrance. Oceania and the United States, National Security Monograph Series 80-6, National Defense University Research Directorate, Washington, D.C. 1980. 6. As discussed elsewhere in this paper, conflicts between Palau's constitution and the Compact of Free Association with the United States remain to be resolved. Approval of the free association relationship by the U.S. Congress is an early and essential next step. Following Congressional approval, arrangements will be necessary for termination, in the United Nations context, of the Trusteeship Agreement �entered into in 1947 by the UN Security Council and the United States. Pending termination of that agreement, the United States will continue to be legally responsible for the administration of Micronesia. 7. For a detailed discussion of Pacific lines of communication see: Robert A. Brand, Patricia K. Hymson, and Hans H. Indorf, Editors. Lines of Communication and Security, National Defense University 1981 Pacific Symposium Proceedings, National Defense University, Fort Lesley J. McNair, Washington, D.C., 1981. 8. From a speech by the Honorable Caspar Weinberger, U.S. Secretary of Defense, before the National Press Club, Canberra, Australia, November 5, 1982. 9. Following are some examples of Soviet disinformation. Moscow TASS in English on October 25, 1982, asserted: "The Pentagon is making plans for turning the Micronesian Republic of Palau into an unsinkable aircraft carrier. It wants to establish on the strategic Pacific island of Palau a big American air base, installations for servicing nuclear submarines and a center for the Rapid Deployment Force ... and a site for storing nuclear, chemical and bacteriological weapons, as well as for testing such weapons." Moscow's Pravda newspaper on December 17, 1982, alleged that "Washington is preparing to build the biggest naval base in the region on the Palau Islands — it will occupy 30 percent of the entire territory of Palau ... More than 32,000 acres ... is to be used as storage dumps for nuclear warheads, while Palau's main port is to become the main base in the region for nuclear submarines ... Here too the CIA has chosen a secret base for itself for training special groups for 'combatting the guerilla movement. 111 In a statement before a Special Session of the United Nations Trusteeship Council on December 20, 1982, American Ambassador William Sherman correctly categorized these and similar allegations as being "groundless and polemical accusations" and "tendentious rubbish." 10. From the Communique issued at the conclusion of the 14th meeting of the South Pacific Forum between August 29-30, 1983, in Canberra, Australia. Participants included the heads of government of Australia, the Cook Islands, Federated States of Micronesia (as an observer), Fiji, Kiribati, Nauru, New Zealand, Niue, Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands, Tuvalu, Vanuatu and Western Samoa. Tonga was represented by its Minister for Foreign Affairs and Defense. The Australian proposal for a South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone envisaged the banning of nuclear testing, �the dumping or storage of nuclear waste, and the basing or storage of nuclear weapons in the region. The Forum agreed to consider further this proposal at its next meeting in 1984. 11. Yet another irritant in U.S. relations with Pacific islands governments is the U.S. position on migratory species of fish (mainly tuna). The U.S. holds that an international body should exercise jurisdiction with respect to management of commercial fishing of these species. Pacific islands governments (and many more) maintain that they have jurisdiction when these fish are within their economic zones. The U.S. and Pacific islands governments are in a dialogue aimed at a practical resolution of this issue. � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Alvin L. Young Collection on Agent Orange Description An account of the resource <p style="margin-top: -1em; line-height: 1.2em;">The Alvin L. Young Collection on Agent Orange comprises 120 linear feet and spans the late 1800s to 2005; however, the bulk of the coverage is from the 1960s to the 1980s and there are many undated items. The collection was donated to Special Collections of the National Agricultural Library in 1985 by Dr. Alvin L. Young (1942- ). Dr. Young developed the collection as he conducted extensive research on the military defoliant Agent Orange. The collection is in good condition and includes letters, memoranda, books, reports, press releases, journal and newspaper clippings, field logs and notebooks, newsletters, maps, booklets and pamphlets, photographs, memorabilia, and audiotapes of an interview with Dr. Young.</p> <p>For more about this collection, <a href="/exhibits/speccoll/exhibits/show/alvin-l--young-collection-on-a">view the Agent Orange Exhibit.</a></p> Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Box The box containing the original item. 075 Folder The folder containing the original item. 1947 Series The series number of the original item. Series III Subseries IV Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Dorrance, John C. Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1983-09-01 Title A name given to the resource Typescript: United States Security in the Pacific Islands, Revision two Subject The topic of the resource military security military impact ao_seriesIII https://www.nal.usda.gov/exhibits/speccoll/files/original/6d756e3798a3feb87ce9f888ef9eca00.pdf bfab4644bc6cb4df7e6420cf79c1b6c5 PDF Text Text Item ID Number 00294 Author Corporate Author Report/Article Title Typescript: Pre 65 DFL Spray Operations RUN Journal/Book Title Year 000 ° Month/Day Color Number of Images 9 OeSCriptOU NOtBS Includes data table of number of gallons of military herbicide procured by the U.S. Department of Defense and disseminated in South Vietnam during the period January 1962 - December 1964, source of table listed as USAF OEHL Report, p. I-9 Monday, January 22, 2001 Page 294 of 341 �p re 65 rirL Spray '"'Derations R M M The first actual test mission in Q outh Vietnam was flown along a road north of Kontum by a VMA 1 7 H-^-l helicopter equioned with a '1°, Navy Helicopter Insecticide Dispersal Apparatus L i q u i d (HTn/U,) Sprav system ^ 1 0 August 1 Q61. Two weeks later, the first fixed-winn: spray mission was flown by a V M A ^ C-47 . stretch of route Thanh. 1 T his mission, flown on ?'» August, a four km 3 about RO km north of Saigon near the V i l l a g e of Chon Roth of these missions disnersed the herbicide n}.noxol . On ? January 1 9^?, President ^ennedy authorized l i m i t e d n^L operations o an experimental nature against separate targets which together comprised about 1 6 miles o^ the total distance about ^ miles along route 1C S between Hien Hoa and Vung T au . Three C-t?3 equipped with MC-1 spray tanks (1000 g a l l o n caoacity) landed at Tan Son Mhut on 7 January 1Q6?. for Ranch Hand until 1 December 1 Tan Son Mhut remained the headouarte 9^*S when the unit mov^d to Rion �The first Ranch Hand spray mission was flown on the morning of 1 96?. A target north of Route 1 1 1 At 0«?o and 0 January one Ranch "and C-1?? sprayed less than 200 gallons of herbicide purple. January along Route > Januar 5 was chosen adjacent to a swath, a "MA17 C-47 had sprayed with herbicide pink on ?9 n^cember 10*>1. 0900 on the morning of ir T wo spray missions were flown on 1 1 *•> which inaugurated the ''anch M and program. Swath width was 500 feet for the first flight and 400 feet for the second flight. A g a i n purple was applied. the following three days. Missions continued along R^ute The mission on the 1 1 ^ on 6th completed the initially authorized spray work which totaled to sorties, used 7,9?0 gallons of herbicide and covered 6,9?0 acres. During the period January - March 6?, many training missions were also flown. On one low level mission, in February 1 96 9 , a D anch Hand aircraf T crashed, destroying the aircraft and k i l l i n g the three crew members. plane went down in an inaccessable area off of "oute 1 5 between Men ll h oa and Vung Tau. Ranch Hand again flew spray missions on 1U-17 February 1Q<5?. 1i n n the lth, they sprayed a target along Route 1'-J which was approximately 1 0 miles long by 400 yards wide and totaled 1^00 acres. T hat same dav they sprayed about 900 acres surrounding the *'han Co airfield. the 1 5th was accomplished on a stretch of Route along Route 1 4 on the previous d a y . T 1 Spraying on the same dimension as he ^ather Hoa area, in the souther portion of the Ca Man penensula, was sprayed on the ifth and i?th of �February. T hese February operations took 1 ? sorties, used 1R'-! drums of purple herbicide and covered 7,800 acres. With the exception of the Rien Hoa airfield and the T han T uy Ha ammunition storage area which were treated by WA 17 helicopters, the spra missions on 17 February completed the i n i t i a l coverage of all authorized targets. Ranch Hard aircraft resprayed the areas alons Rt 1 ^ on ?n Marc 1 .. There was a break in herbicide operations for five months after this mission, to await evaluation of the chemical effects on the foliage. On 1 7 and ?1 July 6? V N A F sprayed scrub growth north, northeast and west of the runway at Bien Hoa. Ranch Hand began spray operations a g a i n d u r i n g the oeriod 3 to 7 September. Six soray missions were conducted along the n ng ^oc River i n An Xuyen Province. Spray operations were again resumed on ?o September. S September and 11 October 1 R etween the period Q(S2, "anch u and sprayed a total of more than 9,000 acres dispensing ?7,6UB gallons of purple herbicide. These missions cleared vegetation along about SO m i l e s of rivers and c a n a l s in the Ca Mau Penensula. 30 November 1 Q6? authorized clearances por ^ specific areas to be snrave �proposed in the July recommendation and also delegated the authority to approve the employment of herbicides in future operations. Highway 1 south of Tuy Hoa on Highway 1 Fast side of 1 '4 Oec ft'3. On 1« *• ?U nee 6? U km of south of Oui Nhon . After these missions were completed defoliation activities were halted until the advent of the rainy season the following June. carried out crop destruction using 5 H-V4 heliconters equipped ^o^ cron destruction. T Vietnam occurred on he first test crop destruction operation in South 1 0 Aug 61. V M A ^ helicopter sprayed trinoxol on crop near a v i l l a g e north of r>ak TO. D resident Kennedy's basic authority for Ranch Hand prohibited crop destruction. Vietnamese program. r ron destruction remained an ai On ? Oct 6? President Kennedy allowed crop destruction operations. restricted Area to be sprayed were portions of a ^ k square area of Phuoc Long Province. The base for this crop destruction program was the air strip at Nui ^ara in D huoc Lons D rovince. US Airforce C- 1 ?3's transported chemicals supplies and equipment to this base. With advise and assistance of American technicians, the South Vietnamese installed HTDAT, spray equioment on five VMA 1 7 H-?ii hel icooter,": Spray operation began on the morning of ? 1 Nov ^"> . A total of ^O gallons of Herbicide "Rlue" (cacadylic acid") was spraved over about 400 acres of crops. On 9? Nov 6P they again spraved Herbicide " n lue" on a total of 375 acres o^ crops in Phuoc Long D rovince. Ranch Hand began a p p l y i n g herbicides along *46 km of canals in the r/\ M(\'r �penensula in June 1C )63. Fight sorties were flown in this region of TV Corns between 6 and P June dispensing 7,?00 gallons of chemicals. Tv ^e unit flew spray missions along a powerline extending *>om Ha Lat to Rien From 3-?7 July Hoa. during 1 1 96?, Ranch Hand sprayed m,7?p g a l l o n s of herhici'il 9 sorties along 58 km of transmission l i n e right-of-way. Ranch Hand spray operations ceased after the July spray missions due to request by the Thai government to assist in the control of locusts. Ranch Hand resumed spray operations in October 1 U Oct 1 1 963. between the period 963 and 1? Jan 1QM they dispensed 7 i f ^ f t n g a l l o n s of herbicide o six separate target complexes. T hree of* these i n v o l v e d h i g h w a y s , one wa a railroad, one was a canal on the Ca M au Peninsula and the southern tio o r the peninsula which connected directly with the Gulf of Thailand. This target required 1^ sorties and uijO^O g a l l o n s of defoMant. March & April 1 During 954 targets were sprayed on the Ha Mau Peninsula. In January 1 Q6iJ, authority was delegated to the senior Mc; Advisors serving with Vietnemise d i v i s i o n for hand-spray operations. This great! reduced log time that has existed from proposal to completion of small defoliation projects; i.e., around depots, airfields and outnosts. Locations and tvpes of herbicides unknown at this time A mission flown by D anch ^and along a canal in the Me v.or\e rielta on ?? April 1 96M accidently caused crop destruction near the model strategic �hamlet of Cha La. During a mission on 30 April 1 9*>U in the Helta, "anch "and aircraft received considerable ground fire. One of the two r _ i ? V s received a hi in one of its engines at this time the pilot feathered the engine and dumped his herbicide load. After encountering this intense ground fire on 30 A p r i l , Ranch Hand discontinued operations until 1 9 May. Spraying resumed on that date against a canal "0 miles south east of Saigon. T his target was spraved for two days, however, spraying was discontinued d u r i n g their mission on the third day due to increased ground fire and damage to the aircraft an spray equipment. Twice during May & June iQfiU Ranch Hand shifted its base of operations north to Da Nang. Targets sprayed were m a i n l y w i n d i n g mountain roads which connected South Vietnemese outposts along the Laotion border. T he flew a total of 26 sorties from DA Nans. During July 1 964 Ranch Hand resprayed areas of the d e l t a that had been discontinued on 30 Apr. Ranch Hand completed the re-soray of these area on ?? July New spray equipment was received by Ranch Hand in August of 1Q(S'J. T his equipment, known as A/A^Y- 1 , incorporated snray booms under each wins, boom under the tail and a new 2R horse power pump which increased the �pump presure from 3^ to ^0 psi and boosted the herbicide pl.ow rate 1 70 to ?80 gallons per minute. D rior to the arrival of this new equipment MC-1 spray tanks were used for spray mission. After the a r r i v a l of this equipment the unit flew 3 1 defoliation sorties along Rt 1 4 and also did more spraying in the northern part of South Vietnam before the end of "'P'SH. On 3 October one of 1 1 96iJ, Ranch Hand flew its first croc destruction sorties, 9 flown between 3 and War Zone D. 1 3 October against a complex of ^ields nea During November and December 1Q^U, Ranch Hand planes flew croo destruction sorties in Phuoc Long Province. destroyed 76?0 acres of Viet riong croos. 1 During iQ^n the unit Prior to 3 Oct iQ^4 the Vietnemese destroyed crops by VM/\^ H-34's and hand delivered spray on th ground . A test program was conducted in T hailand in 1Q^ ^ 1f )<SR to determine effectiveness of acre applications of Purple, Organe and other c a n d i d a t e chemical agents in defoliation of u p l a n d jungle vegetation reoresentive o-p Southeast Asia on duplicate 1 0 acre plots. Agent Organe was first tested Thailand in ^eb Attached is a breakdown of g a l l o n s of herbicide disseminated in South Vietnam by the US during the period January 1Q^P- December' �T here is no e v i d e n c e o*" A g e n t Orange bein? soraved durin!? the neriod - 1964. 1 �• ,'ur.ber of gallons of military h e r b i c i d e procured by the U.S. Department of Defense and disseminated in South Vietnam during the period January 1962 - December 1964. Military Herbicide Gallons of Formulation Pounds A c t i v e Ingredient Blue 5,200 10,000 Green 8,208 66,980 Pink 122,792 1,001,980 Purple 145 ,_0_00 1 , 1 80_, 300_ 281 ,200 2,259,260 Total Source of table: USAF OKHL Report, p. 1-9 * � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Alvin L. Young Collection on Agent Orange Description An account of the resource <p style="margin-top: -1em; line-height: 1.2em;">The Alvin L. Young Collection on Agent Orange comprises 120 linear feet and spans the late 1800s to 2005; however, the bulk of the coverage is from the 1960s to the 1980s and there are many undated items. The collection was donated to Special Collections of the National Agricultural Library in 1985 by Dr. Alvin L. Young (1942- ). Dr. Young developed the collection as he conducted extensive research on the military defoliant Agent Orange. The collection is in good condition and includes letters, memoranda, books, reports, press releases, journal and newspaper clippings, field logs and notebooks, newsletters, maps, booklets and pamphlets, photographs, memorabilia, and audiotapes of an interview with Dr. Young.</p> <p>For more about this collection, <a href="/exhibits/speccoll/exhibits/show/alvin-l--young-collection-on-a">view the Agent Orange Exhibit.</a></p> Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Box The box containing the original item. 020 Folder The folder containing the original item. 0294 Series The series number of the original item. Series II Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Typescript: Pre 65 DFL Spray Operations RUN Subject The topic of the resource Ranch Hand aircraft herbicide application military impact Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Alvin L. Young Collection on Agent Orange Description An account of the resource <p style="margin-top: -1em; line-height: 1.2em;">The Alvin L. Young Collection on Agent Orange comprises 120 linear feet and spans the late 1800s to 2005; however, the bulk of the coverage is from the 1960s to the 1980s and there are many undated items. The collection was donated to Special Collections of the National Agricultural Library in 1985 by Dr. Alvin L. Young (1942- ). Dr. Young developed the collection as he conducted extensive research on the military defoliant Agent Orange. The collection is in good condition and includes letters, memoranda, books, reports, press releases, journal and newspaper clippings, field logs and notebooks, newsletters, maps, booklets and pamphlets, photographs, memorabilia, and audiotapes of an interview with Dr. Young.</p> <p>For more about this collection, <a href="/exhibits/speccoll/exhibits/show/alvin-l--young-collection-on-a">view the Agent Orange Exhibit.</a></p> Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Box The box containing the original item. 020 Folder The folder containing the original item. 0293 Series The series number of the original item. Series II Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource September 20 1966 Title A name given to the resource Clipping: USAF 'Prevents' Forests: Spray Denies VC Concealment Subject The topic of the resource Ranch Hand popular press military impact Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Alvin L. Young Collection on Agent Orange Description An account of the resource <p style="margin-top: -1em; line-height: 1.2em;">The Alvin L. Young Collection on Agent Orange comprises 120 linear feet and spans the late 1800s to 2005; however, the bulk of the coverage is from the 1960s to the 1980s and there are many undated items. The collection was donated to Special Collections of the National Agricultural Library in 1985 by Dr. Alvin L. Young (1942- ). Dr. Young developed the collection as he conducted extensive research on the military defoliant Agent Orange. The collection is in good condition and includes letters, memoranda, books, reports, press releases, journal and newspaper clippings, field logs and notebooks, newsletters, maps, booklets and pamphlets, photographs, memorabilia, and audiotapes of an interview with Dr. Young.</p> <p>For more about this collection, <a href="/exhibits/speccoll/exhibits/show/alvin-l--young-collection-on-a">view the Agent Orange Exhibit.</a></p> Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Box The box containing the original item. 020 Folder The folder containing the original item. 0292 Series The series number of the original item. Series II Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Fawcett, Denby Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource October 21 1966 Title A name given to the resource Clipping: Defoliation Has Its Drawbacks Subject The topic of the resource Ranch Hand popular press military impact Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Alvin L. Young Collection on Agent Orange Description An account of the resource <p style="margin-top: -1em; line-height: 1.2em;">The Alvin L. Young Collection on Agent Orange comprises 120 linear feet and spans the late 1800s to 2005; however, the bulk of the coverage is from the 1960s to the 1980s and there are many undated items. The collection was donated to Special Collections of the National Agricultural Library in 1985 by Dr. Alvin L. Young (1942- ). Dr. Young developed the collection as he conducted extensive research on the military defoliant Agent Orange. The collection is in good condition and includes letters, memoranda, books, reports, press releases, journal and newspaper clippings, field logs and notebooks, newsletters, maps, booklets and pamphlets, photographs, memorabilia, and audiotapes of an interview with Dr. Young.</p> <p>For more about this collection, <a href="/exhibits/speccoll/exhibits/show/alvin-l--young-collection-on-a">view the Agent Orange Exhibit.</a></p> Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Box The box containing the original item. 020 Folder The folder containing the original item. 0291 Series The series number of the original item. Series II Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1966-09-01 Title A name given to the resource Clipping: Spray Planes Shield Crippled Craft From Ground Fire Subject The topic of the resource Ranch Hand aircraft popular press military impact Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Alvin L. Young Collection on Agent Orange Description An account of the resource <p style="margin-top: -1em; line-height: 1.2em;">The Alvin L. Young Collection on Agent Orange comprises 120 linear feet and spans the late 1800s to 2005; however, the bulk of the coverage is from the 1960s to the 1980s and there are many undated items. The collection was donated to Special Collections of the National Agricultural Library in 1985 by Dr. Alvin L. Young (1942- ). Dr. Young developed the collection as he conducted extensive research on the military defoliant Agent Orange. The collection is in good condition and includes letters, memoranda, books, reports, press releases, journal and newspaper clippings, field logs and notebooks, newsletters, maps, booklets and pamphlets, photographs, memorabilia, and audiotapes of an interview with Dr. Young.</p> <p>For more about this collection, <a href="/exhibits/speccoll/exhibits/show/alvin-l--young-collection-on-a">view the Agent Orange Exhibit.</a></p> Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Box The box containing the original item. 020 Folder The folder containing the original item. 0290 Series The series number of the original item. Series II Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource February Title A name given to the resource Clipping: Defoliation Cuts Guard Needs Subject The topic of the resource Ranch Hand popular press military impact Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Alvin L. Young Collection on Agent Orange Description An account of the resource <p style="margin-top: -1em; line-height: 1.2em;">The Alvin L. Young Collection on Agent Orange comprises 120 linear feet and spans the late 1800s to 2005; however, the bulk of the coverage is from the 1960s to the 1980s and there are many undated items. The collection was donated to Special Collections of the National Agricultural Library in 1985 by Dr. Alvin L. Young (1942- ). Dr. Young developed the collection as he conducted extensive research on the military defoliant Agent Orange. The collection is in good condition and includes letters, memoranda, books, reports, press releases, journal and newspaper clippings, field logs and notebooks, newsletters, maps, booklets and pamphlets, photographs, memorabilia, and audiotapes of an interview with Dr. Young.</p> <p>For more about this collection, <a href="/exhibits/speccoll/exhibits/show/alvin-l--young-collection-on-a">view the Agent Orange Exhibit.</a></p> Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Box The box containing the original item. 020 Folder The folder containing the original item. 0289 Series The series number of the original item. Series II Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1967-02-01 Title A name given to the resource Clipping: U.S. Launches Biggest Drive in Vietnam Subject The topic of the resource Ranch Hand popular press military impact https://www.nal.usda.gov/exhibits/speccoll/files/original/1ccaf0e183f0e9b22d9db3f8ea5a1ee7.pdf bf40b733f4537546c361b98acfb6cbf1 PDF Text Text Item ID Number: 00178 Author Corporate Author Engineer Strategic Studies Group, Office, Chief of Engineers, Department of the Army Herbicides and Military Operations: Volume Journal/Bonk Title 1972 Month/Day February Number of Images 152 DeSCriptOD N0t88 Volume II of a three-volume study, includes catof photographs Friday, January 05, 2001 Page 178 of 194 �HERBICIDES AND MILITARY OPERATIONS VOLUME II Prepared by Engineer Strategic Studies Group Office, Chief of Engineers Department of the Army February 1972 �HERBICIDES AND MILITARY OPERATIONS VOLUME II Prepared by Engineer Strategic Studies Group Office, Chief of Engineers Department of the Army February 1972 �CONTENTS SUMMARY v ANNEX A--STUDY PROCEDURE A-l APPENDIX B-3--VEGETATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIA B-3-1 APPENDIX B-4--PHOTOGRAPHS OF THE HERBICIDE EFFECT IN TYPE SITUATIONS IN VIETNAM B-4-1 ANNEX C--SURVEY OF OPINIONS ON HERBICIDE EFFECTS APPENDIX C-l--COMMANDERS AND ADVISORS TAB A--COVER LETTER AND QUESTIONNAIRE APPENDIX C-2--NAVAL FORCES C-l C-l-1 C-l-A-1 C-2-1 TAB A--COVER LETTER AND QUESTIONNAIRE APPENDIX C-3--AIR OPERATIONS C-2-A-1 C-3-1 TAB A--COVER LETTER AND QUESTIONNAIRE APPENDIX C-4--CHEMICAL OFFICERS TAB A--COVER LETTER AND QUESTIONNAIRE APPENDIX C-5--RANCH HAND PERSONNEL TAB A--COVER LETTER AND QUESTIONNAIRE ANNEX G--BIBLIOGRAPHY C-3-A-1 C-4-1 C-4-A-1 C-5-1 C-5-A-1 G-l ill �SUMMARY VOLUME II This is Volume II of a three-volume study on the utility of herbicides to military operations. This UNCLASSIFIED volume contains Annexes A, C, and G and Appendixes B-3 and B-4. Annex A is the study procedure. Annex C is the survey forms and a compilation of the responses. Appendixes B-3 and B-4 describe the vegetation types and military situations in the Republic of Vietnam. Volume I is the main paper; it discusses the military uses of herbicides in general. The study findings and conclusions are explained in Volume I. Volume III is classified SECRET and contains detailed information on the herbicide program in the Republic of Vietnam, earlier studies of military effects of herbicides, the quantitative analysis, and the use of herbicides in other conflicts. �ANNEX A STUDY PROCEDURE �ANNEX A STUDY PROCEDURE Paragraph Page 1 Purpose • \ 2 Scope A-l 3 Terms of Reference A-l 4 Theoretical Analysis A-2 5 Case Study in RVN A-3 6 Conduct of the Study ' A-l A-4 1. Purpose, The purpose of this annex is to describe the procedure which has been used in the conduct of this study. 2. Scope. As a counterpart to the National Academy of Sciences study of ecological and physiological effects of the herbicide program in the Republic of Vietnam (RVN), this study determines the military utility of herbicides. A case study of the herbicide program in RVN is included to determine the utility of herbicides in support of military operations conducted there, Military war gaming procedures are used to develop an estimate of the utility of herbicides in other conflicts. 3. Terms of Reference. a. Impact of the problem. Policies shaping the future role of herbicides in military operations are being examined and careful A-l �consideration should be given to the role of these techniques in supporting the military. Such consideration requires that the utility of herbicides be stated in a form useful to policy deliberations. The future use of herbicides impacts on all the military services, and the study includes the kinds of operations conducted by each of the services, b. Objectives. (1) Evaluate the military utility of herbicides in the Republic of Vietnam. (2) Evaluate the potential military utility of herbicides in other possible areas (theaters of operations) around the world. c. Scope. The study consists of the following: (1) A theoretical analysis of the impact of vegetation on the military operations conducted by the services and on the enemy activities. (2) An evaluation of the herbicide program in RVN« d. Methodology. During the course of the study, the world environment was examined to select regions where vegetation influences the land mass. Conventional linear and nonlinear conflicts are considered in the theoretical analysis. The utility of herbicides in RVN provides a check on the results of the theoretical analysis. 4, Theoretical Analysis. The effect of herbicides is included in the planning procedures used to determine requirements for possible future military conflicts. By comparing the new requirements to those A-2 �of previous war games planned without herbicides, a measure of the utility of herbicides is developed. a. ATIAS. The ATLAS war game, a highly aggregated theater level model, is used in the Portfolio of General Purpose Force Requirements (SPECTRUM), The ATLAS war game is used in this study to represent the effect of herbicides in conventional linear conflict. Results with herbicides in the ATLAS war game are compared with the SPECTRUM results. SPECTRUM uses the force density theory to analyze nonlinear conflict. This analysis also uses the force density theory. (Results are in Annex B.) b. DYNTACS. An attempt was made to analyze the effects of herbicides by using the DYNTACS war gaming model. DYNTACS is a high resolution model including line of sight, stochastic representation of vegetation, and reinforced battalion size forces. (Discussion in Main Paper.) ( 4 i 2)/ 5. Case Study in RVN. The relationship between the military operations and the herbicide program in RVN is investigated. Data from RVN were collected and processed as a case study of the use of herbicides in military operations. a. Military results. The case study includes: The contribution of the herbicide pro- gram to military operations in RVN is investigated. An analysis of the \j The reference numbers in this study are shown at the end of the appropriate sentence or paragraph and are keyed to the bibliography at Annex G, this volume. A-3 �frequency of incidents (friendly initiated, enemy initiated, and fatalities) is made for the area affected by herbicides. The analysis includes a period before the spray and another period after the spray effect. Incidents in areas not treated are included in control areas, (See Annex E.) b. Military personnel who were responsible for the conduct of military operations in RVN were asked to indicate the utility of herbicides in their activities. Questionnaires to US Army battalion commanders or higher and advisors, US Navy personnel conducting riverine operations and advising RVN forces, US Air Force personnel on flying missions, and US Marine Corps ground and air personnel and advisors provided qualitative estimates of herbicide utility. c. Synopsis. (See Annex C.) The study includes a synopsis of the past reviews, evaluations, and studies of the herbicide program in RVN, (See Annex D.) 6. Conduct of the Study. a, A team from the Engineer Strategic Studies Group (ESSG), Office, Chief of Engineers conducted the study. The team included a project director, senior analyst (forester), two analysts, and one associate analyst. Headquarters, USAF provided an additional part-time study team member. b. Plan. A study plan was prepared and briefed to the DOD Steering Group on 5 May 1971, The scope of the study plan has remained unchanged throughout the data collection and analysis processes. A-4 �c. Data collection. In addition to obtaining information from the Defense Documentation Center and other agencies in CONKS, the study team traveled to CINCPAC and to MACV to collect and organize information. The National Military Command System Support Center provided the Herbicide File and the basic file of incidents in RVN. d. Analysis, Data were organi3ed and the analysis performed by ESSG during the period August to December 1971. e. Report, Draft copies of the report Herbicides and Military Operations were provided to the study sponsor for his use and comment, The final published report was distributed in February 1972. A-5 �APPENDIX B-3 VEGETATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIA �APPENDIX B-3 VEGETATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIA Paragraph Pa^e 1 Vegetation in the Republic of Vietnam B-3-1 2 Vegetation Types B-3-2 1. Vegetation in the Republic of Vietnam. The RVN is part of a tropical land mass and has vegetation typical of tropical regions. Foliage throughout the country may be grouped into six categories: rain (moist, dense) forest; deciduous dipterocarp forest (monsoon forest); mangrove forest; pine forest; savanna and grassland; cultivated vegetation. Each of these categories, with the exception of cultivated and some savanna or grassland areas, provides ready concealment to men on the ground. Much of the forested area within the normal limits of these broad types has been altered by man over the years. This is especially true in the rain forest areas where very little virgin vegetation remains. What really exists in many of these categories is various stages of secondary growth. However, the main factors in determining composition of vegetation within these categories is the annual rainfall and its distribution throughout the year, the type of soil, and the elevation. The rainfall pattern (in relation to fastest growing season), the vegetation composition, and the number of canopies are important in B-3-1 �herbicide applications. These factors help to determine the proper herbicide agent and the number of applications that will be required. 2. Vegetation Type s. a. Rain (moist, dense) forest. The rain forest occupies most of the upland area up to an elevation of 2,300 feet in areas where the annual precipitation is over 80 inches and somewhat evenly distributed throughout the year. However, the area is usually subject to a short seasonal dry period. These forests are made up of broadleaf evergreen species. A few areas support vegetation that takes the form of semievergreen forest where the dry season is longer and there is a mixture of species (22, 35, 57). (1) Virgin forests are those that exist in their natural or near natural state. These forests remain only in the more remote areas. They usually attain an average height of 80 to 100 feet and contain a multiple canopy with two or three upper layers. The top layer of the canopy is usually discontinuous, with the crown of the lower layers completely concealing the ground underneath. The forest floor often is relatively open while its other areas are a tangled mixture of vines and shrubs (22, 35, 57), (2) Secondary rain forest. Secondary forests occupy the largest part of the forested areas where the environmental characteristics are those of a rain forest. These secondary forests are not as tall as B-3-2 �the original forests, and the canopy is a dense somewhat even layer of crowns, The low ground cover underneath the main canopy, or the ground cover in the beginning stages of secondary growth (regrowth) is a thick mass of bamboo, various vines and other tropical plants which restrict movement and visibility. Secondary rain forests are more easily defoliated than mature or virgin forests, because the crown structure is usually more uniform and the spray can penetrate to the ground cover •more easily. b, . ' Deciduous (dipterocarp, monsoon) forest. This type of for- est is found primarily at the higher elevations in areas where the rainfall is somewhat less than the rain forest and where there is a prolonged dry season, on the plateau areas of Pleiku, Phubon, Darlac and Quang Due provinces. These forests are usually composed of more widely spaced trees and therefore relatively open both from the standpoint of crown density and ground cover density, Grass is the usual ground cover. However, there are many areas of dense thickets, with bamboo as the ground cover. During the dry season trees within the deciduous forest drop their leaves. Trees in these forests are small to medium in height. Because dipterocarp forests are relatively open, have a single canopy, and drop their leaves naturally for a period each year, they do not present as great a problem for military operations. After clearing a decid- uous forest, the first secondary growth is various herbs followed by B-3-3 �bamboo and bananas and followed in time by the regular dipterocarpus species {22, 35, 57), c. Mangrove forest. Mangrove forests occupy the marsh lowlands along the coastal areas of the Mekong Delta, The largest individual areas containing mangrove forests are in the Rung Sat, southeast of Saigon, and the Ca Mau Peninsula located in the southwesternmost part of Vietnam. Mangrove species help to hold and consolidate alluvial . material. Therefore, mangrove forests gradually advance further into the sea as the rivers deposit more material, These forests grow in a tidal area and are adapted to growing in salt and fresh water. Mangrove forests are composed of about 20 dominant trees and shrubs. The forest canopy is usually uniform in height, continuous, and up to 80 to 100 feet tall on the Ca Mau Peninsula, but somewhat shorter in the Rung Sat. These forests are very difficult to travel through on foot or by land transportation because of a combination of thick brush, tree trunks often with stilt roots, a wet to inundated soil condition, and many winding streams and canals (22, 35, 57). d. Pine forest (coniferous evergreen forest). The distribution of pine (needleleaf) forests in Vietnam is limited in comparison with broadleaf forests, Pine forests are concentrated in Tugen-Duc province. At elevations above 800 to 1,000 meters the pine grows in mixtures with broadleaf dipterocarp trees. Pine forests are also found in local areas B-3-4 �of Kontum province and other scattered upland points. These forests are usually relatively open, but this varies with age, soil, and disturbance by man over the years. Ground cover is composed of grasses and ferns and may range from dense to sparse and from 1 to 2 meters high (22, 35, 57), e. Savanna and grassland, Savanna consists of a very open distribution of trees or shrubs with a ground cover of grasses from 1 to 3 meters high. They usually are situated in areas previously occupied by a deciduous dipterocarp forest. This type is formed as a result of slash and burn operations, annual burns or soil conditions which will not readily sustain forest growth. Savanna type vegetation is most pre- valent in the plateau areas of MR II and MR III, Grassland areas are similar to savannas except that trees are scarce or absent. They may be found in conjunction with savanna, in swamps, steppes, mountain grassland, and abandoned rice fields (22, 35, 57). f, Cultivated vegetation. Cultivated land in Vietnam is concentrated in the Mekong Delta and sizeable dispersed areas adjacent to the coast northward to the DMZ. Other small to medium size cultivated areas are randomly distributed inland, some of which are relatively permanent along stream valleys, while others are slash and burn operations which are periodically abandoned. The primary crop in Vietnam is rice and accounts for over 90 percent of the cultivated land in Vietnam. B-3-5 �APPENDIX B-4 PHOTOGRAPHS OF THE HERBICIDE EFFECT IN TYPE SITUATIONS IN VIETNAM �APPENDIX B-4 PHOTOGRAPHS OF THE HERBICIDE EFFECT IN TYPE SITUATIONS IN VIETNAM Paragraph Page 1 Purpose B-4-2 2 Scope 3 Ambush Along Transportation Routes 4 Infiltration B-4-9 5 Enemy Base Camps B-4-16 6 Perimeter Security at Fixed Bases and Other Installations B-4-18 7 Crop Destruction B-4-20 8 Conclusions B-4-23 Photo Area Location Map Mangrove Forest Defoliated Mangrove Forest Defoliated Mangrove Forest Regrowth in a Defoliated Mangrove Area Defoliated Strip Ca Mau Peninsula Defoliated Strip West of Nam Can Regrowth Along the Cua Lon River Defoliated Strip in Mangrove Forest on Ca Mau Peninsula Defoliated and Nondefoliated Strips in Mangrove Forest Defoliated Area with Some Regeneration Foliage Conceals Enemy Ship Foliage Conceals Enemy Infiltration Ship in Concealed Position B-4-3 B-4-5 B-4-5 B-4-7 B-4-7 B-4-8 B-4-8 B-4-11 B-4-2 B-4-2 Figure B-4-1 B-4-2 B-4-3 B-4-4 B-4-5 B-4-6 B-4-7 B-4-8 B-4-9 B-4-10 B-4-11 B-4-12 B-4-13 B-4-14 B-4-1 . B-4-11 B-4-12 B-4-12 B-4-13 B-4-13 B-4-15 �Figure B-4-15 B-4-16 B-4-17 B-4-18 B-4-19 B-4-20 B-4-21 B-4-22 B-4-23 B-4-24 •"•• Page Defoliated Multiple Canopy Forest Defoliated Multiple Canopy—War Zone D Structure and Trails Uncovered by Defoliation in Bear Cat Area Horizontal Visibility Remains Somewhat Obstructed—Bear Cat Defoliated Vegetation in War Zone C Defoliated Strip Around Perimeter--Nam Can Naval Facility Perimeter of Artillery Hill at Pleiku Perimeter Area of Due Co Fire Base Area in Which Rice Crops were Sprayed Area in Which Rice Crops Were Sprayed and Destroyed--New Crops Growing Purpose. B-4-17 B-4-17 B-4-19 B-4-19 B-4-21 B-4-21 B-4-22 B-4-22 B-4-24 B-4-24 The purpose of this appendix is to show the effect of herbicides on different types of targets in RVN. Some of the photo- graphs were taken after the herbicides program had ended, and there is some evidence of regrowth and regeneration. 2' Scope. Herbicides were used in Vietnam to deny the enemy those military advantages which dense foliage lends to the following military activities: ambush and harassment along transportation routes (land and water), infiltration, enemy base areas, and surprise attack on friendly bases. Herbicides were also used to destroy crops grown in the enemy area. This appendix uses photographs taken by the ESSG study team in June 1971 and other photographs of the effects of herbicides in RVN. See Figure B-4-1 for general location of photo areas. 3. Ambush Along Transportation Routes. Since the beginning of the conflict in Vietnam, the enemy very effectively used the dense forests B-4-2 �PHOTO AREA LOCATION MAP 1 • CA MAU PENINSULA 2 - R U N G SAT 3 - B E A R CAT 4 • WAR ZONE D 5 • WAR ZONE C 6 • DUC CO BASE (ARVN) 7 • ARTILLERY HILL 8 • CROP DESTRUCTION (QUANG TIN PROVINCE) Figure B-4-1 B-4-3 �along many of the key marine and land transportation routes as cover for ambush. There were many areas in Vietnam where the vegetation areas adjacent to the transportation routes were large and dense enough to provide points of attack and safe havens where aerial reconnaissance was ineffective. The Viet Cong also harassed local civilian transport 9f goods by charging taxes to allow passage of goods over many transportation routes where they controlled the adjacent forests. a. Rung Sat Special Zone. The main shipping route to Saigon for oceangoing vessels and a vital link in the US supply system to RVN was subject to interdiction from the earliest days of the conflict. The dense canopy formed by the mangrove forests, like those in Figure B-4-2, provided a unique hideout. There were a few alternate routes for large ships in the Rung Sat, but they did not provide enough flexibility to avoid enemy attacks. The water there is affected by the tides, and much of the land surface is inundated at high tide. Although traveling on foot in this area is difficult because of mud and the intricate system of large to small streams and canals, these channels provide good transportation for the enemy by small boat. Defoliation of this area began in the middle 1960's, and most of the mangrove forests adjacent to shipping routes were defoliated by the late 1960's (see Figure B-4-3). The mangrove forest was so susceptible to agent Orange that in addition to defoliating the mangrove, it also killed the trees, In June 1971, the ESSG study team observed that entire trees (including crown, trunk ' B-4-4 �Figure B-4-2. MANGROVE FOREST IN THE RUNG SAT, VIETNAM. JUNE 1971. Figure B-4-3. DEFOLIATED MANGROVE FOREST ALONG THE SHIPPING ROUTES IN THE RUNG SAT, VIETNAM. JUNE 1971. B-4-5 �and stump-root system) were missing in many areas (see Figure B-4-4). This probably was the result of being uprooted during high water (after some root deterioration) and then floating out to sea. In some areas, local woodcutters were hired to remove dead snags that remained after defoliation. Some salvage cuttings were conducted independently by the local population. This defoliation operation was so complete that it eliminated enemy attacks on shipping in the Rung Sat area, Even though there are a few areas with mangrove regeneration (see Figure B-4-5) and grasses (6 to 9 inches high), the regrowth process is very slow and the military advantage is maintained for several years. The vertical visibility of the ground is improved by 99 to 100 percent. The horizontal visibility is limited only by topography (generally flat to rolling), unsprayed foliage, or an occasional area where dead mangrove stems remain standing (limited obstruction) (see Figure B-4-5). b. Ca Mau Peninsula. A strip along both banks of the Cua Lon River was defoliated (see Figures B-4-6 and B-4-7). Even though the amount and height of regeneration and the number of trees that survived the defoliation is much greater than in the Rung Sat, the vertical visibility remains good. The horizontal visibility is restricted at many locations by a narrow strip of regeneration (new vegetation) along the Cua Lon River and some tributary streams. The photograph in Figure B-4-8 was taken from an RVN patrol boat in June 1971. B-4-6 This regeneration �Figure B-4-4. DEFOLIATED MANGROVE FOREST ALONG THE SHIPPING ROUTES IN RUNG SAT, VIETNAM. NOTE THAT THE TREE TRUNKS ARE ALSO REMOVED. JUNE 1971. Figure B-4-5. REGROWTH IN A DEFOLIATED MANGROVE AREA IN THE RUNG SAT, VIETNAM. JUNE 1971. B-4-7 �Figure B-4-6. DEFOLIATED STRIP (MANGROVE FOREST) ALONG THE CUA LON RIVER ON THE CA MAU PENINSULA, VIETNAM NEAR NAM CAN (VIEW FROM A HELICOPTER). JUNE 1971. Figure B-4-7. DEFOLIATED STRIP ALONG THE CUA LON RIVER, SOUTH BANK, JUST WEST OF NAM CAN (VIEW FROM IETNAMESE PATROL BOAT). JUNE 1971. B-4-8 �within the earliest sprayed areas reveals, to some degree, what the area adjacent to the river would look like from a boat traveling along the river before defoliation. Without defoliation, a patrol boat and other river traffic are prime targets for the enemy. In contrast, the enemy can operate from concealed positions, making exact location and target hits difficult because of the dense forest. c. Land transportation routes, Forest areas adjacent to several highways were defoliated (no photo examples readily available) with the same general advantages in avoiding ambush as in riverine areas. 4. Infiltration. Infiltration of men and supplies into Vietnam has been a menacing problem since the beginning of US support in Vietnam. This problem is compounded by the extensive border area with Cambodia and Laos where the enemy has traveled almost at will. These sanctuaries for men and supplies, a springboard for infiltration into Vietnam, were virtually unmolested until the Cambodian operation. Also, there was considerable infiltration through the DMZ and at various points along the extensive coastline, The predominant points of entry into Vietnam, whether by land or water were in forested areas where vertical visibility is poor and where probes (on foot or motorized patrol) into these sparsely populated hideouts were subject to ambush, The infiltration usually ended at a base area where supplies and equipment are stored and the forest cover was excellent for both men and supplies. From these base camp areas, the enemy conducted raids and operations into surrounding B-4-9 �areas. Normal methods of detection by air and ground did not stem the infiltration, as positive identification of targets and results of aerial or artillery attack were difficult to evaluate because of dense cover and inaccessibility. As a result, herbicides were used to defo- liate many infiltration routes. The study team observed areas in the Ca Mau Peninsula, War Zone D, and the Rung Sat where defoliation was used to help prevent infiltration, a, Ca Mau Peninsula. Ca Mau is an excellent example of defoliation to disrupt infiltration. Alternate strips of defoliated and nondefoliated vegetation across the peninsula allow excellent visibility ! within the defoliated areas, This area had been a temporary staging area for infiltration into the Mekong Delta and for attacks on local shipping and patrol craft along the peninsula's many streams and canals. Figures B-4-9 and B-4-10 clearly reveal the utility of defoliation in disrupting infiltration. Figure B-4-11 illustrates the improved aerial observation that results from defoliation. Contrasting the exposed ground and absence of foliage in the defoliated area with the bush coverage and easy concealment in the untouched area shows how improved observation would help control such an area. Some regeneration i$ also visible in Figure B-4-11. The photographs in Figures B-4-12, B-4-13, and B-4-14 were acquired from COMNAVFORV. They were taken in the Ca Mau Peninsula area in early 1971 and demonstrate the concealment afforded by heavy B-4-10 �Figure B-4-8. REGROWTH ALONG THE CUA LON RIVER, SOUTH BANK, WEST OF NAM CAN AT 8O44'30" N. 104°58'45" E. JUNE 1971. Figure B-4-9. DEFOLIATED STRIP IN MANGROVE FOREST ON THE CA MAU PENINSULA, LOOKING NORTH AT 8°35'00" N. 104°46'30" E. JUNE 1971. B-4-11 �Figure B-4-10. DEFOLIATED AND NONDEFOLIATED STRIPS IN MANGROVE FOREST ON THE CA MAU PENINSULA AT 8°34'00" N. 104°50'40" E. JUNE 1967. Figure B-4-11. DEFOLIATED AREA WITH SOME REGENERATION IN MANGROVE FOREST ON THE CA MAU PENINSULA'AT 8°41'00" N. 105°07'40" E. B-4-12 �• -'.,. I Figure B-4-12. OCEANGOING SHIP (100-TON) CONCEALED (CIRCLED) IN A NONDEFOLIATED STRIP IN MANGROVE FOREST ON CA MAU PENINSULA, EARLY 1971. Figure B-4-13. OCEANGOING SHIP (100-TON) CONCEALED (CIRCLED) WITHIN NONDEFOLIATED STRIP IN MANGROVE FOREST ON CA MAU PENINSULA, INFILTRATION ROUTE, EARLY 1971. B-4-13 �foliage in the mangrove forest. In these photographs, the enemy has taken advantage of a strip that was not defoliated, The area is laced with small streams and canals connected to the open sea. Enemy infiltration and resupply used these small waterways to land forces and supplies. Defoliation in strips through the area exposed many of the waterways to ready observation, thereby limiting enemy use. However, the natural or unchanged strips were used to continue the infiltration and resupply activity. As the close-up photo shows, the enemy positioned a 100-ton oceangoing ship at the circle in the first photo (Figure B-4-12). By securing trees from the stream banks over the ship, the ship's position remained undetected for several weeks to several months. The ship was last sighted on the open seas 6 months before it was spotted in this location. When sighted in this location, the ship had been abandoned for some time due to mechanical difficulties. This ship was unusually large in comparison with the sampans and junks common to the waterways of the Delta. However, its size indicates the importance the enemy attaches to this base and operation. Forces to detect, control, and eliminate enemy operations in areas of this kind are severely handicapped by limited visibility, Herbicides aid military operations by permitting easy observation into formerly heavily forested jungle areas. As a result of improved observation, other weapons and weapon systems can be effectively directed against the enemy to restrict his operation in such areas. B-4-14 �Figure B-4-14. CLOSE-UP VIEW OF 100-TON OCEANGOING SHIP IN CONCEALED POSITION AFTER BEING LOCATED, EARLY 1971. b. War Zone D. War Zone D was defoliated primarily because the area was being used as an enemy base camp. However, Figure B-4-15 demonstrates how effectively roads and trails are exposed when foliage is removed. Roads and trails in this photo were originally concealed by a multiple canopy forest. c. Rung Sat. The mangrove forests of the Rung Sat were used as a base for operations against marine shipping routes to Saigon and for some infiltration from the sea to other parts of the RVN. The defoliation was so effective and extensive (see Figures B-4-2, B-4-3, and B-4-4) that infiltration was eliminated. B-4-15 �5. Enemy Base Camps. The enemy infiltration terminated in large base camps within RVN; some of these camps were located deep in the heart of the country. Other camps were located near the Cambodian bor- der and the previously referred to enemy sanctuaries a relatively short distance from Saigon and the hub of RVN influence. These camps were the source of activities such as raids and harassment of friendly forces, terror attacks on local inhabitants, and attempted infiltration into cities (e.g., the Tet offensive of 1968). When a given operation was completed or aborted, the enemy forces withdrew into these base camp areas for refitting, Defoliation was found helpful in exposing and disrupting the enemy base camp operation. a. War Zone D. This area is typical of the enemy base camp areas in which penetration of the foliage (multiple canopy) by aerial reconnaissance seemed ineffective in locating and destroying the enemy and disrupting his operation. Figures B-4-15 and B-4-16 are examples of areas where the visibility was improved by defoliation. Much of the area was sprayed repeatedly, as it usually required two to three sprays to reach all levels of a multiple canopy forest; repeat sprays were required because of regrowth. Many of the trees in the upper canopy are dead as a result of repeat spraying. b. Rung Sat and Ca Mau mangrove forest. When enemy base camp operations were located within mangrove forests, one application of agent Orange herbicide usually defoliated the area almost completely B-4-16 �Figure B-4-15. IN WAR ZONE D. JUNE 1971. DEFOLIATED MULTIPLE CANOPY FOREST NOTE THE EXPOSED ROADS AND TRAILS. ; ' : • -. •'** t'v< ^;«, V • -^vOC! : ' *:: :jJ''&*''•• ''••'• \ l ;'' '£' ''*'''''* *' '" '* Figure B-4-16. IN WAR ZONE D. DEFOLIATED MULTIPLE CANOPY FOREST NOTE DEAD SNAGS, JUNE 1970. B-4-17 �(especially in the Rung Sat) and exposed the enemy hideout. Study team members saw abandoned enemy fortifications (one- or two-man) and hideout sites from a helicopter at tree height in the Rung Sat. Figure B-4-4 shows a typical mangrove forest. Also, the previous examples in the Rung Sat and Ca Mau Peninsula show the extent to which bases in the mangrove were exposed. c. Bear Cat and War Zone C, The photograph in Figure B^4-17 shows structures and trails uncovered in the Bear Cat area. Figure B-4-18 (Bear Cat) illustrates the fact that horizontal visibility often remains obstructed by tree or shrub trunks and branches after most of the leaves have dropped. The photograph in Figure B-4-19 is of a defoliated area in War Zone C. 6. Perimeter Security at Fixed Bases and Other Installations. There is an obvious need for a sizeable perimeter clear of all vegetation high enough to conceal the movements of crawling men. Under cover of darkness, the enemy can hide in the tall grass or brush even when flares are released. The enemy has actually penetrated perimeter fences and barbed wire barriers before being detected. Without herbicides, control of grass and weeds in the barbed wire barriers is very difficult. A large area around the Nam Can Naval Facility (Base) was defoliated, and local wood cutters were hired to remove some of the remaining dead trees which obstructed observation and weapons fire. B-4-18 �Figure B-4-17. STRUCTURE AND TRAILS UNCOVERED BY DEFOLIATION IN BEAR CAT AREA, VIETNAM. Figure B-4-18. HORIZONTAL VISIBILITY REMAINS SOMEWHAT OBSTRUCTED BY THE TRUNKS AND BRANCHES OF TREES AND SHRUBS AFTER SIGNIFICANT DEFOLIATION. BEAR CAT, VIETNAM. B-4-19 �Figure B-4-20 shows the utility of clearing the perimeter of vegetation. Attacks on the base and anchored boats were negligible after defoliation. Repeat sprays were not necessary in the Nam Can (Ca Mau Peninsula) area because of the mangrove forest's susceptibility to herbicides. However, in areas where bamboo or tall grass surrounded a base, it was necessary to respray every 2 or 3 months to keep the vegetation low. In June 1971, the study group saw the results (Figure B-4-21) of hand sprayings with agent Blue to remove grass from the perimeter fences around Artillery Hill at Pleiku. Due Co Base (RVN) located southwest of Pleiku was sprayed by helicopter with agent Blue; 550 gallons were used on the perimeter area 1% months before the study teams took the photographs in Figure B-4-22. The brown color of dead grass has almost disappeared, and the new grass is very short. In most locations the topography, hazardous conditions, mine fields, and limited work force and equipment precluded other means of keeping the perimeter areas cleared. 7. Crop Destruction, Herbicides were used in Vietnam to destroy crops grown for enemy use, Most crop destruction targets were located in areas where the population was very sparse and the surrounding area was under enemy influence. Also, most targets were located in the western parts of military regions I and II. Rice was the main target for destruction, and agent Blue was the chief herbicide used. The crop destruction program was very successful from the standpoint of B-4-20 �Figure B-4-19. VIETNAM. DEFOLIATED VEGETATION IN WAR ZONE C, Figure B-4-20. DEFOLIATED STRIP AROUND THE PERIMETER OF NAM CAN NAVAL FACILITY ON THE CUA LON RIVER, JUNE 1971. B-4-21 �Figure B-4-21. PERIMETER OF ARTILLERY HILL AT PLEIKU, DEFOLIATED AREAS ARE ALONG FENCES AND WERE HAND SPRAYED WITH AGENT BLUE. PHOTOGRAPH TAKEN IN JUNE 1971. Figure B-4-22. PERIMETER AREA OF DUG CO FIRE BASE. LOCATED SOUTHWEST OF PLEIKU, WAS SPRAYED WITH 10 DRUMS (550 GALLONS) OF AGENT BLUE \\ MONTHS BEFORE PHOTO WAS TAKEN, JUNE 1971. B-4-22 �killing crops, and the effect is permanent on the crop that is sprayed. However, a new crop can be planted at the next planting time, as no residual remains in the soil to retard new crop growth. When the herbicide is applied at lighter rates than required for complete plant kill, the yield of rice often may be reduced to little or nothing anyway. A study team member observed (by helicopter) several areas in Quang Tin Province, MR-1 where the rice crop had been killed by spraying with Blue in 1970 (confirmed by personnel who flew over the area when the crops were brown). New crops were growing in these areas in June 1971 (see Figures B-4-23 and B-4-24); this helps confirm the lack of any residual in the soil that retards subsequent plant growth. 8. Conclusions, The effects of herbicides in RVN indicate that herbicides contribute to military operations. When herbicides were used in mangrove forests where the enemy was infiltrating and resupplying his forces, excellent visibility resulted. Because observation was so improved, the enemy was forced to stop or greatly reduce his operations in these areas. Herbicides used along lines of communica- tions (water, road, and rail) reduced the enemy cover and improved friendly firepower control, thereby forcing the enemy to sharply reduce his ambush activity. When herbicides were used in extensive rain forests against enemy infiltration and bases the results were less impressive; there, herbicides were complimentary to many systems used to identify B-4-23 �Figure B-4-23. AREA IN WHICH RICE CROPS WERE SPRAYED AND DESTROYED IN 1970. NEW CROPS ARE GROWING IN JUNE 1971 AS SHOWN IN THIS PHOTO. LOCATED IN QUANG TIN PROVINCE MR I. Figure B-4-24. AREA IN WHICH RICE CROPS WERE SPRAYED AND DESTROYED IN 1970. NEW CROPS ARE GROWING IN JUNE 1971 AS SHOWN IN THIS PHOTO. LOCATED IN QUANG TIN PROVINCE MR I. B-4-24 �enemy activities. In many instances, herbicides caused the enemy to relocate his activity. Herbicides did not eliminate the enemy, but they sometimes caused relocation or elimination of his activity at a location. The crop destruction program was effective from the standpoint of physical results, Herbicides contributed to the conduct of military operations in RVN. Their use was advantageous to friendly forces and forced the enemy to abandon his activity in many areas, B-4-25 �ANNEX C SURVEY OF OPINIONS ON HERBICIDE EFFECTS �ANNEX C SURVEY OF OPINIONS ON HERBICIDE EFFECTS Paragraph Page 1 General C-l 2 Results C-2 3 Conclusions C-4 APPENDIX C-l--COMMANDERS AND ADVISORS . C-l-1 TAB A--COVER LETTER AND QUESTIONNAIRE FOR COMMANDERS AND ADVISORS C-l-A-1 APPENDIX C-2--NAVAL FORCES C-2-1 TAB A—COVER LETTER AND QUESTIONNAIRE FOR NAVAL FORCES C-2-A-1 APPENDIX C-3--AIR OPERATIONS C-3-1 TAB A--COVER LETTER AND QUESTIONNAIRE FOR AIR OPERATIONS C-3-A-1 APPENDIX C-4--CHEMICAL OFFICERS C-4-1 TAB A--COVER LETTER AND QUESTIONNAIRE FOR CHEMICAL OFFICERS C-4-A-1 APPENDIX C-5--RANCH HAND PERSONNEL C-5-1 TAB A--COVER LETTER AND QUESTIONNAIRE FOR RANCH HAND PERSONNEL ! • General. C-5-A-1 This annex presents the results of a qualitative appraisal of the effects of herbicides used in Southeast Asia. The appraisal is made on the basis of opinions expressed by military personnel who used herbicides in their operations in Southeast Asia, C-l Questionnaires �were distributed to five groups: Army and Marine commanders and advisors at battalion and higher levels, Navy personnel, Air Force and Marine Corps air personnel, Army chemical officers, and Air Force personnel who participated in the herbicide spray operation (Ranch Hand). Responses are analyzed to establish a consensus for each of these groups. Within the groups, a further analysis examines the time of experience, area of operations, level of command or activity, and the type herbicide targets. The analysis also identifies target- types and the effectiveness of herbicides against each. 2. Results. Appendixes C-l through C-5 present the questionnaires and comments from the respondents. The following paragraphs summarize the results. a. Effect on vegetation. (1) The period from application to maximum defoliation was from 3 to 8 weeks--depending on agent, season, and weather, Herbicides applied to food crops were effective in 1 or 2 days. (2) The improvement in visibility provided by defoliation generally lasted 4 to 6 months, (3) The effects of defoliants were in accord with planning factors. (4) Effects of defoliation missions generally met the expectations of tactical commanders. C-2 �(5) For clearing foliage, herbicides are more effective than napalm or HE bombs, about equal to slash and burn, and less effective than Rome Plow. b. Military effects. (1) All services agreed that defoliation assisted their mission performance. There was general agreement that missions would have been possible but more difficult without defoliation. Defoliation impeded only those few missions which required concealment for friendly forces operating in enemy areas. (2) Defoliation assisted direct observation greatly, both on the ground and from the air. Estimates of improvement in vertical visibility varied widely, but averaged 40-60 percent. Observation by night vision devices and by radar was improved to a lesser degree. (3) Defoliation of the areas surrounding fixed bases greatly assisted in their defense. (4) Friendly casualties from ambush were reduced significantly by defoliating along friendly LOG. Friendly casualties from other causes and in other areas of application were reduced slightly. (5) Enemy casualties from unit and support weapons were increased slightly by defoliation. The enemy avoided heavier casualties by avoiding defoliated areas. (6) Defoliation decreased significantly the number of small arms and heavy weapons attacks on friendly vessels, and it decreased C-3 �slightly the accuracy of weapons used in those attacks. The number of attacks by naval mines was not affected. The effectiveness of defensive or retaliatory fire was increased significantly. (7) Crop denial helped to achieve RVN political and military objectives. It made the enemy change his pattern of operations and about half the time made him change his area of operations. Where herbi- cides were used for crop denial, the distinction between crops grown for use by the enemy and crops grown by noncombatants not supporting the enemy was usually reliable. c. Future need, Respondents estimated the need for herbicides in future conflicts as follows: Yes Perhaps No Army Chemical Officers Army and Marine Commanders and Advisors Air Force and Marine Air Navy 28 5 0 238 145 j.07 83 116 35 20 38 _9 Total Respondents 518 239 67 ~ 3 . Conclusions. a. Defoliation helped all services to perform their missions. While the missions would have been possible without defoliation, they would have been more difficult. b. Defoliation reduced friendly casualties. C-4 �c. The enemy was forced to avoid defoliated areas or to accept increased casualties. d. Crop denial helped to achieve RVN political and military objectives. e. There is a forseeable need for herbicides in future conflicts and a capability should be maintained. C-5 �APPENDIX C-l COMMANDERS AND ADVISORS �APPENDIX C-l COMMANDERS AND ADVISORS Paragraph Page 1 Purpose C-l-1 2 Scope C-l-1 3 Respondents C-l-2 4 Replies to Questions C-l-3 Respondents Observing Effects of Herbicides C-l-2 Figure C-l-1 TAB A--COVER LETTER AND QUESTIONNAIRE FOR COMMANDERS AND ADVISORS 1, Purpose. C-l-A-1 This appendix analyzes the replies of Army and Marine Corps personnel who served in RVN as commanders at battalion and higher levels or as advisors in the period 1965 through 1970. 2. Scope. The questions cover the effects of defoliation and crop denial herbicides on both friendly and enemy forces. Respondents are also asked to rate the effectiveness of herbicides in comparison to other methods of clearing vegetation and to give their opinions on the need for herbicides in the future. by level of command, and by time period. letter are appended as Tab A. C-l-1 Replies are analyzed by area, The questionnaire and cover �3. Respondenta. a. Names of Army personnel were extracted from Army Activities Report Southeast Asia (prior to 1969 titled Army Buildup Progress Report). Social Security account numbers were obtained from the Army Register, which also classified individuals as active, retired, or deceased. Addresses of Active Army personnel were obtained from the Army Locator. Four hundred Army responses were received, The Marine Corps made their own selection of individuals to receive the questionnaire and handled the distribution and collection. b. Figure C-l-1 lists the number of respondents who reported that they observed the effects of herbicides in the areas of application examined. These areas are not mutually exclusive, and a single individual may have indicated experience in any or all. This distribution represents the replies of 393 individual respondents. RESPONDENTS OBSERVING EFFECTS OF HERBICIDES Area Respondents On extensive wooded areas of VC shelter On enemy infiltration routes Along friendly roads Along friendly waterways On friendly defense perimeter On food crops 291 263 236 136 233 145 Figure C-l-1 C-l-2 �c, Only positive answers are tabulated. "Don't Know" answers are not included in the analysis. 4. Replies to Questions. a. Use of defoliants on wooded areas of VC shelter. (1) Question 5a(l). Where defoliants were used on wooded areas of VC shelter, friendly cross-country movement was: 5 Seriously Impeded 33 Impeded Somewhat 57 Unaffected 139 Assisted Somewhat 38 Greatly Assisted The average of replies indicates some small degree of improvement. This response is consistent for all areas, time periods, and command levels. (2) Question 5a(2), Where defoliants were used, on wooded areas of VC shelter, friendly casualties from enemy ambush were; 120 Slightly Reduced 65 Significantly Reduced 67 Unaffected 2 Increased Slightly 0 Increased 'Significantly The average of replies indicates a slight reduction in the number of ambush casualties. (3) Question 5a(3i. Where defoliants were used on wooded areas of VC shelter, friendly casualties from road mines were: 21 Significantly Reduced 62 Slightly Reduced 144 Unaffected C-l-3 1 Increased Slightly 2 Increased Significantly �Most respondents indicated that defoliation had no effect on friendly casualties from road mines. The average of replies shows a very slight reduction. The replies are consistent for all areas, time periods, and command levels. (4) Question 5a(4). Where defoliants were used on wooded areas of VC shelter, friendly casualties from booby traps were: 23 Significantly Reduced 102 Slightly Reduced 114 Unaffected 5 Increased Slightly 0 Increased Significantly Nearly equal numbers indicated reduction of casualties and no effect. The average is a slight reduction which holds for all areas, time periods, and command levels. (5) Question 5a(5). Where defoliants were used on wooded areas of VC shelter, enemy casualties from unit weapons were: 7 Significantly Reduced 20 Slightly Reduced 54 Unaffected 134 Increased Slightly 23 Increased Significantly The preponderant reply was slight increase in enemy casualties. The reductions indicated in some replies probably result from enemy evacua# tion of defoliated areas. (6) Question 5a(6), Where defoliants were used on wooded areas of VC shelter, the number of enemy targets engaged.by artillery was: C-l-4 �Significantly . Reduced 6 Slightly Reduced 130 Increased . Slightly 68 Unaffected 34 Increased Significantly The preponderant reply is a slight increase and is representative of all command levels, areas, and time periods. The reductions indicated in some replies probably result from enemy evacuation of defoliated areas. (7) Question 5a(7). Where defoliants were used on wooded areas of VC shelter, enemy casualties from air support were: 2 Significantly Reduced 4 Slightly Reduced 146 Increased Slightly 51 Unaffected 39 Increased Significantly The preponderant reply is a slight increase in enemy casualties. This is representative of all areas and time periods. (8) Question 5a(8). Where defoliants were used on wooded areas of VC shelter, ground observation by conventional means was: 2 Seriously Impeded 6 Impeded Somewhat 166 Assisted Somewhat 20 Unaffected 82 Greatly Assisted An increase in horizontal visibility is indicated for all areas, time periods, and command levels. (9) Question 5a(9). Where defoliants were used on wooded areas of VC shelter, aerial observation by conventional means was: 1 Seriously Impeded 2 Impeded Somewhat 6 Unaffected C-l-5 , 103 Assisted Somewhat 165 Greatly Assisted �There was general agreement that defoliants assisted aerial observation by conventional means, and the preponderant reply indicated that they assisted greatly. The lower enthusiasm was indicated in the I Corps area; but, favorable results were shown for all areas, time periods, and command levels. (10) Question 5a(10). Where defoliants were used on wooded areas of VC shelter, aerial observation by night vision devices was: 0 Seriously Impeded 1 Impeded Somewhat 42 Unaffected 111 Assisted Somewhat 36 Greatly Assisted The preponderant reply, "assisted somewhat," is consistent for all areas, time periods, and for the levels of command from which replies were received. (11) Question 5a(ll). Where defoliants were used on wooded areas of VC shelter, aerial observation by radar was: 0 Seriously Impeded 0_ Impeded Somewhat 60 Unaffected 49 Assisted Somewhat 12 Greatly Assisted Approximately equal numbers of respondents indicated no effect and assistance. The average shows a slight assistance to aerial observa- tion by radar. b. Use of defoliants on enemy infiltration routes. (1) Question 5b(l). Where defoliants were used on enemy infiltration routes, enemy movement was; C-l-6 �33 Seriously Impeded 157 . Impeded Somewhat 43. Unaffected 2 Greatly Assisted 12 Assisted Somewhat The consensus for all areas, command levels, and time periods is that enemy movement was impeded somewhat. (2) Question 5b(2). Where defoliants were used on enemy infiltration routes, friendly casualties from booby traps were: 16 Significantly Reduced 90_ Slightly Reduced 108 Unaffected 0 Increased Slightly 0 Increased Significantly The effect, if any, was favorable but very slight. (3) Question 5b(3). Where defoliants were used on enemy infiltration routes, enemy casualties from unit weapons were: 5 Significantly Reduced 11 Slightly Reduced 61 Unaffected 116 Increased Slightly 26 Increased Significantly The preponderant' reply shows a slight increase in enemy casualties from unit weapons. This was representative of all levels of command for all areas and time periods. (4) Question 5b(4), Where defoliants were used on enemy infiltration routes, the number of enemy targets engaged by artillery was: 2 Significantly Reduced 7 Slightly Reduced 61 Unaffected C-l-7 124 Increased Slightly 32 Increased Significantly �The preponderant reply indicates a slight increase. This was representative of all command levels for all areas and time periods. (5) Question 5b(5). Where defoliants were used on enemy infiltration routes, enemy casualties from air support were: 2 Significantly Reduced 2 Slightly Reduced 48 Unaffected 125 Increased Slightly 48 Increased Significantly The preponderant reply indicates a slight increase in enemy casualties. This was true for all command levels and for all areas and time periods. (6) Question 5b(6). Where defoliants were used on enemy infiltration routes, ground observation by conventional means was: 1 Seriously Impeded 2 Impeded Somewhat 25 Unaffected 155 Assisted Somewhat 64 Greatly . Assisted Respondents indicated that defoliation assisted ground observation by a ratio of 8:1 over those indicating no effect or an unfavorable effect. The preponderant reply "assisted somewhat" is representative of all command levels, areas, and time periods. (7) Question 5b(7), Where defoliants were used on enemy infiltration routes, ground observation by night vision devices was; 1 Seriously Impeded 2 Impeded Somewhat _39 Unaffected CM-8 119 Assisted Somewhat 35 Greatly Assisted �The preponderant reply shows observation assisted somewhat. This is representative of all command levels reporting, all areas, and all time periods. (8) Question 5b(8). Where defoliants were used on enemy infiltration routes, ground surveillance by radar was: Q Seriously Impeded 1 Impeded Somewhat 12, Unaffected 77 Assisted Somewhat Some assistance to ground surveillance by radar is indicated. 20 Greatly Assisted There were no replies from division commanders for the 1965-66 period. Most respondents indicated no effect for the 1965-66 period, (9) Question 5b(9), Where defoliants were used on enemy infiltration routes, aerial observation by conventional means was: Q Seriously Impeded 1 Impeded Somewhat I Unaffected 112 Assisted Somewhat 129 Greatly Assisted Almost all replies indicate assistance, with a preponderance indicating that defoliation assisted observation greatly. The greatest enthusiasm seems to come from the lower levels of command. Overall response was consistent for all areas and time periods. (10) Question 5b(10), Where defoliants were used on enemy infiltration routes, aerial observation by night vision devices was: 0 Seriously Impeded 1 Impeded Somewhat 39 Unaffected C-l-9 95 Assisted Somewhat 36 Greatly Assisted �The preponderant reply indicates that defoliation assisted aerial observation by night vision devices, with nearly equal numbers reporting that observation was unaffected and that it was assisted greatly. Replies were not received for the 1965-66 period from division commanders. Responses were consistent for all areas and time periods, (11) Question 5b(ll). Where defoliants were used on enemy infiltration routes, aerial observation by radar was: 0 Seriously Impeded 0 Impeded Somewhat 51 Unaffected 51 Assisted Somewhat 9 Greatly Assisted Almost as many respondents reported no effect as reported assistance, The average reply indicates some assistance for all areas and time periods. Division commanders did not reply for 1965-66, c. Use of defoliants along friendly roads. (1) Question 5c(l). Where defoliants were used along friendly roads, friendly movement on roads was: 3 Seriously Impeded 2 Impeded Somewhat 27 Unaffected 90 Assisted Somewhat 1Q7 Greatly Assisted Most respondents indicated that friendly travel was assisted, with the preponderance indicating that it was greatly assisted. NO replies were received from division commanders in I Corps area. (2) Question 5c(2), Where defoliants were used along friendly roads, friendly casualties from enemy ambush were; �100 Significantly Reduced 92 Slightly Reduced 24 Unaffected 2 Increased Slightly 1 Increased Significantly Most respondents indicated a reduction in friendly casualties, nearly equally divided between significant and slight, No replies were received from division commanders in I Corps area nor for the 1965-66 period. (3) Question 5c(3). Where defoliants were used along friendly roads, friendly casualties from road mines were; 3 Significantly Reduced 90 Slightly Reduced 88 Unaffected The preponderant reply is a slight reduction. 2 Increased Slightly 1 Increased Significantly Division commanders did not reply for I Corps area nor for 1965-66. The average reply was a slight reduction for all areas and periods. (4) Question 5c(4), Where defoliants were used along friendly roads, friendly casualties from booby traps were: 22 Significantly Reduced 97 Slightly Reduced 83 Unaffected The preponderance indicates slight reduction. 2 Increased Slightly 0 Increased Significantly No replies were received from division commanders in I Corps area nor for 1965-66. The average reply showed casualties slightly reduced in all areas and time periods. (5) Question 5c(5). Where defoliants were used along friendly roads, enemy casualties from unit weapons were: C-l-11 �10 Significantly Reduced 9 Slightly Reduced 49 Unaffected 109 Increased Slightly The preponderant reply shows a slight increase. 24 Increased Significantly Division commanders did not reply for I Corps nor for 1965-66, The average reply "increased slightly," was representative of all areas and time periods. (6) Question 5c(6), Where defoliants were used along friendly roads, ground observation by conventional means was: 0 Seriously Impeded 0 Impeded Somewhat 8 Unaffected 108 Assisted Somewhat 108 Greatly Assisted Improved observation is a nearly unanimous response, with replies differing only in degree. Division commanders did not reply for I Corps area nor for 1965-66. The greatest assistance was reported by division commanders and by advisors. Overall, the average reply "assisted somewhat" was representative of all areas and time periods, d. Use of defoliants along friendly waterways. (1) Question 5d(l). Where defoliants were used along friendly waterways, friendly casualties from enemy ambush were: 41 60 21 1 J) SignificantlySlightlyUnaffectedIncreasedIncreased Reduced Reduced Slightly Significantly The preponderant reply is a slight reduction in casualties. Division commanders did not reply for I Corps area nor for 1965-66, The average reply "slightly reduced" is representative of all areas and time periods. C-l-12 �(2) Question 5d(2), Where defoliants were used along friendly waterways, friendly casualties from booby traps werej 15 Significantly Reduced 47 Slightly Reduced Q Increased Slightly 54 Unaffected 0 Increased Significantly About as many respondents reported reduction in booby trap casualties as reported that the number was unaffected. replied for I Corps area nor for 1965-66. No division commanders The average reply is a slight reduction. (3) Question 5d(3), Where defoliants were used along friendly waterways, enemy casualties from unit weapons were: 6 Significantly Reduced 5 Slightly Reduced 31 Unaffected The preponderant reply is a slight increase. replied for I Corps area or 1965-66. 61 Increased Slightly 12 Increased Significantly No division commanders The reply "increased slightly" is representative of all areas and time periods. (4) Question 5d(4). Where defoliants were used along friendly waterways,, ground observation by conventional means was: 0 Significantly Impeded 0 Impeded Somewhat _8 Unaffected 71 Assisted Somewhat 53 Greatly Assisted Respondents indicated almost unanimously that observation was assisted, with the preponderance "assisted somewhat," C-l-13 Division commanders did �not reply for I Corps area nor for 1965-66. "Assisted somewhat" is the average reply for all command levels, areas, and time periods, e. Use of defoliants on friendly defense perimeter, (1) Question 5e(l). Where defoliants were used on a friendly defense perimeter, defense of that perimeter was; 0 Seriously Impeded 5 Impeded Somewhat 2 Unaffected 79 Assisted Somewhat 147 Greatly Assisted Replies indicate almost unanimously that defense was assisted, and 2:1 that it was greatly assisted, The average reply for all command levels and all areas and time periods is "greatly assisted." (2) Question 5e(2), Where defoliants were used on a friendly defense perimeter, friendly casualties from booby traps were: 31 Significantly Reduced 52 Slightly Reduced 115 Unaffected 1 Increased Slightly 0 Increased Significantly The preponderant reply indicated booby trap casualties unaffected. This is representative of all command levels, areas, and time periods, (3) Question 5e(3), Where defoliants were used on a friendly defense perimeter, enemy casualties from unit weapons were; 2 Significantly Reduced 4 Slightly Reduced 32 Unaffected C-l-14 113 Increased Slightly 51 Increased Significantly �The preponderant reply is a slight increase. reported significant increase. Division commanders For other levels of command and all areas and periods, the average reply was "increased slightly," (4) Question 5e(4). Where defoliants were used on a friendly defense perimeter, ground observation by conventional means 1 _ 0_ Seriously Impeded Impeded Somewhat 1_ Unaffected 75_ Assisted Somewhat 156 Greatly Assisted Respondents indicate almost unanimously that observation was assisted, with replies "greatly assisted" more than double those "assisted somewhat." For all areas and periods, the average reply was "greatly assisted." (5) Question 5e(5). Where defoliants were used on a friendly defense perimeter, ground observation by night vision devices was: 0_ Seriously Impeded 0_ 9_ Impeded Unaffected Somewhat 84_ 128 Assisted Greatly Somewhat Assisted The preponderant reply indicates observation greatly assisted. For all areas and periods, the average reply is "greatly assisted." (6) Question 5e(6), Where defoliants were used on a friendly defense perimeter, ground observation by radar was; 01-15 �0 Seriously Impeded Q Impeded Somewhat 31 Uanffected 79 Assisted Somewhat 66 Greatly Assisted The preponderant reply is "assisted somewhat," For all areas and periods, this is the average response. f. Use of herbicides on food crops, (1) Question 5f(l), Where herbicides were used on food crops in my area of operations, evidence used in designating crops for destruction included; Number of Respondents Response a. Cultivation of areas apparently larger than required to feed the civilian population. b. Cultivation of areas remote from known civilian settlements, 127 c. Method or pattern of cultivation. d. 105 e. Hostile acts attributed to local population. 15 Failure to report hostile efforts such as ambushes, mines, booby traps. g. 36 Proximity to known or suspected enemy supply route. f. 39 7 Provision of guides, porters, or other non-food assistance to enemy forces. C-1'16 23 �Number of Respondents Response h. Cultivation in VC or NVA controlled areas, i, 118 Resistance to resettlement. 7 j. Non-cooperation with RVN government. 11 (2) Question 5f(2). Where herbicides were used on food crops, the distinction between crops grown for use by the enemy and crops grown by noncombatants who were not supporting the enemy was; 21 Completely Reliable 53 Usually Reliable 63 Fairly Reliable 5 Not Usually Reliable The preponderant reply is "usually reliable." 3 Unreliable 14 Of Unknown Reliability For all areas and periods, the average reply of "usually reliable" is representative, (3) Question 5f(3), Where herbicides were used on food crops, destruction of crops made the enemy change his pattern of operations. Yes 44 No 22 The preponderance is 2:1 for the affirmative, (4) Question 5f(4), Where herbicides were used on food crops, destruction of crops made the enemy change his area of operations. Yes 41 No 47 There seems to be no agreement on this question. There is no pattern indicating differences in areas, time periods, or command levels. C-l-17 �(5) Question 5f(5), Considering both military and political effects, how did crop destruction affect RVN objectives? 7 Significantly Impeded 13 Impeded Somewhat 16 Unaffected 71 Assisted Somewhat 22 Greatly Assisted While there is disagreement, the number reporting that crop destruction assisted is almost five times the number reporting that it impeded. The reply "assisted somewhat" is representative of all areas, command levels, and periods. g. Question 6. Effect of defoliation on number of enemy prisoners captured. 0 Significantly Reduced 1 Slightly Reduced 148 Unaffected 89 Increased Slightly 10 Increased Significantly Most respondents report the number of prisoners captured unaffected; those reporting any effect report an increase. report a slight increase. Division commanders Otherwise the reply "unaffected" is representative. h. 2 Enthusiastic Approval Question 7. Reaction of local residents to defoliation. 21 Approval 140 Indifference 71 Disapproval 14 Hostility The preponderant reply is "indifference." The average reply of advisors is a low level of disapproval. Otherwise the average reply "indif- ference" is representative. C-l-18 �i. Question 8, Compared to other means of clearing foliage listed below, herbicides were: Significantly Somewhat Slightly More More Equally Less Effective Effective Effective Effective Significantly Less Effective 119 85 24 25 32 Slash and Burn 64 46 27 39 48 Rome Plow 31 16 11 27 207 131 65 14 35 42 Napalm Bomb HE Bomb For clearing foliage, herbicides are ranked significantly more effective than napalm bomb and HE bomb, significantly less effective than Rome Flow, and about equal to slash and burn, j. Question 9. Change in area under cultivation. 68 Increased Significantly 70 Increased Slightly 88 No Change 38 Decreased Slightly 16 Decreased Significantly The average reply falls between a slight increase and no change. Although the number of responses shows considerable difference of opinion, there appears to be no correlation of replies with a particular command level, period, or area. k. Question 10, Change in ratio of cultivated area to population. C-l-19 �46 Increased Significantly 80 Increased Slightly 93 No Change 37 Decreased Slightly Battalion commanders 1965-66 reported no change. 11 Decreased Significantly Otherwise, the average reply which falls between a slight increase and no change is representative. 1. Question 11. Change in percent of population which supported RVN, 74 Increased Significantly 113 Increased Slightly 48 No Change 14 Decreased Slightly 3 Decreased Significantly The preponderant reply is a slight increase, Four division commanders 1969-70 reported significant increase. Otherwise, the average reply "increased slightly" is representative. m. Question 12. Means of crop denial other than herbicides used, Means Respondents Bombing 55 Burning 102 Other (principally manual destruction) 87 None 93 n. Question 13. Need for herbicides in other future contingency operations. Yes 238 Perhaps C-l-20 83 No 20 �TAB A TO APPENDIX C-l COVER LETTER AND QUESTIONNAIRE FOR COMMANDERS AND ADVISORS Cover Letter C-l-A-2 Credit Data C-l-A-3 Questionnaire C-l-A-4 C-l-A-1 �DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF FOR MILITARY OPERATIONS WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310 Dear Sir; The use of herbicides in Vietnam was authorized by President Kennedy as early as 1961. During the period 1965 to 1970, chemical herbicides were used as a form of combat support to defoliate vegetated areas which were used by the VC as base areas or which provided cover for VC attacks against friendly forces or population centers. They were also used to destroy enemy crops, Their use in Vietnam is the first large scale experience with herbicides in military operations, and their contribution is now being evaluated. At the direction of the Department of Defense (DDR&E), the Engineer Strategic Studies Group (ESSG) is conducting a study to identify the utility of herbicides in the conduct of military operations. An important part of this study is an analysis of the experience of commanders and advisors who participated in military operations in Vietnam while herbicides were being used. To give the study the benefit of your experience, please complete the inclosed questionnaire and return it in the envelope provided. Please respond at your earliest convenience before 22 September 1971, Sincerely yours, rigadier General, GS anior Army Representative lerbicide Study Steering Group Ol-A-2 �HERBICIDES AND MILITARY OPERATIONS RESPONDENT CREDIT DATA Name Present Rank Present Organization The identification on this sheet will be used only to credit you on the roster of respondents as having complied with the request to furnish information. Your response will be credited and this sheet will be removed and destroyed before your answers are examined. The information you furnish will be aggregated in a computer record and the questionnaire sheets will then be destroyed, making it impossible to match any item with the individual source. C-l-A-3 �HERBICIDES AND MILITARY OPERATIONS QUESTIONNAIRE FOR COMMANDERS AND ADVISERS 1. Organization(s) at time of experience with herbicide effects; 2. Assignment(3) at time of experience with herbicide effects: 3. Period covered by experience: From ____ To (month) (month) _ (year) <__ (year) 4. Region(s), zone(s), and province(s) in which effects of herbicides were observed or otherwise known to you: 5. Have you observed the effects of herbicides as applied: many as may apply) __ a. ______ b. (check as On extensive wooded areas of VC shelter. On enemy infiltration routes. c. Along friendly roads, d. Along friendly waterways. e. On friendly defense perimeter. ^_ f, g. On food crops. Other (expand on page 11) If you checked none of the above, please return the questionnaire without answering any of the questions which follow. If you checked one or more of the above, fill in the appropriate rating schedule in the following pages and then complete the overview information on page 12. When you fill in any rating scale, you should base your judgment on your own experience. If you can't estimate what the effect was, skip the question. C-l-A-4 �RATING SCHEDULE FOR USE OF HERBICIDES 5a. Where defoliants were used ON WOODED AREAS OF VC SHELTER in my area of operations: (1) Friendly cross-country, movement was: Seriously Impeded (2) Impeded Somewhat Unaffected Assisted Somewhat Greatly Assisted Friendly casualties from enemy ambush were: Significantly Reduced Slightly Reduced Unaffected Increased Slightly Increased Significantly (3) Friendly casualties from road mines were: Significantly Reduced Slightly Reduced Unaffected Increased Slightly Increased Significantly (4) Friendly casualties from booby traps were: Significantly Reduced (5) Slightly Reduced Unaffected Increased Slightly Increased Significantly Enemy casualties from unit weapons were: Significantly Reduced Slightly Reduced Unaffected Increased Slightly Increased Significantly (6) The number of enemy targets engaged by artillery was: Significantly Reduced Slightly Reduced Unaffected C-l-A-5 Increased Slightly Increased Significantly �5a. Where defoliants were used ON WOODED AREAS OF VC SHELTER in my area of operations-.--CONTINUED (7) Enemy casualties from air support were: Significantly Reduced Slightly Reduced Unaffected Increased Slightly Increased Significantly (8) Ground observation by conventional means was: Seriously Impeded Impeded Somewhat Unaffected Assisted Somewhat Greatly Assisted (9) Aerial observation by conventional means was: Seriously Impeded (10) Seriously Impeded (11) Seriously Impeded . Impeded Somewhat Unaffected Assisted Somewhat Greatly Assisted Aerial observation by night vision devices was: Impeded Somewhat Unaffected Assisted Somewhat Greatly Assisted Assisted Somewhat Greatly Assisted Aerial observation by radar was: Impeded Somewhat Unaffected C'l-A-6 �RATING SCHEDULE FOR USE OF HERBICIDES 5b. Where defoliants were used ON ENEMY INFILTRATION ROUTES in my area of operations: (1) Enemy movement was: Seriously Impeded Impeded Somewhat Unaffected Assisted Somewhat Greatly Assisted (2) Friendly casualties from booby traps were: Significantly Reduced Slightly Reduced Unaffected Increased Slightly Increased Significantly (3) Enemy casualties from unit weapons were: Significantly Slightly Reduced Reduced Unaffected Increased Slightly Increased Significantly (4) The number of enemy targets engaged by artillery was: Significantly Slightly Reduced Reduced Unaffected Increased Slightly Increased Significantly (5) Enemy casualties from air support were: Significantly Reduced Slightly Reduced Unaffected Increased Slightly Increased Significantly (6) Ground observation by conventional means was: Seriously Impeded Impeded Somewhat Unaffected C-l-A-7 Assisted Somewhat Greatly Assisted �5b. Where defoliants were used ON ENEMY INFILTRATION ROUTES in my area of operations:—CONTINUED (7) Ground observation by night vision devices was; Seriously Impeded Impeded Somewhat Unaffected Assisted Somewhat Greatly Assisted Assisted Somewhat Greatly Assisted (8) Ground surveillance by radar was: Seriously Impeded Impeded Somewhat Unaffected (9) Aerial observation by conventional means was: Seriously Impeded (10) Seriously Impeded (11) Seriously Impeded Impeded Somewhat Unaffected Assisted Somewhat Greatly Assisted Aerial observation by night vision devices was: Impeded Somewhat Unaffected Assisted Somewhat Greatly Assisted Assisted Somewhat Greatly Assisted Aerial observation by radar was: Impeded Somewhat Unaffected C-l-A-8 �BATING SCHEDULE FOR USE OF HERBICIDES 5c. Where defoliants were used ALONG FRIENDLY ROADS in my area of operations: (1) Friendly movement on roads was: Seriously Impeded Impeded Somewhat Unaffected Assisted Somewhat Greatly Assisted (2) Friendly casualties from enemy ambush were: Significantly Reduced Slightly Reduced Unaffected Increased Slightly Increased Significantly (3) Friendly casualties from road mines were: Significantly Reduced Slightly Reduced Unaffected Increased Slightly Increased Significantly (4) Friendly casualties from booby traps were: Significantly Reduced Slightly Reduced Unaffected Increased Slightly Increased Significantly (5) Enemy casualties by unit weapons were: Significantly Reduced Slightly Reduced Unaffected Increased Slightly Increased Significantly (6) Ground observation by conventional means was: Seriously Impeded Impeded Somewhat Unaffected C-l-A-9 Assisted Somewhat Greatly Assisted �RATING SCHEDULE FOR USE OF HERBICIDES 5df Where defoliants were used ALONG FRIENDLY WATERWAYS in my area of operations: (1) Friendly casualties from enemy ambush were: Significantly Reduced Slightly Reduced Unaffected Increased Slightly Increased Significantly ( ) Friendly casualties from booby traps were; 2 Significantly Slightly Reduced Reduced Unaffected Increased Slightly Increased Significantly (3) Enemy casualties from unit weapons were: Significantly Reduced Slightly Reduced Unaffected Increased Slightly Increased Significantly (4) Ground observation by conventional means was: Significantly Impeded Impeded Somewhat Unaffected C-l-A-10 Assisted Somewhat Greatly Assisted �RATING SCHEDULE FOR USE OF HERBICIDES 5e. Where defoliants were used ON A FRIENDLY DEFENSE PERIMETER in my area of operations: (1) Defense of that perimeter wag; Seriously Impeded Impeded Somewhat Unaffected Assisted Somewhat Greatly Assisted (2) Friendly casualties from booby traps were; Significantly Reduced Slightly Reduced Unaffected Increased Slightly Increased Significantly (3) Enemy casualties from unit weapons were: Significantly Reduced Slightly Reduced Unaffected Increased Slightly Increased Significantly (4) Ground observation by conventional means was: Seriously Impeded Impeded Somewhat Unaffected Assisted Somewhat Greatly Assisted (5) Ground observation by night vision devices was; Seriously Impeded Impeded Somewhat Unaffected Assisted Somewhat Greatly Assisted Assisted Somewhat Greatly Assisted (6) Ground observation by radar was: Seriously Impeded Impeded Somewhat Unaffected C-l-A-11 �RATING SCHEDULE FOR USE OF HERBICIDES 5f. Where herbicides were used ON FOOD CROPS in my area of operations: (1) Evidence used in designating crops for destruction included: (check as many as apply) a. Cultivation of areas apparently larger than required to feed the civilian population. b. Cultivation of areas remote from known civilian settlements, c. Method or pattern of cultivation. _ d. Proximity to known or suspected enemy supply route, e. Hostile acts attributed to local population, T >-p__ f. Failure to report hostile efforts such as ambushes, mines, booby traps. g. Provision of guides, porters, or other non-food assistance to enemy forces. __ h. Cultivation in VC or NVA controlled areas. i. Resistance to resettlement. j. Non-cooperation with RVN government. k. None, 1. Other (specify) (2) The distinction between crops grown for use by the enemy and crops grown by non-combatants who were not supporting the enemy was: Completely Reliable Usually Reliable Fairly Reliable Not Usually Reliable C-l-A-12 Unreliable Of Unknown Reliability �5f, Where herbicides were used ON FOOD CROPS in my area of operations: CONTINUED (3) Destruction of crops made the enemy change his pattern of operations. ( ) Yes ( ) No ( ) Don't Know ( ) Question not applicable to my area. (4) Destruction of crops made the enemy change his area of operations. ( ) Yes ( ) No ( ) Don't Know ( ) Question not applicable to my area. (5) Considering both military and political effects, how did crop destruction affect RVN objectives? Significantly Impeded Impeded Somewhat Unaffected C-l-A-13 Assisted Somewhat Greatly Assisted �RATING SCHEDULE FOR USE OF HERBICIDES 5g. AREA OF HERBICIDE APPLICATION. Describe below, areas of application not listed in question 5 on page 1. Include the purpose and the military effectiveness. �OVERVIEW ON USE OF HERBICIDES (Continued from page 1) • 6, As a result of the defoliation program, the number of enemy prisoners captured was; Significantly Reduced Slightly Reduced Unaffected Increased Slightly Increased Significantly 7, With regard to the defoliation program, local residents indicated: Enthusiastic Approval Approval Indifference Disapproval Hostility 8. Compared to other means of clearing foliage listed below, herbicides were: Napalm Bomb Slash & Burn Rome Plow HE Bomb Other (Specify) C-l-A-15 �9. During your tour, how did the area under cultivation in your province/ area change, for whatever reason? Increased Significantly Increased Slightly No Change Decreased Slightly Decreased Significantly 10, How did the ratio of cultivated areas to civilian population change, for whatever reason? Increased Significantly Increased Slightly No Change Decreased Slightly Decreased Significantly 7 11, What changes occurred in the percentage of population which supported the RVN? Increased Significantly Increased Slightly No Change Decreased Slightly Decreased Significantly 12, What means of crop denial other than chemical herbicides were used in your province/area? (check as many as apply) a. Bombing b. Burning c. Other (Specify) d. None 13, Considering the contributions of herbicides to accomplishment of your mission in RVN, do you see a need for these agents in other future contingency operations? ( ) Yes ( ) No ( ) Perhaps 14, Expand, as you feel appropriate, on any previous questions or answers. C-l-A-16 �APPENDIX C-2 NAVAL FORCES �APPENDIX C-2 NAVAL FORCES Paragraph 1 Purpose C-2-2 2 Scope C-2-2 3 Respondents C-2-2 4 Replies to Questions C-2-4 Areas of Operation Respondents' Mission Areas Analysis by Area—Question 7 Analysis by Missions-Question Analysis by Area—Question 8 Analysis by Mission—Question Analysis by Area—Question 9 Analysis by Mission—Question Analysis by Area—Question 10 Analysis by Mission—Question Analysis by Area—Question 11 Analysis by Mission—Question Analysis by Area—Question 12 Analysis by Mission—Question Analysis by Area—Question 13 Analysis by Mission—Question Analysis by Area—Question 14 Analysis by Mission—Question C-2-3 C-2-3 C-2-4 C-2-5 C-2-6 C-2-7 C-2-8 C-2-8 C-2-9 C-2-9 C-2-10 C-2-10 C-2-11 C-2-12 C-2-13 C-2-13 C-2-14 C-2-14 Figure C-2-1 C-2-2 C-2-3 C-2-4 C-2-5 C-2-6 C-2-7 C-2-8 C-2-9 C-2-10 C-2-11 C-2-12 C-2-13 C-2-14 C-2-15 C-2-16 C-2-17 C-2-18 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 TAB A—COVER LETTER AND QUESTIONNAIRE FOR NAVAL FORCES C-2-1 C-2-A-1 �1. Purpose. This appendix analyzes the replies of Navy person- _ nel who participated in inland operations in RVN between 1965 and 1970. 2. Scope. The questions asked concern the influence of defoliation on the number and accuracy of attacks on vessels by small arms, heavy weapons, and mines; on the effectiveness of retaliatory fire; and on mission performance. Respondents also were asked their opinions on the need for herbicides in the future, The questionnaire and cover letter are appended as Tab A. 3. Respondents. a. Personnel to receive the questionnaire were selected by the Navy to give a sampling of appropriate missions and periods of service. Of 230 replies received, 150 indicated experience with herbicides. b. The areas of operation designated by more than 10 respondents are listed in Figure C-2-1. c. Missions designated by more than 10 respondents are listed in Figure C-2-2. d. Each question is analyzed both by mission and by area. Each area or mission with 10 or more respondents, as listed in paragraphs b and c above, is reported separately. All other areas or missions are combined under the designation "Other." The number of C-2-2 �individual replies is also shown. Since some individuals served in more than one area or on more than one mission, the number of individual replies is not necessarily the area or mission total. AREAS OF OPERATION No. of Respondents Area IV Corps Rung Sat Mekong Delta Mekong I Corps III Corps Van Co Dong Bassac 59 53 43 36 23 21 14 11 Figure C-2-1 RESPONDENTS' MISSION AREAS Mission No. of Respondents Interdiction 54 River Patrol Intelligence Air Support Construction Assault Support Riverine Forces 41 17 15 11 11 11 Figure C-2-2 C-2-3 �4. Replies to Questions. a. Effects of defoliation on the number of attacks by small arms fire (Question 7) are shown respectively by area and mission"in Figures C-2-3 and C-2-4. Although some few individuals reported an increase in the number of small arms attacks on vessels as a result of defoliation, the weight of opinion in every area examined and for every mission examined favored a decrease in the number of attacks. The median reply indicates a significant decrease. ANALYSIS BY AREA--QUESTION 7 Area IV Corps Rung Sat Mekong Delta Mekong I Corps III Corps Van Co Dong Bassac Other Indiv Replies Inc Sienif 1 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 3 Inc Slightly Replies Remained the Same 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 Figure C-2-3 C-2-4 3 4 1 2 0 1 3 1 8 14 Dec Sliehtlv Dec Sianif 15 15 19 13 11 1 5 1 3 31 61 13 9 6 1 6 4 0 12 38 �ANALYSIS BY MISSION--QUESTION 7 Inc Sipnif Mission Interdiction River Patrol Intelligence Air Support Construction Assault Spt Riverine Forces Other Indiv Replies Inc Slightly Replies Remained the Same Dec Slightly Dec Sisnif 0 , 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 2 1 1 0 0 15 12 2 1 0 2 15 10 5 6 I 4 0 3 3 0 2 1 2 6 14 3 15 38 3 31 61 Figure C-2-4 b. Effects of defoliation on the number of attacks on vessels by heavy weapons (Question 8) are shown respectively by area and mission In Figures C-2-5 and C-2-6, The greatest number of replies indicated a significant decrease in the number of heavy weapons attacks on vessels. Because of a large number of replies indicating no effect, the median of replies is a slight decrease. derant reply an increase. In no area or mission is the prepon- Overall, "decrease" replies exceed "no change" replies almost 4 to 1. c. Effects of defoliation on the number of attacks on vessels by mines (Question 9) are shown respectively by area and mission in Figures C-2-7 and C-2-8. The median reply for all areas and almost all missions indicates that defoliation had no effect on the number of C-2-5 �mine attacks on vessels. Respondents with the missions of air support and support of riverine forces indicated a slight decrease in the number of attacks. Overall, the "no effect" replies equaled the "decrease" replies, while approximately one-third as many indicated an increase. ANALYSIS BY AREA—QUESTION 8 Inc Signif Area IV Corps Rung Sat Mekong Delta Mekong I Corps III Corps Van Co Dong Bassac Other Indiv Replies 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 Inc Slightly 2 2 0 2 0 1 0 0 2 5 Replies Remained the Same Dec Slightly Dec Signif 8 4 4 3 1 3 3 1 11 22 13 14 8 3 1 4 6 0 21 42 14 15 9 1 0 5 0 2 17 44 Figure C-2-5 d. Effects of defoliation on the accuracy of small arms fire directed at vessels (Question 10) are shown respectively by area and mission in Figures C-2-9 and C-2-10. The median reply indicates a slight decrease in the accuracy of small arms fire directed at vessels, A significant decrease is reported for the Mekong, I Corps, and III Corps areas and for the missions of interdiction, river patrol, air support, and assault. No effect is reported for the Van Co Dong and C-2-6 �Bassac areas and for the intelligence and support of riverine forces missions. Although a few individuals reported increases in accuracy, this does not hold for any area or mission examined. ANALYSIS BY MISSION—QUESTION 8 Inc Signif Mission Interdiction River Patrol Intelligence Air Support Construction Assault Spt Riverine Forces Other Indiv Replies Inc Slightly Replies Remained the Same Dec Slightly Dec Signif 0 0 0 1 0 1 3 1 2 0 0 0 5 1 1 1 0 2 15 13 2 0 0 4 13 6 3 6 1 1 0 0 1 0 4 5 1 16 22 4 18 42 2 22 44 Figure C-2-6 e. Effects of defoliation on the accuracy of heavy weapons fire directed at vessels (Question 11) are shown respectively by area and mission in Figures C-2-11 and C.-2-12. The median reply indicates a slight decrease in the accuracy of heavy weapons fire directed at vessels. Respondents in IV Corps, Mekong, I Corps, III Corps, Van Co Dong, and Bassac areas and with missions of intelligence and assault indicate no change. The remaining areas and missions report decreases ranging from slight to significant. C-2-7 �ANALYSIS BY AREA--QUESTION 9 Area IV Corps Rung Sat Mekong Delta Mekong I Corps III Corps Van Co Dong Bassac Other Indlv Replies Inc Signif I 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 Inc Slightly Replies Remained the Same Dec Slightly Dec Signif 5 5 4 2 0 1 1 0 3 10 9 12 4 3 2 5 5 I 15 33 5 6 1 3 0 2 0 1 3 16 4 5 5 1 0 3 0 0 10 17 Dec Slightly Dec Signif Figure C-2-7 ANALYSIS BY MISSION--QUESTION 9 Mission Interdiction River Patrol Intelligence Air Support Construction Assault Spt Riverine Forces Other Indiv Replies Inc Signif Inc Slightly Replies Remained the Same 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 1 1 1 0 1 12 7 4 1 0 3 2 3 0 0 4 4 0 1 1 2 0 1 1 0 7 10 1 15 33 3 8 16 0 8 17 Figure C-2-8 C-2-8 2 3 �ANALYSIS BY AREA—QUESTION 10 Area IV Corps Rung Sat Mekong Delta Mekong I Corps III Corps Van Co Dong Bassac Other Indlv Replies Inc Signif 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 2 Inc Slightly Replies Remained the Same Dec Slightly Dec Signif I 1 1 2 0 0 1 0 2 4 12 7 3 3 0 4 3 1 8 24 3 8 6 1 0 1 3 0 9 17 13 16 10 9 1 6 1 2 19 47 Dec Slightly Dec Signif Figure C-2-9 ANALYSIS BY MISSION--QUESTION 10 Mission Interdiction River Patrol Intelligence Air Support Construction Assault Spt Riverine Forces Other Indiv Replies Inc Signif Inc Slightly Replies Remained the Same 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 9 3 3 0 0 1 4 4 0 1 0 1 16 13 3 4 1 3 0 2 2 0 3 4 2 13 24 2 8 17 0 17 47 Figure C-2-10 C-2-9 �ANALYSIS BY AREA--QUESTION U Area IV Corps Rung Sat Mekong Delta Mekong I Corps III Corps Van Co Dong Bassac Other Indiv Replies Inc Signif 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 Inc Slightly 1 2 0 1 0 0 0 0 3 5 Replies Remained the Same Dec Slightly Dec Sianif 12 8 4 4 1 6 3 2 10 30 3 6 5 0 0 1 1 0 6 15 11 13 8 6 0 4 2 2 19 37 Figure C-2-11 ANALYSIS BY MISSION--QUESTION 11 Mission Interdiction River Patrol Intelligence Air Support Construction Assault Spt Riverine Forces Other Indiv Replies Inc Signif Inc Slightly Replies Remained the Same Dec Slightly Dec Signif 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 1 1 1 0 1 11 4 3 1 0 3 4 6 1 0 0 2 14 6 3 4 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 20 30 1 5 15 2 15 37 3 5 Figure C-2-12 C-2-10 �f. Effects of defoliation an the effectiveness of retaliatory fire when a vessel was attacked (Question 12) are shown respectively by area and mission in Figures C-2-13 and C-2-14. The median of replies indicates that defoliation significantly increased the effectiveness of retaliatory fire. This is true of all missions and of all areas except Van Co Dong where the median was a slight increase in effectiveness. ANALYSIS BY AREA--QUESTION 12 Inc Sienif Area IV Corps Rung Sat Mekong Delta Mekong I Corps III Corps Van Co Dong Bassac Other Indiv Replies Inc Sliaht lv Replies Remained the Same 21 26 13 10 3 7 5 4 33 75 12 13 10 7 0 3 6 0 15 38 4 2 0 2 0 2 1 0 5 10 Dec Slightly 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 Figure C-2-13 g. The degree to which defoliation affected the mission (Question 13) is shown respectively by area and mission in Figures C-2-15 and C-2-16. For all areas and for all missions, the median reply indicated that the mission would have been possible but more difficult without defoliation. A very few (11 of 148) respondents C-2-11 Dec Signif 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 �who said that defoliation made their mission more difficult, were engaged in activities which involved beating the guerrillas at their own game and therefore required concealment. ANALYSIS BY MISSION--QUESTION 12 Inc Signif Mission Interdiction River Patrol Intelligence Air Support Construction Assault Spt Riverine Forces Other Indiv Replies Inc Slightly Replies Remained the Same Dec Slightly Inc Signif 21 6 5 9 1 4 4 9 4 1 0 2 10 0 0 0 0 2 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 28 75 3 21 38 1 4 10 0 0 1 0 0 0 Figure C-2-14 h. The responses to Question 14, "Do you see a need for these agents in other future contingency operations?" are shown respectively by area and mission in Figures C-2-17 and C-2-18. Respondents who indicated a positive need for herbicides outnumbered those who saw no need by 12 to 1. They outnumbered those who indicated a possible need 3 to 1. There was no area or mission where "No" answers exceeded "Perhaps" nor where "Perhaps" answers exceeded "Yes" answer. C-2-12 �ANALYSIS BY AREA--QUESTION 13 Replies Area IV Corps Rung Sat Mekong Delta Mekong I Corps III Corps Van Co Dong Bassac Other Indiv Replies Impossible Without Unaffected More Difficult 32 32 21 18 2 9 8 3 52 109 1 3 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 3 Difficult Without 10 10 4 3 1 3 2 0 9 25 4 4 0 1 1 3 2 0 4 11 Pvnt 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Figure C-2-15 ANALYSIS BY MISSION--QUESTION 13 Replies Mission Interdiction River Patrol Intelligence Air Support Construction Assault Spt Riverine Forces Other Indiv Replies Impossible Without Difficult Without Unaffected More Difficult Pvnt 0 1 0 1 0 0 30 23 6 9 2 5 6 4 4 2 1 2 7 1 1 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 3 7 48 109 2 12 25 0 7 11 0. 0 0 Figure C-2-16 C-2-13 �ANALYSIS BY AREA—QUESTION 14 Replies Area Yes IV Corps Rung Sat Mekong Delta Mekong I Corps III Corps Van Co Dong Bassac Other Individual Replies 33 36 19 19 3 12 8 3 45 107 Perhaps 11 11 6 4 0 4 3 .1 15 35 No 4 3 2 0 1 0 1 0 4. 9 Figure C-2-17 ANALYSIS BY MISSION--QUESTION 14 Mission Yes Replies Perhaps No 32 21 8 9 1 6 Inderdiction River Patrol Intelligence Air Support Construction Assault 11 6 3 3 1 4 0 2 1 0 1 0 7 50 107 1 18 35 1 4 9 Spt Riverine Forces Other Individual Replies Figure C-2-18 C-2-14 �TAB A TO APPENDIX C-2 COVER LETTER AND QUESTIONNAIRE FOR NAVAL FORCES Cover Letter C-2-A-2 Credit Data C-2-A-3 Questionnaire C-2-A-4 C-2-A-1 �DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAt, OPERATIONS WASHINGTON. D.C. 20350 From: To: IN REPLY REFER TO Chief of Naval Operations Subj: Herbicides in Military Operations Encl: (1) Respondent Credit Data Sheet and Study Group Questionnaire 1. Public Law 91-441, 7 October 1970, requires the Secretary of Defense to contract with the National Academy of Sciences (NAS) for a comprehensive study and investigation to determine the ecological and physiological effects of the defoliation program carried out in South Vietnam. By 1 March 1972, the Secretary of Defense is required to transmit the NAS study (together with his comments and recommendations) to the President and the Congress. To assist the Secretary in presenting a complete and balanced report it is necessary to evaluate the military advantages and disadvantages of herbicides. 2. At the direction of the Department of Defense (DDR§E), the Engineer Strategic Studies Group (ESSG) of the Army is conducting an in-depth study to determine the degree of military benefit which resulted from the Southeast Asia herbicide, or defoliation program. As one aspect of this study, ESSG is examining the effect of defoliants on our Navy river patrol and river assault operations. As a veteran of these operations your experience can help the Navy and the study group in assessing the benefits of using herbicides in possible future military operations. 3. It therefore is requested that you complete enclosure (1) and return it to ESSG in the envelope provided by 30 September 1971. Replies should be based on your own observations. If the questions are outside your experience, say so. Your help in this survey will be greatly appreciated and will allow us to take better advantage of what you learned in Vietnam. C-2-A-2 G.S. MORRISON By direction �HERBICIDES AND MILITARY OPERATIONS RESPONDENT CREDIT DATA Name Present Rank Present Organization The identification on this sheet will be used only to credit you on the roster of respondents as having complied with the request to furnish information, Your response will be credited and this sheet will be removed and destroyed before your answers are examined. The information you furnish will be aggregated in a computer record and the questionnaire sheets will then be destroyed, making it impossible to match any item with the individual source. C-2-A-3 �HERBICIDES AND MILITARY OPERATIONS QUESTIONNAIRE FOR RIVERINE PERSONNEL 1, Organization(s) at time of experience with herbicides; 2. Assignment in SEA:_ 3. Mission: 4. Period of SEA Tour: Month Year From: To: .5. Area of operations: 6. Did you observe the effect of defoliants in your area? Yes No If your answer is No, please return this questionnaire without answering the remaining questions, 7. As a result of defoliation, the number of attacks on vessels by small arms fire: a. Increased significantly. b. Increased slightly, c. Remained the same. d. Decreased slightly. e. Decreased significantly. f. Don't know, 8. As a result of defoliation, the number of attacks on vessels by heavy weapons, such as mortars, artillery, and rockets: a. Increased significantly. b. Increased slightly. c. Remained the same. d. Decreased slightly. C-2-A-4 �e. Decreased significantly. f, Don't know, 9, As a result of defoliation, the number of attacks on vessels by mines: a. Increased significantly. b. Increased slightly. c. Remained the same. d. Decreased slightly. e. Decreased significantly. f. Don't know, 10, As a result of defoliation, the accuracy of small arms fire directed at vessels: a. Increased significantly. b. Increased slightly. c. Remained the same. d. Decreased slightly. e. Decreased significantly. f. Don't know. 11. As a result of defoliation, the accuracy of heavy weapons (mortar, Artillery, rocket) fire directed at vessels: a. Increased significantly. b. Increased slightly. c. Remained the same. d. Decreased slightly. e. Decreased significantly. f. Don't know. \ C-2-A-5 �12. When a vessel was attacked, defoliation made defensive or retaliatory fire: a. Significantly more effective. b. Slightly more effective, c. No more effective, d. Slightly less effective. e. Significantly less effective, f. Don't know. 13. Indicate the degree to which defoliation affected your mission. a. Mission would have been impossible without defoliation. b. Mission would have been possible, but more difficult without defoliation. c. Mission performance was unaffected by defoliation. d. Mission was made more difficult by defoliation. e. Mission was prevented by defoliation. 14. Considering the contributions of herbicides to accomplishment of your mission in RVN, do you see a need for these agents in other future contingency operations? a. Yes. b. No. c. Perhaps. 15. Expand as you feel appropriate any previous questions or answers. C-2-A-6 �APPENDIX C-3 AIR OPERATIONS �APPENDIX C-3 AIR OPERATIONS Paragraph Page I Purpose C-3-1 2 Scope C-3-1 3 Respondents C-3-1 4 Replies to Questions C-3-2 Respondents With Knowledge of Defoliation Opinions on Future Need for Herbicides C-3-3 C-3-6 Figure C-3-1 C-3-2 TAB A--COVER LETTER AND QUESTIONNAIRE FOR AIR OPERATIONS C-3-A-1 ! Purpose. This appendix analyzes the replies of Air Force • (other than Ranch Hand) and Marine air personnel who served in Southeast Asia between 1965 and 1970. 2, Scope, Questions concern the effect of defoliation on visi- bility, reaction time of vegetation to defoliants, duration of effect of defoliants, military value, effect of defoliation on mission accomplishment, and future need for herbicides. The questionnaire and cover letter are appended as Tab A. 3. Respondents• s ' . • ' _ a. Air Force personnel to receive the questionnaire were selected from a list furnished by the Air Force, The Air Force listing C-3-1 �provided a sampling of missions, areas of operation, aircraft flown, and time periods. Of 272 Air Force respondents to the questionnaire, 201 indicated some acquaintance with defoliant effects or application. The Marine Corps made their own selection and handled the distribution and collection of questionnaires, Of 222 Marine respondents, 115 indicated acquaintance with defoliant effects or application. b. The number of respondents with a knowledge of defoliation who reported participating in each type mission and flying in each type aircraft is shown by area in Figure C-3-1. Since some respondents operated in more than one area, participated in more than one type mission, or flew in more than one type aircraft, the summaries are not totals of the other entries, 4. Replies to Questions. a. Increase in vertical visibility (Question 15). The average reply indicated an improvement in vertical visibility of 40 to 60 percent. Reconnaissance personnel in II, III, and IV Corps made an average estimate of 70 to 90 percent. With this exception, the 40 to 60 percent estimate was typical of all missions and areas. b. Time from application to maximum defoliation (Question 16). The average estimate for all areas and missions was 6 to 8 weeks. C-3-2 �RESPONDENTS WITH KNOWLEDGE OF DEFOLIATION TACAIR RECON AF Marine Total AF Marine Total All Missions FAC Other and Aircraft AF Marine Total AF Marine Total AF Marine Total Aircraft >300 KT7STRIKE < 300 KT/STRIKE FAC /RECON GUNSHIP/13V AIR AF Marine Total AF Marine Total AF Marine Total AF Marine Total Swith Vietnam o I to i I Corps 38 61 99 1 29 30 33 31 64 18 43 63 79 110 189 32 48 80 8 17 25 34 47 81 15 30 South Vietnam II Corps A4 « 52 1 3 4 35 3 38 17 3 20 86 11 97 33 7 40 11 0 U 36 2 38 18 2 20 South. Vietnam III Corps 39 7 46 3 1 4 40 2 42 19 2 21 85 7 92 32 6 38 » 1 10 40 2 42 20 1 21 South Vietnam IV Corps 35 « 41 2 4 6 15 3 18 1« 2 18 57 7 64 29 4 33 South Vietnam All Areas 60 61 121 4 29 33 92 31 123 32 45 77 167 110 277 48 48 96 Figure C-3-1 9 14 45 0 9 16 3 19 14 1 15 17 31 96 47 143 29 30 59 �c. Duration of improvement in vertical visibility (Question 17). The average estimate for all areas and missions was 4 to 6 months* d. Did defoliation make objects or areas of surveillance easier to see or to monitor? (Question 18) All missions in all areas answered "yes," The ratio of "yes" to "no" answers varies from 5 to 1 in I Corps to 10 to 1 in IV Corps. The average for all areas and missions is 7 to 1 for the affirmative, e. Did defoliation decrease the time required for target acquisition or surveillance? (Question 19) All missions in all areas answered "yes." The ratio of "yes" to "no" answers varies from 3,7 to 1 in I Corps to 16 to 1 in IV Corps. The average ratio for all areas and missions is about 5 to 1, f. Did defoliation make reconnaissance feasible at a higher or safer altitude without loss of accuracy? (Question 20) All missions in all areas answered "yes." The average ratio for all areas and missions is about 2 to 1, g. Did defoliated areas serve as a navigational aid? (Ques- tion 20) AH missions in all areas answered "yes." The ratio of "yes" to "no" answers in all areas is approximately 2 to 1. h. Were new objects or suspected targets identified or discovered as a result of defoliation? (Question 22) The answer for all areas and all missions is "yes," The ratio of "yes" to "no" answers generally runs somewhat less than 2 to 1, C-3-4 �1, Did defoliation allow more area to be monitored during a flight? (Question 23) All missions in all areas answered "yes," Defo- liation was most useful to RECON, FAG, and TACAIR in that order. The average answer for all areas and missions is "yes" with a preponderance somewhat higher than 2 to 1. j. Were any known mission benefits derived? (Question 24) All missions in all areas answered "yes," FAC and RECON have "yes" preponderance of 6 to 1; TACAIR of 3 to 1. This difference is not surprising, considering the nature of the missions. k. Effect of defoliation on mission accomplishment (Question 25). The average reply for all missions and areas was that defoliation helped somewhat, but the mission could have been performed without it, However, RECON and FAC missions report that their missions, while possible, would have been more difficult without defoliation. Since the TACAIR mission is somewhat independent of ground visibility because TACAIR targets are marked by the FAC, the reply that the mission would have been possible but more difficult without defoliation is more representative of air operations as a whole, 1. Future need for herbicides (Question 26), mission, were as listed in Figure C-3-2. II, III, and IV Corps. and Laos. The answers, by Definite affirmatives came from "Perhaps" was the predominant answer in I Corps No mission or area gave "no" as the predominant answer. C-3-5 �OPINIONS ON FUTURE NEED FOR HERBICIDES Yes Perhaps No TACAIR 55 60 15 RECON 19 11 3 FAC 77 41 16 Other 39 31 7 145 116 38 All Missions Figure C-3-2 03-6 �TAB A TO APPENDIX C-3 COVER LETTER AND QUESTIONNAIRE FOR AIR OPERATIONS Page Cover Letter C-3-A-2 Questionnaire C-3-A-3 C-3-A-1 �DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES AIR FORCE WASHINGTON, D.Q. REPLY TO ATTN OF: _ _, , „ _ AF/XO SUBJECT: Herbicide Survey TO: 8 0 A U G 1971 Selected Aircrew Members 1, At the direction of the Department of Defense (DDR&E), the U.S. Army's Engineer Strategic Studies Group (ESSG) with Air Force participation is conducting an in-depth study to determine the military benefits gained from the SEAsia herbicide program. Some benefits which may have accrued to the Air Force as a result of herbicide operations may be identified in the TAG air, reconnaissance, and FAC missions. As an aircrew member flying one of these missions, your knowledge can help qualify the degree of benefit gained by the Air Force. Accordingly, request you complete this questionnaire and return it to ESSG in the envelope provided. Replies should be based on your own observations. As far as possible, please provide your most objective and complete responses. If questions are outside your own experience, so indicate. 2, To give the study the benefit of your experience and observations, please respond by 22 September 1971. 1 Atch Survey Questionnaire DONAVON F.'SMITH, Maj General, USAB Acting Deputy Chief of Staff flans and Operations C-3-A-2 Underwrite Your Country's Might - Buy U.S, Savings Bonds �QUESTIONNAIRE FOR AF PERSONNEL Information on Respondent 1, Name: 2, Present Rank: 3, Present Organization; 4, Unit/units to which assigned during SEA tour: 5, Aerial mission during SEA tour: a. TACAIR, b. RECON. c. FAC. d. Other (specify) 6. Aircraft flown in SEA: Over 300 KT/Strike Under 300 KT/Strike FAC/RECON Gunship/UW Air a. F4 e. B57 j. 01 n. AC130 b, F100 f. A26 k. 02 o, AC119 c. F105 g. Al 1. OV10 p. C123 d. Specify h. T28 m. Specify q. Specify i. Specify 7. Duration of SEA tour: From: month year To: month year C-3-A-3 �8, Area in which missions were flown; a. In country, b. Mostly in country, c. 50/50, d. Mostly out country. e. Out country. 9. In what provinces, zones, or areas were your operations conducted? a. In country . b. O u t country . . . - . ' Information on Effects; 10. Are you aware of any defoliation efforts within your area of operation before or during your tour? a. Yes. b. No, (If your answer is NO, you may discontinue answering questions and return the questionnaire with only this portion answered,) 11. Did you observe any evidence of prior defoliation operations within your area? a. Yes. b. No. 12. Were any defoliation operations conducted in your area during your tour? a. Yes. b. No. c. Unknown, C-3-A-4 �13. Within areas of defoliation: a. There was a significant increase in visibility. b. There was no significant effect on vegetation, c. The vegetation was affected without significantly increasing visibility, 14. If defoliation was apparent in your area during your tour, the vertical visibility (percent ground visible) in affected areas: a. Remained the same with no known additional defoliation efforts. b. Was increased by additional defoliation efforts. c. Remained the same with additional defoliation efforts. d. Decreased despite additional defoliation efforts, e. Decreased with no known additional defoliation efforts, f. Unknown, 15. By what percentage did defoliation increase vertical visibility in comparison to untreated adjacent areas? a. 0% to 40% b. 40% to 60% c. 70% to 90% d. 100% e . Other (specify) ••---, f. Unknown C-3-A-5 �16, If you have knowledge of a defoliation mission within your area, can you estimate a response time for maximum defoliation to occur? a, 3-5 weeks, b, 6-8 weeks. c, 9-12 weeks. d, Unknown. e, Other (specify) _______-_—__^_____^__-_^____-_____^______^__ 17. In areas defoliated during your tour, where regrowth occurred prior to your departure, a significant improvement in vertical visibility lastedj a, 0 months, b, Up to 4 months, c, 4-6 months. d, 7-9 months, e, Other (specify) '.„ t f, Unknown, g, Not applicable. AS A RESULT OF DEFOLIATION: Yes 18, Objects or areas of surveillance were easier to see or monitor, () 19, Less time was required for target acquisition or area surveillance, () 20, Visual reconnaissance was feasible at a higher or safer altitude without loss of accuracy during surveillance, ( ) C-3-A-6 No ( ) ( ) ( ) �AS A RESULT OF DEFOLIATION: Yes No 21. "Burn" areas served as a navigational aid. () () 22. New objects or suspected targets were identified or discovered, ( ) 23. MOre area could be monitored during duration of flight, ( ) 24. No known mission benefits were derived. ( ) () () () 25. Defoliation affected your mission to the extent that: a. Generally could not have conducted the mission without defoliation. b. Mission would have been possible, but more difficult, without defoliation, c. Helped somewhat, but mission could have been accomplished without it. d. No significant effect on the mission. e. Interfered with mission accomplishment. 26. Considering the contributions of herbicides to accomplishment of your mission in SEA, do you see a need for these agents in other future contingency operations? a. Yes. b. No. c. Perhaps, 27. If defoliation affected the accomplishment of your mission, please describe how: C-3-A-7 �28, Expand, as you feel appropriate, on any previous questions or answers; C-3-A-8 �APPENDIX O4 CHEMICAL OFFICERS �APPENDIX C-4 CHEMICAL OFFICERS Paragraph Page 1 Purpose C-4-l 2 Scope C-4-l 3 Respondents C-4-2 4 Replies to Questions C-4-2 Level of Respondents' Service Replies to Question 5 Replies to Question 6 Replies to Question 7 Replies to Question 8 C-4-2 C-4-3 C-4-3 C-4-4 C-4-4 Figure C-4-l C-4-2 C-4-3 C-4-4 C-4-5 TAB A—COVER LETTER AND QUESTIONNAIRE FOR CHEMICAL OFFICERS 1» Purpose, C-4-A-1 This appendix analyzes the replies of Army personnel who served in RVN as chemical officers at brigade or higher level or as chemical advisors between 1965 and 1970, 2, Scope. The questions cover the timeliness of response to her- bicide mission requests, satisfaction of tactical commanders with herbicide mission performance, the degree to which performance corresponded with planning factors, and the need for herbicides in future operations. questionnaire and cover letter are appended as Tab A. C-4-l The �3. Respondents* a. Names were selected from a roster showing current and past assignments furnished by the Chemical Corps, Forty-two replies were received. b. .Respondents who indicated experience with herbicides served at the levels indicated in Figure C-4-1. Where a respondent served at more than one level, the table shows the higher. LEVEL OF RESPONDENTS' SERVICE Level Number of Respondents Brigade Division Special Forces Group Marine Amphibious Force Field Force Advisor MACV 2 13 1 1 2 3 11 Figure C-4-1 4. Replies to Questions, a. Question 5, "Was approval of herbicide mission requests received soon enough for timely response?" (1) Replies to Question 5 are tabulated in Figure C-4-2, (2) The responses indicate that approval of requests for herbicide missions were late more frequently than not. C-4-2 �REPLIES TO QUESTION 5 . Response I Always Generally Seldom Never 0 7 9 0 Number of Responses Corps II III 0 8 4 0 0 9 9 2 Individual IV 0 6 3 1 Replies 0 12 17 2 Figure C-4-2 b. Question 6. "Did the effects of herbicide missions meet the expectations of tactical commanders?". (1) Replies to Question 6 are tabulated in Figure C-4-3, REPLIES TO QUESTION 6 Responses I Always Generally Seldom Never 0 15 1 0 Number of Reponses Corps Individual IV II III Replies 0 11 1 0 2 17 0 0 1 9 0 0 2 26 2 0 Figure C-4-3 (2) There is a definite consensus that the expectations of tactical commanders were generally met. c. Question 7, "Were the effects on vegetation in accord with planning factors?" C-4-3 �(1) Replies to Question 7 are tabulated in Figure C-4<-4. REPLIES TO QUESTION 7 Responses I Always Generally Seldom Never 4 12 1 0 Number of Responses Individual Corps IV II III Replies 5 7 0 0 6 13 0 0 5 .; 5 0 0 8 22 1 0 Figure C-4-4 (2) Most respondents (71 percent) indicated that the planning factors were generally proved by the effects, and a substantial minority (26 percent) said that this was always so. i d, Question 8. "Considering the contributions of herbicides to accomplishment of your mission in South Vietnam, do you see a need for those agents in other future contingency operations?" (1) Replies to Question 8 are tabulated in Figure C-4-5, REPLIES TO QUESTION 8 Response Yes Perhaps No I 16 1 0 Number of Responses Individual Corps II III IV Replies 11 1 0 18 3 0 Figure C-4-5 C-4-4 10 0 0 22 5 0 �(2) All respondents agree that there is a possible need for herbicides in future conflicts; 85 percent replied with a definite affirmative. C-4-5 �TAB A TO APPENDIX C-4 COVER LETTER AND QUESTIONNAIRE FOR CHEMICAL OFFICERS Pape Coyer Letter C-4-A-2 Credit Data C-4-A-3 Questionnaire C-4-A-4 C-4-A-1 �DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF FOR MILITARY OPERATIONS WASHINGTON, O.C. 20910 Dear Sir: The use of herbicides in Vietnam was authorized by President Kennedy as early as 1961. During the period 1965 to 1970, chemical herbicides were used as a form of combat support to defoliate vegetated areas which were used by the VC as base areas or which provided cover for VC attacks against friendly forces or population centers. They were also used to destroy enemy crops. Their use in Vietnam is the first large scale experience with herbicides in military operations, and their contribution is now being evaluated. At the direction of the Department of Defense (DDR&E), the Engineer Strategic Studies Group (ESSG) is conducting a study to identify the utility of herbicides in the conduct of military operations. An important part of this study is an analysis of the experience of chemical officers who participated in military operations in Vietnam while herbicides were being used. To give the study the benefit of your experience, please complete the inclosed questionnaire and return it in the envelope provided. Please respond at your earliest convenience before 22 September 1971. Sincerely yours, >HN R/*Dr CLELANI igadier General, GS nior Army Representative erbicide Study Steering Group C-4-A-2 �HERBICIDES AND MILITARY OPERATIONS RESPONDENT CREDIT DATA Name Present Rank Present Organization^ The identification on this sheet will be used only to credit you on the roster of respondents as having complied with the request to furnish information. Your response will be credited and this sheet will be removed and destroyed before your answers are examined. The information you furnish will be aggregated in a computer record and the questionnaire sheets will then be destroyed, making it impossible to match any item with the individual source. C-4-A-3 �HERBICIDES AND MILITARY OPERATIONS QUESTIONS FOR CHEMICAL OFFICERS 1. Organization(s) at time of experience with herbicides; 2. Assignment(s) at time of experience with herbicides; 3. Period covered by experience: Month From; To; r_i r_^ Year • ^ 4. Regions, zones, and provinces in which you had experience with herbicides; 5, Was approval of herbicide mission requests received soon enough for timely response? a. Always b. Generally. . c. Seldom. t d. Never. \ e. Unknown, 6. Did the effects of herbicide missions meet the expectations of tactical commanders? a. Always, d ' b. Generally, Never e. Unknown, c. Seldom, C-4-A-4 �7, Were the effects on vegetation in accord with planning factors? a0 Always. b. Generally. _i c. Seldom. t d. Never, e. Unknown. 8, Considering the contributions of herbicides to accomplishment of your mission in the Republic of Vietnam, do you see a need for those agents in other future contingency operations? a. Yes. b. No. i c. Perhaps. 9, How could herbicides have been employed more effectively? C-4-A-5 �APPENDIX C-5 RANCH HAND PERSONNEL �APPENDIX C-5 RANCH HAND PERSONNEL Purpose C-5-1 Scope C-5-1 Respondents C-5-1 Replies to Questions C-5-2 Ranch Hand Replies to Replies to Replies to C-5-2 C-5-2 C-5-3 C-5-4 Assignments and Areas of Operations Question 6 Question 7 Question 8 TAB A—COVER LETTER AND QUESTIONNAIRE FOR RANCH HAND PERSONNEL C-5-A-1 1. Purpose, This appendix analyzes the replies of Air Force personnel who participated in the herbicide spraying operation (Ranch Hand) in RVN between 1965 and 1970. 2. Scope* The three questions asked concern agent effects only; (,' questions of military value were not believed appropriate for Ranch Hand personnel. 3. Respondents. a. Names and addresses were furnished by the Air Force, Approx* imately 300 questionnaires were distributed and 175 responses received. b. Respondents indicated experience in the areas of operations shown in Figure C-5-1. Since personnel frequently had assignments in C-5-1 �both aircrew and staff capacities and experience in more than one area of operations, the total is greater than the number of respondents. RANCH HAND ASSIGNMENTS AND AREAS OF OPERATIONS Assignments I II Corps III IV Air Crew 112 103 167 136 53 62 88 69 Staff Figure C-5-1 Replies to Questions • a. "If you observed an area in which you knew the time of application, what is your estimate of the time to maximum defoliation?" (1) Replies to the above question (Question 6) are tabulated in Figure C-5-2. REPLIES TO QUESTION 6 Time (Weeks) I Corps II III IV Individual Replies 3-5 46 34 60 45 69 6-8 40 38 55 49 68 9-12 4 9 13 13 16 Figure C-5-2 C-5-2 �(2) Analysis of the above tabulation indicates that the results were not uniform in all areas. Comments by respondents indicate that results were dependent on agent used, type of vegetation, and weather, Considering individual replies without regard to area, very nearly equal numbers estimated 3-5 weeks and 6-8 weeks. On this basis, it can only be said that maximum defoliation was achieved 3 to 8 weeks after spraying, b. "At maximum defoliation, what was the percent of increased vertical visibility (percent ground visible) in relation to untreated adjacent areas?" (1) Replies to the above question (Question 7) are tabulated in Figure C-5-3. REPLIES TO QUESTION 7 Corps Individual Replies Percent I II III IV 0-40 4 2 8 5 8 40-60 ' 28 28 40 34 46 70-90 46 39 63 50 80 100 11 13 21 18 23 Figure C-5-3 * (2) The median figure in each area and for Individual respondents is an increase of vertical visibility between 70 and 90 percent, C-5-3 �However, more than half as many reported increased visibility from 40 to 60 percent, c, "If, following crop destruction missions, you observed the response time, how long was it before the crop was affected?" (1) Replies to the above question (Question 8) are tabulated in Figure C-5-4. REPLIES TO QUESTION ,8 Time (Days) I Corps II III IV Individual Replies 1-2 49 45 67 57 79 3-4 22 25 34 24 39 5-6 7 5 11 7 12 Figure C-5-4 (2) In all areas and among individual respondents, the median reply was 1-2 days, However, a significant number of replies, nearly half as many, indicated a response time of 3-4 days. The difference is due (to some extent) to the agent applied and the nature of the crop (leaf or grain). C-5-4 �TAB A TO APPENDIX C-5 COVER LETTER AND QUESTIONNAIRE FOR RANCH HAND PERSONNEL Page Cover Letter C'5-A-2 Questionnaire C-5-A-3 C-5-A-1 �DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES AIR FORCE WASHINGTON, D.C. REPLY TO ATTN OF: AF/XO 3 0 AUS SUBJECT. Herbicide Survey TO: Selected Aircrew Members 1. At the direction of the Department of Defense (DDR&E), the U.S. Army's Engineer Strategic Studies Group (ESSG) is conducting an .in-depth study to determine the military benefits gained from the SEAsia herbicide program. The USAF, as the operator of this program, is participating in the study. Information regarding the reaction time of defoliants, percent of improved vertical visibility, and duration of significantly improved vertical visibility is desirable. 2, As a RANCH HAND aircrew member, your experience, observations, and expertise can be highly beneficial in attaining a realistic figure in these areas. Accordingly, request you complete this questionnaire and return it to ESSG in the envelope provided by 22 September 1971. Replies should be based on your own observation. As far as possible, please provide your most objective and complete responses. If questions are outside your own experience, so indicate. 1 Atch Survey Questionnaire DONA\/QN F. SMITH, Maj General, USAB Acting Deputy Chief of Staff flans and Operations C-5-A-2 Underwrite Tour County's Might - Buy U.S, Savings Bonds �QUESTIONNAIRE FOR RANCH HAND PERSONNEL Information on Respondent. 1. Name: 2. Aircrew position assigned during SEA tour:, 3. Staff position assigned during SEA tour; 4. Duration of Ranch Hand tour: From: Month ^ Year __ To: 5, Area in which most of your missions were flown. (In cases where areas may approximate equal duration, please check more than one.) a. ( ) I Corps. b. ( ) II Corps. c. ( ) III Corps. d. . ( ) IV Corps, Information on Effects. 6. If you observed an area in which you knew the time of application, what is your estimate of the time to maximum defoliation? a. ( ) 3-5 weeks. b. ( ) 6-8 weeks, c. ( ) 9-12 weeks. d. ( ) not applicable, 7. At maximum defoliation, what was the percent of increased vertical visibility (percent ground visible) in relation to untreated adjacent areas? C-5-A-3 �a. ( ) 0-40% b. ( ) 40-60% c. ( ) 70-90% d. ( ) 100% e. ( ) Other (specify) f. ( ) Unknown 8. If, following crop destruction missions, you observed the response time, how long was it before the crop was affected? a, ( ) 1-2 days. b, ( ) 3-4 days. c, ( ) 5-6 days, d, ( ) Other (specify) e, ( ) Not applicable. 9, Expand, as you feel appropriate, on any previous questions or answers. C-5-A-4 �ANNEX G BIBLIOGRAPHY �ANNEX G BIBLIOGRAPHY 1. Advanced Research Projects Agency, Project AGILE, DefoliationIncidents Correlation Study ( ) U . Report No. TACIC-TR by R, H. Pesut and W. P. Virgin. Contract No. SD-171, ARPA Order No. 324. Columbus, Ohio: Battelle Memorial Institute, Remote Area Conflict Information Center, 1 April 1967 (CONFIDENTIAL). 2. Aerospace Studies Institute, Defoliation Operations in Southeast Asia ( ) U . Special Report No. 70-16, Project Corona Harvest. Maxwell AFB, Alabama, March 1970 (SECRET). 3. , Special Operations Force Report, 1 Jan 65rMar 68, Phase III Input, Project Corona Harvest ( ) Maxwell AFB, Alabama, U. 1 December 1969 (TOP SECRET). 4. American Embassy, Saigon, Report on the Herbicide Policy Review ( ) U. Saigon, 28 August 1968 (CONFIDENTIAL). 5. Booz-Allan Applied Research, Inc., Joint Munitions Ef f ectivene s s Manual for Defoliation. Contract No. F08635-71-C-0016 for US Air Force Armament Laboratory, Eglin Air Force Base, Florida, February 1971 (UNCLASSIFIED). 6. Central Intelligence Agency, Nig, Cuba, Section 24. Washington, D. C., May 1967 (CONFIDENTIAL). 7. . . . _ . ' , . . > NISj Ethiopia, Eritrea and the Somalilands, Section 24. Topography ( ) Washington, D. C., February 1960 (CONFIDENTIAL). U. 8. . , NIS, France, Section 24. D. C., August 1969 (CONFIDENTIAL). 9. , NIS, Iran, Section 24. Topography ( ) U. D. C., October 1965 (CONFIDENTIAL). Topography ( ) U. Washington, Washington, 10. , NIS. Israel. Section 24. D. C., February 1957 (CONFIDENTIAL). 11. , NIS, Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg, Section 24. Topography ( ) U . Washington, D. C., July 1969 (CONFIDENTIAL). G-l Topography ( ) U. Topography ( ) U. Washington, �12. Central Intelligence Agency, NIS, South Korea. Section 24, Topography (U) . Washington, D, C., November 1970 (CONFIDENTIAL). 13. Topography ( ) U, r r ^_, NlS^^South Vietnam, Section 24. Washington, D. C,, July 1965 (CONFIDENTIAL). 14. _t , . , . , _ > NIS, West Germany, Sec^tion^ 24. Topography ( ) U. Washington, D. C,, June 1962 (CONFIDENTIAL). 15. Combined Intelligence Center, Vietnam, Evaluation of Herbicide Operations in RVN ( ) Research and Analysis Study, ST 67-003, U. APO San Francisco 96243, Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, 12 July 1966 (CONFIDENTIAL-NOFORN except Republic of Vietnam, Australia, New Zealand and the Republic of Korea by the authority of COMUSMACV dated 3 December 1965). 16. , Rice in Vietnam; Provinces of I CTZ (U), CICV Study ST 68-02, Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, APO San Francisco 96233, 13 July 1968 (CONFIDENTIAL-NOFORN except Republic of Vietnam, Australia, New Zealand, Republic of Korea, Philippine Republic and the Kingdom of Thailand only by authority of COMUSMACV). 17 • . , ' Rice in Vietnam; Provinces of II CTZ ( ) CICV Study U. ST 68-05, Office of Assistant Chief of Staff, APO San Francisco 96222, 10 May 1968 (CONFIDENTIAL-NOFORN except Republic of Vietnam, Australia, New Zealand, Republic of Korea, Philippine Republic and the Kingdom of Thailand only by authority of COMUSMACV). 18 • , Rice in Vietnam; Western Provinces II CTZ ( ) CICV U. Study ST 68-04, Office of Assistant Chief of Staff J-2, APO San Francisco 96222, 8 August 1968 (CONFIDENTIAL-NOFORN except Republic of Vietnam, Australia, New Zealand, Republic of Korea, Philippine Republic and the Kingdom of Thailand only by authority of COMUSMACV). 19, Commander in Chief, Pacific, Scientific Advisory Group, A Review of the Herbicide Program in South Vietnam ( ) Scientific Advisory U. Group Working Paper No. 10-68, FPO San Francisco 96610, August 1968 (CONFIDENTIAL-NOFORN). 20. Department of the Air Force, HQ, 7th Air Force, Directorate of Technical Analysis, Herbicide-De£o1lation Program ( ) 7 AF p/67 U. DOA Working Paper 69/18, February 1969 (CONFIDENTIAL). G-2 �21. Department of the Air Force, HQ, Pacific Air Forces', Directorate, Tactical Evaluation CHECO Division. Herbicide Operations in South'east Asia. July 1961-June 1967 (U), 11 October 1967 .(SECRET-NOFORN). 22'. Department of the Air Force, HQ, Pacific Air Forces, Project CHECO Southeast Asia Report—Impact of Geography on Air Operations in SEA. ( ) APO San Francisco 96553, 11 June 1970 (SECRET-NOFORN). U. 23. Department of the Army, Field.Evaluation of Desiccants and Herbicide Mixtures as Rapid Defoliants. Technical Report 114. Fort Detrick, Frederick, Maryland, January 1971 (UNCLASSIFIED). 24. _,__.. , Review of Selected Army Models. Washington, D, C., May 1971 (UNCLASSIFIED). 25. Department of the Army, Army Biological Center, OCONJJS. Defoliation Test Program. Contract ARPA Order-423, Fort Detrick, Frederick, Maryland (UNCLASSIFIED). 26. Department of the Army, Army Biological Laboratories, Evaluation of the Ca Mau Peninsula Defoliation Targets in Republic of Vietnam. Fort Detrick, Frederick, Maryland, 15 November 1962 (UNCLASSIFIED). 27. Department of the Army, Army Concept Team in Vietnam, Base Defense Foliage Penetration Radar ( ) ACTIV Project No. ACL 9/691. APO U. San Francisco 96384, 28 August 1971 (CONFIDENTIAL). 28. , Final Report - Forward Looking Infrared (FLHQ Target Acquisition and Fire Control System (II)i. ACTIV Project No. ACA368IS. APO San Francisco 96384, 10 May 1971 (CONFIDENTIAL-NOFORN). 29. _ i •" , Final Report, Integrated Observation System (U). ACTIV Project No. ACL 1/70IS. APO San Francisco 96384, 20 January 1971 (CONFIDENTIAL). 30. , Final Report, Man-Portable Foliage Penetration Radar (U). ACTIV Project No. ACE 9/691. APO San Francisco 96384, 25 February 1970 (CONFIDENTIAL). 31. , Final Report, STANO III, Unattended Ground Sensor Combat Evaluation ( ) ACTIV Project No. ACL 16/69IS. APO San Francisco U. 96384, September 1970 (CONFIDENTIAL). G-3 �32. Department of the Array, Biological Sciences Laboratory, Crops Division, Defoliation of Tropical DryEvergreen Forest in Thailand, Final Report. Project ARPA Order 423, Fort Detrick, Frederick, Maryland, September 1967 (UNCLASSIFIED). 33. Department of the Army, Combat Developments Command, The Use of Defoliants to Support Army Operations (U), Fort Belvoir, Virginia, January 1965 (SECRET). 34. Department of the Army, Combat Developments Command, Institute of Land Combat, Ecological Impact of Antip.Iant Agents and Implications for Future Use ( ) ACN 16223, Fort Belvoir, Virginia, July 1970 U. (CONFIDENTIAL-NOFORN). 35. Department of the Army, 559th Engineer Detachment (Terrain). The Forest Types of South Vietnam. APO San Francisco 96375, October 1968 (UNCLASSIFIED). 36. Department of the Army, Fort Detrick, Maryland, Defoliation of Tropical jungle Vegetation in Hawaii, by Robert A. Suehisa, et al, Contract No, DAAA 13-67-C-0163, Hawaii, Department of Agronomy and Soil Science, University o£ Hawaii, Hawaii Agricultural Experiment Station, Kauai Branch Station, June 1968 (UNCLASSIFIED). 37. Department of the Army, HQ, Joint Munitions Effectiveness Manual, Air to Surface Defoliants^ ( ) FM 101-50-4, Washington, D. C.: U. US Government Printing Office, 5 April 1968 (CONFIDENTIAL), 38. . - ..» Land TClearing - Lessons Learned, DA 525-6, Washington, D. C f , 16 June 1960 (UNCLASSIFIED). 39. Briefing by LTC M, L. r t 1 1 , The Use of Herbicides in Vietnam. Sanches, Washington, D. C., 13 November 1969 (UNCLASSIFIED). 40. Department of the Army, Office, Chief of Engineers, Engineer Strategic Studies Group, Portfolio of General Purpose Force Requirements Scenarios (SPECTRUM Scenarios) (U), Vol I-X, Washington, D. C., August 1968 (TOP SECRET-RESTRICTED DATA), 41. 42. ..r r i .. > Tactical Eyaluation of Sensors ( ) March 1971 (SECRET), U. Department of th.e Army, Plant Sciences Laboratories, Herbicides Used in SEA. Technical Report SAOQ-TR-69-11078, Fort Detrick? Maryland, August 1969 (UNCLASSIFIED). G-4 �43. Department of the Army, Plant Sciences Laboratories, Vegetation Control. Agents (Defoliants and HerbicidesJ, Fort Detrick, Maryland, 12 February 1970 (UNCLASSIFIED). 44. , VegetationControl - Dissemination System, Fort Detrick, Frederick, Maryland, 12 February 1970 (UNCLASSIFIED), 45. Department of the Army, Plant Sciences Laboratories, Plant Physiology Division, Information Manual for Vegetation Control in Southeas t Asia. Miscellaneous Publication 33. Frederick, Maryland, December 1969 (UNCLASSIFIED). 46. Headquarters of the Commander in Chief, Pacific, Scientific Advisory Group, Crop Destruction Operations in RVN during CY 1967 ( ) U. Scientific Advisory Group Working Paper, No. 20-67. FPO San Francisco 96610, 23 December 1967 (CONFIDENTIAL). 47. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Message to CINCPAC, Restrictions on Use of Defoliants and Herbicides. 3986JCS, R052218Z. November 1969 (UNCLASSIFIED). 48. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Studies, Analysis, and Gaming Agency Organization. Catalog of War Gaming Models (U). SAGA-209-71, 5th Edition. Washington, D. C., 30 June 1971 (FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY). 49. Library of Congress, Legislative Reference Service, Science Policy Research Division. Ajrechnology Assessment of the Vietnam Defoliant Matter. A Case History. Report to the Subcommittee on Science, Research, and Development of the Committee on Science and Astronautics, US House of Representatives Ninety-first Congress, Washington D.C.: US Government Printing Office, 8 August 1969 (UNCLASSIFIED). 50. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, Military Operations, Herbicides Operation^ (U). MACV Directive 525-1. Saigon, Vietnam, 12 August 1969 (CONFIDENTIAL). 51. Ohio State University, The Tank Weapon System. Report QR 69-2A. Final Report, Contract No. DA 15-014, All-2965. Columbus, Ohio: Systems Research Group, Department of Industrial Engineering, October 1969 (UNCLASSIFIED). 52. __ , The Tank Weapon System. RF 573 AR 69 2B. Final Report. Contract No, DA 15-014, AII-2965. Columbus, Ohio: Systems Research Group, Department of Industrial Engineering, September 1969 (UNCLASSIFIED). G-5 �53, RAND Corporation, The, An Evaluation of Chem.j.cal^ Crop, Destruction in Vietnam ( ) MemorandumRM-5446-ISA/ARPA, by Russell Betts and U. Frank Denton, Contract DAHC1567C0143, Santa Monica, California, October 1967 (CONFIDENTIAL). 54, ,,,,-:> A Statistical Analysis of the U. S, Crop Spraying Program in South Vie tnam (U)_. Memorandum RM-5450-ISA/ARPA, by Anthony J. Russo. Contract DAHC1567C0143, Santa Monica, California, October 1967 (CONFIDENTIAL), 55, Research Analysis Corporation, A Technique for Evaluating the Structure of US Army Forceg in an Area Domination Role. RAC-TP-412, by J, A. Bruner, et al. Contract DAHC19-69-C-0017, McLean, Virginia, December 1970 (UNCLASSIFIED). 56, ,.-,-,-.» Impact of Chemical Attack on Guerrilla Food Crops ( ) U. RAC-TP-119 by Richard E. Tiller and Ralph Ostrich. Contract No. DA 44-188-ARO-l, McLean, Virginia, April 1964 (SECRET-NQFORN). 57, Republic of Vietnam Ministry of Agriculture, Directorate of Agricultural Research, Natural Environment and Land Use in South Vietnam. Second Edition, Saigon, October 1967 (UNCLASSIFIED), 58, 7th Air Force, Operations Traildust ( ) Operations Order 491-69, U. Republic of Vietnam, 1 April 1969 (SECRET). 59, 7th Air Force, 12th Operations Squadron, End of Tour Report (U), by LTC R. K. Stoner, Jr, Republic of Vietnam, September 1969 (CONFIDENTIAL). 60, 7th Air Force, 315 Special Operations Wing, 315 Special Operations Wing History Jul-Sep 68 ( ) Republic of Vietnam, September 1968 U. (SECRET). 61, Stilwell, LTG Richard G. "Evolution in Tactics—The Vietnam Experience," ARMY. Vol. 20, No. 2, Washington, D. C,; The Association of the U. S. Army, February 1970 (UNCLASSIFIED). 62, Tactical Air Command, USAF Tactical Air Warfare Center, PAVE PAT II ( ) Tac Test No. 70A-069T. TAWC Project No. 0051, Eglin Air U. Force Base, Florida, June 1971 (CONFIDENTIAL). 63, US Army GBR Agency, Evaluation of Ca Mau Peninsula Defoliation Targets in Republic of Vietnam, by Charles E, Minareck, PhD and Albert L. Bertram, 2/LT, CmlC, USA. Fort Detrick, Maryland; US Army Biological Laboratories. 15 November 1962 (UNCLASSIFIED). G-6 �64. United States Army, Combat Developments Command, Chemical Biological-Radiological Agency, The Use of Defoliants to Support Army Operations (U), USACDCCBRA 64-2. Fort McClellan, Alabama, January 1965 (SECRET), 65. United States Army, Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, Task Force Saigon Herbicide Evaluation Team (U), Saigon, RVN, October 1963 (SECRET). 66. US Army War College, Chemical Herbicides—A New Dimension in Chemical Operations (U)t by LTC Sampson H. Bass, Jr. USAWC Research Element (Thesis). Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania, 13 February 1969 (SECRET-NOFORN). 67. United States Department of Agriculture, Agricultural Research Service Crop Research Division, Research Report--Response of Tropical and Subtropical Woody Plants to Chemical Treatments, by Fred H. Tschirley. CR-13-67. ARPA Order No. 424. Washington, D. C., February 1968 (UNCLASSIFIED). 68. United States Department of Agriculture, Forest Service, Forest Fire Research. Final Report-Phase I (U). Vol 1. ARPA Order No. 818. Washington, D. C., January 1966 (SECRET). 69. US Department of Commerce, Midwest Research Institute, Assessment of Ecological Effects of Extensive or Repeated Use of Herbicides. Contract No. DAHC15-68-C-0119. MRI Project No. 3103-B. Kansas City, Missouri, 1 December 1967 (UNCLASSIFIED). G-7 �ASDIRS No:, Study Category: Development Studies Initiated by: Environmental and Life Sciences, DDR&E Study Sponsor: OCRD Study Agency; Engineer Strategic Studies Group Reference No: TOPOCOM ID No. 9022300 Title: Herbicides and Military Operations (U) Study Subcategory; General Starting Date: May 1971 Completion Date; January 1972 Availability Date; February 1972 Abstract; The purpose of this study is to determine the military effects of herbicides used to support military operations. This study, based upon currently available herbicides and means of dissemination, included research and analysis of historical, experimental, and theoretical evidence. This study considered the results of a specially conducted survey of US military officers with first hand knowledge of the use of herbicides, A new analysis of quantitative evidence on this subject confirms some military benefits. This study concludes that herbicides can be useful as a specialized support to military operations under several specific circumstances. Time Frame: Current Study Descriptors: Doctrine; land warfare; CBR; target acquisition; counterinsurgency; Southeast Asia; applications; models; effects; performance. Classification: Volume I UNCLASSIFIED Volume II UNCLASSIFIED Volume III SECRET ASDIRS No: Study Category: Development Studies Initiated by: Environmental and Life Sciences, DDR&E Study Sponsor: OCRD Study Agency: Engineer Strategic Studies Group Reference No: TOPOCOM ID No. 9022300 Title: Herbicides and Military Operations (U) Contributes to: Operations; planning; doctrine; conduct of military operations; force requirement planning; military effectiveness analysis, Study Subcategory: General Starting Date: May 1971 Completion Date: January 1972 Availability Date; February 1972 Abstract: The purpose of this study is to determine the military effects of herbicides used to support military operations. This study, based upon currently available herbicides and means of dissemination, included research and analysis of historical, experimental, and theoretical evidence. This study considered the results of a specially conducted survey of US military officers with first hand knowledge of the use of herbicides, A new analysis of quantitative evidence on this subject confirms some military benefits. This study concludes that herbicides can be useful as a specialized support to military operations under several specific circumstances. Time Frame: Current Study Descriptors: Doctrine; land warfare; CBR; target acquisition; counterinsurgency; Southeast Asia; applications; models; effects; performance. Classification: Volume I UNCLASSIFIED Volume II UNCLASSIFIED Volume III SECRET Contributes to: Operations; planning; doctrine; conduct of military operations; force requirement planning; military effectiveness analysis. �ASDIRS No:, Study Category Development Studies Initiated by: Environmental and Life Sciences, DDR&E Study Sponsor: OCRD Study Agency; Engineer Strategic Studies Group Reference No: TOPOCOM ID No. 9022300 Title; Herbicides and Military Operations (U) Study Subcategory; General Starting Date: May 1971 Completion Date; January 1972 Availability Date; February 1972 Abstract; The purpose of this study is to determine the military effects of herbicides used to support military operations. This study, based upon currently available herbicides and means of dissemination, included research and analysis of historical, experimental, and theoretical evidence. This study considered the results of a specially conducted survey of US military officers with first hand knowledge of the use of herbicides, A new analysis of quantitative evidence on this subject confirms some military benefits. This study concludes that herbicides can be useful as a specialized support to military operations under several specific circumstances. Time Frame: Current Study Descriptors: Classification; Doctrine; land warfare; CBR; target acquisition; counterinsurgency; Southeast Asia; applications; models; effects; performance. Volume I UNCLASSIFIED Volume II UNCLASSIFIED Volume III SECRET ASDIRS (No: Study Category: Development Studies Initiated by: Environmental and Life Sciences, DDR&E Study Sponsor: OCRD Study Agency: Engineer Strategic Studies Group Reference No: TOPOCOM ID No. 9022300 Title: Herbicides and Military Operations (U) Contributes to: Operations; planning; doctrine; conduct of military operations; force requirement planning; military effectiveness analysis. Study Subcategory: General Starting Date: May 1971 Completion Date: January 1972 Availability Date; February 1972 Abstract: The purpose of this study is to determine the military effects of herbicides used to support military operations. This study, based upon currently available herbicides and means of dissemination, included research and analysis of historical, experimental, and theoretical evidence. This study considered the results of a specially conducted survey of US military officers with first hand knowledge of the use of herbicides, A new analysis of quantitative evidence on this subject confirms some military benefits. This study concludes that herbicides can be useful as a specialized support to military operations under several specific circumstances. Time Frame: Current Study Descriptors: Classification: Doctrine; land warfare; CBR; target acquisition; counterinsurgency; Southeast Asia; applications; models; effects; performance. Volume I UNCLASSIFIED Volume II UNCLASSIFIED Volume III SECRET Contributes to: Operations; planning; doctrine; conduct of military operations; force requirement planning; military effectiveness analysis. �ASDIRS No:, Study Category; Development Studies Initiated by: Environmental and Life Sciences, DDR&E Study Sponsor: OCRD Study Agency: Engineer Strategic Studies Group Reference No: TOPOCOM ID No. 9022300 Title: Herbicides and Military Operations (U) Study Subcategory; General Starting Date: May 1971 Completion Date; January 1972 Availability Date; February 1972 Abstract; The purpose of this study is to determine the military effects of herbicides used tp support military operations. This study, based upon currently available herbicides and means of dissemination, included research and analysis of historical, experimental, and theoretical evidence. This study considered the results of a specially conducted survey of US military officers with first hand knowledge of the use of herbicides, A new analysis of quantitative evidence on this subject confirms some military benefits. This study concludes that herbicides can be useful as a specialized support to military operations under several specific circumstances. Time Frame: Current Study Descriptors: Classification: Doctrine; land warfare; CBR; target acquisition; counterinsurgency; Southeast Asia; applications; models; effects; performance. Volume I UNCLASSIFIED Volume II UNCLASSIFIED Volume III SECRET ASDIRS No: Study Category: Development Studies Initiated by: Environmental and Life Sciences, DDR&E Study Sponsor: OCRD Study Agency: Engineer Strategic Studies Group Reference No: TOPOCOM ID No. 9022300 Title: Herbicides and Military Operations (U) Contributes to: Operations; planning; doctrine; conduct of military operations; force requirement planning; military effectiveness analysis. Study Subcategory; General Starting Date: May 1971 Completion Date: January 1972 Availability Date; February 1972 Abstract: The purpose of this study is to determine the military effects of herbicides used to support military operations. This study, based upon currently available herbicides and means of dissemination, included research and analysis of historical, experimental, and theoretical evidence. This study considered the results of a specially conducted survey of US military officers with first hand knowledge of the use of herbicides, A new analysis of quantitative evidence on this subject confirms some military benefits. This study concludes that herbicides can be useful as a specialized support to military operations under several specific circumstances. Time Frame: Current Study Descriptors: Doctrine; land warfare; CBR; target acquisition; counterinsurgency; Southeast Asia; applications; models; effects; performance. Classification: Volume I UNCLASSIFIED Volume II UNCLASSIFIED Volume III SECRET Contributes to: Operations; planning; doctrine; conduct of military operations; force requirement planning; military effectiveness analysis. i �64. United States Army, Combat Developments Command, Chemical Biological-Radiological Agency, The Use^of Defoliants to Support Army Operations ( ) USACDCCBRA 64-2. Fort McClellan, Alabama, January U, 1965 (SECRET), 65. United States Army, Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, Task Force Saigon Herbicide Evaluation Team (U). Saigon, RVN, October 1963 (SECRET), 66. US Army War College, ChemicalHerbicides--A Hew Dimension in Chemical Operations ( ) by LTC Sampson H. Bass, Jr. USAWC Research U, Element (Thesis). Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania, 13 February 1969 (SECRET-NQFORN). 67. United States Department of Agriculture, Agricultural Research Service Crop Research Division, Research Report--Response of Tropical and Subtropical Woody Plants to Chemical Treatments, by Fred H. Tschirley. CR-13-67. ARPA Order No. 424. Washington, D. C., February 1968 (UNCLASSIFIED). 68. United States Department of Agriculture, Forest Service, Forest Fire Research, Final Report-Phase I (U). Vol 1, ARPA Order No. 818. Washington, D. C., January 1966 (SECRET). 69. US Department of Commerce, Midwest Research Institute, Assessment of Ecological Effects of Extensive or Repeated Use of Herbicides. Contract No. DAHC15-68-C-0119. MRI Project No. 3103-B, Kansas City, Missouri, 1 December 1967 (UNCLASSIFIED). G-7 �ASDIRS No: Study Category: Development Studies Initiated by: Environmental and Life Sciences, DDR&E Study Sponsor: OCRD Study Agenc/: Engineer Strategic Studies Group Reference No: TOPOCOM ID No. 9022300 Title; Herbicides and Military Operations (U) Study Subcategory: General Starting Date: May 1971 Completion Date: January 1972 Availability Date: February 1972 Abstract: The purpose of this study is to determine the military effects of herbicides used to support military operations. This study, based upon currently available herbicides and means of dissemination, included research and analysis of historical, experimental, and theoretical evidence. This study considered the results of a specially conducted survey of US military officers with first hand knowledge of the use of herbicides, A new analysis of quantitative evidence on this subject confirms some military benefits. This study concludes that herbicides can be useful as a specialized support to military operations under several specific circumstances, Time Frame: Current Study Descriptors: Classification: Doctrine; land warfare; GBR; target acquisition; counterinsurgency; Southeast Asia; applications; models; effects; performance, Volume I UNCIASSIFIED Volume II UNCIASSIFIED Volume III SECRET ASDIRS No: Study Category: Development Studies Initiated by: Environmental and Life Sciences, DDR&E Study Sponsor: OCRD Study Agency: Engineer Strategic Studies Group Reference No: TOPOCOM ID No, 9022300 Title: Herbicides and Military Operations (U) Contributes to: Operations; planning; doctrine; conduct of military operations; force requirement planning; military effectiveness analysis, Study Subcategory; General Starting Date: May 1971 Completion Date: January 1972 Availability Date: February 1972 Abstract: The purpose of this study is to determine the military effects of herbicides used to support military operations. This study, based upon currently available herbicides and means of dissemination, included research and analysis of historical, experimental, and theoretical evidence. This study considered the results of a specially conducted survey of US military officers with first hand knowledge of the use of herbicides, A new analysis of quantitative evidence on this subject confirms some military benefits. This study concludes that herbicides can be useful as a specialized support to military operations under several specific circumstances, Time Frame: Current Study Descriptors: Doctrine; land warfare; CBR; target acquisition; eounteriniurgeney; Southeast Asia; applications; models; effects; performance. Classification: Volume I UNCLASSIFIED Volume II UNCIASSIFIED Volume III SECRET Contributes to: Operations; planning; doctrine; conduct of military operations; force requirement planning; military effectiveness analysis, �ASDIRS No: Study Category: Development Studies Initiated by: Environmental and Life Sciences, DDR&E Study Sponsor: OCRD Study Agency: Engineer Strategic Studies Group Reference No: TOPOCOM ID No. 9022300 Title: Herbicides and Military Operations (U) Study Subcategory; General Starting Date: May 1971 Completion Date: January 1972 Availability Date: February 1972 Abstract: The purpose of this study is to determine the military effects of herbicides used to support military operations. This study, based upon currently available herbicides and means of dissemination, included research and analysis of historical, experimental, and theoretical evidence. This study considered the results of a specially conducted survey of US military officers with first hand knowledge of the use of herbicides, A new analysis of quantitative evidence on this subject confirms some military benefits. This study concludes that herbicides can be useful as a specialized support to military operations under several specific circumstances, Time Frame: Current Study Descriptors: Classification: Doctrine; land warfare; CBR; target acquisition; counterinsurgency; Southeast Asia; applications; models; effects; performance. Volume I UNCLASSIFIED Volume II UNCLASSIFIED Volume III SECRET ASDIRS ,No: Study Category: Development Studies Initiated by: Environmental and Life Sciences, DDR&E Study Sponsor: OCHD Study Agency: Engineer Strategic Studies Group Reference No: TOPOCOM ID No. 9022300 Title: Herbicides and Military Operations (U) Contributes to: Operations; planning; doctrine; conduct of military operations; force requirement planning; military effectiveness analysis, Study Subcategory: General Starting Date: May 1971 Completion Date: January 1972 Availability Date; February 1972 Abstract: The purpose of this study is to determine the military effects of herbicides used to support military operations. This study, based upon currently available herbicides and means of dissemination, included research and analysis of historical, experimental, and theoretical evidence. This study considered the results of a specially conducted survey of US military officers with first hand knowledge of the use of herbicides. A new analysis of quantitative evidence on this subject confirms some military benefits. This study concludes that herbicides can be useful as a specialized support to military operations under several specific circumstances. Time Frame: Current Study Descriptors: Classification: Doctrine; land warfare; CBR; target acquisition; counterinsurgency; Southeast Asia; applications; models; effects; performance. Volume I UNCIASSIFIED Volume II UNCLASSIFIED Volume III SECRET Contributes to: Operations; planning; doctrine; conduct of military operations; force requirement planning; military effectiveness analysis, �ASDIRS No; Study Category: Development Studies Initiated by: Environmental and Life Sciences, DDR&E Study Sponsor: OCRD Study Agency: Engineer Strategic Studies Group Reference No: TOPOCOM ID No, 9022300 Title; Herbicides and Military Operations (U) Study Subcategory; General Starting Date: May 1971 Completion Date: January 1972 Availability Date: February 1972 Abstract: The purpose of this study is to determine the military effects of herbicide! used to support military operations. Thia study, based upon currently available herbicides and means of dissemination, included research and analysis of historical, experimental, and theoretical evidence. This study considered the results of a specially conducted survey of US military officers with first hand knowledge of the use of herbicides, A new analysis of quantitative evidence on this subject confirms some military benefits. This study concludes that herbicides can be useful as a specialized support to military operations under several specific circumstances, Time Frame: Current Study Descriptors: Classification: Doctrine; land warfare; GBR; target acquisition; counterinsurgency; Southeast Asia; applications; models; effects; performance. Volume I UNCLASSIFIED Volume II UNCLASSIFIED Volume III SECRET ASDIRS No: Study Category: Development Studies Initiated by: Environmental and Life Sciences, DDR&E Study Sponsor: OCRD Study Agency: Engineer Strategic Studies Group Reference No: TOPOCOM ID No. 9022300 Title: Herbicides and Military Operations (U) Contributes to: Operations; planning; doctrine; conduct of military operations; force requirement planning; military effectiveness analysis, Study Subcategory; General Starting Date: May 1971 Completion Date: January 1972 Availability Date: February 1972 Abstract: The purpose of this study is to determine the military effects of herbicides used to support military operations. This study, based upon currently available herbicides and means of dissemination, included research and analysis of historical, experimental, and theoretical evidence. This study considered the results of a specially conducted survey of US military officers with first hand knowledge of the use of herbicides, A new analysis of quantitative evidence on this subject confirms some military benefits. This study concludes that herbicides can be useful as a specialized support to military operations under several specific circumstances. Time Frame: Current Study Descriptors: Doctrine; land warfare; CBR; target acquisition; counterinsurgency; Southeast Asia; applications; models; effects; performance. Classification: Volume I UNCLASSIFIED Volume II UNCLASSIFIED Volume III SECRET Contributes to: Operations; planning; doctrine; conduct of military operations; force requirement planning; military effectiveness analysis. � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Alvin L. Young Collection on Agent Orange Description An account of the resource <p style="margin-top: -1em; line-height: 1.2em;">The Alvin L. Young Collection on Agent Orange comprises 120 linear feet and spans the late 1800s to 2005; however, the bulk of the coverage is from the 1960s to the 1980s and there are many undated items. The collection was donated to Special Collections of the National Agricultural Library in 1985 by Dr. Alvin L. Young (1942- ). Dr. Young developed the collection as he conducted extensive research on the military defoliant Agent Orange. The collection is in good condition and includes letters, memoranda, books, reports, press releases, journal and newspaper clippings, field logs and notebooks, newsletters, maps, booklets and pamphlets, photographs, memorabilia, and audiotapes of an interview with Dr. Young.</p> <p>For more about this collection, <a href="/exhibits/speccoll/exhibits/show/alvin-l--young-collection-on-a">view the Agent Orange Exhibit.</a></p> Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Box The box containing the original item. 016 Folder The folder containing the original item. 0178 Series The series number of the original item. Series II Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Description An account of the resource <strong>Corporate Author: </strong>Engineer Strategic Studies Group, Office, Chief of Engineers, Department of the Army Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1972-02-01 Title A name given to the resource Herbicides and Military Operations: Volume II Subject The topic of the resource ecological impact Ranch Hand military impact https://www.nal.usda.gov/exhibits/speccoll/files/original/90b72923a486d86fddcbfa9031178e82.pdf 4f245730fb6d4f290356ece15974756c PDF Text Text Item ID Number: 001 eo Howard, John D. Corporate Author RBDBPt/ArtitiB TltlB Herbicides in Support of Counterinsurgency Operations: A Cost-Effectiveness Study Journal/Book Title Yaar i Bui 1972 Month/Day March Color D 132 Introduction and background gives brief overview of Operation Ranch Hand and use of herbicides in Vietnam. Friday, January 05, 2001 Page 160 of 194 �Howard, J. D,, 5 ^ 1972 . Herbicides in support of counterinsurgency operations: a cost effectivness study I/UNLIMITED AD A0745180 Technical Report £EJEIOMEDICAL LIBRARY JAW 10 1980 distributed by fiQClIMENTS Defense Technical Information Center DEFENSE LOGISTICS AGENCY Cameron Station*Alexandria, Virginia 22314 UNCLASSIFIED/UNLIMITED �* - -4 1.0 11.25 �o 00 NAVAL SCHOOL Monterey, California T-H THESIS HERBICIDES IK SUPFOl^ OF COUNTERIKSURGEKCy OPERATIONS: A COST-EFFECTIVENESS STUDY John DaXton Howard Thesis Advisor: NATIONAL TECHNICAL INFORMATION SERVICE James R. Caora March 1972 ion pubtic. x.e£e&!>e.; datuiittien untuniltd. K. \ �Herbicides in Support of Counterinsurgency operations: A Cost-Effectiveness Study John DaIton Howard Major, United States Army B.S., United States Military Academy, 1964 Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for a degree of MASTER OF SCIENCE IN OPERATIONS RESEARCH from the NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL March 1972 Author Approved by: Thesis Advisor Chainrari, Department of Operations Research // and Administrative Sciences Academic Dean �UNCLASSIFIED Cl as<unration DOCUMENT CONTROL DATA - R & D !.*!• avrrstt rmptttt tt j*. REPORT SECURITY cn-.iif ic* TIO« t of title, fcodr ttf *t>*tr*ft TtN6 A C T I V I T Y Unclassified Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, California 93940 J*. SltOU* Herbicides In Support Of Courterinsurgency Operations: A Cost-Effectiveness Study of t*«6tt •nd.inC*ir»ire <****» Master's Ihesisj March 1972 John D. Howard C NO. O EPOBT D A T E 130 March 1972 M. C O M T K A C T Oft G R A N T NO. 44 M. OntCIMATOM't HE'QMT MUMICHIH ». fHOJECT NO. • 6. O T H E R *E»O*T HO(I> ( tft/« IS. D I J T A i e u T I O M t T A T E M E M T Approved for public release; distribution unlimited. It. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES 11. SPONSORtNC UILIT A R T A C T I V I T Y I). A K S f K A C T This study develops costs, effectiveness criteria, and cost-effectiveness ratios for military herbicide systems and three other alternatives which can perform the missions of foliage removal and crop destruction in support of counterinsurgency operations. The results reflect the Vietnam combat environment wheie all systems were employed at sometime during the period 1965-1971. The systems considered are aerial delivery of herbicides by UH-1 helicopters and ue-123 Air Force aircraft, tactical land clearing with crawler tractors, "slash and burn" clearing with indigenous cutters, and fireboizbing with CH-47 helicopters. The effectiveness criteria focus on the ability of these systems to perfona the two missions and withstand the rigorous constraints of a hypothetical combat mission. From these criteria, two sets of cost-effectiveness vectors are obtained to allow a decision maker the opportunity to evaluate each system and determine a possible force structure to accomplish the two missions in a Vietnam-type insurgency. DD/r.,1473 UNCLASSIFIED S/N 01 Of*«Q7-«S!t Security Ctatsificitio* �UNCLASSIFIED S«eurit¥ Classification LIM K A l*N K • KKT W0»0» »OLt tri>. • c «« T Cost-effectiveness Herbicides Tactical Land Clearing Firebombing "Slash and Burn" Clearing Counterins urgency | 1 DD /,T.,!473 «8*«> ^^ UNCLA SSIFI ED Security CUstiftcttiet >.]«BI �ABSTRACT This study davelops costs, effectiveness criteria, and cost-effectiveness ratios for military herbicide systems and three other alternatives which can perform the missions of foliage removal and crop destruction in support of counterinsurgency operations. The results reflect the Vietnam combat environment where all systems were employed at sometime during the period 1965-1971. The systems considered are aerial delivery of herbicides by UH-1 helicopters and UC-123 Air Force aircraft, tactical land clearing with crawler tractors, "slash and burn" clearing with indigenous cutters, and firebombing with CH-47 helicopters. The effec- tiveness criteria focus oh the ability of these systems to perform the two missions and withstand the rigorous constraints of a hypothetical coiribat mission. From these criteria, two sets of cost-effectiveness vectors are obtained to allow a decision maker the opportunity to evaluate each system and determine a possible force structure to accomplish the two missions in a Vietnam-type insurgency. �TABLE OP CONTENTS I. INTRODUCTION A. II. PURPOSE B. 6 • BACKGROUND • • 6 7 THE ALTERNATIVES 14 A. AERIAL DELIVERY OF HERBICIDES 14 1. UC-123 — 14 2. UH-1 • • 16 • 20 B. C. "SLASH AND BURN" CLEARING 28 D. III. TACTICAL LAND CLEARING ~ PIREBOMBING 30 METHODOLOGY 33 A. ASSUMPTIONS • 33 B. PARAMETERS C. COST ANALYSIS D. EFFECTIVENESS CRITERIA AND COST-EFFECTIVENESS • • 34 • 35 MEASURES E. 36 PARAMETER SENSITIVITY — 38 IV. ANALYSIS OF AERIAL DELIVERY OF HERBICIDES 40 V. ANALYSIS OF TACTICAL LAND CLEARING 75 VI. ANALYSIS OP "SLASH AND BURN" CLEARING 92 VII. ANALYSIS OF FIREBOKBING 100 VIII. INSIGHTS AND CONCLUSIONS 109 A. RESULTS OF THE ANALYSIS 109 B. INSIGHTS C. CONCLUSIONS • • • — 112 114 �APPENDIX A: DETAILED HERBICIDE COSTS 116 APPENDIX B: DETAILED COSTS FOR TACTICAL LAND CLEARING— 118 APPENDIX C: DETAILED COSTS FOR FIREBQMBING APPENDIX D: DATA SOURCES 120 — BIBLIOGRAPHY — 121 — 124 INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST FORM DD 1473 • — 128 • ,»— __ .. �ACKNOWLEDGEMENT This study was made possible through the contributions and assistance of the V. S. Array Engineer Strategic Studies Group, Washington, D. C., and Major Richard C. Bennett, senior project director in that office. A special acknowledgement, goes to Mr. J. T. Soules, Vice President of the International Depar-iaent of the Rome Plow Company, whose correspondence and interest in the study provided the author with a wealth of data and many insights into the salient features of tactical land clearing. �I. A. INTRODUCTION PURPOSE The purpose of this study is to conduct a costeffectiveness evaluation of military herbicide systems in a counterinsurgency environment. The test case for the determination of relevant costs will be those dollar costs incurred during the systems' empJoyment in vegetation renoval and crop destruction missions .in support of combat operations in the Republic of Vietnam (RVN) during 1965-1971. Since costs are the values of alternatives foregone, the study will address three other techniques used for foliage clearance and crop control in RVN during the same timeframe. The alternatives to herbicide operations which will be considered are: 1. Tactical land clearing operations. 2. "Slash and burn" clearing using indigenous labor forces. 3. Firebomb?ng. Each method will be discussed in detail in Chapter II. Specifically excluded from the scope of the study is consideration of the externalities that night result from possible damage to the ecological balance of the host country. The cost measures will attempt to show the relative dollar expenditores araong the systems involved. Several �measures of effectiveness will be used to Judge their output and ability to accomplish the missions of foliage reioval and crop des' =tion under combat conditions. These, coupled with the cost measures, will yield cost-effectiveness figures which will be the basis for comparisons, These comparisons will present the decision maker with sets of data on the strengths and weaknesses of the individual alternatives and combinations of the systems. B. BACKGROUND The proper use of cover and concealment has always been a critical factor ..n planning military operations. History is full of examples of armies that effectively used natural cover and foliage. Often, judicious use of these elements made up for other deficiencies in the forces. The colonial settlers of early America learned the arts of cover and concealment from the Indians and later put them to good use in the War of Independence. As warfare evolved from the strjiight-line formations of the 19th century and the trenches of World War I, it became apparent that strict adherence to the principles of concealment was not reserved solely for the guerrilla or irregular soldier. Hence, tactics and methods were developed in an attempt to deny any potential enemy, insurgent or conventionally organized, the protection and sustenance that might be offered by the vegetation. �The term "herbicide" was coined in the 1930's to enctmpass that family of chemicals which are antiplant agents. Some members of this family were found to be systemic hormones which entered broad-leaf plants touching off wild growth and eventually killing then. Others were determined to be dessicants which injured the foliage by direct chemical action on contact. Throughout World War u, military research in chemical warfare played an important role in the development of the potent herbicides now in world-wide use. Although initial efforts were directed at the discovery of suitable dessicants (for use as antierop agents), scientists from the university of Chicago determined that some of these growth regulators might be applied to grasses and tropical plants. This generated a great deal of interest in the defoliation or foliage removal properties of the chemicals since many tons of explosives had been expended on Pacific islands to deny the Japanese concealment afforded by the tropical rain forests. In early 1945, successful tests were conducted in the Florida Everglades concerning the possibility of using several inorganic defoliants in aerosol form, The results from this work prompted the Army to recommend the use of ammonium thiocynate in the Pacific theater. This recommendation was not adopted for fear of the repercussions that might arise from the agent's association with chemicals of the cyanide faaily. The war ended prior to the testing of a more suitable agent. 8 �In the late forties, the research generated during World War II was readily employed by civilian industry. The previous discovery of the organic chemicals 2,4-D and 2.4,5-T fostered revolutionary steps in chemical plant control and stimulated the development of a host of new agents. These herbicides were more effective, more selective, and less hazardous than the former compounds. Chemicals such as piclorara, bromacil, cacodylic acid, and paraquat were tailored to perform specific kinds of vegetation control. Consequently, their use at home and abroad became widespread. In 1950 the estimated market for herbicide? came to §1.5 million while by 1965, it had gruwii to over $211 million. (This was prior to extensive military purchase of certain agents for use in RVN.) In 1959 alone, American farmers treated 53 million acres of acres of agricultural land not to mention the thousands of miles sprayed by local government agencies and private corporations to control growth along highways, powerline right-of-ways, fire breaks, and ditches. (House and others, 1967.1 >, J The Department of Defense (DOD) did not become involved in herbicide operations until 1958. The success of British defoliation operations with helicopters in Malaya prompted several feasibility studies on acceptable defoliants and delivery techniques. In 1961, on request of President Diem and the government of RVK, a test program was established to assist in countering that nation's growing Communist-inspired insurgency. The Vietnamese army (ARVN) found that the most �difficult and frustrating task was locating the enemy. The dense forests and jungles offered the Viet Cong (VC) excellent concealment which permitted them to cove with relative impunity to within striking distance of key military installations , lines of communications (LOG), and government centers. By removing parts of the foliage, the Allied forces hoped to increase aerial and ground surveillance capabilities and deny the use of certain areas as sanctuaries. The actual herbicide operations began under the codename RANCH HAND in January 1962 with three specially configured U.S. Air Force (U3AF) UC-123B aircraft. The operations proceeded for the next two years at a moderate scale but with increased enemy resistance. Ground fire became so intense that in March of 1965 fighter escorts were provided on a permanent basis. The demand for defoliation and controlled crop destruction missions increased as U.S. participation in the war grev. This resulted in the RANCH HAND program being expanded in 1966 into a squadron-size unit, 12th Air Coimr-ando Squadron (later the 12th Special Operations Squadron), with an equipment level of 18 aircraft and headquarters at Bien Hoa Air Base. In the peak years of defoliation operations (1967-1968), the squadron was increased to 24 aircraft. jKcConnell, 1970.1 To supple- ment the 12th Special Operations Squadron, some U.S. division commanders were given the authority to conduct local defoliation and crop destruction missions in their area of operations (AO) with U.S. Army helicopters. These operations �were usually complementary to the RANCH HAND sorties and employed local aviation assets thit were diverted froia other lift tasks. From the inception of the test program, great effort was oade to insure proper targets were picked and spraying of friendly areas was prevented. Each mission was approved by the local Vietnamese province chief, the Military Assistance Command Vietnam (KACV), and the U.S. Embassy, crop destruction targets were subject to special scrutiny so that the most harm would be done to the VC and the least to the local inhabitants. A commission was established to contpensate and reimburse those people who had suffered financial loss as a result of herbicides. Although friendly areas were never specifically targeted, some spray did occasionally drift causing damage to rice crops or rubber trees. U.S. authori- ties attempted to take prompt action on any claims whenever this situation occurred. Iconzales 1968 J Concurrent with increased herbicide operations in Vietnam, there was an expanding controversy over the program in the united States. Critics asserted that if chemical herbicides were coroaonly used, it might not be long before more noxious chemical agents are considered usable. Others have claimed that such an indiscriminate weapon results in as much suffing for the local populace as the VC. 19681 and fLewallen |Hersh 1971 J . The scientific community raised the question of the ecological consequences of repeated herbicide applications. 11 The American Association �for the Advancement of Sciences (AAAS) has been and still is the center of the controversy. Probably the most vocal and widely quoted critic within AAAS is Dr. Matthew Meselson, a. Harvard University biologist. Or. Meselson chaired the AAAS Herbicide Assessment Commission and visited Vietnam on a five-week tour. In the committee statement to an AAAS convention, the following assertions were mades 1. fhe Army's crop destruction program was a failure. 2. Cae-fifth to one-half of Vietnam's mangrove forests had been "utterly destroyed." 3. One-half the trees in the mature hardwood forests north and west of Saigon were dead. 1 Several other scientists who had previously visited RVH in 1958-19S9 strongly recommended and lobbied for the cancellation of the herbicide operations until scientists had time to study the long-term effects of the program, Pfeiffer [orians and 1970] These recommendations coupled with severe criticism from certain members of Congress and other citizens helped bring about the suspe: sioa of herbicide operations in the summer of 1970. On 7 October 1970, Public Law 91-441 directed the Secretary of Defense to prepare a study to identify the role %offey, Phillip M., "Herbicides in Vietnam: AAAS Study Finds Widespread Devastation," Science, 15 January 1971, p. 43. 12 �of herbicides in support of combat operations and evaluate their utility in KVB. It also required him to contract with the National' Academy of Sciences (HAS) for a comprehensive study to determine the ecological and physiological effects of the herbicide program in RVN. By 1 March 1972, the Secretary of Defense was required to transmit the DOD findings together with the RnS study to the President and the Congress. It is against this background of U.S. use of herbicides and Congressional concern about the role of herbicides that the examination of the alternatives discussed in the next section has been undertaken. 13 �II. ALTERHRTIVES A. AERIAL DELIVERY OF HERBICIDES Aerial delivery is the prime method of dissemination of chemical herbicides for large-scale defoliation or crop destruction missions. Other methods, such as use of the three-gallon hand-pucp sprayer, the M-106 riot control dispenser, and boat-counted spray systems, have beep employed in Vietnam but will not be considered in the context of this study. However, all herbicide missions are designed to accomplish some or all of the following objectives: 1. Deny tlie enemy cover and concealment and channel his movement. 2. Deny the enemy the capability to forage off tne land. 3. Deny tae enemy ambush sites adjacent to LOG. 4. Provide improved aerial and electronic surveillance. 1. Delivery By Fixed Wing Aircraft (UC-123) The major portion of the U.S. herbicide effort is carried by a modified version of the Air Force's two-engine medium cargo carrier, the C-123B "Provider." Ahe aircraft is given a spray capability ("UC" designation) by the installation of the Hayes AA-45 system which consists of a 1,000 gallon internal tank, an operator console, and three high pressure spray booms. Since most missions are carried 14 �out at low altitudes and low speeds, the performance of the aircraft is significantly upgraded by the addition of turbojet engines. The intensity of enemy ground fire in Vietnam has forced the Air Force to further protect the UC-123K with additional armor plating for the crew ami engines. The DC-123K's travel in fighter escorted flights ranging anywhere from two to seven aircraft, depending on the target configuration. Each aircraft dispenses its 1,000 gallon load in four minutes at less than 150 niles per hour and 150 feet off the ground. The Hayes ays ten can be adjusted for variable dissemination rates; however, these rates are usually between one and one-half gallons to three gallons per acre. [Major Pyatt] Photo # 1: Pour UC-123 aircraft of the 12th Air Commando Squadron defoliating a jungle area east of Siigon. June 1968 U.S. Array Photograph 15 �2. Delivery By RotaryWing Aircraft (UH-1) In certain areas, ground commanders are authorized to conduct local herbicide operations. When CC-123 aircraft are not available to do the Job or the target is too small to merit fixed wing sorties, the UH-1 helicopter (commonly known as the "Huey") can be equipped with an internal tank and spray booms. In initial operations in RVU, some U.S* Army nalts used a field expedient which employed a 55-gallon drum fitted with rubber hoses and sprayers mounted on the helicopter skids. The second generation system used in the UH-1 is the AGAVENCO sprayer, developed by a Las Vegas firm for use in agricultural work. This system can be mounted in the aircraft in less than one-half hour and consists of a 200 gallon tank, pump, and pressurized nozzles. of the Array (DA) Training Circular (TC) 3-16 [Department 1969 ] . The UH-1 fitted with the AGAVENCO provides the same dissemination rates as the UC-123 but its capacity is considerably less. Although the system is designed for a 200 gallon capacity, the combat requirements of two pilots, two door gunners, and a system operator cut the UH-l's lii't capability to such an extent that the tank can only be loaded with 100 gallons. I^TC Rudrowj The use of the helicopter in RVN for delivery of herbicides has been far less standard than the operations of the 12th Spscial Operations Squadron. Since division comifcanders were the controlling authorities for these missions in each AO, the methods used varied considerably 16 �throughout the theater. Ideally, several "Hueys" should be employed for efficiency's sake. However, since no helicopters were set aside specifically for herbicide missions, they were normally diverted on a one-by-one basis from other conibat sorties. The security escorts, the AH-lG ("Huey Cobra"), faced the same problem, and while a defoliation helicopter should be supported by two Cobras, on r«any occasions, none were available. did not curtail the missions. However, this lac'k of security \LTC Rudrow and LTC Saiiches] Photo # 2: UH-1 helicopter taking-off on a defoliation mission. U.S. Army Photograph 17 �3. Chemical Agents ORANGE, WHITE, and BLUE will Toe the agents considered in this study. These chemicals do not constitute the complete spectrum of herbicides, but they were the most widely used in support of U.S. combat operations in RVN. Table II-l: Composition and Use of Selected Agents AGENT COMPOSTTTQW USES ORANGE 5056 2,4-D(r»-butyl.2-4 dicholoroph*".noxyacetate) 50% 2,4,5--7(n-butyl,2,4,5trichorophenoxyacetate) WHITE 20% Picloraro (4-araino-3,5,6- General defoliation: trichloropicoline acid) Slower acting but 80% 2,4-D(trisopropanolamine| more persistent than General defoliations wangrove, jungle, and low-land scrub trees. ORANGE BLUE 3 pounds per gallon of water of: 65?o cacoclylic acid 35% inert ingredients: sodium chloride, sodium sulfate, calcium sulfate and water. Crop destruction: Most effective against grassy plants, rice, manioc, corn, and banana trees, During defoliation operations in RW, agents ORANGE and WHITE were used interchangeably. It was found that these agents did not permanently destroy all vegetation, although the mangrove swamps still show heavy effects of the spraying. Recent pictures taken of heavily defoliated areas show considerable regrowth of foliage in hardwood forests and along waterways. The NAS study will address this question 2 DA TC 3-16, Employment of Riot Coatrol Agents, Flaree, Smoke, Antiplant Agents, and Personnel Detectors in CounterGuerrilla Operations, p. £0-81, April 1 6 . 39 18 �In detail along with other ecological effects of chemical herbicir?s. [Tschirley 1963] and [office of Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (ODASD) 1971] .. 4. Coverage and Limitations The present sprayer systems used in both fixed and rotary wing aircraft allow variable dissemination of lierMcides. 'rhese rates are as follows: Table I1-2: Herbicide Dissemination Rates Mission Type Rate Defoliation Crop Destruction 3ftree gallons/acre One and one-half to three gallons/acre [DA TC 3-16 1969] The use of herbicides in support of conibat operations is limited in several respects. The best time to apply them is during the particular plant's most active growing period. While spraying during the dry season (which corresponds to the non-active period of most plants) does produce defoliation, the vegetation dies at a slower rate. In ac'lition, the proper atmospheric conditions must exist to insure maximum coverage of the aerosol, assuming the aircraft is flying at the proper speed and altitude. An inversion temperature gradient and a wind of less than eight knots insure not only proper coverage of the target but also minimize the probability of drift onto friendly areas. This is particularly important in an insurgency environment where unintentional destruction of the indigenous population's 19 �property and crops would be detrimental to the position of the counterinsurgent forces. B. TACTICAL LAND CLEARING A tactical land clearing operation is designed to support the ground tactical forces by denying the enemy any use or benefit that might be gained from heavily vegetated terrain. Unlike herbicide missions, a well-planned clearing operation seeks to not only remove foliage but also the source of it as well. This produces an advantage above those received by defoliation since surveillance is improved in the horizontal dimension as well as the vertical. This improvement is realized by: 1. An increased ground-based anti-personnel radar capability. 2. Increased visual observation. 3. Improved fields of fire. 4. Physical elimination of potential ambush sites and base areas. A secondary benefit derived from land clearing is the possible economic enhancement of the area. Marketable tiitiber felled during the operation can be extracte'"- for the local lumbering industry, and if the tactical situation pernits, there is the potential for conversion of this unused land for productive agricultural cultivation. Pamphlet (Pam) 525-6 1970 ] . 20 iDA �1. Equipment and Organization Tactical land clearing revolves around the proper use of a standard crawler tractor equipped with the Rome K/G blade and kit assembly. This item of equipment, commonly referred to as the "Rome Plow," was developed by Ernest Kissner of Lottie, Louisiana for land reclamation of heavily wooded tracts. The success of the blade prompted Mr. Kissner to sell the rights to his equipment to the Rome Plow Company of Cedartown, Georgia. Since 1957, it has been produced to fit all standard sizes and makes of tractors (Caterpillar, Allis-Chalroers, International Harvester). The tractor and Rome blade became the method accepted for pilitary land clearing in 1966 after a test period at Fort Belvoir, Virginia and Vietnam of practically all known commercial clearing equipment. [Rome Plow Company, Training Program November 19711. The Rome K/G treedozer, unlike the bulldozer blade which clears by uprooting, works on the shearing principle in that the total horsepower of the tractor is applied to the sharp cutting edge extending the length of the blade. In addition to the cutting edge, a wedge-like projection, the "stinger," extends forward from the left of the leading edge of the blade. This allows larger trees to be split in one or more passes before they are actually felled by the cutting edge. In order to permit faster operation with less operator fatigue, a flat sole is mounted on the heel of the blade to float on the surface of the ground and conform to 21 �topographic irregularities. Through the technique of shearing the vegetation at ground level or below, its disposal by burning or extraction is much faster because it is soil free. There is less soil disturbance since the tilted blade cuts the vegetation rather than uprooting it. [DA Para 525-6 1970] . 'She "Rome Flew" has become the nucleus of the recently organized Engineer Land Clearing Company whose primary mission is, "... to destroy or clear extensive der.i,e vegetation in critical areas for the purpose of denying its use by the enemy as bases of operation, supply bases, marshalling areas, ambush sites, and cover and concealment."-5 This unit, part of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineer organization, has thirty medium crawler tractors each equipped with the Rome kit. It was spawned by the success of the "Rome Plow" used initially in twos and threes by practically all engineer elements in RVH. The land clearing role became so large that in 1969 the Army organized the 62nd Engineer Battalion to handle the clearing requirements in M_litary Region III. Usually one of its three plow companies was placed in support of a divisional clearing mission. Tha company was found to be the primary unit for employment since fragmenting it into smaller elements for prolonged periods of time resulted in the loss of maintenance posture. [62nd Engineer Battalion Letter February 1971] United States Army Combat Developments Command, Table of Organization and Equipment Number 5-87T - Engineer Land ClearingConpany, p. 1, 7 February 1969. 22 �Photo #3: Rome K/G blade and protection group on a Caterpillar D7F tractor. Rose Plow Company Photograph 23 �2. Clearing Estimates and Limitations It is virtually impossible to establish exact rates at which any piece of equipment can clear land. Such factors as vegetation type, terrain, climate, enemy situation, and quality of assets available will directly influence this. Accurate estimates require a detailed clearing reconnaissance to include several "tree counts" for tree size, diameter of large trees, and secondary growth estimates. The information frcra this reconnaissance can be placed into one of several forculas developed by the Rose Plow Company to determine time required per acre cleared. [Rome Industries Salesgram, 1 September 1971.1 In the event that'this procedure cannot be followed, the Department of the Army has established planning estimates for clearing operations using one land clearing tractor for various types of cuts: Table II-3: Land Clearing Estimates VEGETATION UNIT {Equipment-hours/unit) AREA CLEARING STRIP CLEARING LIGHT: Less than 12 inches in diameter Acre .4 . 6 MEDIUM: 12 to 18 inches in diameter Acre . 8 1.3 HEAVY: -Greater than 18 inches in diameter Acre 1.3 2.1 Several factors which constrain tactical clearing operations are soil trafficability, support requirements. 4 Department of the Army Parphlet 525-6, Land Clearing Lessons Learned, p. 60, 16 June 1970. ~ 24 �and determination of the enemy to resist the land clearing mission. Since the medium tractor with the Rome kit has a gross weight of more than 20 tons, the ground must be relatively solid to permit movement. This would restrict its use in areas subject to heavy seasonal rainfalls and locations that are inundated on a regular basis, such as mangrove swamps. Even if the terrain permits movement of the tractors, there is always the possibility that it is interlaced with streams, canals, or steep-sided gullies. Supporting troops are necessary to install bridging across these obstacles and assist in tractor recovery operations. Aviation support is required for proper command and control of large scale cutting operations, m many cases, the engineer commander must be airborne to guide the lead tractors since, in heavy vegetation, the operators' visibility is negligible. Aerial reconnaissance of the cut is also essential for sound planning and accurate assessment of the clearing to be accomplished. During RVN clearing operations, the land clearing companies of the 62d Engineer Battalion were furnished observation helicopters on the average of five hours per working day. |62d Engineer Battalion Letter, February 1971.J For immediate protection of the land clearing company, the desired security force is one armored cavalry troop or one mechanized infantry company. Foot infantry would have difficulty in keeping up with the tractors and would have no protection from falling trees. If the area 25 ��Photo # 5: Land clearing with the Rome K/G blade on a D7 Caterpillar tractor. Rome Plow Cornpany Photograph 27 �C. "SLASH AND BURN" CLEARING Indigenous personnel can be hired to assist in many land clearing operations or to conduct small-scale clearing efforts on their own ("slash and burn" operations). They can be eraplo*'ed in clearing vegetation adjacent to lines of communications (LOG), around support bases, and removing/ burning debris from other operations. The objectives of this technique are similar to the tactical land clearing operations with the additional function of releasing U.S. troops for more pressing combat roles. 1. Organization Usually, the personnel for the operations are recruited and hired by the U.S. force's Civil Affairs staff working in conjunction with the host country's local and national labor office. These officials determine the salaries and working conditions. They attempt to get job applicants with previous experience in clearing or lumbering. The equipiiient, support, and supervision for the clearers is furnished by the U.S. unit working in the AO. This system was used by the Army during the Korean War. It was designed to help the Republic of Krrea's massive unemployment problems and assist the allies in accomplishing tasks requiring unskilled labor. The Koreans served as ammunition bearers, porters, kitchen police, and woodcutters. Its success was such that at the end of the war the Korean Service Corps (KSC) was formed on a paramilitary basis. 28 �To the present day, the KSC has provided labor augmentation for the residual United Nations troops that have remained in Korea. 2. Clearing Estimates and Limitations Like tactical land clearing, production rates are dependent upon many variables: morale, health, state of experience, terrain, crew size, and supervision. Planners must also consider the tiice required to transport the personnel to and froca the clearing sites since security requirements would eliminate the possibility of remaining in the area overnight. The planning rates that have been established by DA are: Table I - : Clearing By Hand I 4 VEGETATION UNIT HAN-HOURS PER UNIT LIGHT: Less than 12 inches in diameter. Acre 125 MEDIUM: 12 to 18 inches in diameter. Acre 350 HEAVY: Greater than 18 inches in diameter. Acre 600 LIGHT: Same as above but strip 10 meters wide.* 100 Linear Meters 25 MEDIUM: Same as above but strip 10 roaterr. wide.* 100 Linear Meters 70** ** *Strip clearing. **Approxiir.ately 100 man-hours/linear acre and 280 man-hours/ linear acre. 5 Ibid.. p. 55. 29 �The use of "slash and burn" techniques for vegetation removal is usually limited to secure areas or where major combat operations are already in progress. Time serves as an additional constraint on the method since a great many cutters are required to clear an area in a short period. However, it is particularly useful in areas where the soil trafficability will not support the heavy equipment required for tactical land clearing. D. FIREBOMB1NG Firebonibing is a method of reducing vegetation by burning the foliage with incendiary munitions. The primary means to accomplish this is by dropping drums of thickened fuel (napalm) from helicopters or fixed wing aircraft. The technique is especially applicable to area clearance in locations where there is a definite dry season during the year. The objectives of firebombing coincide with those of herbicide operations but the results differ in "zhat the trees are permanently destroyed and not subject to regrowth. The tactic ./as first used in RVN in 1967 during Operation PINK ROSE in which Air Force aircraft were employed to drop the cannisters of napalm on the target areas. Its purpose was to burn-off enemy infiltration routes in the northern provinces and base areas in War Zone C and D, all of which had b^en previously treated with herbicides. 1970 I 30 [McCcnnsll �1. Organization and Equipment Authority to burn portions of an AO is usually delegated to the division commanders. The Array uses the twin-engine CH-47 helicopter ("Chinook") to conduct firebombing missions. Thickened fuel, consisting of gasoline Mixed with M-4 fuel thickener, is placed in salvaged 55gallon drums and sling-loaded beneath the CH-47. Fifteen to twenty drums are carried in one lift, depending on the aircraft's fuel load and weather conditions. When the aircraft is over the target, the drums are released and fall in a cluster into the impact area. The drops are supervised by a command and control officer in a light observation helicopter (LOH), and if air assets are available, security is provided by several helicopter gunships (AH-lG). JLTC Rudrow j 2. Coverage and Limitations Evaluation of the coverage of a firebombing mission is very difficult since proper burning is subject to many condition.0. Some of the factors that effect and limit the coverage are: (1) Dryness of the vegetation (2) Wind and temperature (3) Probability of a drum cluster detonation upon contact with the ground (4) Number of drums per lift. 31 �These variables dictate the use of a probabilistic model to estimate the coverage of any particular firebombing mission. In addition to the factors mentioned above, firebombing missions are limited by the utilization of the CH-47 in other roles. The "Chinook" has become the workhorse for the Army's medium lift tasks. In RVN, it has been extensively used for transportation of artillery pieces and resupply of forward bases. Hence, there is a high demand for the aircraft, and the commander roust decide on which missions he places the higher priority. 32 �III. METMDODQGY The alternatives for this study will be analyzed with respect to the two primary missions of herbicide operations: 1. Removal of foliage (defoliation) in order to deny the enemy cover and concealment. 2. Ths destruction of crops in the enemy's territory in order to curtail his ability to forage off the land. To accomplish this, costs for each method oust be isolated in some uniform manner and in units to facilitate a costeffectiveness evaluation for several measures of effectiveness (MOE). The vectors resulting from this evaluation can then be compared on an intra-systera, inter-system and forcemix basis. The analysis of the alternatives will take the form of the major subheadings below. Each of these sections attempts to amplify the "how and why" of the methodology used in Chapter IV through VII. A. GENERAL ASSUMPTIONS Implicit in the assumptions for each alternative is the adherence to the system descriptions of Chapter II. Several general assumptions are also applicable. In order to simplify the o-ialysis and the data collection, all alternatives are assisted to have commenced their operations at the same point in time. It is also assured that all systems are in "steady state" and not subject to 33 �the initial erratic fluctuations in costs that new systems often demonstrate prior to the occurrence of the "learning curve" phenomena. At the end of the systems' life, all are given a zero residual value. Finally, no adjustments are made to the costs for inflation. While inflationary pressures have abated slightly, it is doubtful that the price stability of the early 1960's will return in the near future. This could introduce some bias when looking at yearly costs, total system cost (T3C), and investment replacement of primary mission equipment (PME) over the planning horizon. [Augusta and Snyder 197 oj B. PARAMETERS The planning horizon for the analyses will be ten years. Like the explicitly stated parameters for each alternative, this is a reasonable estimate but in no way reflects any official policy. The reviewer should be cautioned that the planning horizon and other inputs are optimistic estimates and adverse conditions car change thea significantly. Where a great deal of uncertainty exists as to the parameter values, upper (U) and lower (L) cost bounds will be specified for each alternative. Most of these bounds reflect the judgement of men who were involved with these systems during counterinsurgency operations in RVN. 34 �C. COST ANALYSIS All costs will be determined in reference to one unit equipment (UE) . A UE could be one specially equipped aircraft, one crawler tractor with the Rome kit, or a crew of indigenous cutters for "slash and burn* clearing. With this in mind, life cycle costs will be identified through a generalized input structure. Since no research and develop ment (KD) costs are encountered, only the following major cost categories will be investigated: Investment Cost ( C 1) Operating Cost (OC) Procurement Costs Maintenance Stock Costs Modernization Replacement of Equipment due to Attrition or Operational Loss Initial Travel Transportation Replacement Pay and Allowance Fuel, oil and lubricants (POL) Replacement Training Munitions Security Special Control Fisher 197 l These inputs are used to obtain a system cost (SC) by evaluating each cost category with respect to the major subsystems of each alternative. The basic equation used in the analysis is: T LT SC = a L« i j TT ICi-t + a L. *— J i j OC<< J where a_ is a constant to obtain costs in the desired units (i.e., $/year, ^/mission, or $/day) and ic*j is the jth investment cost of the ith subsystem. Generally, costs will be determined in units associated with basic operating tines. 35 �Ground-based systems will be evaluated in terms of dollars per day and aviation systems in dollars per mission. Included in the operating cost input program will be several opportunity costs. Although they'will never be reflected in tables of costs held by service comptrollers, they are very real costs due to the scarcity of personnel and equipment assets in combat. There is difficulty judging what cost should be attached to a supervisory or security force that could be gainfully employed in other combat operations, m order to tackle this problem in the study, the cost assessed will be that operating cost incurred by the force over the period that it was used. D. EFFECTIVENESS CRITERIA AND COST-EFFECTIVENESS MEASURES 1. Effectiveness C r i t eria The measures of effectiveness (MOE) should be closely related to the mission objectives. However, it is very hard to quantify the results of any denial operation because one soon gets into the realra of trying to determine "why something did not happen." These types of objectives force the writer away from "objective-oriented" MOE's and toward the "performance-oriented" effectiveness criteria. Two KOE's will be utilized in order that a balanced presentation of each alternative may be achieved. a. MOE * 1 - "Area" The first MOE will be that of "area treated, cleared or burned per normal operating period." 36 These �three terras show the different effects that each alternative has on the terrain. However, they present an evaluation of each system's effectiveness and give a specific indication of their performance capability during a normal operating period. b. MOE # 2 - Constrained Cost Minimization This MOE is designed to determine which alternatives can complete a given mission subject to the exigencies of combat. It attempts to take a reasonable mission of denying the enemy cover and concealment in a given area and requiring that this be completed prior to certain time limits and within theater asset constraints. In program format: Minimize the cost of denying cover and concealment in a 6,000 acre base area Subject to: (1) Mission accomplishment in 30 days or less. (2) Mission asset requirements w4thin the supply capability of the responsible commander. A vegetation removal mission was chosen since these were the roost common of the herbicide missions in RVN. The figure of 6,000 acres was designated because thij is approximately 25 grid squares on a 1:25,000 or 1:50,000 topographical map and could easily be a suspected insurgent base area. Although this is a large scale mission, it is not unreasonable since there have been defoliation/clearing operations in War Zone C and other parts of Military Region 37 �Ill in RVN that encompassed larger areas (during Operation 3W3CTIO8 CITY). The effects of reducing the mission size are also examined in Chapter VIII, Section B. Constraint # 2 of the program retires the determination of what will be the "supply capability of the responsible coonander." To resolve this, the author will use his judgement and past experience in RVN to determine whit are "reasonable" and "unreasonable" asset requirement*? to accomplish a particular mission. 2. Cost- E ffectIvenes s Measureg Using the cost measures of the analysis section and the effectiveness criteria, cost-effectiveness measures can be developed for each system in dollars per acre. These measures can then be segregated into mission categories for foliage removal and crop destruction with maximum and oiniraura cost limits. These coupled with the cost minimization v. ctors will help illuminate the differences in the systems, their costs, and their effectiveness in support of counterinsurgency operations. E. PARAMETER SENSITIVITY Sensitivity analysis will be used to test the parametric uncertainties in each system. The testing will examine the system costs as the parameters vary over a reasonable range of values. Although the only relevant costs are dollar costs, the sensitivity tables will show dollars and cents. Certainly, the calculation of costs to the actual pennies 38 �is not relevant or meant to be a serious cost estimate. However, this is done since they demonstrate the orders of magnitude of change over the range of the parameter values. 39 �IV. A. ANALYSIS OF AERIAL DELITSRY OF HERBICIDES ASSUMPTIONS 1. UC-123 a. Each aircraft has an ejected life of ten years after modification for herbicide operations. b. hours. [Major Pyatt] Each sortie has an expected duration of two [Major Hidalgo] c. Flights over a given target consist of between two and seven h^xbicide aircraft. d. Security for each flight consists of four USAF A-1E "Skyraider" aircraft. Control for each flight consists of one forward air controller (FAC) in a USAF OV-10 "Bronco." [Downs and Scrivner e,. 1970J Each UC-123K has a 90 per cent coverage effi- ciency for its 1,000 gallon load. {See sensitivity analy- sis. Sec. E) 2. UH-1 a. A variety of "Hueys" haie been employed in RVN. For this study, use of the UH-1H is assumed. b. Each sortie has a duration of one-half hour. Rudrew] c. A flight over a given target consists of one helicopter. d. The AGAVENCO sprayer wJH be the only helicopter- raounted system considered. Although the capacity of the 40 �tank is 200 gallons, weight limitations tinder combat conditions curtail the load, will be analyzed. e. A 100 gallon per mission load [t,TC Sanchesj When available, armed helicopter security consists of two AH-lG "Cobras." f. and [DA -re 3-16 1969 ] [LTC Rudrow] the OT-lH has a 90 per cent coverage efficiency for its 100 gallon load. It is employed under the same operational and climatic conditions as the UC-123 missions. {Also see sensitivity analysts, Sec. E) B. PARAMETERS ! • Flying Hours Since the DC-123K has a two-hour mission duration, 25 missions per month per aircraft (or 600 hours per year) will be the study parameter. Data indicates that the sortie rate varies considerably over a year's operation and that the use of 25 sorties per month would not be unreasonable [Major Hidalgo J . A similar number of flying hours per year for the UH-lH would dictate a sortie rate of 100 missions per month. However, this is probably less than the normal rate since the UH-lH has a prograrsed flying-hour limit of up to 960 houis per year in an active combat environment. Manual (FM) 101-20 [DA Field 1970J . This implies that the effects of the sortie generation rate for both aircraft should be examined in a sensitivity analysis (Section E). 41 �2- Cost Bounds Bounds on certain portions of the herbicide costs are set by the variation in security, control, and transportation costs that can occur in normal operations. These parameters set the "optimistic and pessimistic" bounds for system cost. Since the UC-123 flights range from two to seven aircraft, the security and control cost (for four A-lE's and one OV-10) must be pro rated in accordance with the number of herbicide aircraft per flight to obtain a cost for one unit equipment (UE). Costing the helicopter system does not present this problem since the operations are usually conducted with one UH-1 (assumption c>. Hence, the security costs for a UH-1 mission can range from zero to the cost of using two "Cobras" for one-half hour. The UH-1 has an additional bound on the i»..3stment cost formed by the mode of transporting (surface or air) the AGAVENCO system to the cornbat theater. C. COST ANALYSIS 1. Is_o la t ion o f Re le vant Cos ts A detailed breakdown of these costs can be found in Appendix A. a. UC-123K Research and Development; None. Investment Costs for the aircraft subsystem: (1) Initial procurement of the aircraft is a sunk cost since the C-123B's were drawn from air assets that 42 �existed in the Air Force inventory. Hence, it will not be considered. (2) Jet engine modification: C-123B to a turbo-jet model (C-123K)i Conversion of the $302,732/aircraft. [Miss Lucky] Operating Costs for the aircraft subsystem: [ (1) Operating and nsainteaance (O&M): $7QO,000/ ^ Captain Wallace j (2) Modernization cost: h two per cent per year cost is incurred by each aircraft for raodernization expenditures. .02 x 5870,000/aircraft = $l?,400/aircraft/year. [captain Wallace] (3) Security costs: A-1E is $200/AOur. The operating cost for one~~ Major Sims The munition expenditures for one A-iF; are $1250/raission. f LTC Cooper] For a two- hour mission with four A-lE's, the cost amounts to $6600/ mission. (4) Control costs: The operating cost for the OV-10 is $54/liour and $1000/aircraft for a full load of munitions. [liTC Monoham 1 This amounts to a control cost i J of $1108/roission. (5) Combat attrition rates are negligible since <Nfc only two aircraft have been lost to enemy fire since 1962. j Downs and Scrivner 1970 ] 43 �Investment Cost for the aerosol subsystem; (1) The dispenser mechanisii consists of the installation of the Hayes AA-45 system at a cost of $37,254/ aircraft. [Miss Lucky I (2) Additional armor plating: $19,354/aircraft. [Miss Lucky] Operating Costs for the aerosol subsystem; ( ) Maintenance of the dispenser systcs* training 1 the operators, and stocking spare parts are included in the cost of operating the aircraft. ( ) Cost of herbicides: 2 The USAF is responsible for procurement of herbicides for all users. The cost of the agent includes shipment and storage costs. [Mr. Carter] AGENT COST/GALLON COST/MISSION WHITE $7.78 $7,780 ORANGE $7.24 $7,240 BLUE $2.31 $2,310 b. UH-1H Research and Development: Hone. Investment Cost for UH-lH; This is a sunk cost since the helicopter used for herbicide operations is diverted from Army aviation assets on a "need* basis. Operating Costfor UH-lH; ( ) O&M costs are rated at 15 per cent of the 1 aircraft procurement cost. JMr. Donaldson] Since the UH-lH 44 �costs $266,578 [DA FM 101-20 1970J , the O&M cost is approximately $40,000/year. (2) Crew salaries are not included in Army O&M estimates. Normal conibat crew on a UH-1 is two pilots and two door gunners. These yearly opportunity costs amount to: 2 x $14,000/officer/year = $28,000/year 2 x $10,000/enlisted man/year = $2Q,000/year [DA Fact Sheet 1971j and I Major Howe ] (3) Security costs range from zero (no security) to $200/mission for two AH-lG "Cobras." (Appendix A) Investment Costs forthe aerosol subsystem; (1) Procurement of AGAVENCO system: $7,850 [MT. Drake| (2) Transportation cost for the AGAVENCO: $545 by ship and $1,937 by aircraft. (Major Howe 1 (3) The expected life of the UH-1H equipped for herbicide missions is ten years. [ Mr. Donaldson] Operating Costfor theaerosol subsystem; ( ) The maintenance cost of the AGAVENCO system 1 is nine per cent of the procurement cost: S707/year. [ Mr. Drake] (2) The system requires one operator: $iO,000/ year. (3) Herbicide costs: 45 �AGENT COST/GALLON COST/MISSION WHITE $7.78 §778 ORAHGE $7.24 $724 BLUE $2.31 $231 IW. CarltonJ 2. Yearly Costs Using the relevant costs and the herbicide parameter, a yearly system cost can be developed from the formula: SC = a L, L, ICjj + b Lf L» OCii J i j i 1 wr«re a_ is the reciprocal of the expected life (and equal to the planning horizon) and b is a dimensional constant to obtain costs la dollars per year. a. Identification of Costs for UC-123K Investmant Cost = 1/10 (Engine modification +• spray system + arnor) = $35,934/year. Operating Cost = O&M cost + Security cost + Control cost + Agent cost. The security and control (S&C) costs for a UE on any particular mission can be found in the following manner: Security cost (U): Security cost ( ) L: $6600/flight 2 aircraft/flight S6600/fliaht 7 aircraft/flight _ $3300/aircraft = ?943/aircraft (A similar procedure determines the control cost.) Using the parameter that a UC-123K flies 25 missions per month, 46 �the yearly mission rate would be 300 missions (msn) per year. A typical calculation, this one for the upper bound using Agent WHITE, is as fallows: Operating Cost = §700,000/yr + §17,400/yr + 300rasn/yrx §33QO/msn + 300 msn/yr x §554/msn + 300 msn/yr x §778Q/rasn = §4,207,600/year. Table IV-1: Yearly Costs for UC-123K (Costs in Millions of Dollars per Year) AGENT LOWER BOUND UPPER BOUND WHITE §3.417 $.4 424 ORANGE §3.257 §4.081 BLUE §1.777 §2.603 b. Identification of Costs for UH-1H Investment Cost - 1/10 (AGAVEHCO Cost + Transportation Cost) = $979/year (U) or $840/year ( ) L. Operating Cost = O&M Cost + Security Cost + Agent Cost. The UH-1 will fly 100 missions per month. (Section B) An upper bound cost using Agent WHITE: Operating Cost §98,707/yr 4- 1200 msn/yr x $200/msn + 1200 msn/yr x $778/msn « §l,272,307/year. Table *V-2: Yearly Costs for UH-1H (Costs in Millions of Dollars per Year) AGENT LOWER BOUND UPPER BOUND WHITE §1.033 §1.273 GRANGE § .968 §1.208 BLUE § .377 § .617 47 �Table IV-2: Yearly Costs for UH-1H (Costs in Millions of Dollars per Year) AGEKT LOWER BOUND WRITE $1.033 $1.273 ORANGE $ .968 $1.208 BLUE $ .377 $ .617 c. UPPER BOUND Remarks At this point a total system cost could be readily identified. However, like the yearly cost, it is extremely sensitive to the particular input parameters, The parameter of "missions per year" accounts for a major portion of the system cost solely by virtue of its multiplicative role in the cost formula. The reviewer must consider this when evaluating the systems with respect to the outlay of funds on a yearly basis for a UE. More important than the magnitude of the costs involved is the relative difference between the two systems. 3. Mission Costs cost of a herbicide mission gives the reviewer a better insight into the dollars involved for a UE. This cost is more suitable to relate to an effectiveness criterion that is oriented toward perfon=ance. Mission Investment Costt Summation of the Investment Costs (Expected Life)x(Number of Xsn/Year) 48 �Mission Operating Cost: Summation of O&M Costs/year Number of Msn/Year Summation of Security, Control, ^ ^ent costs/Mission fable IV-3: PC-123K Missioa Costs (Dollars per Hission) AGENT LOWER BOUND OPPER BOUND 1C OC SC 1C OC SC WEITE $120 $11,272 $11,392 $120 $14,025 $14,145 ORANGE $120 $10.732 $10,852 .'12® $13,485 $13,605 BLUE $120 $ 5,802 $ 5,922 $128 $ 8,555 $ 8,675 The costs are not categorized for the helicopter since the UE-lP investment cost is negligible. Tal/le IV-4t UH-lH Miss JOB Costs (Dollars per Mission) AGENT LOWER BOUN*? PPfgR BOUND WHITE $861 $1061 ORANGE $807 $1007 BLUE $314 $ 514 It is evident after this analysis that the agent cost comprises a large portion of the system cost for both alternatives. It accounts for approximately 50 per cent of the UC-123K costs and about 80 of the 0«-1 mission cost. The extent of this can be examined by locking at the two systems participating in defoliation operations. If the cost of the agent is varied from one dollar to ten dollars per gallon, the effect on "dollars per mission" can be 49 �better illustrated. This can also allow the reviewer the opportunity to examine the cost expectation of a sudden technicological breakthrough in the chemical industry causing a decrease in prices or if current trends in upward prices continue. Table IV-5s Cost Variation Due to Agent Costs (Dollars per Mission) COST OF &GEHT SYSTEM COST ($/Gal) TJH-1 (S/Msn) UC-123 Hin D. Min 183 283 383 483 583 683 783 883 983 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Max 383 483 583 683 783 883 983 4612 5612 6612 7612 8612 9612 10612 11612 12612 13612 1083 1183 1283 1083 Max 7365 8365 9365 10365 11365 12365 13365 14365 15365 16365 EFFECTIVENESS CRITERIA AND COST-EFFECTIVENESS MEASURES 1. Effectiveness Criteria a. MOE fl - "Area" This measure of effectiveness, "acres treated per mission," presents the systems' overall or net effectiveness during a normal operating period. . Gallons/Mission Effectiveness criterion (EC) = e x Gailons/Acre " where e is the coverage factor. EC = .9 x For UC-123 operations, 1000 qal/tosn , 30Q 3 gal/acre 50 acres/mission �EFFECTIVENESS CRITERIA (Acres/Mission) AGENT LOWSR BOUND UH-1H UC-123 UPPERBOUND UH-1H UC-123 WHITE 30 300 30 300 ORANGE 30 300 30 300 BLUE 60 600 30 300 b. MOE # 2 - Constrained Cost Minimizatior This HOE takes the following mathematical programming formats Minimize the cost of defoliating 6000 acres Subject to: Mission completion 1 30 days Assets required 1 Command's supply capability In addition to the assumptions of this chapter, several more. are necessary to restrict the analysis. (1) Flights by UC-123K's will be examined la relation to a minimum of two and a maximum of seven aircraft per flight. ( ) Agent ORANGE will be the defoliant. 2 ( ) Spraying must be completed within five days. 3 The last restriction is necessary since herbicides require approximately three to four weeks t3 act on tropical vegetation. For herbicides to be effective, they must remove a sufficient amount of foliage to deny the enemy use of the terrain for base areas and daylight movement and to permit improved aerial observation. 51 The �requirement is amplified by the following charts Defoliant Rate 1 \fk 2 Vk 1 H° 3 fto ORANGE 3 gal/acre 1/ 98 6 Ho 1 Yr 73/32 89/73 79 66 54 (The figure to the left of the slash represents percentage of leaves desicated; that to the right represents the percentage of leaves defoliated. The single figure is defoliation.)6 Therefore, it is imperative that the a«ent be applied quickly to insure naximuin defoliation at the end of 30 days. 2. Cost-Sffeetiveness Hea sures a. HOE tl Cost-Effectiveness Measure = Mission Cost Effectiveness Criterion Table IV-6A: Aerial Delivery of Herbicides (Dollars per Acre) AGENT LOWER BOUND UPPER BOUND UH-lH UC-123 UH-1H UC-123 WHITE §29 $38 $35 §47 ORANGE $27 $36 §34 $45 BLUL $ 5 $10 $17 $29 Breaking these costs into the two primary mission categories (defoliation and crop destruction), isaxirauro and House, W. B. and others. Assessment of the Ecological Effects of Extensive or Repeated Use of Herbicides, p. 141, Midwest Research Institute, 1967. ' ~~~ 52 �minimum limits are formed. The mission categories facilitate comparison with the other alternatives. This is readily done since ORANGE and WHITE are general purpose defoliants and BI-UE is exclusively used for crop destruction. In the next table, the tgaximuin and ^ntiimaa limits on defoliation missions are formed by using Agent WHITE'S upper bound and QRASGE's lower bound. The uaximum and minimum cost vectors for crop destruction can be taken directly from Table IV-6A. Table IV-6B: Cost-Effectiveness Measures for Aerial Delivery of Herbicides (Dollars per Acre) MISSION UH-1H UC-123 MIN MAX MIN MAX Defoliation $27 $35 $36 $47 Crop Destruction $ 5 $17 $10 $29 b. HOE #2 Defoliation of a 6,000 acre area would require ten flights of two UC-123K's or three flights of seven IK-123K aircraft (each aircraft covering 300 acres per mission). The fiva-day dissemination period could easily be accomplished even with the smallest flight. If a squadron organization existed, the requirement would have little or no effect. Upper Bound: $13,605/aircraft/msn x 2 aircraft x 10 missions =» $272,100. 53 �Lower Bound: $10,852/aircraft/n»sn x 7 aircraft x 3 nissions - $227,892. Using the UH-lH's effectiveness criterion of 30 acres per mission, 200 sorties would be required. This implies that 100 helicopter flying hours would be needed in a five-day period. This would be a tremendous drain on the aviation assets of a division commander and would mean that he would have to divert five to ten helicopters a day for the better part of a week to psrlcrs the defoliation task, Hence, a violation of the second constraint might be realized. Table IV-7: Minimum Cost Program For Defoliation (Costs in Dollars) SYSTEM LOWER BOUND UPPER BOUND UC-123K $227,892 $272,100 UH-1B** $161,400 $201,400 The program constraints make the UH-1 virtually infeasible for a mission of tteis scale. E. PARA1-CETER SENSITIVITY The sensitivity analysis is presented to determine the effect of variation of three of the parameterized inputs for the herbicide alternative. The tests are performed on the icaximura and minimum limits for the cost-effectiveness categories in Table IV-6B. 1. Sensitivity of Sortie Generation Rate a. UC-123 (Table IV-8A & SBj 54 �A sensitivity analysis indicates that this parameter is not as crucial to the system cost explanation as one might expect. Examination of the costs indicates that even at the lower number of sorties per month the system cost does not experience any appreciable rise. As flying hours increase past the 600 hour per year mark, the cost begins to experience an almost linear decrease. 55 �TABLE IV-8A SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS - HERBICIDE DELIVERY BY UC-123K SENSITIVITY OF SORTIE GENERATION RATE ($/ACRE) DEFOLIATION 0 & M COST MIN MAX SYSTEM COST M|N MAX HOURS PER YR. INVESTMENT COST 15. 360. 0.67 41.09 52.07 41.75 52.73 16. 384. 0.62 40.26 51.23 40.88 51.86 17. 408. 0.59 39.53 50.50 40.11 51.09 18. 432. 0.55 38.87 49.85 39.43 50.41 19. 456. 0.53 38.29 49.27 38,82 49.79 20. 480. 0.50 37.77 48.74 38.27 49.24 21. 504. 0.48 37.29 48.27 37.77 48.74 22. 528. 0.45 36.86 47.84 37.32 48.29 23. 552. 0.43 36.47 47.44 36.90 47.88 24. 576. 0.42 36.11 47.08 36.52 47.50 25. 600. 0.40 35.77 46.75 36.17 47.15 26. 624. 0.38 35.47 46.44 35.85 46.83 SORTIES PER MO. �TABLE IV-8A (Continued) SORTIES PER MO, HOURS PER YR. INVESTMENT COST 27. 648. 0.37 35.18 46.16 35.55 46.53 28. 672, 0.36 34.92 45.90 35.28 46.25 29. 696. 0.34 34.67 45.65 35.02 46.00 30. 720. 0.33 34.45 45.42 34.78 4.6 57 31. 744. 0.32 34.23 45.21 34.55 45.53 32. 768. 0.31 34, J3 45.01 14.34 45.32 33. 792. 0.30 33.84 44.82 34.14 45.12 34. 816. ' 0.29 33.66 44.64 33.96 44.93 35. 840. 0.29 33.50 44.47 33.78 44.76 36. 864. 0.28 33.34 44.32 33.62 44.59 37. 88d. 0.27 33.19 44.17 33.46 4.4 44 38, 912. 0.26 33.05 44.02 33.31 44.29 39. 936. 0.26 32.91 43.89 33.17 44.15 40. 960. 0.25 32.79 43.76 33.03 44.01 OPERATING COST MIN MAX SYSTEM COST MIN MAX �TABLE IV-8B SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS - HERBICIDE DELIVERY BY UC-123K SENSITIVITY OF SORTIE GENERATION RATE ($/ACRE) CROP DESTRUCTION SORTIES PER MOT HOURS PER YR, INVESTMENT COST OPERATING COST MIN MAX SYSTEM; COST MIN MAX 15. 360. 0.67 12.66 33.83 12.33 34.50 16. 384. 0.62 12.22 33.00 11.91 33.63 17. 408, 0.59 11.84 32.27 11.55 32.86 18. 432. 0.55 11.50 31.62 11.22 32.17 19. 456. 0.53 11.19 31.03 10.93 31.56 20. 480. 0.50 1.2 09 30.51 1.7 06 31.01 21. 504. 0.48 10.67 30.04 10.43 30.51 22. 528. 0.45 10.44 29.60 10.21 30.06 23. 552. 0.43 10.23 29.21 10.02 29.64 24. 576, 0.42 10,04 28.85 9.84 29.27 25. 600. 0.40 9.87 28.52 9.67 28.92 Ul oo �TABLE IV-8B (Continued) SORTIES PER KO. HOURS PER YR. INVESTMENT COST OPERATING -COST MIN. MAX. SYSTEM COST MIN. MAX. 26. 0.38 9.71 28.21 9.52 28.60 27. 648. 0.37 9.56 27.93 9.38 28.30 28. 672. 0.36 9.42 27.66 9.24 28.02 29. 696. 0.34 9.29 27.42 9.12 27.76 30. in 624. 720. 0.33 9.17 27.19 9.01 27.52 31. 744. 0.32 9.06 26.97 8.90 27.30 32. 768. 0.31 8.95 26.77 8.80 27.09 33. 792. 0.30 88 .6 26.59 8.70 26.89 34. 816. 0.29 8.76 26.41 8.62 26.70 35. 840. ' 0.29 8.67 26.24 8.53 26,53 30. 864. 0.28 8.59 26.08 8.45 26.36 37. 888. 0.27 8.51 25.93 8.38 26.20 30. 912. 0.26 84 .4 25.79 8.31 26.05 39. 936. 0.26 8.37 25.66 8.24 25.91 40. 960. 0.25 8.30 25.53 8.18 25.78 �CHART IV-1: SENSITIVITY OF SORTIE GENE8ATION RATE (UC-123) (System Cost (SC) in Dollars/Acre) C 50.. DEFOLIATION 30 „ _ 20 . .. CROP D E S T R U C T I O N 10 . „ 4 360 -I -4 &0 600 4 720 Plying Hours per Year 60 840 {-> 960 �b. UH-1H (Table IV-9A & 9B) fable 9A and 9B show that the costs per acre fcr defoliation and crop destruction are virtually insensitive to the sortie generation rate of the aircraft. "The cause for this is the dominance of the agent cost. For a mission flown with Agent ORANGE (lower bound), the cost less the defoliant is $83 per mission. Shis condition persists throughout this analysis. 2. Sensitivity of Security and Control Costs a. UC-123K (Table IV-10) In the analysis, S & C costs range from $1100 per mission to approximately $3350 per mission. The lower spectrum of the scale shows the costs that might be incurred in a low-intensity environment that would require little or no security. The costs above $4000 per mission indicate the incremental changes when high-performance aircraft are allocated to security roles in lieu of propeller-driven "Slcyraiders." b. UH-1H (Table IV-11A & 11B) c. Both sets of tables (10 and 11) show the effect that security has on determining bounds on cost estimates. They also point out that the difference in Agent WHITE and Agent ORANGE for a similar security posture is almost negligible. 61 �TABLE IV-9A SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS - HERBICIDE DELIVERY BY UH-1 SENSITIVITY OF SORTIE GENERATION RATE ($/ACRE) DEFOLIATION SORTIES PER MO. HOURS PER YR. 0 & M COST MAX. INVESTMENT COST MIN V SYSTEM COST MAX. MIN. GO. 0.05 28.70 37.17 28.74 37.22 64. 384. 0.04 28.42 36.88 28.45 36.93 68. cr> to 360. 408. 0.04 28.17 36.63 28.20 36.67 72. 432. 0.04 27.94 36.41 27.97 36.45 76. 456. 0.04 27.74 36.21 27. 77 36.24 80. 480. 0.03 27.56 36.03 27.59 36.06 84. 504. 0.03 27.40 35.86 27.43 35.90 88. 528 0.03 27.25 35.72 27.28 35.75 92. 552. 0.03 27.11 35.58 27.14 35.61 96. 576. 0.03 26.99 35.46 27.01 35.48 100. 600. 0.03 26.88 35.34 26.90 35.37 104. 624. 0.03 26.77 35.24 26.79 35.26 �TABLE IV-9A (Continued) SORTIES PER MO. HOURS PER YR. INVESTMENT COST O & M COST MIN. MAX. SYSTEM COST MIN. MAX. 108. 648. 0.03 26.67 35.14 26.69 35.16 112. 672. 0.02 26.58 35.05 26.60 35.07 116. 696. 0.02 26.50 34.96 26.52 34.99 120. 720. 0.02 25.42 34.88 26.44 34.91 124. 744. 0.02 26.34 34.81 26.36 34.83 128. 768. 0.02 26.28 34.74 26.29 34.76 132. 792. 0.02 26.21 34.G8 26.23 34.70 136. 816. 0.02 26.15 34.62 26.17 34.64 140. 840. 0.02 26.09 34,156 26.11 34.58 144, 864. 0.02 26.04 34. 90 86.03 34.52 140. 883. 0.02 25.99 34.45 26.00 34.47 152. 912. 0.02 25.94 34,40 25.95 34.42 156. 936. 0.02 25.89 34.36 25.91 34.38 160. 960. 0.02 25.85 34.31 25.86 34.33 �TABLE IV-9B SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS - HERBICIDE DELIVERY BY UH-1 SENSITIVITY OP SORTIE GENERATION RATE (§/ACRE) CROP DESTRUCTION SORTIES PER MO. HOURS PER YR. INVESTMENT COST O & M COST MIN. MAX. SYSTEM COST MIN. MAX. 60. 360. 0.05 6.13 18.94 6.15 18.98 64. 384. 0.04 5.99 18.65 6.01 18.69 68. 408. 0.04 5.87 18, 10 5.88 18.44 72. 432. 0.04 5.75 18,17 5.77 18.21 76. 456. 0.04 5.65 17.97 5.67 18.01 80. 480. 0.03 5.5b 3,7.79 5.58 17.83 84. 504. 0.03 5.4Q 17.63 5.50 17.66 88. 528. 0.03 5.41 17.48 5.42 17.51 92. 552. 0.03 5.34 17.35 5.42 17.51 96. 576. 0.03 5.28 17.22 5.29 17.25 600. 0.03 5.22 17.11 5.23 17.14 100. �TABLE IV-9B (Continuea) SORTIES PER MO^ HOURS PER YR. INVESTMENT COST O & M COST SYSTEM COST MIN. MAX. MIN. MAX. 104. 624. 0.03 5.17 17.00 5.18 17.03 108. 648. 0.03 5.12 16.91 5.13 16.93 112. 672. 0.02 5.07 16.81 5.08 16.84 116. 690. 0.02 5.03 16.73 5.04 16.75 120. 720. 0.02 4.99 16.65 5.00 16.67 124. 744. 0.02 4.96 16.58 4.96 16.60 120. 768. 0.02 4.92 16.51 4.93 16.53 132. 792. 0.02 4.89 16.44 4.90 16.46 136. 816. 0.02 4.86 16.30 4.67 16.40 140. 840. 0.02 4.83 16.33 4.84 16.34 144. 864. 0.02 4.80 16.27 4.81 16.29 148. 888. 0.0? 4.78 16.22 4.78 16.24 152. 912. 0.02 1.75 16.17 4.76 16.19 1S6. 936. 0.02 4.73 16.12 16.14 160. 960. 0.02 4.71 16.08 4.74 4.71 Ul 16.10 �CHART? IV-2: SENSITIVITY OF SORTIE GENERATION RATE (UH-1) (Systes Cost {SC> in Dollars/Acre) SC DEFOLIATION 30,. 25.. CROP 10.. 360 480 DESItUCIIOH 600 Flying Hours per Year �TABLE IV-10 SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS - HERBICIDE DELIVERY BY UC-123K SENSITIVITY OF SECURITY & CONTROL COST ($/MSN) DEFOLIATION SECURITY + CONTROL = TOTAL S & C COST SYSTEM COST ($/ACRE) (S/MSN) HIS. 0. 600. 1200. 10. 80 2400. 3000. 3600. 4200. 40. 80 50. 40 60. 00 6600. 0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800 900 1000 1100 0 . 700. 10. 40 2100. 2800. 3500. 40. 20 40. 90 5600. 6300. 70. 00 7700. MAX. 32.50 34.84 37.17 39.50 41.84 44.17 46.50 48.84 51.17 53.50 55.84 58.17 34.30 36.64 38.97 •'•1.30 43.64 45.97 48.30 50.64 52.97 55.30 57.64 59.97 8.04 9.20 10.37 11.54 12.70 13.87 15.04 16.20 17.37 18.54 19.70 20.87 16.07 18.40 20.74 23.07 25.40 27.74 30.07 32.40 34.74 37.07 39.40 41.74 CROP DESTRUCTION 0. 600. 1200. 1800. 2400. 3000. 3600. 4200. 4800. 5400. 60. 00 6600. 0 100 200 300 400 500 500 700 800 900 1000 1100 0. 700. 1400. 21CO. 2800. 3500. 4200. 4900. 5600. 6300. 70. 00 7700. 67 �TABLE IV-11A SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS... HERBICIDE DELIVERY BY 13H-1 SENSITIVITY OF SECURITY COSTS DEFOLIATIGS SECUKI7V COST ($/KSN) SYSTEM COST ($/ACRS) Mat. 0. 10. 20. 30. 40. 50. (0. 70. 80. 90. 100. 110. 120. 130. 140. 150. 160. 170. 180. 190. 200. 210. 220. 230. 240. 250. 260. 270. 280. 290. 300. MAX. 26.90 27.24 28.70 29.03 27.57 21. y& 28.24 28.57 28.90 29.24 2S.57 25.90 30.24 30.57 30.90 31.24 31.57 31.90 32.24 32.57 32.90 33.24 33.57 33.90 34.24 34.57 34.90 35.24 35.57 35.90 36.24 36.57 36.90 29.37 2S.70 30.03 30.37 30.70 31.03 31.37 31.70 32.03 32.37 32.70 33.03 33.37 33.70 34.03 34.37 34.70 35.03 35.37 35.70 36.03 36.37 36.70 37.03 37.37 37.70 38.03 38.37 38.70 �TABLE IV-11B SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS - HERBICIDE DELIVERY BY UH-1 SENSITIVITY OF SECURITY COSTS CROP DESTRUCTION SECURITY COST SYSTEM COST (S/ACRE) (S/KSN) MIN. 0. 10. 20. 30. 4. 0 50. 6. 0 70. 8. 0 9. 0 100. 110. 120. 130. 140. 150. 160. 170. 180. 190. 200. 210. 220. 230. 240. 250. 260. 270. 280. 290. 3QO. MAX, 5.23 5.40 5.57 5.73 5.90 6.07 6.23 6.40 6.57 6.73 6.90 7.07 7.23 7.40 7.57 7.73 7.90 80 .7 8.23 8.40 8.57 8.73 8.90 9.07 9.23 9.40 9.57 9.73 9.90 10.07 10.23 10.47 1.0 08 11.13 11.47 11.80 12.13 12.47 12.80 13.13 13.47 13.80 14.13 14.47 1.0 48 15.13 15.47 15.80 16.13 16.47 16.80 17.13 17.47 17.80 18.118.47 18.80 19.13 19.47 1.0 98 20.13 20.46 �3. Sensitivity of Effectiveness Criterion (Table IV-12 and Table IV-13) These tables demonstrate the effect on system cost when commanders insist on conducting herbicide operations when conditions such as temperature, wind, and weather are less than favorable. 4. Remarks Prior to completing the analysis, the effect of variation of the agent cost in terms of dollars per acre c . ?n be investigated. (Reference Table IV-5) These show the dominance of the agent costs. Cost Variation Due to Agent Costs (Cost in Dollars per Acre) COST OF AGENT §1 UC-123 ($/ACRE) M1N. § 2 $ 3 $4 $ 5 $ 6 $7 $ 8 $9 §10 UH-1 ($/ACRE) MAX. MIK. MAX. $13 $15 $19 $22 $25 $29 $32 $35 $39 $42 $45 $25 $28 $31 $35 $38 $41 $45 $48 $51 $55 $ 6 $ 9 $16 $19 $23 $26 $29 $33 $36 $39 $43 $13 $16 $19 $23 $26 $29 $33 $36 70 �SABLE IV-12 SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS - HERBICIBg DELIVERY BY UC-123 SENSITIVITY OP EFFECTIVENESS OF COVERAGE DEFOLIATION COVERAGE (ACRES/MSB) SYSTEM COST (I/ACRE) % EFFECTIVE KIN. 220. 230. 240. 250. 260. 270. 280. 290. 300. 310. 320. 330. 49.33 47.18 45.22 43.41 41.74 40.19 38.76 37.42 36.17 35.01 33.91 32.89 66.0 69.0 72.0 75.0 78.0 81.0 84.0 87.0 90.0 93.0 96.0 99.0 MAX. 64.30 61.50 58.94 56.58 54.40 52.39 50.52 48.78 47.15 45.63 44.20 42.86 CROP DESTRUCTION COVERAGE (ACRES/MSN) MIN. 220. 230. 240. 250. 260. 270. 280. 290. 300. 310. 320. 330. SYSTEM COST ($/ACRE) MIN. 6. 60 6. 90 72.0 75.0 78.0 8. 10 8. 40 8. 70 9. 00 93.0 9. 60 9. 90 71 MAX. 13.46 12.87 12.34 11.84 11.39 10.97 10.58 10.21 9.87 9.55 9.25 8.97 MAX. 40 4. 460. 480. 50. 0. 520. 540. 560. 580. 60 0. 620. 640. 650. EFFECTIVE 39.43 37.72 36.15 34.70 33.37 32.13 30.98 29.91 28.92 27.98 27.11 26.29 �CHART IV-3: SENSITIVITY OF EPFECTIVE2GSS OF COVERAGE (UC-123) S60 $50 ' ~ S401-- S 3 0 -- S 20 . . CROP DESTRUCTION S 10 .. 100 Percentage of Effectiveness 72 �TABLE IV-13 SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS - HERBICIDE DELIVERY BY UH-1 SENSITIVITY OF EFFECTIVENESS OF COVERAGE DEFOLIATION COVERAGE (ACRES/MSN) SYSTEM COST ($/ACRE) % EFFECTIVE MIN. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29. 30. 31. 32. 33. 36.68 35.09 33.62 32.28 31.04 29.89 28.82 27.83 26.90 26.03 25.22 24.45 66.0 69.0 72.0 75.0 78.0 81.0 84.0 87.0 90.0 93.0 96.0 99.0 MAX. 48.23 46.13 44.21 42.44 40.81 39.30 37.90 36.59 35.37 34.23 33.16 32.15 CROP DESTRUCTION COVERAGE (ACRES/MSN) MIN. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29. 30. 31. 32. 33. SYSTEM COST ($/ACRE) MIN. 66.0 6. 90 72.0 75.0 78.0 81.0 8. 40 87.0 90.0 93.0 96.0 99.0 73 MAX. 7.14 6.83 6.54 6.28 6.04 5.81 5.61 5.41 5.23 5.06 4.91 4.76 MAX. 44. 4. 6 48. 50. 52. 54. 56. 58. 60. 62. 6. 4 66. EFFECTIVE 23.37 22.35 21.42 20.56 19.77 19.04 18.36 17.73 17.14 16.58 16.06 15.58 �CHART IV-4: SENSITIVITY OF EFFECTIVENESS OF COVERAGE (UH-1) (System Cost (SC) in Dollars/Stare) sc ,k $50 $40 • $30-- $20 , $10. CROP DESTRUCTION -I 70 80 90 100 percentage of Effectiveness 74 9- �V. A. TACTICAL LAKD CLEARING ASSUMPTIONS 1. The vehicle examined will be the D7E/D7F medium crawler tractor (made by the Caterpillar Tractor Company) equipped with the Rone K/G clearing blade and protection kit. 2. The expected life of the tractor under combat conditions is two years. | Major BennettJ The expected life of the blade and protection kit is one year. I 62d Engineer BattalionJ 3. A land clearing company has 25 of its 30 medium tractors operational at any one time. I Planning factor from DA Pam 526-6 197oJ 4. Security forces consist of one armored cavalry troop or a comparable-size mechanized infantry unit. [Major Bennett! The operation is controlled by the commander who is airborne in a light observation helicopter (LOH). 5. Crops are considered under the category of light vegetation. 6. The discount rate is ten per cent. B. PARAMETERS 1. Utilization The operating time for ^ Rome-equipped tractor will be eight hours per day. .. >rmally, these vehicles work 75 �in tine field for 45 days prior to returning to their base areas for a 15-day "stand down" and maintenance period. [&2d Engineer Battalion Letter, February 1971j This implies a 75 per cent work factor and 270 work days per year. 2. Cost Bounds a. Investment Cost The investment cost for a tractor is bounded by the consideration of inherited assets. When the Rome clearing blade was introduced in RVN, the tractors "in country" were equipped with bulldozer blades. These blades were simply converted by unit maintenance personnel. In other situations, the kits and tractors were sent to RVN to form land clearing units. Thus, the upper bound considers procurement of the initial tractor while the lower bound considers the initial tractor to be a sunk cost. b. Operating Cost The operating costs are bounded by the security, control, and readiness postures of the clearing unit. The desired security for a land clearing company is an armored cavalry troop while a mechanized infantry company (-} is a less desired but acceptable replacement. 1 DA Pam 525-6 1970J The security costs will be considered to range from $130 per day to $80 per day for a UE. (Appendix B) The control costs are directly proportional to the use of the LOU that is attached to the land clearing company during clearing operations. The attachment can be from several 76 �hours to all day. f62d Engineer Battalion 11 April 197 1] The unit readiness rating determines the equipment and personnel manning levels. High ratings dictate the assignment of two operators per tractor. However, during periods of budgetary austerity or when the manpower pool cannot support this requireoent. this is lowered to the assignment of one operator per tractor. FuSACDC TOE 5-58T 1969^j C. COST ANALYSIS 1. Isolation of Relevant Costs (Appendix Bj a. Investment Cost (1) Investment cost for D7 Tractor. This investment cost is bounded by the requireraent to procure the initial tractor. Additionally, the expected life of the D7 dictates replacement across the ten year planning horizon. Since replacement is necessary, the planner roust consider the present value cf the dollars spent in order for an equitable comparison to be made with the other alternatives. 01 2 The replacement schedule will be: 345 67 8 9 10 The present value coefficients will be: 8 8 PV1 = - _ = 3.5404 and PV2 = £o (1 + r) 1 ^ for i an even integer and r = .10. 77 --—j = 2.5404 ( I f r) 1 I Hiishleif er 1970J �D7 procurement cost: $32,916 [DA Supply Bulletin (SB) 700-200 197l] $ 2,400 [DA DCS, Logistics (LOG) $35,316 1971] (Appendix B) Itotal - Upper bound on the investment cost: 3.54 x $35,316=$125,019 Lower bound on the investment cost: 2.54 x $35,316=$ 89,703 (2) Investment cost for the Rome K/G blade and kit. The blade and kit have an expected life of one year in cosbat which means purchase from time zero to the end of year nine. 9 l Z 4 n i=0 i » 0,1,2, _. _ 6.759 where r = .10 and (1+r) ,8,9. Procurement cost: $ 7,623 Transportation to RVN: $ 900 Total = $ 8,523 [DA SB 700-200 fpA DCSLOG 197ij (Appendix B) Investment cost: 6.759 x $8,523 = $57,607. (3) Investment cost due to combat attrition. The Rome-equipped tractors of the 62d Engineer Battalion (Land Clearing) have experienced a 25 per cent attrition rate when engaged in tactical clearing. [Major Bennett] This would mean the replacement of the tractors and kits on a yearly basis. The present value "ill be: 9 PV4 = ) r = 5.759 where ~ (i+r)i i - 1,2,...,8,9. r « .10 and The investment cost for a UE is: 5.759 x .25 x ($35,316 + $8,523) = $63,117. 78 �(4) The total investment a-jrtorized over the planning horizon is §24,574 per year (U) and 521,043 per year ( ) L. b. Operating Cost (1) Hourly costs. Unless otherwise noted, the costs listed here come from the caterpillar Performance Handbook. Fuel: (Light Vegetation) 5.5 gal/hr x $.15/gal * $.83/hr (Medium Vegetation) 7.0 gal/hr x $.15/gal = $1.05Ar (Heavy Vegetation) 9.0 gal/lir x $.15/gal = $1.35/hr Lubricants and filters; $.33/hr. Tractor repairs: Using the Caterpillar repair factor, th« repair cost would be $4.60 per hour. However, a review of the data furnished by Major Bennett indicates that $7.00 per hour is a more realistic figure. Rome blade and kit repairs: $1.8Q/hr. 1 Major Bennett) Total hourly costs: Heavy vegetation Medium Vegetation Light Vegetation $10.48 $10.18 $9.96 (2) Daily corts. Operators' salaries: Security cost: Control cost: $55 (U) $130 $6 (U) $27 (L) (U) $80 (L) $4 (L) (Appendix B) 2. Daily Costs 1C = Yearly cost/365 days and OC = 8 hours/day x Hourly cost + Summation of Daily Costs. �Tab le V-lj Daily Costs (Dollars per Day) VEGETATION LOWER BOUND 1C OC UPPER BQUJJD SC 1C OC SC Light $58 $191 $249 $67 $271 $338 Medium $58 $193 $251 $67 $273 $340 Heavy $58 $195 $253 $67 $275 $342 3. Yearly Costs Investment cost: Operating coxtt 365 days/year x investment cost/day. 270 days/year* x Operating cost/day. * Tractors work 270 days per year (Section B ) . Table V-2: Yearly Costs (Dollird per Year) VEGETATION LOWER BOUND UPPER BOUND 1C OC SC 1C OC SC Light 21,043 51.570 72.613 24,574 73,170 97.744 Median 21,043 52,110 73,153 24.574 73,710 98,284 Heavy 21.043 52,650 73.693 24,574 74,250 96.824 D. EFFECTIVENESS CRITERIA AND COST-F-FFEfTIV'^SS MEASURES 1. EffectivenessCriteria a. KOE it 1 - "Area" This HOE considers the system's net effective- ness during a normal day's operation. The criteria takes into consideration the three classifications of vegetation and the two principal types of cuts. 80 �__, . . _ .. , Hours available Effectiveness Criterion = •- , •. —• Clearing rate Using the clearing rates from Table II-3, the effectiveness criteria for a UE can be obtained. Table V-3t Effectiveness Criteria for One Tractor (Acres per Day) VEGETATION AREA CLEARING STRIP CLEARING Light 20 13.33 Medium 10 6.15 Heavy 6.15 3,8 b. KOE # 2 - Constrained Cost Minimization Minimize the cost of clearing 6000 acres Subject to: Mission completion £ 30 days Assets required £ Ability of commander to supply In order to examine the performance of the land clearing operation under constrained cost rsiniraization, several additional assumptions are necessary: (1) Vegetation is either categorized as heavy or medium. (2) Area clearing is required. (3) Cost per day is based on 30 tractors in the unit although only 25 are operational. ( ) Land clearing cornpany has a high readiness 4 rating and security is provided by a cavalry troop (i.e., upper bound cost figures for heavy and medium area clearing will hold). Area clearing rates for a land clearing company 8t �with 25 of its 30 mediura tractors conducting sustained operations are: Heavy vegetation Medium vegetation 100 acres/day 250 acres/day j . Para 525-6 p 1970J 2. Cost-Effectiveness Measures a. KOE #1 Table V-4: Tactical Land Clearing ollars per Acre) VEGETATION AREA CLEARING STRIP CLEARING Lower Bound Upper Bound Lower Bcund Upper Bound Light $12 $17 $19 $25 Medium $25 $34 $41 $55 Heavy $41 $56 $66 $90 The raission categories must take into consideration the terrain sensitivity of this alternative. The Biinisuxn cost for both land clearing and crop destruction are those costs incurred during light area clearing while tl»e -axirouro costs for land clearing are those that occur tiurir.g heavy strip clearing (sasiRuiB costs for crop destruction come during light strip clearing). 82 �Table V-5: Cost-Effectiveness Measures forTactical Land Clearing (Dollars per Acre) MISSION MINIMUM MAXIMUM Land Clearing $12 $90 Crop Destruction* $12 $25 *fhe Rome-equipped tractor is lieited to areas where crops grow on trafficable terrain, This eliminates many paddy- grown crops from this type mission. b. MOB # 2 As pointed out previously, a medium land clearing company can clear 100 acres per day in heavy vegetation and 250 acres per day in medium vegetation. The time constraint on a 6,000 acre mission would require two companies working for 30 days in heavy vegetation and one company working for 24 days in medium vegetation. The cost per day for a company are: Heavy vegetation - $10,260 Medium vegetation - $10,200. The cost in_ doj-lar^ for this KOS is: UPPER BOUND: LOWER BOUND: E. $615,600 $244,800 PARAMETER SENSITIVITY 1. Utilization (Table V-6 A,B, & C) The tables show the variability in costs (dollars per acre) that occur in accordance with the operational 83 �hours per day of each vehicle. The tables indicate the importance of a high utilization factor, consistent with the operators' and support elements' ability to perform the required daily maintenance on the tractors. 2. Security (Table V-7A, B, & C) fluctuation in security cost demonstrates the effect on system cost when the commander varies his security posture from no protection to that equivalent of a reinforced armored cavalry troop. 84 �TABLE V-6As MAX COST - LAND CLEARING LYSIS - TACTICAL LAND CLEARING IIPMENT UTILIZATION - STRIP CLEARING Heavy- Clearing UTILIZATION {HOURS/DAY) R&DCOST 5.0 0.00 28.28 5.5 0.00 6.0 INVESTMENT COST C & M COST SYSTEM COST 102.14 130.42 25.71 94. a 6 120.57 0.00 23.57 88.79 112.35 6.5 0.00 21.75 83.65 105.40 7.0 0,00 20.20 79,35 99.45 7.5 0.00 18.85 75.43 9 4.20 8.0 0.00 17.67 72.09 89.77 8.5 0.00 16.63 69.15 85.78 9.0 0.00 15.71 66.53 82.24 9.5 0.00 14.88 64,18 79.07 10.0 00 .0 14.14 62.08 76.22 10.5 0.00 13.47 60. 17 73.63 11.C 0.00 12.85 58.43 71.29 11.5 0.00 12.30 56.85 69.14 12.0 0.00 11.78 55.40 67 . 18 GO ** �TABLE V-6BJ MAX. COST -CROP DESTRUCTION SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS - TACTICAL LAND CLEARING SENSITIVITY OF EQUIPMENT UTILIZATION - STRIP CLEARING Light Clearing LIZATION nm 5.0 5 .5 6.0 R ft.» COST INVESTMENT cor.T 9 *• M COBT, fYSTEty coa-tf 36.95 0.00 8.08 7.35 8 26 . 7 26 .79 0.00 6.73 25 .06 31.79 6.22 7. 0 0.00 0.00 5 .77 23 .59 22 .33 29.80 28. 10 7.5 0.00 5.39 21 .24 26.63 8.0 0.00 5.05 20 .29 25.34 8.5 0.00 4.75 19 . 4 4 24.20 9. 0 0. 0 0 4.49 18 .70 23.18 9.5 0.00 4.25 18 .03 22.28 10 .0 10 .5 0.00 0. 0 0 4.04 3.85 17 .42 16 . 8 8 21.46 20.73 11 .0 0 0. 0 3.67 16 .38 20.06 11 .5 0.00 3 .51 15 .93 19.44 12 .0 0.00 3 .37 15 ,52 18.88 6.5 0.00 34. 14 �TABLE V-6BJ MIN. COST - CROP DESTRUCTION AND LAND CLEARING SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS - TACTICAL LAND CLEARING ENSITIVITY OF EQUIPMENT UTILIZATION - AREA CLEARING Light Clearing INVESTMENT COST O & M COST SYSTEM COST 0.00 0.00 0.00 4.61 4.19 12.90 12.09 17.51 16.28 3.84 11.41 15.25 6.5 0.00 10. &* 7.0 0.00 3.55 3.29 10.35 14.39 13.64 7.5 0.00 3.07 9.93 13.00 8.0 0.00 2.88 9.55 12.44 8,5 0.00 9.0 0.00 2.71 2.56 9.23 8.94 11.94 11.50 9.5 0.00 8.67 11.10 10.0 0.00 2.43 2.31 8.44 10.75 10.5 0.00 2.20 10.42 11.0 0.00 2.10 8.23 8.03 11.5 0.00 2.01 7.86 9,86 12.0 0.00 1.92 7.70 9.62 UTILIZATION HOURS/DAY 5.0 5.5 6.0 3 R 6, n COST 10.13 �CHART V-l: SENSITIVITY OF TRACTOR UTILIZATION (System Cost (SC) in Dollars/Acre) S120-- S100- - SCO.. LAND C L E A R I N G S60 • • s-io.. S20. •4CROP /DEST. (L)- LC AND CD 1 5 6 1- 9 8 10 Utilization - (Hours/Bay) 88 11 T2 �TABLE V-7A: MAX. COST - LAND CLEARING SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS - TACTICAL LARD CLEARING SENSITIVITY OF SECURITY COST STRIP CLEARING Heavy Clearing SECURITY COSTS (S/DAY) SYSTEM COST ($/ACRE) 0. 55.64 10. 58.2? 20. 6.9 08 30. 63.52 40 6.4 61 50. 68.77 60. 71.39 70. 74.02 80. 76.64 90. 79.27 100. 81.89 110. 84.52 120. 87.14 130. 8.7 97 140. 92.39 150. 95.02 160. 97.64 170. 100.27 180. 102.89 190. 200. 105.52 108.14 89 �TABLE V-7B: MAX. COST - CROP DESTRUCTION SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS - TACTICAL LAND CLEARING SENSITIVITY OF SECURITY COST STRIP CLEARING Light Clearing SECURITY COSTS CS/DAY) SYSTEM COST ($/ACRE) 0. 15.59 10. 16.34 20. 17.89 30. 17.84 40. 18.59 50. 19.34 60. 20.09 70. 20.84 80. 21.59 90. 22.34 100. 23.09 110. 23.84 120. 24.59 130. 25.34 140. 26.09 150. 2.4 68 160. 27.89 170. 28.34 180. 29.09 190. 2.4 98 200. 30.59 90 �TABLE V-7C: MIN. COST - LANE) CLEARING AMD CROP DESTRUCTION SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS - TACTICAL LAND CLEARING SENSITIVITY OP SECURITY COST AREA CLEARING Light Clearing SYSTEM COST ($/ACREj SECURITY COSTS ($/DAY) 0 . 84 .4 1. 0 89 .4 20. 9.44 30. 9.94 4. 0 10.44 50. 1.4 09 6. 0 11.44 70. 11.94 8. 0 12.44 90. 1.4 29 100. 13.44 110. 13.94 120. 14.44 130. 14.94 140. 15.44 - 150. 15.94 160. 16.44 170. 16.94 180. 17.44 190. 17.94 200. 1.4 84 91 �VI. AHALYSIS OF "SLASH AND BURN" CLEARING A. ASSUMPTIONS 1. A crew consists of 45 men with one U.S. enlisted man as supervisor. All crew members are considered workerr since no allowance is made for any internal chain of command axaong the personnel. [ Mr. Underwood! 2. Payraant of the indigenous cutters is consistent with those rates paid in Military Region IV in the fall of 1970. 3. This type of clearing takes place in secure areas or where security is provided by units already engaged in major land clearing operations. 4. The U. S. units provide transportation for the workers to and from the clearing site. are drawn from current inventories. Tools for the cutters [Mr. Underwood I 5. Crops fall into the category of light vegetation. While the first four statements can be categorized a" "assumptions," they all have basis in fact. Mr. Elton Undersood of the Array's Engineer Strategic Studies Group verified these on a trip to RVN in May and June of 1971. The data he returned with contained detailed information on a U.S.-sponsored operation in An Kuyen Province on the Cau Mau Peninsula during the period September to December 1970. However, their inclusion as assumptions is- meant to preclude their being taken as policy for MACV as a Ahole. 92 �B. PARAMETERS 1. Tha utilization parameter will be in units of "hours per day." For this portion of the study, a utilization factor of eight hours per day and 270 work days per year will be used. This corresponds to the utilization rates of Chapter V. However, both of these inputs ar3 part of the working conditions that are agreed upon by the U.S. Civil Affairs office prior to hiring the civilian crews. 2. Ccst Bounds The bounds on each method of cutting and each type of vegetation are set by the maintenance and transportation costs. These costs can range from zero to some preset value. The cost for maintenance of the workers* tools and equipment will be set at five collars per crew per day. The transportation cost will be ten dollars per crew per day (based on the utilisation of two trucks for approximately one hour per day). C. COST ANALYSIS 1. Isolation of Relevant Costs The only costs incurred by this method of clearing are operating costs. The only investment cost would ba the procurement of tools, but by assumption # 4, these are sunk costs. a. Salaries Each man is paid 200 piasters per day and furnished one meal at a cost of 37 piasters per day. �JKr. Underwood! This amounts to approximately $.86 per man or $38.80 per crew per day based on the 197Q exchange rate of 275 piasters to one U. S. dollar. b. Supervision The opportunity cost for using one U. S. enlisted man as a supervisor is $10,000 per year or $27 per day. I Major Howe] c. Transportation In some cases, the crews could walk from their assembly points to the clearing sites. If this were not feasible, two trucks would be needed for approximately an hour each day to transport the crews. Cost: (Irt or zero ( ) L. $10/crew/day (Section Bj d. Maintenance Cost: $5/crew/day (U) or zero ( ) L. (Section B) 2. Daily Costs Daily cost = Crew salaries +• Supervision -f Transportation + Maintenance Upper Bound: $81 per crew per day Lower Bound: $66 per crew per day 3. Yearly Costs Yearly cost = 270 days/year x Cost per day Upper Bound: $21,870 per year Lower Bound: $17,820 per year 94 �D. EFFECTIVENESS CRITERIA AND COST-EFFECTIVENESS MEASURES 1. Effectiveuess Criteria a. HOE # 1 - "Area" This MOE presents the system's net effectiveness during a normal day's operation. Since this alternative is sensitive to the three classifications of vegetation and two types of clearing (strip and area), six criteria will be determined. , Hours available x Crew size Effectiveness Criterion (EC, —€iearjLng Rate The clearing rates are obtained from Table II-4. For light area clearing: „, EC = 8 hr/dav x 45 men . „„ ., -£—« = 2.88 acres/day 125 roan-hours/acre Table VI-1: Crew EffectivenessCriteria (Acres per Day) VEGETATION AREA CLEARING Light 2.68 3.6 Medium 1.0 1.3 .5 .5 Heavy b. STRIP CLEARING MOE # 2 - Constrained Cost Minimization Minimize the cost of clearing 6,000 acres Subject to: Mission completion 1 30 days Personnel and equipment required 1 Ability of Local Area to Supply 95 �Several assumptions are necessary to complete the examination of this MQE: (1) The vegetation is either medium or heavy. (2) Method of clearing will be "area" type. 2. Cost-Effectiveness Measures a. MOB f 1 Cost-Effectiveness Measure = Cos t/crew/day •- For area clearing in light vegetation ( ) U: $81/crev/day 2.88 acres/day = ?28 Per acre' Similar calculations yield the following tablei Table VI-2: "Slash and Burn" Clearing liars per Acre) AREA CLEARING STRIP CLEARING Lower Bound Upper Bound Lover Bound Upper Bound Light $23 $28 $18 $23 Medium $64 $79 $51 $63 $147 $180 $147 $180 VEGETATION Heavy If these costs are to be depicted by mission categories, the vegetation classifications and the method of clearing must be encompassed by the maximum and minimum limits. Although this gives a large interval for the costs to be within, the review must ren>en±>er that vegetation removal by ground personnel and equipment is extremely sensitive to the type of terrain which the work is being conducted in. 96 �Table VT-3: Cost-Effectiveness Measures for "Slashand Burn" Clearing (Dollars per Acre) MISSION MINIMUM MAXIMUM Land Clearing $18 $180 Crop Destruction $18 $ 28 b. MOE # 2 In order to analyze this program, one nmst first look at the constraints. In medium vegetation, a crew of 45 can only clear one acre per day. The size of the operation dictates that at least 200 acres must be cleared per day in order to meet the 30 day time constraint. This would mean 200 crews or 9,000 men would have to be hired. It is doubtful that the host government could supply or the U. S. units could secure that many workers. Hence, this method of clearing is considered infeasible for a large scale land clearing operation. E. PARAMETER SENSITIVITY Since indigenous cutters are paid by the day, it would be important to examine the cost fluctuation over a range of possible utilization factors. As might be expected by noting the units of the clearing rr-tes (man-hours per acre), changing the utilization factor from the established eight hours p*1'" uay results in a large cost variation. This shows the importance of negotiating a work agreement that insures enough "time on the job." It also amplifies the costs 97 �incurred if the cutters' pick-up point were far from the clearing site, causing an excessive amount of transportation time to jecrease the crew utilization, or if the supervisor were unable to motivate his crew. TABLE VI-4: VEGETATION REMOmi> SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS....SLASH AND BUBM CLEARING SENSITIVITY OF CREW UTILIZATION.. .ARES. BURNING (Heavy Clearing) UTILIZATION (HOURS/DAY) MAXIMUM SYSTEM COST i^/^C&E) 5.0 $288.61 5.5 6.0 6.5 7.0 7.5 8.0 262.37 240.51 222.01 206.15 192.41 180.38 8.5 9.0 169.77 151.90 10.0 10.5 11.0 144.31 131.43 131.19 SENSITIVITY OP CREW UTILIZATION STRIP CLEARING (Light Clearing) UTILIZATION MAXIMUM S1STEM COST 29.41 26.74 24.61 22.63 21.01 5.0 5.5 6.0 6.5 7.0 7.5 19.61 8.0 18.38 8.5 9.0 9.5 10.0 10.5 11.0 17.30 16.34 15.48 14.71 14.01 13.37 98 �TABLE VI-5; CROP DESTRUCTION SENSITIVITY AKALYSIS... .SLASH AKD BURN CLEARING SENSITIVITY OF CREW UTILIZATION.. .AREA CLEARING (Light Clearing) UTILIZATION (HOURS/DAY) MAXIMUM SYSTEM COST (S/ACRE) 5.0 5.5 60 . 6.5 4.0 51 41.00 37.58 3.9 46 32.21 30.06 28.18 26.53 25.05 23.73 22.55 21.47 20.50 70 . 7.5 80 . 8.5 90 . 9.5 10.0 10.5 11.0 SENSITIVITY OP CREW UTILIZATION.. STRIP CLEARING (Light Clearing) UTILIZATION MAXIMUM SYSTEM COST 29.41 26.74 24.51 22.63 21.01 19.61 18.38 17.30 16.34 15.48 14.71 14.01 13.37 5.0 5.5 60 . 6.5 7.0 7.5 8.0 8.5 90 . 9.5 10.0 10.5 11.0 99 �VII. ANALYSIS OF FIREBOMBING v A. ASSUMPTIONS 1. Firebombing is conducted with the C-raodel medium helicopter (CH-47C - "Chinook"). 2. Each sortie has an expected d^jration of one-half hour. I LTC Ruirowj 3. A flight over a given target consists of one CH-47C. j LTC Rudrow J 4. Salvaged slings and salvaged 55-gallon drums are used in the drops. M-4 fue:l thickener is mixed with gasoline to form a six per cent solution of thickened fuel. j DA TC 3-336 1965 j Twenty drums will be carried on one mission (or more common terminology, one "drop"). [LTC RudrowJ 5. The number of missions over a target area is dependent on the requirement to have a .90 probability of success from one or more drops. 6. When available, security forces consist of two AH-1G arnied helicopters. However, unlike herbicide missions with the UH-1, firebombing missions will not be flown unless one AH-lG is present. One OH-6A or OH-58A light observation helicopter will provide the necessary control. [LTC RudrowJ 100 �B. PARAMETERS 1. Flying Hours Initially, the flying hours for the CH-47 that will be used as basis for the analysis will be the saiae as the other aerial systems. A mission duration of one-half hour implies that the helicopter will fly 100 sorties per month in order to reach the specified 600 flying hours per year. However, like the UH-1 helicopter, this is below the CH-47's programmed limit of flying (720 hours per year) in an active combat environment. |DA FM 101-20 1970 J The effects of this difference will be examined in a sensitivity analysis of the sortie generation rate in Section E. 2. CostBounds The bounds on the mission costs are obtained by the variation cf the security and control posture that often results during normal employment. Control of a drop is accomplished by a representative of the ground commander in an LOH. However, if the Chinook pilots are familiar with the mission and the AO, the presence of the LOH is unnecessary. Under normal operating conditions, security is provided by two AH-lG helicopters. The lower cost bound is reached when only one armed helicopter is used. The use of one "Cobra," even under die most austere conditions, is due to the vulnerability and lack of maneuverability of the CH-47. 101 �C. COST ANALYSIS 1. Isolation of Relevant Costs The only costs incurred by this method of vegetation removal are those that are categorized as operating costs. The procurement of the CH-47 is treated as a sunk cost since the helicopter is diverted from normal lift missions to conduct firebombing operations. a. 0 & M cost is rated at 15 per cent of the procurement cost of the helicopter, j Mr. Donaldson! The w» *i procurement cost for the CH-47C is $1,536,424. 700-200 197l] O & M cost: b. Crew salaries: [DA SB $230,000 per ycir. Crew consists of two officers and one enlisted roan. [DA FM 101-20 1970] Total cost: $38,000 per year. (Major Howe] c. Security forces: $200 per mission (U}-2 AH-lG's. $100 per mission (L)-1 AH-lG. (Appendix A) d. Control: $ 25 per mission (U) 0 (Appendix C) e. Thickened fuel: (L) $163 per mission. (Appendix C) 2. Mission Cost SC = (O & M cost + Salaries) Number of Missions/Year + Security cosfc + Control cost + Agent cost Cost per Mission LOWER BOUND UPPER BOUND $ 486 $ 611 102 �3. Yearly Costs The yearly cost is extremely sensitive to the input parameters. This, coupled with the fact that the CH-47 would never be solely employed for fireborabing missions, diminishes its importance. Cost per Year I^JWER BOUND UPPER BOUND $583,200 D. $733.200 EFFECTIVENESS CRITERIA AND COST-EFFECTIVENESS MEASURES 1. Effectiveness Criteria a. MOE t 1 - "Area" The effectiveness of any one mission is contingent upon many variables. The condition of the vegetation, weather, scattering effect of the incendiary fuel, and the probability of detonation of the drura cluster require that the evaluation of effectiveness be accomplished with a probabalistic model. An appropriate model would be a two or three dimensional fragmenting projectile model. However, this would require the determination of a lethality function and directional variances of the bursting radii of the cluster just to obtain a conditional single drop probability of burn (pB). Since this data was not available, a model was used. The probability statement is: Prob Fire burns 50 acres in one or raore drops (missions) when n drops are made 103 = Prob(pB,n) = . 0 9. �This uses the data from assumption # 5 and has the implicit assumption that 50 acres will be burned per B drops (missions). Prob(pB,n) = 1 - (1 - pB)n where pB is the probability that 50 acres are burned on any particular drop. Inherent in this model are the assumptions that: (1) pB is the same for all drops. (2) There is statistical independence between drops (or no information is gained from one mission to the other). An evaluation of n for Prob(pR,n) £ . 0 yields: 9 PB n .2 10 .3 7 .918 .4 5 .922 .5 4 .3 98 .6 3 .936 .7 2 .1 9 .8 2 .6 9 .9 1 . 9 Prob(pB,n) . fapp) 9 For this portion of the analysis, PQ = .4, which will necessitate five drops or missions to insure a .9 probability of burning 50 acres on at least one of the five drops. b. KOE # 2 - Constrained Cost Minimization Minimiza the cost of burning 6,000 acres 104 �Subject to: Mission completion £ 30 days Assets required £ Local command supply capability Two CH-47 helicopters would be required to fly ten sorties per day for 30 days in order to be 90 per cent sure that this method would burn off 6,000 acres. Like aerial delivery of herbicides in the UH-1 constrained cass, this represents a significant drain on the area's aviation asset*:, Few commanders could afforci such a program due to the important role the "Chinook" plays in combat support and combat service support operations in an insurgency conflict. For this reason, it is felt that the second constraint is violated, and thus, the alternative is infeasible. The area would have to be reduced significantly for firebombing to be a viable alternative. 2. Cost-Effectiveness Measures N x Mission Cost System Cost = ; where N = the 50 acres/mission nuraber of missions (drops). No differentiation is made between crop destruction and foliage removal for this alternative. The reviewer should not overlook the problems encountered in RVK when attempts tfere made to burn large caches of dry rice. Therefore, live rice and other paddy-type crops would be virtually impervious to destruction by firebombing. 105 �Tafcle tfll-1: Cost-Sffecti mess Measures for FireboiBbing (DolJ ;:s per Acre) MINIMUM $49 E. MAXIMUM $61 PARAMETER SENSITIVITY 1. Sensitivity ofSortie GenerationRate (Table VII-2J Table VII-2 indicates that the number of missions flown per month has relatively little effect on the cost of burning an acre. iMs is due to the fact that only $223 per mission are subject to fluctuations caused by a variable sortie rate. (Mission cost vectorj ($611, $456).) The remainder of the costs are caused by security, control, and fuel costs and these are based OE a flat rate per sission. 2. Sensitivity of Probability of Burn on any Single Drop (pB) (Table VII-3) T*»is testing shows the effect of varying the single drop probability of burn over a reasonable range of values, In actual operations, pB would law- a tendency to be at the lower end of this spectrum rather tfian the higher. 3. Sensitivity of Security tests (Table VII-4) These parameter values raage from zero to the cost that would be ir-urred if three escort heliccpters accompanied the mission. 106 �TABLE VII-2 SENSITIVITY AKM.YSIS - FIREBOMB ING WITH CH-47 SENSITIVITY OP SORTIE GENERATION R .TE ($/ACRE) SORTIES PER MO. HOURS PER YEAR SYSTEM COST MIN. SYSTEM COST MAX. 78. 470. 54.81 67.31 80; 480. 54.22 66.72 82. 490. 53.65 66.15 83. 500. 53.10 65.60 85. 510. 52.57 65.07 87. 520. 52.07 64.57 88. 530. 51.58 64.08 90. 540. 51.11 63.61 92. 550. 50.66 63.16 93. 560. 50.23 62.73 95. 570. 49.81 62.31 97. 580. 49.40 61.90 98. 590. 49.01 61.51 100. 600. 48.63 61.13 102. 610. 48.27 60.77 103. 620. 47.91 60.41 105. 630. 47.57 60.07 107. 640. 47.24 59 74 108. 650. 46.92 59.42 110. 660. 46.60 59.10 112. 670. 46.30 58.80 113. 660. 46.01 58.51 115. 690. 45.72 58.22 117. 700. 45.44 57.94 118. 710. 45.17 57.67 120. 720. 44.91 57.41 107 �TABLE VII-3 SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS - FIREBOKBING WITH CH-47 SENSITIVITY OF PROBABILITY OP BURN ON ONE DROP (§/Acre) # OF DROPS 10. 8. 7. 6. 5. 4. 4. 3. 3. ' 3. 2. 2. 2. 2. 1. P. SYSTEM COST MIK. 0.20 0.25 0.30 0.35 0.40 0.45 0.50 0.55 0.60 0.65 0.70 0.75 0.80 0.85 0.90 97.27 77.81 68.09 58.36 48.63 38.91 38.91 29.18 29.18 29.18 19.45 19.45 19.45 19.45 9.73 SYSTEM COST KAX. 122.27 97.81 65.59 73.36 61.13 48.91 48.91 36.68 36.68 36.68 24.45 24.45 24.45 24.45 12.23 TABLE VII-4 SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS - FIREBOMBISG WITH CH-47 SENSITIVITY OF THE SECURITY COSTS ($/Acre) SECURITY COSTS ($/MSN) SYSTEM COST MIK. SYSTEM COST KAX. 0. 25. 50. 75. 100. 38.63 41.13 43.63 46.13 48.63 41.13 43.63 46.13 48.63 51.13 125. 51.13 53.63 150. 175. 200. 225. 250. 275. 300. 53.63 56.13 58.63 61.13 63.63 66.13 68.63 56.13 58.63 61.13 63.63 66.13 68.63 71.13 108 �VIII. INSIGHTS AND CONCLUSICTIS The need for defoliation and crop destruction is a direct result of the tropical growth, clinate, and peculiarities of insurgency warfare. It would be difficult to imagine the necessity of these measures in a conventional war in a barren country like the Republic of Korea or in many areas of Western Europe. Conventional war raises the additional security problem of antiair protection and the costs incurred to insure local air superiority. These and other problems of the "linear war" have not been considered here. Hence, ths conclusions drawn froa this study are applicable only to those parts of the world affected by certain climates, vegetation, and the press4-7 needs of con&ating an eneasy insurgent. A. RESULTS OF TEE ANALYSIS 1. MOE # 1 The first measure of effectiveness attempted to focus on each system's performance capability. A complete display of the results allows a better comparison of the alternatives. Table VIII-1: Cost-Effectiveness Vectors for KOE * 1 (Dollars per Acre) IGLIAGE REMOVAL HERBICIDES UC-123 UH-1H TACTICAL LAND CLEARING "SLASH AKD BURN" FIREBOMB ING MAX. $47 $35 $90 $180 $61 MIN. $3S $27 $12 $ 18 $49 109 �CROP DESTRUCTION HERBICIDES UC-123 UH-1H TACTICAL LAND CLEARING "SLASH AND BURiT, FIREBOMBING §29 MIN. $17 $25* §28 $61* $10 $ 5 $12* $18 $49* *Not appropriate where rice is the staple of the diet. Table V-5) (See Tactical land clearing and "slash and burn" clearing show considerable variability in their maximum and minimum cost limits. This is due to the terrain sensitive nature of both systems. This, coupled with the different clearing results (one improves vertical surveillance while the other improves both vertical and horizontal surveillance), makes comparison with aerial-supported methods difficult. If comparisons are made within aerial categories and within ground categories for each mission type, dominance can be used to eliminate some vectors, since the maximum and minimum limits for these two groups of systems are caused by the same factors. FOLIAGE REMOVAL Aerial Systems UH-1 Ground Systems "Rome Plow" MAX. $35 $90 MIN. $27 $12 When tactical land clearing and firebocibing are eliminated as alternatives for crop destruction, herbicide delivery by UH-1 dominates all other vectors. 110 �2. HOE # 2 This measure of effectiveness attempted to amplify which system(s) could meet a rigorous set of hypothetical combat conditions. The program format was: Minimize the cost of defoliating/clearing 6.000 acres Subject to: (1) Mission accomplishment in 30 days ( ) A reasonable amount of assets to 2 complete the task. The major additional assumptions stated: ( ) Spraying (using Agent ORANGE) must be 1 accomplished within five days. ( ) The vegetation is either medius or heavy and 2 area clearing is required. (3) Ground systems are considered to be in a high state of readiness. Table VIII-2: Cost Minimization vectors for Foliage Removal ( 0 0 acres) with Tice and Resource Constraints 60 (Costs in Dollars) Herbicides UC-123K Tactical Land Clearing IU) $272,100 §615,600 (L) $227,900 $244,800 **Infeasible alternatives are not shown. The preceding table shows that only two alternatives can meet a stringent set of combat conditions. Ill �More important than the actual dollar costs is the relative cost difference between the tvro systems. By looking at this change in the cost minimization vectors, it is possible to examine the incremental costs incurred to vgain another dimension in surveillance capability. A defoliation mission usually improves only vertical surveillance. Although roost of the leaves are off the vegetation, the trees and undergrowth remain to restrict visual and electronic surveillance frcru the ground- a tactical land clearing operation removes all vegetation and thus produces a horizontal capability ai well as the vertical. It can also be assumed that an area which has been subjected to land clearing restricts enemy movement and channelizes his movement far more th?Jt the same defoliated terrain. B. INSIGHTS In order to check the information of Table ¥111-2 is not biased by the scale of the operation, the mission size can be restricted. By reducing the area by 50 per cent, another set of cost minimization vectors can be obtained. The assumptions of KOE # 2 are maintained with the exception of having the UC-123 flights ran^e from two to five aircraft. Table VIII-3: Cost Minimization Vectors forVegetation -.emoval of 3,000 Acres (Costs in Dollars) HERBICIDES UH-1 TACTICAL LAKD UC-123 CLEARIKG (U) ?100,700 $136,050 $307,800 (L) $ 80,700 $112,930 $112,400 112 �(Firebombing would be feasible only if the area were less than 1,000 acres.) The relaxation of mission requirements indicates that the UE-1 defoliation system is minimum cost system and for this program dominates the other alternatives. However, the figures do not show the faster mission accomplishment rate of the UC-123 or the complete clearance capability of the D7 tractor equipped with the Rome K/G clearing blads. In order to gain isore insight into the problem of distinguishing between the systems, a "conanen mission" vector can be obtained for each alte .'native. This vector attempts to show the cost per acre for foliage removal under conditions that are most likely to occur in a counterinsurgency situation. It differs from the results of Table VIII-1, which were oriented toward optimistic and pessimistic estimates, in that it can be considered to be the "best estimate." The conditions making up the "coirjrson mission" are: 1. Defoliation/foliage removal operation (far more cciCTon than crop destruction). 2. The vegetation is classified as medium or heavy since thicker terrain is more valuable to the enemy for use as sanctuaries, staging areas, hospitals, and base carcps. 3. Clearing is limited to area type since strip clearance is restricted to vegetation removal (anti-arabush measures) along lines of cocnunication. 113 �4. Defoliation systems use Agent ORANGE since it is faster acting than WHITS but not as persistent. 5. Land clearing units have two operators per tractor and the optimum security and control available. Reference: Table IV-6A, Table V-4, Table VI-2, and Table VII-1. Table VIII-4: Common Mission Vectors (Dollars/Acre) HSRBICIDES UH-1 UC-123 TACTICAL LAND CLEARING "SLASH AKD BURN" PIREBOKBING () U $34 $45 $56 $180 $61 () L $27 $36 $34 $ 79 $49 Again, herbicide delivery by UH-1 helicopter dominates "*-il other alternatives. These results serve to confirm the findings shown in Tables VIII-1 through VIII-3. C. CONCLUSIONS The cost-effectiveness measures obtained in this study through the evaluation of the two measures of effectiveness indicate that a force mix of herbicide aircraft and land clearing tractors woyldrocs'-likely provide a costeffective solution to the foliage removal/crop destruction missions faced during counterinsurgency operations in an RVN-type environment, especially when one takes into account that horizontal and vertical vision is desirable. However, this is not meant to exclude the employment of fireboxr£>ing or "slash and burn" clearing %\?hen the other systems are not available to do the job. 114 �The ratio of the force-mix must be determined through further examination of the problem. The decision to use the UH-1, UC-123, or both as herbicide delivery systems would depend on the intensity of the conflict, the commitment of U.S. assets, and the desired flexibility of the over-all force structure. Certainly the helicxpter provides more flexibility since it can be used for «any other combat support tasks, fhe UC-123 accomplishes its mission at a much faster rate but is entirc-ly cojiiBitted to aerbicide operations since its configuration does not lend itself to easy modification. Likewise, the aaount of tractors and their desired organization (sections, companies, battalions) would be a function of the increased costs that the decision maker might be willing to accept to gain tJie benefit of a two dimensional '.surveillance capability. If the results of this study are to be useful in the allocation of funds to foliage removal/crop destruction missions, the decision maker must develop a detailed situation estimate and employment model. This would include a threat analysis of enemy forces and capabilities, an estimate of friendly forces and objectives, and a contingency analysis of possible commitment areas. If this were accomplished and if an RVN- type environment were encountered in the scenario, then the results of this study nay be applicable in determining a proper mix of systens to effectively accomplish these two combat support missions. 115 �APPENDIX A DETAILED HERBICIDE COSTS A. UC-123K 1. yearly operating cost for a squadron in Pacific Air Force (PACAF); [captain Wallace^ Direct element Modification/spares Maintenance - Operating Support Equipment Personnel § .5 million $1.7 million $ .1 million $2.9 million $5.2 million Major support commands Base operating Depot Maintenance $ .7 million $1.2 million $1.3 million other $3.2 million TOTAL = $8.4 million This figure is for 12 aircraft. Thus the operating cost for one aircraft is $700,000 per year. 2. Modification costs a. [Hiss LuckyJ Installation of the Hayes AA-45 system. Total of 51 aircraft modified. $1.4 million $ .3 million $ .2 million $1.9 million b. Hardware Installation Initial Spares Engine modification. $36.1 $11,2 $ 8.1 $55.4 million million million million 116 Total of I .3 aircraft. Hardware Initial spares Installation �c. Armor plating. Total of 31 aircraft. §400,000 $100,000 $100,000 $600.000 B. Hardware Initial spares Installation UH-1H Security costs for UH-1 herbicide missions. flying hour costs for AH-lG: $64 per hour 1970J or $32 per mission. Direct [DA FM 101-20 If approximately $70 were allowed for munitions and salaries of pilots, the cost of one AH-lG on a security escort mission would be $100. 117 �APPENDIX B DETAILED COSTS FOR TACTICAL LAND CLEARING A. Cost of lubricants and filters. The Caterpillar Performance Handbook (Sec. 21, p. 5) gives a quick estimate of $.26 per based on oil at $1 per U.S. gallon, grease at $.20 per pound, EP oil at $1.10 per U.S. gallon, and filters at U.S. Consumer's List Prices. Under heavy operating conditions, these costs increase by 25 per cent. B. Typical repair costs over a two-year period for medium tractor and Rome kit Number 5 2 1 5.5 18 2.5 1.2 2 C. in RVN: Major Bennett] Eguipr;.3nt Unit Cost Total Cost Engir/5 Transmissions Winch Cabs Cutting Blades Blades Radiators Track assembly $6,129 $4,498 $4,750 $1,600 $ 278 $1,887 $1,200 $1,249 $30,645 $ 8,996 $ 4,750 $ 8,800 $ 5,004 $ 4,718 $ 1,440 $ 2,498 $66,850 Security cdsts are based on the approximate field strengths of an armored cavalry troop and a aechanized infantry rifle company ( ) -. Usually, the trocp will field approximately 130 to 140roei.while the infantry company would have between 100 and 120 men. The cavalry troop would have 20 or more tracked vehicles and tbe infantry unit would have 10 to 15. 118 �D. Costs for a light observation helicopter are based on direct flying hour costs of $30 per hour. JDA FM 101-20 1970] E. Transportation Cost to RVN: Shipping, Surface General Cargo ($/Ton) Line Haul within U.S. Port Handling, West Coast Ocean Shipping " Port Handling, RVN Other " D7 Tractor: Rome kit and blade: Equipment weights: $40 $21 $72 $14 $3 $150 per Ton jpCSLOG 1971] 16 tons x $150/ton = $2400 6 tons x $150/ton = $ 900 JMr. Soules I. 119 �APPENDIX C DETAILED COSTS FOR FISIS3MBING A, Control costs are based on direct hour flying costs of the LOH which are $30 per hour. JJ3A FM 101-20 197o[| This coupled with the pilot's salary and Use ground commander's representative yields a control cost cf $25 per mission. B. Thickened Fuel: Pounds of M4 Thickener Headed for XJmrious Blends of Thickened Fuel Gallons of Gasoline 4% «3& 8% 40 5 ?% 10 50 6% 1§ 13% [DA tC 3-366 1965J Ten pounds of M4 thickener are used with each druo (55 gallon) of gasoline. M4 thickener costs $1.30 per 20 pound can. 1971 ] Using a cost of $.15 per gallon j~DA SB 700-200 of gasoline, a drum of thickened fuel «^osts $8.15. $8.IS/drum x 20 drums/mission = 5163 per mission 120 �APPENDIX D: DATA SOURCES The personnel listed in this appendix contributed in the assembly of data for the study. The contributions and the office/address (as of June 1971) are listed as documentation. 1. Aerial delivery of herbicides. Mr. Carlton W. Carter: USAF Deputy Chief of Staff (DCS), Systems and Logistics (S & L), Washington, D. C. Costs of herbicides to include transportation and storage. a. UC-123K (1) Miss Joyce B. Lucky: USAF ODCS, S & L, Washington, D. C. UC-123 codification costs for engine modifications, spray systera, and armor plating. (2) captain James A. Wallace, USAF: Office of the Coiaptroller of the Air Force, Washington, D. C. Procurement and operating costs for the UC-123K. (3) Major Robert Pyatt, USAF: ODCS, Plans and Operations {Special Operations Division), Washington, D. C. General information about herbicide operations. (4) Major Peter D. Hidalgo, USA: Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development (OACSFCR), Washington, D. C. Verification of sortie duration and sortie generation rates. (5) LTC Kenneth M. Cooper, USAF: ODCS. S & L, Washington, D. C. Operating cost for A-1E. 121 �(6) LTC Arthur L. Monahan, USAF: Washington. D. C. (7) ODCS, S & L, Munition costs for FAC's. Major John D. Sins, USAF: Resources, Washington, D. C. ODCS, Programs and Hourly operating costs for the OV-10 and A-1E. b. UH-1: (1) LTC Manuel L. Sanches and LTC Robert G. Rudrow, USA: OACSFOR, Washington, D. C. Aerosol system and capa- city, attrition rates, security configurations, mission duration, and system coverage. (2) Mr. F. X. Donaldson: OACSFOR, Washington, D. C. Maintenance factors and expected life of UH-1. ( ) Mr. Drake: Operations Manager, Agricultural 3 Aviation Engineering Company, 1333 Patrick Lane, Las Vegas, Nevada, S9109. AGAVENCO System: Cost, size, maintenance factor, and capacity. (4) Major Robert Howe, USA: Engineer Strategic Studies Group, Washington, D. C. Personnel salaries costs and transportation costs for the AGAVENCO. 2. Tactical Land Clearing. a. Major Richard Bennett, USA: Engineer Strategic Studies Group (ESSG), Washington, D. C. 07 tractor and Rome kit repair costs and rates. b. Mr. Jim Guthrie: Supervisor of Defense services Section, caterpillar Tractor Company, Peoria, Illinois. General information about the Caterpillar tractor. 122 �c. Mr. J. T. Soules: Vice President of International Department, Rome **low Company, Cedartown, Georgia. General information about the Rome clearing blade and kit. 3. "Slash and burn" Clearing. Mr. Elton Underwood: ESSG, Washington. D. C. Payaent rates for indigenous clearing crews and verification of clearing rates.__ 4. Firebopbing. LTC Robert G. Rudrow, USA: OACSFOR, Washington, D. C. Security, control, equipment, and duration of the missions. 123 �BIBLIOGRAPHY Some sources listed in this bibliography are classified. However, the information used in this study came from unclassified sections of these documents. 1. American Ersbassy, Report on theHerbicide Policy Review (U) , ySOlil'IDttft'PBf, Saigon, August 1968. 2. Augusta, Joseph H, and Snyder, Christopher L., Defense Planning In A High Inflation Economy, paper presented at 26th Military operations Research Symposium, Monterey, California 17-18 Kovember 1970. 3. Boffey, Philip M., "Herbicides in Vietnam: AAAS Study Finds Widespread Devastation," Science, v. 171, p. 43-47, 8 January 1971. 4. Caterpillar Tractor Coir.pany, Peoria, Illinois, The Caterpillar Performance Handbook, e«I. I, section 21, Deceirber 1970. 5. Cook, Robert E., Haseltine, William, and Galston, A. W., "What Have We Done to Vietnam?" The new Republic, p. 18-21, 10 January 1971. 6. "Defoliants-A Closed Case?" 15 January 1971. 7. Department of the Air Force, Air Force Manual 172-3, USAF Planning Factors (U), iTi'll lliliLll Hi . H Washington, 'i D. C., 31 March 1971. 8. Department of the Army, 18th Engineer Brigade, APO San Francisco 96307, Demonstration and Testing in Vietnam, July-August 1966. • Commonweal, p. 363-364, 9. , DA PAH 525-6, Lessons Learned - Land Clearing, p. 23-79, Washington, D. C,, June 1970. 10. , DCS Logistics, Transportation Analysis Division, Budget Cost Factors for Cargo Movements, p. 1-3, Washington, D. C., 15 July 1971. 124 �11. , Fact Sheet.- Personnel Investnsant Costs, Washington, D. C., 12 October 1971. 12. , FM 101-20, united States Army Aviation Planning Manual (U), CONFIDENTIAL, p. 1-10, p. 4-2 4-3, Washington, D. C., August 1970. 13. , SB 700-200, Array Adopced/Other Selected Items and List ofReportable Items, p. 2-355 - 2-358. Washington, D. C., December 1970. 14. , TC 3-16. Employment of Riot Control Agents, Flame, Smoke, Ahtiplant Agents, and Personnel De tec tors in Co untergue r r ilia opera t ions, p. 62 - 81, Washington, D. C., April 1969. 15. , TC 3-366, Flame FueIs, p. 3 - 5, p. 8 - 13. Washington, D. C., July 1965. 16. Directorate, Tactical Evaluation, Project CHECO Southeast Asia F°p^rt July 1961 - June 1967 (u), SECRET, Headquarters pacific Air Force, 11 October 1967. 17. Downs, E. D. and Scrivner, J. H., De fo1iat ion Opera tions in Southeas t Asia (U), SECRET, Maxwell AFB, Alabama, 1970. 18. Fisher, Gene H., Cost Considerations in Systems Analysis. p. 63-118, American Elsevier Publishing Co.. 1971. 19. Gonzales, Arturo F., "Defoliation - A Controversial U.S. Mission in Vietnam," Data, v. 13, p. 12-15, October 1968. 20. Goodell, Hon. Charles E. (New York), U.S., Congress, Senate, Congressional Record, 91st Cong., 2d sess., S-1574-S-1580. 21. Headquarters, 62d Engineer Battalion, APO San Francisco 96491, Letter, Subject: "Ea^ic Land Clearing Briefing," February 1971. 22. , Letter, Subject: "Narrative to Accompany Slide Briefing, 11 April 1971. 23. Headquarters, 169th Engineer Battalion, APO San Francisco, Letter, Subject; "Land Clearing Test Program Completed, 16 August 1971. �24. Hersh, Seymour M. , Chemical and Bio log-teal Warfare America's Hidden Arsenal, p. 144-167, Bobbs -Merrill Company, 1968. 25. Heyroont, I. and others, A Guide for Reviewers of Studies Containing Cost Effectiveness Analysis, Research Analysis Corporation, July 1965. 26. Hirshleifer, J. , Investment, Interest, and Capital, p. 48-49, Prentice-Hall, 1970. 27. House, W. B. and others. As sesstnen t o f Ecolog ical Effects of Extensive or Repeated Use of Herbicides, p. 1-72 and p. 108-150, Midwest Research Institute, 30 November 1967. 28. Kastenroeier, Hon. Robert W. (Wisconsin)* U.S., Congress, House, "Ecological Destruction in Vietnam," Congressional Record - Extension of Remarks, 92d Cong., 1st sess., E-22SC - E-2293. 29. Lewallen, John, Ecology of Devastation; p. 58-94, Penguin Books, 1971. Indochina, 30. McCarthy, Richa7.-d p. , The ultimate Folly, p. 75-98, Alfred A. Knopf/ 1971. 31. McConnell, Arthur F. (LTC, USAF) , "Mission: Ranch Hand," Air University Review, p. 89-94, v. 21, n. 2, JanuaryFebruary 19^0. 32. Nelson, Hon. Gay lord (Wisconsin), U.S., Congress, Senate, "Environmental Warfare," congressional Record , 91st Cong., 2d sess., S-14217-S-14230. 33. Office of Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Systems Analysis') , Southeast Asia Analysis Report - March/April 1971 (U) , SECRET, p. 35-36 and p. 41-43, Washington, D. C., 14 May 1971. 34. Orians, Gordon H. and Pfeiffer, E. W. , "Ecological Effects of the Wai in Vietnam," Science, v. 168, p. 544-554, 1 May 1970. 35. _ , and _ , "Mission to Vietnam - Part I," Scientific Research, v. 4, p. 22-30, 9 June 1969. 36. _ , and _ , "Mission to Vietnam - Part II," Scientific Research, v. 4, p. 26-30, 23 June 1969. 126 �37. Rome plow company, cedartown, Georgia, Land Clearing Equipment for Vietnam, p. 1-5, 22 April 1966. 38. , Presentationto U. S. Army - Equipment for Land Clearing in Vietnam, p. 108, 9 February 1966. 3S. , Salesgraro; Guide for Estimating Production with Rome K/G Clearing Blade, 1 September 1971. 40. , Military Applications of the Rome K/G Clearing Blade, November 1971. 41. Tschirley, Fred H., "Defoliation in Vietnam," Science, v. 163, p. 779-786, 21 February 1969. 42. U.S. Anxsy Combat Developments Command (USACDC), Table of Organization and Equipment 5-87T - Engineer Land Clearing Company, Fort Belvoir, Virginia, 7 February 1969. 43. Westing, Arthur H., "Ecocide in Indochina," Natural History, v. 80. p. 56-60, March 1971. 44. Young, Hon. Stephen K. (Ohio), U. S., Congress, Senate, Congressional Record. 91st Cong., 2d sess., S-21486 S-21488. 127 �� Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Alvin L. Young Collection on Agent Orange Description An account of the resource <p style="margin-top: -1em; line-height: 1.2em;">The Alvin L. Young Collection on Agent Orange comprises 120 linear feet and spans the late 1800s to 2005; however, the bulk of the coverage is from the 1960s to the 1980s and there are many undated items. The collection was donated to Special Collections of the National Agricultural Library in 1985 by Dr. Alvin L. Young (1942- ). Dr. Young developed the collection as he conducted extensive research on the military defoliant Agent Orange. The collection is in good condition and includes letters, memoranda, books, reports, press releases, journal and newspaper clippings, field logs and notebooks, newsletters, maps, booklets and pamphlets, photographs, memorabilia, and audiotapes of an interview with Dr. Young.</p> <p>For more about this collection, <a href="/exhibits/speccoll/exhibits/show/alvin-l--young-collection-on-a">view the Agent Orange Exhibit.</a></p> Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Box The box containing the original item. 015 Folder The folder containing the original item. 0160 Series The series number of the original item. Series II Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource Howard, John D. Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1972-03-01 Title A name given to the resource Herbicides in Support of Counterinsurgency Operations: A Cost-Effectiveness Study Subject The topic of the resource Ranch Hand aircraft herbicide application military impact https://www.nal.usda.gov/exhibits/speccoll/files/original/42cf7c14e91a84772f29cd3f258ff731.pdf fd2cf2b6a328349550d5cf305cdc8e80 PDF Text Text INFO PLAIN McConnell, A.F. 1970 Mission: Ranch Hand T f N t. T I. * O OF An« /;- U,./ UJ CM CM N^ «K I— -X ^ • « O •£> •, CJ o o x ua oooooooool o>»ocxooooooWt » « * * » * * * <y l^J ^fj ^jg gQ 50 tibn11w f PFY JANUARY-FEBRUARY 1970 C H A N G ? IN E A R N t D R t l H B M UOO CFY REIMS UOQ 1ST UOO uno ,«F V' �AIR UNIVERSITY THE P R O F E S S I O N A L review J O U R N A L OF THE UNITED S T A T E S THE AIR STAFF Gen. John C. Meyer, USAF AIR FORCE MANAGEMENT Lt. Gen. Duward L. Crow, USAF MILITARY PROGRAMMING AND BUDGETING PRACTICES D. V. Schnurr •/THE ENVIRONMENT AND FUNCTIONS OF MANAGEMENT ANALYSIS IN THE 1970s Dal Hitchcock INFORMATION PROCESSING STANDARDS FOR COMPUTERS Col. Lucius Theus, USAF ON THE LEVERAGE OF MULTIPLE-PURPOSE WEAPONS Richard H. Anderson Dr. Bruno J. Manz SOME ASPECTS OF AIR FORCE-UNIVERSITY RELATIONS Dr. William J. Price ^HE TIME BARRIER: PSYCHOLOGICAL FRONTIER OF STUDENT ACTIVISM 1st Lt. Charles M. Plummer, USAF Air Force Review SIDE-FIRING WEAPON SYSTEMS Lt. Col. Ross E. Hamlin, USAF MISSION: RANCH HAND Lt. Col. Arthur F. McConnell, Jr., USAF In My Opinion LAUNCH ON WARNING—A COUNTER TO THE ARMS RACE Robert I. Widder Books and Ideas ON HISTORY AND STAFF WORK Dr. I. B. Holley, Jr. MILITARY HISTORY AND THE FIRST GREAT AIR WAR Dr. James J. Hudson THE CONTRIBUTORS Address manuscripts to: Editor, Air Univcrtity Review, Aerospace Studies Institute. Maxwell Air Force Buse, Ala. 36112. Printed by Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. Subscriptions are sold by Air University Book Department, Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala. 36112: yearly $4.50, back issues 75 cents. USAF RECURRING PUBLICATION 50-2. Vol. XXI No. t JANUARY-FEBRUARY 1970 AIR FORCE 2 10 19 . . . . 28 36 46 57 65 76 89 95 101 109 114 the cover With General John C. Meyer's article, "The Air Staff," Air University Review enters a new year and a new decade by beginning a new series of articles about the Air Staff. In this, the first installment, Comptroller of Air Force activities are the center of interest. Subsequent issues will focus on other Air Staff agencies. Review readers will thus be given an up-to-date accounting of some of the important plans and programs coming from the Air Staff. �^MISSION: RANCH HAND LlEUTKNANT COLOVEL AnTHXJK F. McC()NVKLL, Jit. T HE nature and environment of the conflict in South Vietnam have required the U.S. and its allied military forces to revise many traditional strategic and tactical concepts of operations. Without question one of the most difficult and frustrating problems facing these forces is that of actually locating the enemy. The many densely forested areas throughout the country afford the enemy excellent concealment, which permits him to move personnel and supplies rapidly and with impunity to within striking distance of key government centers, lines of communication. Special Forces camps, and other military installations. The use of air-delivered chemical defoliants as a tactical weapon to deny the enemy concealment in forest areas evoked considerable interest in Southeast Asia as early as 1945. British forces operating in Malaya employed this tactic with a fair degree of effectiveness during the late 1940s, with helicopters applying the defoliant along lines of communication. It was not until 195&-59, however, that the United States undertook any largescale defoliation tests. As a result of the tests, several acceptable defoliants and delivery techniques were selected for further consideration. In late 1961 a test program in South Vietnam was approved for the United States Air Force. With the lull concurrence and support of the government of the Republic of Vietnam (CVN) and the Vietnamese Air Force, this project, under the code name RANCH IIAVD, began trial operations in January 1962 with three specially equipped UO-123 aircraft based at Tan Son N'hut Airport. Saigon. The initial unit designation was "Special Aerial Spray Flight." Because of the newness and uniqueness of this weapon sv stern, the volunteer crews assigned to the RANCH IIAVD project designed their own concept of operations and an entire range of tactics and delivery techniques. Constantly innovating and modifying, the crews slowly developed a highly effective defoliant-delivery operation geared to the varied tropical vegetation, foliage, and terrain of Southeast Asia. By June 1962 the crews of the Special Aerial Spray Flight were ready to fly tactical missions, and it was not long before the merits of the delivery sxstem were proven. A notable effort occurred in October 1962. when the crews successfully completed their first largescale defoliation mission on the Can Man Peninsula in the Mekong River delta. This project was personally observed and evaluated by the Chief of the U.S. Army Chemical Corps as "outstanding." Even so, defoliation operations in the following months wen- mostly conducted on a moderate scale. By mid-1964. however, authority had been received to expand project coverage and to establish limited operations from Da Nang Air Base. The program \vas proving its worth, and new target requests were constantly being received. As hostile ground fire became more intense;, the mission became extremely hazardous. The heroic efforts of the early spray crews were not without cost. Since the need to assign fighter aircraft to escort and support the defoliation project had not yet been recognized, the spray aircraft were entirely defenseless. However, despite the considerable number of problems inherent in their mission, the RANCH HAND crews delivered increasing amounts of defoliant on targets from the Demilitarized Zone (n\fz) to the delta. Although RANCH HAND aircraft received heavy automatic-weapons fire from the ground with increasing regularity, it was not until January 1965 that approval was granted to prestrike targets with fighter aircraft and to provide a fighter escort for the spray aircraft. From that point forward, close-in fighter support was a vital part of the defoliation pro- �90 AIR i:\ivF.nsin' gram and made a significant contribution toward minimizing the effect of ground fire against tho defoliation aircraft, although it could not entirely eliminate losses of aircraft and crews. Operations continued to increase during 1965, and tlie Special Aerial Spray Flight successfully completed defoliation of a number of critical target areas. Particularly noteworthy was the unit's work in the Rung Sat Special Zone, a dense mangrove-covered swamp along the main shipping channels into Saigon. Because of the excellent cover afforded by the mangrove swamp, hostile forces operated with near impunity throughout the area and constantly harassed allied shipping into and out of the capital city. In March 1965 Rung Sat was placed on the list of critical targets, and in the following weeks sp. ay crows Hew 42 missions into the area, delivering over 77.000 gallons of defoliant on the target. The results rank as one of the most successful de-foliation projects carried out by RANCH HAND crews, enabling friendly forces to sweep the area and secure the shipping channels against further enemy encroachment. Another \ital target during this period was War Zone D. In spite of hcav\ hostile troop concentration within the target area and almost continuous ground fire, tho spray crews returned again and again until the project was successfully completed. Because of a greatly increased demand for defoliation throughout South Vietnam, the United States and South Vietnamese governments directed that the HANOI HAND program be expanded. On 15 October 1966, the 12th Air Commando Squadron (HA.NCIJ HAND—VILTVAM) became an administrative and operational reality. It was initially equipped with 18 UC-123 spray aircraft, and the crews—all handpicked volunteers—quickly established an outstanding reputation for mission accomplishment throughout South Vietnam. Several important events occurred in the months following establishment of the 12th ACS. including approval to assign OIK; aircraft to Operation Flyswaltor, a program designed to deliver insecticides over various populated areas throughout the country, to control ma- laria mosquitoes and other disease-bearing insects. Using techniques similar to those employed in defoliation, the insecticide crews made an outstanding contribution to the health and welfare of the people of Vietnam. I5y late 1966 the 12th ACS had significantly increased ils defoliation operations and embarked upon another key project: the southern half of the DM/, was approved for targeting. Flying o\er flat terrain and visible to the enemy for many miles throughout the target run. the HAVCII HAND crews courageously defied groat odds to place their defoliant precisely on the briefed targets. As a result of these operations, much of the southern portion of tho DM/, was exposed, and the enemy was denied ready access to his hitherto secure; infiltration and supply routes into South Vietnam. In December 1966, as RANCH HAND crews continued their country-wide defoliation schedule, the 12th ACS moved its operational headquarters to Bien Iloa Air Base, where it remains today. During early 1967 the main areas of activity were War Zones C and D. while Da Nang-based aircraft concentrated on targets along enemy infiltration routes in South Vietnam. One of the highlights of this period was Operation Pink Rose, a jungle-burning project carried out by RANCH HAND crews. They (lew approximately 225 sorties and delivered over a quarter-million gallons of herbicide on selected target areas in War Zones C and D. successfully completing their part ill tho project in April 1967. Target areas throughout the country wen; sprayed during the remainder of 1967, particular emphasis being placed on vital targets in the IV Corps area. This accounted for a significant increase in hits received from ground fire during 1967. since the flat terrain of the delta region allowed enemy gunners to see the spray aircraft coming from miles away. The flexibility of the 12th Air Commando Squadron \\as severely tested in February 196S. in the throes of the Communist Tet offensive 1 . The unit was directed to assume an airlift role under diree;tion of its parent organi/ation. the- 315th Air Commando Wing. The; �A/rt FORCE REVIEW RANCH HAND team stripped the aircraft of all defoliation equipment, including tanks and spray booms, and reported in. "Ready to go." in the amazing time of 24 hours. During the weeks that followed, crews of the 12th flew 2866 productive sorties in the airlift role, with the same professionalism and /.eal which had become the RANCH HAND trademark. After the Tet offensive was blunted, the UC-]23s were restored to their defoliation mission. Again in minimum time, maintenance teams reconfigured the aircraft, and spray operations were quickly resumed. The remainder of 196S reflected a continning increase in the amounts of herbicides dispensed and in the testing of new formations and tactics. So that seasonal weather for spraying priority targets in I Corps might be used to advantage, a significant increase was made in the size of the detachment operating from Da \ang Air Base, and the sortie rate doubled. RANCH HAND crews operating from this forward base flew highly successful defoliation missions against some of the most heavily defended areas in South Vietnam, including the A Shau Valley, Khe Sanh. and as far south as Pleiku. In defiance of the rugged mountain terrain and accurate enemy antiaircraft fire, the defoliation crews frequently went in over these vital targets in order to open them np for aerial observation. The results were always outstanding, as attested to by Army commanders and aerial observers. On 1 August 1968 all units in Southeast Asia with an "Air Commando" designation were renamed "Special Operations," and RANCH HAND became the 12th Special Operations Squadron. Between the date of the first RANCH HAND flight in January 1962 and 1 January 1969, defoliation crews made more than 19,000 combat sorties, all of which were flown under the extremely difficult and hazardous circumstances associated with defoliation work. With rare exceptions, target areas were occupied and/or utilized by unfriendly forces, consisting primarily of hostile base camps and lines of communication. In this hostile low-level environment the RANCH HANDS received more than 3500 hits 91 from all types of enemy ground fire. Yet, without hesitation, with complete disregard for personal safety, and in outstanding displays of courage and determination, combat crews daily flew their four-minute target runs—the "run of terror"—arid laid the defoliant with near-perfect precision. The enemy has testified to the effectiveness of HA NCI r HAND operations. A Viet Cong prisoner of war observed that after a base area had been sprayed the camp would be moved. Kach man would pick up his hammock and backpack and walk about three hours to a new camp site. Another i>ow stated that defoliated areas hampered the vc in moving and stationing troops. These areas had to be avoided for nearly a year before they could be reused. When it was necessary to cross a defoliated area en route to an objective, the vc waited for nightfall or crossed singly—either course of action delaying the movement. When it was necessary to cross small defoliated areas, they crossed in daylight, provided the unit could assure itself that no aircraft were in the vicinity. With regard to the defoliation along GVN lines of communication, the vc published orders making the removal of brush and trees along roads and waterways a punishable offense: they used the cover for hiding places from which to spring ambushes. Our defoliation and subsequent removal of vegetation along such lines were therefore a prudent exercise. ^—,„.., ....... —•- "*Trp 'Defihite""a3vantages accrued from the de- 4/ foliation program, particularly along the lines of communication in South Vietnam. In one instance, no ambushes or hostile incidents occurred after defoliation. In another, there were only eleven in a four-month period. In a third, the number of incidents decreased from six in four months to four in six months. During this same period, the amount of traffic along the roads remained constant or increased. Thus defoliation resulted in a dramatic decrease in the incident rate, and the potential for ambush was greatly reduced. Defoliation along one river caused the vc to evacuate their sheltered positions there. Along another river, defoliation caused at least three Continued on page 94 �Defoliation Operations The boundaries of a defoliation objective must be carefully observed, to ensure maximum concentration of the herbicide on Viet Cong areas. The formation leader and following aircraft keep lateral distance so as to cover the proper swath. . . . The Hayes AA-45 internal defoliant system . . . A C-123 modified for defoliation operations . . . Spray as seen from the tail. ��94 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIKW ainbush attempts to fail in a region when; / they had regularly succeeded. There was a vivid improvement in the ability to find enemy routes of travel, bunkers, structures, and defenses after the foliage cover had been removed. Ground commanders reported increased visibility from 40 to 60 percent, while forward air controllers reported improved aerial visibility from 70 to 90 percent. ~1 War Zones C and D were heavily defoliated. Prior to defoliation, seven brigades wen; necessary to maintain U.S./GVN presence in War Zone C; after defoliation, only three were required. In War Zone D, only one brigade was necessary after defoliation. In one instance plans called for a 22s-division effort to be conducted. Defoliation made this operation unnecessary. These examples emphasized the value of the defoliation operations and underlined the need for continuation of the program. IN SUMMARY, the defoliation program did what it was intended to do. Viet Cong routes of movement were revealed, and their hiding places were eliminated. They were forced to divert resources to noncombatant tasks—moving base camps, waiting for hours of darkness, etc. The number of our trucks and troops lost in ambushes decreased because of defoliation operations. The unique role played by RANCH HAND in Southeast Asia bred an esprit de corps among its members that became respected throughout the area of operations. Taking immense pride in their mission, their aircraft, and their purple scarves, RANCH HAND crews displayed gallantry and courage of the highest order. With full knowledge of the importance of their work, as well as its hazardous nature, they continued on countless target runs while receiving intense and accurate hostile ground fire. They significantly increased the ability of aerial observers to monitor the movements of hostile forces and to direct fighter-bomber strikes against them. More important, they provided allied ground forces with protection against sneak attack by depriving enemy troops of valuable ambush positions, resulting in many allied lives saved. In totality, they enhanced the combat effectiveness of allied air and ground forces fighting in Vietnam. The obvious corollary to a successful air mission is a reliable ground operation. The dedication of the maintenance crews of the 12th Special Operations Squadron in preparing the aircraft for flight, in continually repairing battle-damaged aircraft, and returning them to operational status in minimum time is equally responsible for the success enjoyed by the RANCH HAND mission. The 12th has written a new page in the history of aerial warfare. Ent Air Force Basv, Colorado � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Alvin L. Young Collection on Agent Orange Description An account of the resource <p style="margin-top: -1em; line-height: 1.2em;">The Alvin L. Young Collection on Agent Orange comprises 120 linear feet and spans the late 1800s to 2005; however, the bulk of the coverage is from the 1960s to the 1980s and there are many undated items. The collection was donated to Special Collections of the National Agricultural Library in 1985 by Dr. Alvin L. Young (1942- ). Dr. Young developed the collection as he conducted extensive research on the military defoliant Agent Orange. The collection is in good condition and includes letters, memoranda, books, reports, press releases, journal and newspaper clippings, field logs and notebooks, newsletters, maps, booklets and pamphlets, photographs, memorabilia, and audiotapes of an interview with Dr. Young.</p> <p>For more about this collection, <a href="/exhibits/speccoll/exhibits/show/alvin-l--young-collection-on-a">view the Agent Orange Exhibit.</a></p> Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Box The box containing the original item. 015 Folder The folder containing the original item. 0159 Series The series number of the original item. Series II Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource McConnell, Arthur F., Jr. Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived Air University Review Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource January-February 1970 Title A name given to the resource Mission: Ranch Hand Subject The topic of the resource Ranch Hand aircraft military impact https://www.nal.usda.gov/exhibits/speccoll/files/original/763d7385a239da434b818aea88c15f80.pdf 27b1afeb665c87f569c2dfad609f4e65 PDF Text Text Item ID Number 00158 Author Corporate Author RBpOrt/ArtlGiB TltlO Typescript: Department of Defense Reports Referenced in National Academy of Science Reports Journal/Book Title Year Month/Day Color Number of Images n 2 Doscripton Notes Monday, February 26, 2001 Page 158 of 768 �Department of Defense Reports Referenced in National Academy of Sciences Reports: 1. Herbicides and Military Operations Volume I, Mam Paper - (AD. 893214 - $3.75) Volume II, - (AD 893215 -.$9.00) V 2. An Evaluation of Chemical Crop Destruction in Vietnam, Betts arid Denton, (AD-779 790, $5.25) « 3. A Statistical Analysis of the US Crop Spraying Program in South Vietnam, Russo (AD-779 791, $5.25) ' 4. Research and Analysis Study ST67-003, Evaluation of Herbicide Operations in RVN (AD-779 792, $4.75) 5. Directive Number 525--1, Military Operations, Herbicide Operations (AD-779 793, $4. 00) 6. Report on the Herbicide Policy Review, 28 August 1968 (AD-779 794, $10. 00) 7. Evaluation of Herbicide Operations in the Republic of Vietnam, September 1962 - September 1963. (Declassified from SECRET) (AD-779 795, $5.75) 8. Project CHE CO Southeast Asia Report. Herbicide Operations in Southeast Asia. July 1961 - June 1967. October 11, 1967 (Declassified from. SECRET) (AD-779 796, $8. 00) 9. A Review of the Herbicide Program in South Vietnam, William F. Warren, Scientific Advisory Group, Working Paper No. 10-68, CINCPAC, August 1968. (Declassified from CONFIDENTIAL) Less Appendices A and C. (AD-779 797, $6. 50) ^j Crop Destruction Operations in RVN during CY 1967. Warren, Henry and Johnson. CINCPAC Scientific .Advisory Group, Working Paper No. 20-67, CINCPAC, December 23,- 1967. (Declassified from SECRET) Less Appendices A and C and noted deletions. (AD-779 798, $5. 25) P4- �14. Perceived Effects of Herbicides Used in the Highlands of South Vietnam (AD-779 027, $3.00) 15. The Location of Herbicide Missions and Hickcy's Informants in South Vietnam: An Appraisal (AD-779 0-28, $3, 00) 16. Studies of the Inland Forests of South Vietnam and the Effects of Herbicides Upon Those Forests (AD-,779 028, $3.00) 17. Beliefs, Attitudes, and Behavior of Lowland Vietnamese (AD-779 030, $6.75) 18. Models of Herbicide, Mangroves, and War in Vietnam (AD-779 031, $7.25) 19. Air-Photo Inventory of the Rung-Sat (AD-779 032 $3. 00) � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Alvin L. Young Collection on Agent Orange Description An account of the resource <p style="margin-top: -1em; line-height: 1.2em;">The Alvin L. Young Collection on Agent Orange comprises 120 linear feet and spans the late 1800s to 2005; however, the bulk of the coverage is from the 1960s to the 1980s and there are many undated items. The collection was donated to Special Collections of the National Agricultural Library in 1985 by Dr. Alvin L. Young (1942- ). Dr. Young developed the collection as he conducted extensive research on the military defoliant Agent Orange. The collection is in good condition and includes letters, memoranda, books, reports, press releases, journal and newspaper clippings, field logs and notebooks, newsletters, maps, booklets and pamphlets, photographs, memorabilia, and audiotapes of an interview with Dr. Young.</p> <p>For more about this collection, <a href="/exhibits/speccoll/exhibits/show/alvin-l--young-collection-on-a">view the Agent Orange Exhibit.</a></p> Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Box The box containing the original item. 015 Folder The folder containing the original item. 0158 Series The series number of the original item. Series II Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Typescript: Department of Defense Reports Referenced in National Academy of Science Reports Subject The topic of the resource Project CHECO Ranch Hand military impact bibliographies Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Alvin L. Young Collection on Agent Orange Description An account of the resource <p style="margin-top: -1em; line-height: 1.2em;">The Alvin L. Young Collection on Agent Orange comprises 120 linear feet and spans the late 1800s to 2005; however, the bulk of the coverage is from the 1960s to the 1980s and there are many undated items. The collection was donated to Special Collections of the National Agricultural Library in 1985 by Dr. Alvin L. Young (1942- ). Dr. Young developed the collection as he conducted extensive research on the military defoliant Agent Orange. The collection is in good condition and includes letters, memoranda, books, reports, press releases, journal and newspaper clippings, field logs and notebooks, newsletters, maps, booklets and pamphlets, photographs, memorabilia, and audiotapes of an interview with Dr. Young.</p> <p>For more about this collection, <a href="/exhibits/speccoll/exhibits/show/alvin-l--young-collection-on-a">view the Agent Orange Exhibit.</a></p> Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Box The box containing the original item. 014 Folder The folder containing the original item. 0151 Series The series number of the original item. Series II Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Description An account of the resource <strong>Corporate Author: </strong>Rand Corporation Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1972-03-01 Title A name given to the resource Studies of the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam Subject The topic of the resource Ranch Hand military impact civilian impact ecological impact Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Alvin L. Young Collection on Agent Orange Description An account of the resource <p style="margin-top: -1em; line-height: 1.2em;">The Alvin L. Young Collection on Agent Orange comprises 120 linear feet and spans the late 1800s to 2005; however, the bulk of the coverage is from the 1960s to the 1980s and there are many undated items. The collection was donated to Special Collections of the National Agricultural Library in 1985 by Dr. Alvin L. Young (1942- ). Dr. Young developed the collection as he conducted extensive research on the military defoliant Agent Orange. The collection is in good condition and includes letters, memoranda, books, reports, press releases, journal and newspaper clippings, field logs and notebooks, newsletters, maps, booklets and pamphlets, photographs, memorabilia, and audiotapes of an interview with Dr. Young.</p> <p>For more about this collection, <a href="/exhibits/speccoll/exhibits/show/alvin-l--young-collection-on-a">view the Agent Orange Exhibit.</a></p> Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Box The box containing the original item. 014 Folder The folder containing the original item. 0150 Series The series number of the original item. Series II Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Description An account of the resource <strong>Corporate Author: </strong>Rand Corporation Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1972-03-01 Title A name given to the resource Studies of the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam Subject The topic of the resource Ranch Hand military impact civilian impact ecological impact Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Alvin L. Young Collection on Agent Orange Description An account of the resource <p style="margin-top: -1em; line-height: 1.2em;">The Alvin L. Young Collection on Agent Orange comprises 120 linear feet and spans the late 1800s to 2005; however, the bulk of the coverage is from the 1960s to the 1980s and there are many undated items. The collection was donated to Special Collections of the National Agricultural Library in 1985 by Dr. Alvin L. Young (1942- ). Dr. Young developed the collection as he conducted extensive research on the military defoliant Agent Orange. The collection is in good condition and includes letters, memoranda, books, reports, press releases, journal and newspaper clippings, field logs and notebooks, newsletters, maps, booklets and pamphlets, photographs, memorabilia, and audiotapes of an interview with Dr. Young.</p> <p>For more about this collection, <a href="/exhibits/speccoll/exhibits/show/alvin-l--young-collection-on-a">view the Agent Orange Exhibit.</a></p> Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Box The box containing the original item. 014 Folder The folder containing the original item. 0149 Series The series number of the original item. Series II Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Description An account of the resource <strong>Corporate Author: </strong>Rand Corporation Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1972-03-01 Title A name given to the resource Studies of the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam Subject The topic of the resource Ranch Hand military impact civilian impact ecological impact Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Alvin L. Young Collection on Agent Orange Description An account of the resource <p style="margin-top: -1em; line-height: 1.2em;">The Alvin L. Young Collection on Agent Orange comprises 120 linear feet and spans the late 1800s to 2005; however, the bulk of the coverage is from the 1960s to the 1980s and there are many undated items. The collection was donated to Special Collections of the National Agricultural Library in 1985 by Dr. Alvin L. Young (1942- ). Dr. Young developed the collection as he conducted extensive research on the military defoliant Agent Orange. The collection is in good condition and includes letters, memoranda, books, reports, press releases, journal and newspaper clippings, field logs and notebooks, newsletters, maps, booklets and pamphlets, photographs, memorabilia, and audiotapes of an interview with Dr. Young.</p> <p>For more about this collection, <a href="/exhibits/speccoll/exhibits/show/alvin-l--young-collection-on-a">view the Agent Orange Exhibit.</a></p> Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Box The box containing the original item. 014 Folder The folder containing the original item. 0148 Series The series number of the original item. Series II Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Description An account of the resource <strong>Corporate Author: </strong>Rand Corporation Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1972-03-01 Title A name given to the resource Studies of the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam Subject The topic of the resource Ranch Hand military impact civilian impact ecological impact